Matthew Focht Enterprises, Inc. v. Lepore
Filing
117
OPINION AND ORDER that Defendant Michael Lepore's Renewed Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 109 is GRANTED. Defendant is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $155,871.33, and costs in the amount of $20,213.80, for a tota l award of $176,085.13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Matthew Focht Enterprises, Inc.'s Renewed Motion for Attorney Fees 111 is GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $38,365.50, and costs in the amount of $2,456.47, for a total award of $40,821.97. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 8/17/2015. (anc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
MATTHEW FOCHT
ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
1:12-cv-4479-WSD
MICHAEL LEPORE,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Michael Lepore’s
(“Defendant”) Renewed Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs [109] (“Defendant’s
Motion”) and Plaintiff Matthew Focht Enterprises, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff”) Renewed
Motion for Attorney Fees [111] (“Plaintiff’s Motion”).
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Relevant Factual Background 1
Plaintiff is an “independent sales organization” that sells, on behalf of credit
card processing companies, credit card processing services to retail merchants.
Plaintiff receives a portion of the processing fees charged by the processing
companies to the merchants Plaintiff solicits. Plaintiff contracts with sales agents
to solicit merchants on its behalf, for which Plaintiff pays the sales agents a
commission.
Defendant was a sales agent for Plaintiff. On March 24, 2009, Plaintiff and
Defendant entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (the “Agreement”)
governing, among other things, the parties’ relationship and the commissions to be
paid by Plaintiff to Defendant. The Agreement was in force for three (3) years. At
some point in 2011 or 2012, Defendant decided to discontinue working for
1
These facts are taken from the following statements of facts submitted in
accordance with Local Civil Rule 56.1: Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts
(“SUMF”) [37-2], Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff=s SUMF [42], Defendant’s
SUMF [38-2], and Plaintiff=s Response to Defendant’s SUMF [40]. Where a party
disputed a factual assertion contained in a statement of facts, the Court also
considered the specific exhibits cited in support of the assertion. See LR
56.1(B)(3), NDGa (providing that the court deems a party=s SUMF citation as
supportive of the asserted fact “unless the respondent specifically informs the court
to the contrary in the response”). Additional factual assertions are considered with
the parties’ arguments below.
2
Plaintiff. Defendant ultimately began competing, in various forms, with Plaintiff
in the sale of credit card processing services.
B.
Procedural History
When Defendant began competing against Plaintiff, on November 21, 2012,
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant in the Superior Court of Cobb County,
Georgia. Plaintiff generally alleged that Defendant had breached various
contractual and fiduciary duties he owed to Plaintiff and sought injunctive and
damages relief based on Defendant’s alleged conduct. On December 31, 2012,
Defendant removed the action to this Court.
In an Amended Complaint [2] (“Complaint”), Plaintiff asserted nine
(9) scattershot causes of action including: (1) breach of contract based on
Plaintiff’s alleged violation of restrictive covenants (Count I); (2) tortious
interference with contractual relations between Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s customers
(Count II); (3) defamation (Count III); (4) “unfaithful agent” liability under
O.C.G.A. § 10-6-1 (Count IV); (5) computer theft (Count V); (6) injunctive relief
prohibiting Defendant from violating the restrictive covenants alleged in Count I
(Count VI); (7) a declaratory judgment that Defendant is not entitled to additional
compensation from Plaintiff (Count VII); (8) punitive damages (Count VIII); and
(9) attorneys’ fees (Count IX).
3
On January 7, 2013, Defendant filed his Counterclaim [3], asserting five
(5) causes of action against Plaintiff including: (1) breach of contract based on
Plaintiff’s underpayment of commissions (Count I); (2) breach of contract based on
Plaintiff’s failure to pay post-termination compensation (Count II); (3) an
accounting related to the post-termination compensation alleged in Count II (Count
III); (4) a declaratory judgment that Defendant is entitled to the post-termination
compensation alleged in Count II (Count IV); and (5) attorneys’ fees and costs
(Count V).
