Smith v. Colvin

Filing 17

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 14 Motion for Attorney Fees per EAJA. Defendant is DIRECTED to transmit to counsel for Plaintiff a check in the amount of $6,505.82, payable to Plaintiff, as payee. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 4/24/2014. (anc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
FAITH CRYSTAL SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.

1:13-cv-1421-WSD

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees
pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (the
“Motion”) [14].
On November 26, 2013, the Court issued an order reversing and remanding
the Commissioner’s decision under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further
proceedings [11] and judgment was entered on November 26, 2013 [12]. On
December 8, 2013, Plaintiff, through her counsel, filed the Motion seeking an
attorney’s fee award.

I.

DISCUSSION
The EAJA provides that a court “shall” award costs and attorney’s fees to a

party who prevails against the United States in a non-tort civil action, unless the
court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). A party
who obtains a sentence-four remand reversing the Commissioner’s denial of
benefits is a prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA. Shalala v. Schaefer,
509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $6,155.82 plus
$350.00 in costs. The Commission does not object to an award of attorney’s fees
and costs in the amounts claimed [15].
A.

Reasonableness of Hours Expended

The EAJA provides for recovery of “reasonable attorney’s fees.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the hours requested are
reasonable. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). Reasonable
hours are billable hours. See Perkins v. Mobile Hous. Bd., 847 F.2d 735, 738
(11th Cir. 1988). The Court having reviewed the thirty-three (33) hours expended
finds them to be reasonable.

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B.

EAJA Hourly Rate

The EAJA provides that “attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of
$125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living
[from March 1996] justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii); United
States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327, 1342 (11th Cir. 2004). In this case, the parties
agree that a cost of living increase justifies a higher fee proportional to the increase
in the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”), a monthly calculation of the prices paid by
urban consumers for a representative basket of goods and services. See United
States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index,
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/. The Commissioner does not contest the $184.54 hourly
rate used by Plaintiff to calculate her fee request. Applying this hourly rate to the
33 hours the Court determines is reasonable in this case, the Court concludes that
attorney’s fees should be awarded in the amount of $6,155.82.1
C.

Payment of EAJA Fees

The Supreme Court recently held in Astrue v. Ratliff that the prevailing
party, not the prevailing party’s counsel, is eligible to recover attorney fees under

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Plaintiff also claims costs in the amount of $350.00, which the Court finds
reasonable.

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the EAJA as part of the party’s litigation expenses. Astrue v. Ratliff, ___ U.S.___,
130 S. Ct. 2521, 2526-27 (2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1), (d)(2)(A)); see
also Panola Land Buying Ass’n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509-11 (11th Cir. 1988)
(awarding EAJA fees to the prevailing plaintiff, not its counsel, in accordance with
the specific language of the EAJA). The Eleventh Circuit in Reeves v. Astrue
reaffirmed that the plaintiff, not the plaintiff’s attorney, is the “prevailing party”
within the meaning of the EAJA. Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir.
2008). The Reeves court stated that the EAJA statute “plainly contemplates that
the prevailing party will look to the opposing party for costs incurred, while
attorneys and other service providers must look to the [prevailing] party for
compensation for their services.” Id.
The Supreme Court in Ratliff acknowledged that until 2006, the government
“frequently paid EAJA fees in social security cases directly to attorneys”; however,
since 2006, the government has continued the direct payment practice “only in
cases where the plaintiff does not owe a debt to the government and assigns the
right to receive the fees to the attorney.” Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. at 2528-29 (internal
quotation marks omitted).2 In light of Ratliff, the Court determines that the award
2

The rulings in Ratliff and Reeves both support that an award of EAJA attorney’s
fees may be offset by the government where the plaintiff owes a pre-existing debt
to the United States. See Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. at 2524 (discussing government’s
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of EAJA fees is required to be made to Plaintiff as the prevailing party and that the
award shall be in the form of a check payable to Plaintiff, as payee. The check
shall be sent to Plaintiff’s counsel for delivery to Plaintiff. The check will be in the
total amount of $6,505.82, representing allowed attorney’s fees and expenses.
II.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 [14] is
GRANTED and Defendant is DIRECTED to transmit to counsel for Plaintiff a
check in the amount of $6,505.82, payable to Plaintiff, as payee.

SO ORDERED this 24th day of April, 2014.

authority to use administrative offsets); Reeves, 526 F.3d at 732 n.3 (finding that
the EAJA attorney fee award was subject to the plaintiff’s debt under the Debt
Collection Improvement Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3701, 3716(a)); see also 31 C.F.R.
§ 285.5 (detailing the centralized offset of federal payments to collect nontax debts
owed to the United States).

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