Godwin v. Wellstar Health Systems, Inc.

Filing 76

OPINION AND ORDER that Plaintiff Mary Godwin's Motion in Limine 70 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED, and Defendant is precluded from making any statements relating to the claims dismissed at the summar y judgment stage of this action. Defendant also is precluded from presenting Linda Durham, Paula Arnett, and Phil Phillips as trial witnesses. Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED regarding Linda Durham, Paula Arnett, and Phil Phillips's personne l documents, subject to Plaintiff's objection to admission of the documents if Defendant seeks to introduce them at trial. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Wellstar Health Systems,Inc.s Motion in Limine 71 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.Defendants Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff is precluded from presenting:(1) the E-mails and Awards; (2) evidence that Plaintiff suffered emotional injury,pain and suffering, or mental anguish as a result of Defendants alleged conduct; and (3) evidence that insurance proceeds were not available under a policy on Plaintiff's spouse's life. With respect to Defendant's Motion to exclude "me too evidence," Defendants Motion is GRANTED to the extent Plaintiff seeks to i ntroduce testimony about a witness's views and beliefs regarding the reasons for the witness's own termination. Defendant's Motion is DENIED to the extent Plaintiff seeks to introduce specific "me too" evidence and testimony that may show Brown's discriminatory animus. With respect to Defendant's Motion to exclude evidence of Brown's alleged fabrication of disciplinary forms and thatTrupiano knew of Plaintiff's age discrimination complaints to HR, Defendant's motion is DENIED. To the extent Defendant seeks to exclude evidence of claims dismissed on Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Defendant's motion is GRANTED. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 11/18/2015. (anc)

Plaintiff’s claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).
Trial is set for February 29, 2016. (November 12, 2015, Order).
On September 28, 2015, the Parties filed their respective motions in limine.
Plaintiff moves in limine: (1) to prohibit Defendant from making any statements,
directly or indirectly, relating to the claims dismissed at the summary judgment
stage of this action; and (2) to strike Linda Durham, Paula Arnett, and Phil Phillips
from Defendant’s trial witness list under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c), because Defendant
failed to timely disclose these individuals as people having knowledge of
information relating to the issues in this case.
Defendant moves in limine to exclude: (1) e-mails and awards praising
Plaintiff on the ground that the e-mails and awards are hearsay, irrelevant, and
more prejudicial than probative; (2) “me too” evidence that other current or former
employees believed that Cherise Brown (“Brown”), the alleged discriminator in the
case, also discriminated against them because of their age; (3) evidence or
argument regarding claims that have been dismissed by the Court; (4) evidence
that Plaintiff suffered emotional injury, pain and suffering, or mental anguish as a
result of Defendant’s alleged conduct; and (5) stray remarks allegedly made by
Brown that she wanted to put some people “out to pasture.”
2

II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Plaintiff’s Motion
1.

Claims Dismissed on Summary Judgment

Plaintiff seeks to prohibit Defendant from making statements relating to the
claims dismissed on summary judgment. She argues that “[a]llowing such
statements could cause the jury to infer that, having lost all of her claims but one,
her remaining age discrimination claim is questionable.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 3). She
argues these statements should be excluded as irrelevant and inadmissible under
Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and that, even if the Court
finds the statements are relevant, they should be excluded as prejudicial under Rule
403. Defendant does not object to the motion to preclude references to dismissed
claims, and the motion is granted on this ground. See McGinnis v. Am. Home
Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 5:11-cv-284 (CAR) 2013 WL 3964916, at *2 (M.D. Ga.
July 31, 2013) (granting motion in limine “to the extent that such evidence is
proffered in support of . . . dismissed claims”).
2.