A variety of litigation activities resulted in the dismissal of claims from the
case. On July 15, 2013, Plaintiff stipulated to the withdrawal of Counts III and V
of the ComplaintCtwo facially weak claims. On September 9, 2013, the Court
entered its Order [43] on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I,
II, and VI of the Amended Complaint. These counts, which were calculated to
prohibit Defendant from competing with Plaintiff, were the initial centerpiece of
the litigation. The Court granted summary judgment on these three claims.
This left four remaining Plaintiff claims: unfaithful agent (Count IV),
declaratory judgment that Defendant is not entitled to additional commission
compensation (Count VII), punitive damages (Count VIII), and attorneys’ fees and
costs (Count IX). On March 21, 2014, the Court granted [49] Plaintiff’s Motion
4
for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I of the Counterclaim seeking
pre-termination compensation.2 The Court denied Plaintiff’s summary judgment
motion with respect to counterclaim Counts II, IV, and V. Accordingly, the
following claims were required to be tried: Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary
duty, including injunctive relief, and for punitive damages, and Defendant’s claim
and request for declaratory judgment based on the breach of contract claim for
failure to pay post-termination compensation.
On June 3, 2014, the Court set [58] this case for trial on July 28, 2014. In
the Order setting trial, the Court set forth a schedule for filing pre-trial motions,
including motions in limine.
On June 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed its Motion in Limine [60] to bar Defendant
from (1) introducing breach of contract damages in excess of $10,000 on the
grounds that the Contract capped compensation damages at this amount,3 and
(2) from arguing that he did not owe a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. The Court
2
The Court also denied Defendant=s Motion for Summary Judgment on
Count I of the Counterclaim [38]. The parties also were entitled to assert claims
for attorneys’ fees and costs.
3
This contract interpretation issue was one that, if raised earlier in the case,
would have saved the parties significant litigation time and expense. The motion
presented a pure question of law that could, early on, have significantly narrowed
the issues in this matter.
5
granted the motion to apply the damages cap, and denied the motion to preclude
Defendant from arguing he did not owe a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff.
At the trial on Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty and punitive damages
claim, and Defendant’s post-termination compensation payment breach of contract
claim, the jury found against Plaintiff on its breach of fiduciary duty claim 4 and
found for Defendant on his breach of contract compensation claim. On
July 30, 2014, judgment [97] was entered in favor of Defendant on his breach of
contract compensation claim.
On August 13, 2014, Plaintiff filed its first motion for attorneys’ fees [98],
and Defendant filed his first motion for attorneys’ fees [99]. Plaintiff sought
attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $27,846.32, claiming it was the
prevailing party on Defendant’s pre-termination breach of contract claim.
Defendant sought attorneys’ fees in the amount of $257,965.00 and costs in the
amount of $2,647.80, claiming he is the prevailing party on all of Plaintiff’s
4
Before the case was submitted to the jury the Court granted Defendant=s
motion under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment on the
pleadings on the grounds that no reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff on its
punitive damages claim.
6
claims. 5 The parties relied on Section 6.13 of the Agreement in seeking an
attorneys’ fee and cost award:
Should any suit or arbitration be brought to enforce or interpret any
part of the Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover
its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, including expert witness fees
and fees on appeal.
(Agreement § 6.13).
On October 31, 2014, the Court denied [108] the parties’ motions for
attorneys’ fees. The Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to prevail on any of the
nine claims it asserted in the action and that its aggressive pursuit of these claims
resulted in the counterclaim filed by the Defendant, on only one of which--Count
I--did Plaintiff prevail, and that was early in the litigation. (October 31, 2014,
Order, at 8-9). The Court concluded that Plaintiff was not, under Section 6.13 of
the Agreement, entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs as a prevailing
party on its claims, and was only a prevailing party on Count I of the
Counterclaim. 6
5
Defendant asserted that the attorneys’ fees and costs he sought, for both his
lead and local counsel, was adjusted to remove any fees and costs associated with
his work to seek post-termination compensation greater than $10,000.
