Anderson et al v. Southern Home Care Services, Inc. et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER that Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 13 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Complaint is DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs are permitted to file, within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order, an amended complaint which complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts Local Rules. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 3/21/2014. (anc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
MARGARET ANDERSON, MARY
DIXON, LATASHA WILLIAMS,
and KYONNE SUTHERLAND,
individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
1:13-cv-840-WSD
SOUTHERN HOME CARE
SERVICES, INC., and RES-CARE,
INC.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Southern Home Care
Services, Inc. (“Southern Home”) and Res-Care, Inc.’s (“Res-Care”) (together,
“Defendants”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [13].
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Margaret Anderson, Mary Dixon, Latasha Williams and Kyonne
Sutherland (together, “Plaintiffs”) bring this purported class action to recover
unpaid wages under the Georgia Minimum Wage Law, O.C.G.A. § 34-4-1 et seq.
(“GMWL”), and under theories of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs
seek to represent “all individuals employed by Defendants from May 2004, to the
present who were employed in Georgia to provide services to medically homebound clients of Defendants, at the clients’ residences, but who were not paid for
the time they spent traveling between their various job sites in a day.” (Compl.
¶ 10).
A.
The Geddis Litigation
This action is the latest in a series of related wage and hour cases against
Defendants. 1 On May 1, 2007, a similar group of plaintiffs brought a collective
action in this Court against Defendants to recover unpaid wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (the “FLSA”). Geddis v. Southern
Home Care, Inc. and ResCare, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-036 (N.D. Ga.). On November
21, 2007, the parties entered into a Tolling and Stay Agreement (the “Geddis
Tolling Agreement”), which provides:
This Agreement is made by and between [Defendants] and the
ResCare Class Members as that term is defined herein. This
agreement applies to potential “ResCare Class Members” who are
defined as all current and former employees of [Defendants] who held
the same position (previously identified and defined by [Defendants]
. . . as “direct care staff”) or who performed duties similar to those of
Plaintiffs in the Lawsuit. ResCare Class Members is further limited to
those individuals who were not paid for the time they spent traveling
between client sites in a workday, and includes but is not limited to,
those approximately 4452 individuals identified by [Defendants] in
1
The actions all have been brought by the same plaintiff lawyers.
2
response to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 1 in the Lawsuit. The
“Lawsuit” is the civil action titled Geddis . . . .
1.
Tolling Provision. No statute of limitations on any claim
under the FLSA or other state wage and hour statutes under the
laws of the states in which ResCare Class Members are/were
employed shall run against ResCare Class members and the
same shall be tolled during the period of time while this
Agreement is in effect. Neither party shall put forward, or rely
upon, the period of time while this Agreement is in effect as a
bar or laches or for any other purpose to defeat or reduce the
claims made or to be made in the Action. . . .
...
10. Authority to Bind. Each Counsel executing this
Agreement represents and warrants that he has been authorized
to enter into this Agreement on behalf of the party on whose
behalf it is signed and that signatory has full and complete
authority to do so.
(Geddis Tolling Agreement [15.1] at 1-2). The Geddis Tolling Agreement was
signed by counsel for the Geddis plaintiffs.
On August 14, 2009, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to amend their
complaint to add, individually and on behalf of all Georgia plaintiffs who had
opted-in to the litigation, claims for unpaid wages under the GMWL. Geddis, Doc.
141.
On October 28, 2009, the Court conditionally certified the case as a
collective action. Geddis, Doc. 144. Notice was sent to approximately 11,328
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potential class members, of which 2,768 opted into the action. It is undisputed that
Plaintiffs in this action did not opt into the Geddis litigation.
On March 15, 2011, the Court granted the plaintiffs leave to file their second
amended complaint to add class claims under the GMWL.
On April 12, 2011, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs’ GMWL claims and dismissed them without prejudice.2 The
Court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ GMWL
claims because to do so would require the Court as matters of first impression
under state law to define “domestic employees,” and determine how wages should
be calculated, under the GMWL, “principles of comity suggest that the Court avoid
needlessly deciding these issues of state law.” Geddis, Doc. 187 at 8 (alterations
and citations omitted).
On August 31, 2012, the parties entered into a settlement agreement of their
FLSA claims, which the Court approved, and Geddis was dismissed with
prejudice. Geddis, Docs. 203, 204.
2
The Court noted in Geddis that the “local controversy” exception to the
Class Action Fairness Act may have stripped the Court of original subject matter
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ GMWL claims because the plaintiffs and putative
class members were Georgia citizens and, at the time, Southern Home was a
Georgia corporation. Since Geddis, Southern Home became a Delaware
Corporation with its principal place of business in Kentucky.
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B.
The Ford Litigation
On October 6, 2011, two of the opt-in plaintiffs in Geddis, and two
additional plaintiffs, filed in the Superior Court of Dougherty County, Georgia a
renewed putative class action against Defendants for unpaid wages under the
GMWL. Ford et al. v. Southern Home Care Services, Inc., No. 11cv2256-2.