Untimely Disclosure of Trial Witnesses

Plaintiff seeks to exclude witnesses and documents she claims Defendant
did not timely disclose or produce during discovery. Plaintiff claims that Linda
3

Durham, Paula Arnett, and Phil Phillips (together, the “Witnesses”), whom
Defendant identifies as trial witnesses, were not disclosed in Defendant’s Initial or
Amended Disclosures. (Pl.’s Mot. at 6). Plaintiff also claims that the Witnesses
were not identified in response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 5. Plaintiff seeks to
preclude their testimony at trial.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides: “if a party fails to provide
information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) and (e), the party is not
allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence . . . at a trial, unless
the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
“The burden of establishing that a failure to disclose was substantially justified or
harmless rests on the nondisclosing party.” Mitchell v. Ford Motor Co., 318 F.
App’x 821, 824 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Leathers v. Pfizer, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 687,
697 (N.D. Ga. 2006)). In determining whether a witness is properly excluded
based on a failure to disclose, the Eleventh Circuit considers: “(1) the importance
of the testimony; (2) the reason for the appellant’s failure to disclose the witness
earlier; and (3) the prejudice to the opposing party if the witness had been allowed
to testify.” Bearint ex rel. Bearint v. Dorell Juvenile Grp., Inc., 389 F.3d 1339,
1353 (11th Cir. 2004).
4

Defendant admits that it was required to identify the Witnesses in its Initial
Disclosures or Discovery Responses, but claims the failure to disclose was
harmless. (Def.’s Resp. [72] at 2-3). Defendant argues that the Witnesses were
repeatedly referenced in documents produced by both Parties, and these documents
are intended to be used by the parties at trial. (Id. at 3). Defendant notes that the
Witnesses were referenced at depositions, including by Plaintiff’s counsel, and the
documents and deposition testimony show Plaintiff knew that the Witnesses had
relevant information about the case. (See id. at 3-4). Defendant notes also that
Plaintiff identified Ms. Arnett and Ms. Durham as comparators. Finally,
Defendant argues Plaintiff has identified three “may call” witnesses she did not
previously disclose. (Id. at 7).2
Defendant has failed to meet its burden to show its failure to disclose was
harmless. Document production and deposition testimony show, at most, that
Plaintiff was aware of the Witnesses. The rules requiring disclosure—which
require identification and information about them—exist to avoid forcing parties
into guessing games, and so the parties have the opportunity to conduct meaningful

2

To the extent Plaintiff failed to disclose and identify witnesses, the analysis
in this section of the Order also applies.
5

discovery, including by deposing potential witnesses. See Nance v. Ricoh
Electronics, Inc., 1:06-cv-2396-RWS, 2008 WL 926662, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 4,
2008) (finding that a plaintiff’s non-compliance with Rule 26(a) was not harmless
because defendant did not have the opportunity to depose the witnesses); see also
Ross v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1344 (M.D. Ga. 2007)
(holding that party’s failure to identify witnesses during discovery not harmless
because opposing party “has not had the chance to refute the alleged facts” attested
to by those witnesses).3 A party’s identification of a person as knowledgeable
about the facts in a case has unique import, allowing the parties to focus on those
an opposing party and their counsel specifically identify in initial disclosures and
interrogatories. Failure to identify people with facts about a case results in
procedural and legal prejudice. This prejudice is made particularly apparent by
Defendant’s failure to update its response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 5, which
required identification of and specification about those knowledgeable about the

3

Defendant’s argument that its failure is harmless because “there is no reason
to believe that Plaintiff would have deposed” the Witnesses, (Def.’s Resp. at 7), is
unavailing. Plaintiff very well may have deposed the Witnesses had they been
timely disclosed by Defendant and had Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s
Interrogatory No. 5, informing Plaintiff of the knowledge the Witnesses possessed.
6

facts in the case. (Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A).4 Plaintiff’s motion to exclude Linda
Durham, Paula Arnett, and Phil Phillips from presenting testimony at trial is
granted.5
B.

Defendant’s Motion
1.