6
The Court rejected Plaintiff’s claim that it was the prevailing party on Count
II because Plaintiff successfully argued that Defendant’s award was capped at
$10,000. (October 31, 2014, Order, at 10-11).
7
The Court concluded that Defendant prevailed on Plaintiff’s claim for
breach of the non-compete and confidentiality provisions of the Agreement
(Counts I and II of the Complaint), and prevailed on his breach of contract
counterclaim for post-termination compensation (Count II of the Counterclaim).
(Id. at 11). The Court concluded further that the cap on damages for Count II of
the Counterclaim did not discredit that Defendant prevailed on this claim, and did
not preclude an award of the attorneys’ fees and costs Defendant incurred to prove
a violation of the post-termination compensation provision of the Agreement. (Id.
at 12).
After its review of the supporting documentation submitted by the parties in
support of their respective claims for attorneys’ fees, the Court concluded that the
parties’ “failure to limit their attorneys’ fees and costs requests to the fees and
costs incurred on the claims on which they prevailed, preclude[d] the Court from
awarding reasonable fees and costs in this case.” (Id. at 14). The Court allowed
the parties to file new motions for attorneys’ fees and costs that were “limited to
the fees and costs incurred or for which an award under Section 6.13 is permitted.”
(Id.).
On December 1, 2014, Defendant filed his Renewed Motion for Attorney
Fees and Costs, and Plaintiff filed its Renewed Motion for Attorney Fees.
8
Defendant states he reviewed the time and expense incurred on the claims on
which Defendant prevailed and reduced his attorneys’ fees claim. Defendant
argues that his claim for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $224,701.90 and expenses
in the amount of $20,213.80 is now reasonable. Defendants’ revised claim reflects
modest reduction in the amount Defendant claimed in his initial request. Plaintiff
seeks attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of $63,942.50 and costs in the
amount of $4,094.11. 7
The parties continue to dispute the attorneys’ fees claimed. Defendant also
objects to Plaintiff’s costs.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
It is well-established that a prevailing party in litigation to enforce a term of
an agreement may be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs where the contract
between them provides for the award of attorneys’ fees and cost to the prevailing
party. Silar v. Hodges, 250 Ga. App. 42, 43 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). Section 6.13 of
the Agreement states:
7
Plaintiff, in the alternative, requests sixty-percent of the $63,942.50 in fees
and $4,094.11 in costs incurred, noting that this percentage is a reasonable
apportionment of the fees and costs incurred on the one claim upon which it
prevailed. (Plaintiff’s Motion at 5-8).
9
Should any suit or arbitration be brought to enforce or interpret any
part of the Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover
its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, including expert witness fees
and fees on appeal.
(Agreement § 6.13).
The starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable
hourly rate . . . [t]he product of these two figures is the lodestar and there is a
strong presumption that the lodestar is the reasonable sum the attorneys deserve.”
Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008) (considering the
recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). The court may adjust the lodestar amount
based upon the results obtained. See Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery,
836 F.2d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir. 1988). For example, attorneys’ fees may be
adjusted if the result was partial or limited in success. Id. Put another way,
[i]f fee applicants do not exercise billing judgment, courts are
obligated to do it for them. . . . . [I]t is as much the duty of courts to
see that excessive fees and expenses are not awarded as it is to see that
an adequate amount is awarded.
Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999)
“A request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.”
Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437
10
(1983)). It is “perfectly proper to award attorney’s fees based solely on affidavits
in the records.” Id. “The court, either trial or appellate, is itself an expert on the
question and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning
reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment with or without
the aid of witnesses.” Id. (citations omitted). Evidentiary hearings are only
necessary “where there [a]re disputes of fact, and where the written record [i]s not
sufficiently clear to allow the trial court to resolve the disputes of fact.” Id.
B.
