Washington v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.
Filing
24
ORDER granting (2825) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in case 1:07-md-01845-TWT; granting (19) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in case 1:13-cv-00034-TWT. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 7/30/2014. Associated Cases: 1:07-md-01845-TWT, 1:13-cv-00034-TWT(ss)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
IN RE CONAGRA PEANUT
BUTTER PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION
MDL DOCKET NO. 1845
1:07-md-1845-TWT
BETTY WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:13-CV-34-TWT
CONAGRA FOODS INC.,
a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
The Defendant seeks partial summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s claim for
punitive damages, arguing that the Plaintiff has not provided evidence sufficient to
sustain a claim for punitive damages under either District of Columbia or Georgia law.
The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant willfully disregarded its need to upgrade a
peanut roaster in its facilities in order to prevent the growth of bacteria.
I. Background
The Plaintiff, Betty Washington, alleges that she became infected with
Salmonella after eating contaminated peanut butter manufactured at the Defendant’s
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Sylvester, Georgia, facility. She was hospitalized for Salmonella in the District of
Columbia from October 26, 2006 through November 4, 2006. She claims that at trial
she can show that the peanut roaster at the Sylvester plant insufficiently sterilized
peanuts, and that ConAgra was aware that the roaster posed safety hazards.
ConAgra contends that it had several measures in place to ensure that its peanut
butter was void of infection. Indeed, according to ConAgra, regular audits by the
FDA, the Georgia Department of Agriculture, and third parties, as well as internal
audits, confirmed that its procedures produced peanut butter in a manner that would
prevent bacterial infection.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and
affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue of material fact exists
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 The court should view
the evidence and any inferences that may be drawn in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant.2 The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds that
show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.3 The burden then shifts to the
1
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
2
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970).
3
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
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nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to
show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist.4 “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence
supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be a sufficient
showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.”5
III. Discussion
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages cannot
survive under either Georgia law or District of Columbia law. The Plaintiff initially
filed her action in the District of Columbia. District of Columbia choice-of-law rules
direct the court to determine whether a “true conflict” exists between the laws of
Georgia, where the conduct allegedly causing the Plaintiff’s injury occurred, or the
laws of the District of Columbia, where the Plaintiff sustained her injuries.6 The
parties seem to agree that District of Columbia law would apply to the Plaintiff’s
claim. In any event, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive
damages cannot be sustained under either jurisdiction’s laws.
4
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
5
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990).
6
GEICO v. Fetisoff, 958 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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First, this Court previously disposed of nearly identical claims for punitive
damages in Kidd v. ConAgra.7 In that case, the Court noted that Georgia law permits
punitive damages in tort actions only where the “defendant’s actions showed willful
misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which
would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.”8 The
plaintiff in Kidd, like the Plaintiff here, argued that ConAgra knew it had a faulty
peanut roaster and knew the safety hazards stemming from the faulty roaster. The
Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s evidence, while possibly sufficient to show gross
negligence, was “not enough to show that ConAgra acted willfully, maliciously, or
with ‘that entire want of care that would raise the presumption of conscious
indifference to consequences.’”9 Here too, the Plaintiff’s evidence that ConAgra was
aware of a faulty roaster at the Sylvester plant is insufficient to show ConAgra’s
“willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or [its] entire want of care
7
See [Doc. 6], Case No. 1:07-CV-01415-TWT (N.D. Ga. Jul. 28, 2011).
8
O.C.G.A. § 51- 12-5.1(b).
9
Kidd v. ConAgra, [Doc. 6], Case No. 1:07-CV-01415-TWT, at 7 (N.D.
Ga. Jul. 28, 2011) (quoting In re Stand ‘N Seal Products Liab. Litig., 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 63540, at *26 (N.D. Ga. July 15, 2009)).
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which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.”10 The
Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages should be dismissed under Georgia law.
Similarly, the Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages under District of
Columbia law. Under that law, after proving that the Defendant committed a tortious
act, the Plaintiff must satisfy a two-part standard to be entitled to punitive damages.
The Plaintiff is required to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, “(1) that the
defendant acted with evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or
with intent to injure, or in willful disregard for the rights of the plaintiff; AND (2) that
the defendant’s conduct itself was outrageous, grossly fraudulent, or reckless toward
the safety of the plaintiff.”11 Here, the Plaintiff is unable to show by clear and
convincing evidence that ConAgra can be liable for punitive damages. ConAgra’s
evidence shows that it voluntarily undertook a hazard analysis critical control point
plan years before such plans were mandated by the FDA in 2011. Likewise,
ConAgra’s evidence showed that it consistently reassessed the roaster in the Sylvester
plant. Even giving the Plaintiff favorable inferences, her evidence can only show that
ConAgra may have inappropriately minimized some of the risks associated with the
10
O.C.G.A. § 51- 12-5.1(b).
11
District of Columbia v. Jackson, 810 A.2d 388, 396 (D.C. 2002) (quoting
Croley v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 759 A.2d 682, 695 (D.C. 2000)).
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faltering roaster because of cost concerns. However, as in Kidd, the Court concludes
that this conduct does not rise above gross negligence. Because ConAgra’s conduct
was not itself “outrageous, grossly fraudulent, or reckless toward the safety” of the
Plaintiff, ConAgra cannot be liable for punitive damages under District of Columbia
law. ConAgra’s motion for partial summary judgment should accordingly be granted.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages [Doc. 19] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 30 day of July, 2014.
/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge
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