E-Mails or Awards Praising Plaintiff

Defendant moves to exclude any e-mails or awards “praising” Plaintiff (the
“E-mails and Awards”). (Def.’s Mot. at 2-3). Defendant argues the E-mails and
Awards are inadmissible as hearsay, and, even if they are not, they are irrelevant
because there is no evidence the relevant decisionmakers were aware of the
4

Defendant concedes the Witnesses will “provide testimony similar
to . . . disclosed witnesses.” (Def.’s Resp. at 2). Defendant has disclosed sixteen
witnesses. The Witnesses’ testimony therefore does not appear to be critical, and
likely will be cumulative. This weighs in favor of exclusion. See Bearint, 389
F.3d at 1353 (holding that the importance of the testimony is one factor to consider
in finding a failure to disclose justified or harmless); see also Roberts v. Scott
Fetzer Co., No. 4:07-cv-80 (CDL), 2010 WL 3546499, at *9 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 7,
2010) (excluding testimony where importance of witness was outweighed by lack
of justification for failure to disclose and the resulting harm to plaintiff).
5
Plaintiff also seeks to exclude the personnel files for the Witnesses. The
files were produced because Document Request No. 12 required the production of
all personnel documents of employees identified as witnesses in the pretrial order.
(Def.’s Resp. at 8-9). It is unclear whether the personnel files were required to be
produced pursuant to a request for the production of documents served during
discovery. Ultimately, the Court does not know if these personnel records will be
introduced at trial now that the Witnesses are excluded. If the records are
introduced, Plaintiff may object to their admission
7

E-Mails and Awards, and the information in the E-mails or the fact of an Award is
unrelated to the reasons Plaintiff was terminated. (Id. at 6).
“Hearsay is ‘a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.’” United States v. Perl, 492 F. App’x 37, 40 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)). The E-Mails and Awards are hearsay, and do not fall under
any exception.6 Plaintiff claims that the E-Mails and Awards are not being offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but argues they should be “allowed
to . . . rebut Defendant’s defenses.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 4). If offered to rebut
Defendant’s defenses, they necessarily are offered for the truth of the matter they
assert. Plaintiff apparently seeks to introduce the E-Mails and Awards to show
Plaintiff’s “good performance,” to contradict Defendant’s criticism of her

6

Plaintiff claims that “[s]everal of the e-mails are admissions of an
opponent,” and therefore fall under a hearsay exception. (Pl.’s Resp. at 3).
Plaintiff, however, only identifies a single document as falling under the opponent
admission exception. Defendant states this document was mistakenly included in
Defendant’s exhibit of documents to exclude, and that Defendant does not move to
exclude this document. (Def.’s Reply [74] at 2 n.1).
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performance. Considering the reason Plaintiff appears to introduce the E-mails
and Awards, the Court finds they are hearsay and thus are required to be excluded.7
Plaintiff identifies three E-Mails, Plaintiff’s Exhibits 12, 25 and 27, she
seeks to introduce. These e-mails identify relevant decisionmakers as addressees
or copy addressees. Plaintiff argues these documents are not hearsay because trial
witnesses can lay an evidentiary foundation for admission.
The Court has reviewed these three e-mails, assuming Plaintiff could
provide a sufficient authentication of these documents and could overcome their
exclusion under Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Exhibit 12 is a 2010
e-mail from Katherine Hodges to Plaintiff, copying Brown. In it, Hodges thanks
Plaintiff “for taking the initiative today to get that price change done for me.”
(Def.’s Mot., Ex. A at 3). The “initiative” appears to be providing specific price
change information to the e-mail author, and in doing so helped provide the
information requested, even though that task was the responsibility of some other
employee. Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s
termination is that Plaintiff continuously made errors in purchase orders.
7

It is possible the Emails and Awards may rebut other evidence introduced at
trial. If Plaintiff believes trial evidence allows this evidence, she may request, out
of the presence of the jury, the Court to consider their admission.
9