Defendant’s Claim for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Defendant asserts that he incurred approximately $370,125.00 in attorneys’
fees and $33,353.72 in costs in this action. Defendant requests an award of
$224,701.90 in attorneys’ fees and $20,213.80 in costs, which Defendant asserts
represents a portion of the fees and expenses Defendant incurred to defend against
Counts I and II of the Complaint and to prosecute Count II of the Counterclaim
(the “Prevailing Claims”). (Defendant’s Motion ¶ 5-7). Defendant asserts that he
has not included any fees or costs attributable to any non-contractual claims that
were litigated and that would, thus, not be subject to Section 6.13 of the
Agreement. (Id.) Defendant, in response to the Court’s concern about
overstaffing, removed all time entries made by Robert M. Dees,
Michael T. Fackler, Erin A. Jazapavicus, and Jenny Bezis Howard, and reduced its
11
request for attorneys’ fees from $262,937.50 in his initial motion to $224,701.90--a
reduction of $38,235.60. Defendant notes that the attorneys’ fees award now
requested is 60% of the overall attorneys’ fees he incurred in litigating this action.
(Id. ¶ 8).
Of the $224,701.90 in attorneys’ fees Defendant requests be awarded to
him, $209,025 is attributable to the Milam Howard firm, and $15,676.90 is
attributable to Mr. Myles Eastwood. (Defendant’s Motion, Exhibit A [109-2]
(“Exhibit A”) at 1). At Milam Howard, Defendant claims time was incurred by
four partners, three associates, and two paralegals who billed time on this case.8
(Id.). Of those nine, Defendant elects not to seek an award for time incurred by
Robert M. Dees, Michael T. Fackler, Erin A. Jazapavicus, and Jenny Bezis
Howard, three attorneys and a paralegal. (Id.). These were not included in the
revised attorneys’ fees claimed in response to the Court’s previous criticism of the
Milam Howard firm’s inefficient use of seven lawyers to litigate this commercial
dispute. Defendant now seeks an award for the services provided by (1) G. Alan
Howard, a partner with a $350 per hour billing rate; (2) W. Braxton Gillam,
another partner with a $350 per hour billing rate; (3) Paul M. Renner, a third
partner with a $300 per hour billing rate; (4) Patrick W. Joyce, an associate with a
8
More than seven attorneys billed time to this matter, but Defendant has
elected not to seek reimbursement for the time incurred by these other attorneys.
12
$200 per hour billing rate; and (5) Heather Durham, a paralegal with a $125 per
hour billing rate. Defendant seeks an award for 334.3 hours billed by Messrs.
Howard, Gillam, and Renner, 467.4 hours billed by Mr. Joyce, and 36 hours billed
by Ms. Durham. Mr. Eastwood, a further lawyer who served as local counsel,
charges $375 per hour for his services, and billed 41.8 hours of services which
Defendant seeks to recover. ([110-2] ¶¶ 6, 12-14).
The hourly rates charged for the attorney services in this case are
reasonable.9 By deleting charges for services not related to the Prevailing
Claims--as he was required--and his further reduction of $38,235.60 in charges
from his original request for fees, the Court agrees that Defendant has made a
significant, but not complete, effort to ensure that the amount of fees requested is
connected only to the Prevailing Claims, and does not represent a redundancy of
work or inefficient staffing. Defendant, however, still has not completely removed
charges for claims on which he did not prevail. For example, Defendant seeks
attorneys’ fees for his counsel’s preparation of his Motion for Partial Summary
9
“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonable comparable skills,
experience, and reputation.” Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir.
1994). The Court determines that the Atlanta metropolitan area is the relevant
legal community for the purposes of determining the prevailing market rate for
legal fees in this case.
13
Judgment on Count I of the Counterclaim [38], 10 a motion the Court denied and a
count on which the Court granted Plaintiff summary judgment. (March 21, 2014,
Order [49]).