On September 11, 2012, Defendants and the named plaintiffs in Ford entered
into a settlement agreement and the case was dismissed.
C.
Procedural History
On February 15, 2013, Plaintiffs in this action filed their Complaint [1.1] in
the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia.
On March 15, 2013, Defendants removed the DeKalb County Action to this
Court based on the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
On May 10, 2013, Defendants filed their Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings [13]. Defendants argue that, because Plaintiffs were not parties to the
Geddis Tolling Agreement, their claims for allegedly unpaid wages before
February 15, 2010, are barred by the GMWL’s three-year statute of limitations.
Defendants argue also that the FLSA preempts Plaintiffs’ GMWL claims, and that
even if it did not, the GMWL does not apply to Defendants.
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II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
“Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts
in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001).
Motions for judgment on the pleadings based on allegations of a failure to state a
claim are evaluated using the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
See Sampson v. Washington Mut. Bank, 453 F. App’x 863, 865 n.2 (11th Cir.
2011); Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d
1293, 1295 n.8 (11th Cir. 2002); Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Phila. v. City of
Atlanta, 864 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (“A motion for judgment on the
pleadings is subject to the same standard as is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”).
In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the allegations
contained in the complaint must be accepted as true and the facts and all inferences
must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Pursley, 450 F. App’x 888, 890 (11th Cir. 2012); Hawthorne
v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998). Ultimately, the
complaint is required to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To
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state a claim to relief that is plausible, the plaintiff must plead factual content that
“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“Plausibility” requires more than a “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully,” and a complaint that alleges facts that are “merely consistent with”
liability “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement
to relief.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
B.
Analysis
1.
Whether the GMWL applies to Defendants
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim under the GMWL
because Defendants are employers subject to the FLSA. The GMWL requires an
employer to “pay to all covered employees a minimum wage which shall be not
less than $5.15 per hour for each hour worked in the employment of such
employer.” O.C.G.A. § 34-4-3(a). The GMWL
shall not apply to any employer who is subject to the minimum wage
provisions of any act of Congress as to employees covered thereby if
such act of Congress provides for a minimum wage which is greater
than the minimum wage which is provided for in this Code section.
O.C.G.A. § 34-4-3(c). The GMWL thus does not apply to an employer who is
subject the FLSA, as to employees who are covered under the FLSA, if the FLSA
provides for a minimum wage greater than $5.15 per hour for each hour worked—
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which the FLSA has since July 24, 2007.3 To state a claim for relief under the
GMWL, a plaintiff therefore must allege, among other things, that the defendant is
not subject to the FLSA. See O.C.G.A. § 34-4-3(c).
The Complaint alleges that Defendants are “employers,” and Plaintiffs are
“covered employees” within the meaning of the GMWL. (Compl. ¶ 8). The
Complaint does not contain any allegations to support that Defendants—two
nonresident companies who employ “thousands of persons” to provide services to
Defendants’ medically home-bound clients—are not subject to the FLSA.
Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that they “do not fall within any exemption under
the GMWL” (Compl. ¶ 13) states a legal conclusion, lacks factual support, and
fails to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir.
2010) (construing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544) (Court is not
required to accept conclusory allegations and legal conclusions as true); Oxford
Asset Mgmt. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[C]onclusory
allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as
facts will not prevent dismissal.”). For this reason, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, as
3
The Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 amended the FLSA to increase the
federal minimum wage to $5.85 per hour effective July 24, 2007; to $6.55 per hour
effective July 24, 2008; and to $7.25 per hour effective July 24, 2009.
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currently plead, fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim and is required to be
dismissed.
Because Plaintiffs may be able to state a plausible claim under the GMWL,
Plaintiffs shall be permitted to file, within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this
Order, an amended complaint which complies with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Court’s Local Rules.4, 5
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings [13] is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED.
4
The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed in the Superior Court of
DeKalb County and removed to this Court. “The pleading standard in Georgia is
lower than the standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Under Georgia law, fair notice of the nature of the claim
is all that is required, and the elements of most claims can be pled in general terms.
Pleading conclusions, rather than facts, may be sufficient to state a claim for
relief.” Ullah v. BAC Home Loans Serv. LP, 538 F. App’x 844, 846 (11th Cir.
2013) (comparing Georgia and federal pleading standards in evaluating fraudulent
joinder); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(2) (“After removal, repleading is
unnecessary unless the court orders it.”).
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Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is required to be
dismissed for failure to state a claim, the Court does not consider Defendants’
additional grounds for relief, including that certain of Plaintiffs’ claims are barred
by the statute of limitations, that the GMWL is preempted by the FLSA and that,
under Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), Plaintiffs cannot
maintain this case as a class action.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs are permitted to file, within
twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order, an amended complaint which
complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s Local Rules.
SO ORDERED this 21st day of March, 2014.
E
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