Exhibit 12 is unrelated to Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
Plaintiff’s termination, and that she helped on a discrete unrelated task is irrelevant
to the issues to be tried.
Exhibit 25 is a 2011 e-mail from Plaintiff to Gail Sikora, and Sikora’s reply
to Plaintiff which also includes Brown and two other individuals as recipients. In
it, Sikora states “Thank you all for your efforts in this . . . We work hard to manage
our inventory and not to have emergency requests for PO’s.” (Def.’s Mot., Ex. A
at 20). The “effort” mentioned in the e-mail is unspecified, but appears to be
isolated to some discrete requests for information to which Plaintiff promptly
responded. This e-mail refers to a discrete task on a special request for some
information necessitated by Defendant’s use of a new system. While the “PO”
reference presumably refers to purchase orders, it appears to show Sikora handling
the purchase orders, not Plaintiff. Exhibit 25 is not relevant to the issues in this
case, including to rebut the grounds for Plaintiff’s termination.
Exhibit 27 is a 2011 e-mail conversation involving Plaintiff and Laura
Chollet, among others. (Def.’s Mot., Ex. A at 24-26). In it, Chollet tells Brown
and others that she “acknowledge[s] the outstanding service we received from
Mary Godwin yesterday . . . regarding a last minute request for vendor approval.”
10

(Id.). This e-mail references Plaintiff’s effort to provide some information to a
potential vendor. This e-mail does not sufficiently relate, if it does at all, to
Plaintiff’s performance with respect to purchase orders.
The three e-mails, over a three-year period of time, do not relate to the
conduct for which Plaintiff was allegedly discharged and do not otherwise rebut
the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons upon which Defendant took its
employment action that is the basis of this case. The e-mails, thus, are not, under
Federal Rule of Evidence 401, relevant to the issues to be tried.8 Defendant’s
Motion to exclude the E-mails and Awards is granted.9
2.

“Me Too” Evidence and Cherise Brown’s “Out to Pasture”
Comment
a.

“Me Too” Evidence

Defendant next seeks to exclude evidence that other employees of Defendant
believe that Brown discriminated against them because of age (“me too” evidence),
including the testimony of David Wells, a former employee of Defendant.

8

Even if the E-mails and Awards were relevant, their probative value is
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or the
possibility of misleading the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
9
The Court’s ruling extends to those documents identified in the table on
page 5 of Defendant’s Motion.
11

Defendant concedes the Eleventh Circuit has upheld the admission of “me
too” evidence in other cases, under the facts in those actions. Defendant argues
courts regularly prohibit “me too” evidence from employees who claim they also
were discriminated against, because such evidence is highly prejudicial and only
slightly relevant. (Def.’s Mot. at 10 (citing cases)). Defendant argues that “me
too” evidence in this case would confuse issues for the jury because Defendant
would be forced to engage in mini-trials with respect to other employees’ alleged
claims.
“The Supreme Court has held that wide evidentiary latitude must be granted
to those attempting to prove discriminatory intent and that ‘the trier of fact should
consider all the evidence.’” Demers v. Adams Homes of Nw Fla., Inc., 321 F.
App’x 847, 853 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
714 n.3 (1983)). In Demers, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged its prior decisions
approving the use of “me too” evidence in discrimination cases, particularly where
the evidence is used to demonstrate the discriminatory intent of a common
decisionmaker. Id. at 854 (citing Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d
1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008)). “Even when ‘me too’ evidence is relevant under
Rule 401, the district court retains the discretion to exclude that evidence, under
12