Defendant also seeks attorneys’ fees for charges that appear to be for the
litigation as a whole, without apportioning these fees between the Prevailing
Claims and claims on which Defendant is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the
Agreement. 11
The Court does not expect Defendant to perfectly apportion these charges
between the Prevailing Claims and other claims, because it would be difficult to do
so considering the prominence of the Prevailing Claims in the context of the entire
litigation. Cf. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 n.11 (1983) (noting that it
is not significant that a prevailing plaintiff did not receive all the relief requested);
10
In August 2013, Mr. Joyce spent 18.2 hours drafting Defendant’s motion for
partial summary judgment, charging $3,640 for these services. (Exhibit A at 36).
11
For example, Mr. Renner spent 7.7 hours on June 25, 2013, preparing for
depositions, 9.5 hours on June 26, 2013 preparing for and attending Plaintiff’s
deposition, and 11.3 hours preparing for and attending the deposition of Mr.
Matthew Focht. (Exhibit A at 28). The total charges for Mr. Renner’s services for
these three entries equal $8,550. (Id.). On June 25, 2013 and June 26, 2013,
Mr. Joyce spent a total of 9.4 hours assisting with Mr. Renner’s deposition
preparation, charging $1,565 for these services. (Id. at 27). Similarly, on
January 4, 2013, Mr. Joyce spent a total of 7.4 hours meeting with drafting
Defendant’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims, and meeting with
Mr. Howard and Mr. Fackler regarding the same, charging $1,480 for these
services. (Id. at 4). Hours spent on discovery are similarly not apportioned
between discovery related to the Prevailing Claims and other claims.
14
Sierra Club v. Hankinson, No. 1:94-CV-2501-MHS, 1997 WL 33303277, at *4
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 1997) (“All issues in this case were inextricably linked, and
plaintiffs were overwhelmingly successful in the litigation as a whole. The Court
thus declines to strictly apportion plaintiffs’ compensation to account for minor
defense victories.”).
The Court, however, from its detailed review of Defendant’s counsel’s
billing records, determines a further reduction is required. The reduction which the
Court applies seeks to apportion between fees claimed for general services
provided on this matter, and recognizes the relatively small amount awarded on the
claims on which Defendant prevailed. The Court thus, in its discretion, reduces by
thirty percent (30%) the attorney fees claimed by Defendant in this renewed
motion for attorneys’ fees. The Court also reduces the fees claimed in the amount
of $1,420.00--the fees for service performed to prepare the second attorneys’ fees
motion which was required by the failure to submit a proper motion initially. The
total reduction in the attorneys’ fees claimed is $68,830.57
Having conducted its detailed evaluation of the fees billed in this matter and
having determined, in its discretion, that the fees billed must be reduced for the
reasons and in the amounts discussed above, the Court finds that attorneys’ fees in
the amount of $155,871.33 are reasonable for the work performed on the claims on
15
which Defendant prevailed in view of the results obtained by Defendant on the
Prevailing Claims. 12 In the absence of any opposition to the costs and expenses
claimed, and because the Court finds the claimed costs and expenses claimed
reasonable, costs and expenses are awarded in the amount claimed, or $20,213.80.
C.
Plaintiff’s Claim for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Plaintiff was the prevailing party with respect to Count I of Defendant’s
Counterclaim, and is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees related to this claim. 13
Plaintiff asserts that it incurred $63,942.50 in attorneys’ fees and $4,094.11 in
costs related to its defense on Count I of Defendant’s Counterclaim. (Plaintiff’s
Motion at 4). Plaintiff acknowledges that this amount includes fees and costs
incurred for services that were necessary to prevail on Count I that may also have
12
Plaintiff asserts that because Defendant recovered only $10,000 of the
approximately $550,000 in damages it identified in the Proposed Pretrial Order
submitted by the parties, an amount equal to approximately two-percent (2%) of its
requested damages, Defendant should only be entitled to recover two-percent (2%)
of its attorneys’ fees. (Plaintiff’s Br. in Opp. [113] at 8-9). The Prevailing Claims,
however, are not limited to Defendant’s successful prosecution of Count II of his
Counterclaims, but also Defendant’s successful defense of Counts I and II of
Plaintiff’s Complaint. Thus, the Court reduced fees claimed for the results
achieved by six-percent (6%). That reduction is reflected in the total thirty-percent
(30%) reduction made.