Rule 403, if it is unduly prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or cumulative.” Adams
v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014).
The witness testimony and evidence Defendant seeks to exclude are offered
by Plaintiff to show discriminatory animus by Brown, the person who
recommended Plaintiff’s termination. (See Pl.’s Resp. at 7). Some of the
evidence, however, consists of witnesses’ statements of their belief that they too
suffered discrimination. The admission of this kind of speculative evidence would
effectively require a mini-trial to litigate whether the witnesses were, in fact,
“discriminated” against. Litigation to determine whether discrimination occurred
would be unduly prejudicial, confusing or misleading to the jury, and of limited
probative value regarding whether plaintiff suffered discrimination.
In King v. Volunteers of Am., N. Ala., Inc., 614 F. App’x 449, 455-56 (11th
Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit upheld a district court’s decision to permit witness
testimony that a decisionmaker asked the witness to write a false statement about
plaintiff, and to exclude testimony of the witness’s own discrimination lawsuit
against the employer. The Court finds this approach instructive because it
distinguishes between factual information that may be probative of a defendant’s
reason for an employment decision from a witness’s belief of the effect of such
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conduct on the witness. This distinction is sound. Accordingly, Plaintiff is
excluded from introducing testimony about a witness’s views and beliefs regarding
the reasons for the witness’s own termination. Plaintiff is permitted to introduce
concrete “me too” evidence to the extent it shows Brown’s conduct toward or
comments directed at others provided Plaintiff can establish such conduct or
comments is evidence of alleged discriminatory animus. The “out to pasture”
comment discussed below is an example of the type of testimony permitted.
b. “Out to Pasture” Comment
Defendant seeks to exclude evidence that Brown allegedly told Wells that
some people are going to be put “out to pasture.” (Def.’s Mot. at 14). Mr. Wells
testified as follows:
A:
[…] [Brown] made a comment to the extent of some people are
going to be put out of the pasture. And I thought, wow, okay.
Q:
Who did you understand she made the put-out-to-pasture
comment about?
A:
I think it had—from my perspective, it had to do with those of
us, the older individuals, that really didn’t have the computer savvy or
the computer skills to do the things she wanted done from a computer
standpoint.
Q:
Was Mr. Reed included in that?
A:
Absolutely.
Q:
Was Ms. Godwin?
A.
Yes.
(Wells Dep. [36] at 58:10-59:1).
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Defendant claims that the comment is not relevant to the issues in this
lawsuit because it is a stray comment, and that, “even under Wells’s interpretation,
the comment was not intended to indicate an animus against all older individuals—
just those without computer skills. As such, it is not indicat[ive] of age
discrimination, but rather discrimination against those without the necessary
computer skills needed for the job.” (Id. at 15). Plaintiff notes Wells also
attributed the following statements to Brown and her animus to older workers:
“It’s a shame we’ve got so many people in our department deficient in their ability
to work on computers,” (Wells Dep. at 79); “I want people who can hit the ground
running,” (id. at 96-97); and “At your age, I would think that you know how to do
this,” (id. at 98).
The “out to pasture” comment could be construed as evidencing
discriminatory animus against older workers or, as Defendant contends, animus
against those without computer skills—a skill that may be associated with older
people. A jury is required to make that determination. The Court denies
Defendant’s Motion to exclude evidence that Brown stated some people are going
to be put “out to pasture.”

15

3.

Claims Dismissed on Summary Judgment

Defendant moves to exclude evidence (1) that Brown, on two occasions,
manufactured fictitious WellStar forms to recommend Plaintiff’s termination; and
(2) that when Trupiano approved Brown’s recommendation to terminate Plaintiff,
he was aware Plaintiff previously had complained to HR about age discrimination,
and that HR was investigating Plaintiff’s age discrimination complaint against
Brown. Plaintiff argues that the evidence Defendant seeks to exclude “should not
be excluded merely because it also supported Plaintiff’s dismissed claims.” (Pl.’s
Resp. [73] at 9). 10
Rule 401 provides that evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R.
Evid. 401. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 bars the admission of irrelevant
evidence. Rule 403 allows a court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
10

To the extent Plaintiff moved to exclude evidence of Plaintiff’s dismissed
claims, her motion did not apply to evidence that is relevant to Plaintiff’s age
discrimination claim.
16

time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Courts
have excluded evidence of dismissed claims when a case is tried on the remaining
claims. See, e.g., Andazola v. Logan’s Roadhouse, Inc., No. CV-10-S-316-NW,
2013 WL 1834308, at*8 (N.D. ala. Apr. 29, 2013); McGinnis, 2013 WL 3964916,
at *1-2.
The evidence Defendant seeks to exclude could be relevant to Plaintiff’s age
discrimination claim. Defendant argues that Alverio v. Sam’s Warehouse Club,
Inc., 253 F.3d 933, 943 (7th Cir. 2001) supports that allowing retaliation evidence
would confuse the jury and thus should be excluded. (Def.’s Mot. at 13). The
retaliation at issue in Alverio, however, was “based on a different set of . . . facts”
that were unrelated to the remaining sexual harassment claim. Here, Brown’s
fabrication of disciplinary forms recommending Plaintiff’s termination may be
evidence of Brown’s intent in seeking to terminate Plaintiff, and that Trupiano
knew at the time he approved Brown’s recommendation that Plaintiff had
complained to HR about age discrimination may be relevant to whether Brown’s
discriminatory animus, if there was one, is imputed to Trupiano. Defendant’s
motion is denied on this ground. See McGinnis, 2013 WL 3964916, at *2
(denying motion in limine to exclude evidence that supported dismissed claims
17

because the evidence could also support remaining claim and was more probative
than prejudicial)
4.