13
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is not the prevailing party because Plaintiff
did not receive a benefit from prevailing on Count I of the Counterclaim.
(Defendant’s Br. in Opp. [112] at 2-3). The Court, having previously concluded
that Plaintiff was the prevailing party on Count I of the Counterclaim, finds this
argument to be without merit. (See October 31, 2014, Order, at 8-9).
16
been related to other counts in this action. (Id. at 4-5 n. 2). Plaintiff, accordingly,
after considering counsel’s review of the billing records and taking into account
that tasks that were performed for more than just its defense against Count I of the
Counterclaim, asserts that, in the alternative to granting it an award of all of the
above-mentioned fees and costs, it is reasonable to allocate 60% of the fees and
costs it identified to Count I of the Counterclaim. (Id. at 7-8).
The Court, from its detailed review of Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing records,
determines, in its discretion, that Plaintiff’s suggested award of sixty-percent
(60%) of the attorneys’ fees it incurred is appropriate. This represents a reduction
in the amount of $25,577.00 in the fees billed in this matter.
Having conducted its detailed evaluation of the fees billed in this matter and
having determined in its discretion that the fees billed must be reduced for the
reasons and in the amounts discussed above, the Court finds that attorneys’ fees in
the amount of $38,365.50 are reasonable in view of the results obtained by Plaintiff
on Count I of the Counterclaim.
Plaintiff also seeks recovery of costs, specifically: (1) $100.57 for
accommodations for expert’s first deposition in Jacksonville, Florida;
(2) $1,416.14 for the first deposition transcript of expert witness; (3) $429.80 for
airfare to and from Jacksonville, Florida for expert’s first deposition; (4) $1,107.30
17
for the transcript for Plaintiff’s deposition; and (5) $1,040.30 transcript for
Defendant’s deposition. (Plaintiff’s Motion at 4).
Defendant asserts that, pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Plaintiff is not entitled to recover costs for travel and lodging.
Defendant asserts also that Plaintiff’s request for costs related to the expert’s
deposition should be denied because the expert’s deposition was only necessary
because Plaintiff waited until the motion in limine stage to raise its limitation of
damages argument.
Plaintiff is not seeking the recovery of damages pursuant to Rule 54(d), but
pursuant to Section 6.13 of the Agreement, which allows the prevailing party to
recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. (Agreement § 6.13). Plaintiff,
thus, is not limited to the costs permitted by Rule 54(d). Plaintiff notes also that
the first deposition of Defendant’s expert occurred during discovery, prior to when
it could have reasonably raised at summary judgment its limitation of damages
argument. Plaintiff is entitled to recover the costs it claims to have incurred that
relate to the count on which it prevailed.
Here the entirety of these costs is not related to Count I of the Counterclaim.
The Court determines, in its discretion, that Plaintiff’s suggested award of
sixty-percent (60%) of the costs it incurred is appropriate. This represents a
18
reduction in the amount of $1,637.64 in the costs incurred. The Court finds that
costs in the amount of $2,456.47 are reasonable.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Michael Lepore’s Renewed
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs [109] is GRANTED. Defendant is awarded
attorneys’ fees in the amount of $155,871.33, and costs in the amount of
$20,213.80, for a total award of $176,085.13
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Matthew Focht Enterprises,
Inc.’s Renewed Motion for Attorney Fees [111] is GRANTED. Plaintiff is
awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $38,365.50, and costs in the amount of
$2,456.47, for a total award of $40,821.97.
SO ORDERED this 17th day of August, 2015.
19
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