Emotional Damages

Defendant seeks to exclude evidence regarding Plaintiff’s emotional
damages in this case. The Parties agree that Plaintiff is not entitled to emotional
distress damages under the ADEA. Plaintiff claims that “evidence of events that
caused her emotional injury and mental anguish will not be used to establish
non-recoverable compensatory damages, but rather will be used to support her
credibility and economic damages which she is entitled to under the ADEA.”
(Pl.’s Resp. at 12). Evidence that Plaintiff suffered from depression and that she
lost her home as a result of termination, however, bolster sympathy for her rather
than her credibility. Plaintiff’s emotional injury, pain and suffering or mental
anguish is irrelevant to any recoverable damages, and, even if it were relevant—
which it is not—it is required to be excluded as more prejudicial than probative
and confusing and misleading to the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403.
Plaintiff also states that she intends to show evidence that, when she was
terminated, she was no longer able to purchase life insurance for her husband. As
a result, she lost her life insurance benefits when he passed away after her
18

termination. (Pl.’s Resp. at 12). The proceeds of her husband’s life insurance
policy are not recoverable under the ADEA. To the extent loss of insurance
coverage is a basis for damages, the measure of damages is the amount paid in
premiums on Plaintiff’s behalf, or the amount paid to obtain comparable insurance.
See Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 965 (4th Cir. 1985) (in ADEA
case, holding that “insurance coverage, not the proceeds, is the benefit for which
the employer must be held liable”); EEOC v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735, 744 (8th
Cir. 2006) (in Title VII case, holding the same). The Court excludes evidence of
insurance proceeds upon Plaintiff’s husband’s death as irrelevant under Rule 401.
The Court finds that, even if relevant, this evidence is substantially prejudicial and
would be misleading to the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403.11
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Mary Godwin’s Motion in

Limine [70] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s Motion
is GRANTED, and Defendant is precluded from making any statements relating to
11

The Court cautions Plaintiff not to present evidence that she had coverage on
her husband, lost coverage on her husband and that her husband died. That
Plaintiff’s husband is deceased is unlikely to be relevant to this action.
19

the claims dismissed at the summary judgment stage of this action. Defendant also
is precluded from presenting Linda Durham, Paula Arnett, and Phil Phillips as trial
witnesses. Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED regarding Linda Durham, Paula Arnett,
and Phil Phillips’s personnel documents, subject to Plaintiff’s objection to
admission of the documents if Defendant seeks to introduce them at trial.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Wellstar Health Systems,
Inc.’s Motion in Limine [71] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff is precluded from presenting:
(1) the E-mails and Awards; (2) evidence that Plaintiff suffered emotional injury,
pain and suffering, or mental anguish as a result of Defendant’s alleged conduct;
and (3) evidence that insurance proceeds were not available under a policy on
Plaintiff’s spouse’s life. With respect to Defendant’s Motion to exclude “me too
evidence,” Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED to the extent Plaintiff seeks to
introduce testimony about a witness’s views and beliefs regarding the reasons for
the witness’s own termination. Defendant’s Motion is DENIED to the extent
Plaintiff seeks to introduce specific “me too” evidence and testimony that may
show Brown’s discriminatory animus. With respect to Defendant’s Motion to
exclude evidence of Brown’s alleged fabrication of disciplinary forms and that
20

Trupiano knew of Plaintiff’s age discrimination complaints to HR, Defendant’s
motion is DENIED. To the extent Defendant seeks to exclude evidence of claims
dismissed on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Defendant’s motion is
GRANTED.

SO ORDERED this 18th day of November, 2015.

_______________________________
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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