Hankerson v. Drew et al
Filing
10
OPINION AND ORDER denying 8 and 9 Motions for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 6/20/2014. (anc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
CLEVELAND HANKERSON,
Petitioner,
v.
1:13-cv-1790-WSD
DARLENE DREW, Warden, and
UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY
ATLANTA, GA,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s [sic] “Reply Seeking An
Reconsideration To: Opinion and Order” [8] and Motion for Redress [9]. The
Court construes these filings as Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court’s Order from October 11, 2013 [6].
I.
BACKGROUND
On May 28, 2013, Petitioner Cleveland Hankerson (“Petitioner”), an inmate
at the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner challenged his
sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia. He specifically challenged the “career offender” enhancement imposed
by the sentencing court.
On June 19, 2013, Magistrate Judge King issued her R&R after reviewing
the petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Judge King
found that Petitioner previously filed two habeas petitions.1 Noting that successive
§ 2241 petitions are not permitted, Judge King concluded that this action is
required to be dismissed. On June 27, 2013, Petitioner filed his objections [5]. He
did not address Judge King’s finding that this action is required to be dismissed as
a successive petition.
On October 11, 2013, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge King’s R&R. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (“No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person
pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States if it appears that the legality
of such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a
prior application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . .”); see also Antonelli v. Warden,
542 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a),
1
In 2006, Petitioner filed a § 2255 motion in the Middle District of Georgia
challenging his convictions, and in 2011, Petitioner also filed a § 2241 petition in
the Court challenging the “career offender” finding and its impact on his
sentencing. Both of these petitions were denied.
2
“[s]uccessive § 2241 petitions by federal prisoners are subject to threshold
dismissal in the district court.”).
On November 11, 2013, 27 days after the Court issued its Order, Petitioner
filed two (2) incomprehensible documents, which the Court construes as his
Motion for Reconsideration.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
“A motion for reconsideration made after final judgment falls within the
ambit of either Rule 59(e) (motion to alter or amend a judgment) or Rule 60(b)
(motion for relief from judgment or order).” Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber
Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 806 n.5 (11th Cir. 1993). The Court
does not reconsider its orders as a matter of routine practice. LR 7.2 E., NDGa. The
Court’s Local Rules require the parties to file motions for reconsideration “within
twenty-eight (28) days after entry of the order or judgment.” Id.
The Court construes that Petitioner seeks reconsideration pursuant to Rule
59(e). Motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) are appropriate only where
there is newly-discovered evidence2 or a need to correct a manifest error of law or
2
Evidence that could have been discovered and presented on the previously-filed
motion is not newly discovered. See Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343-44 (11th
Cir. 2007); see also Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997)
3
fact. See Hood v. Perdue, 300 F. App’x 699, 700 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Pres.
Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
916 F. Supp. 1557, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d, 87 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1996));
Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343 (“The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion are
newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.”); Jersawitz v. People
TV, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 1999).3
A motion for reconsideration should not be used to present the Court with
arguments already heard and dismissed, or to offer new legal theories or evidence
that could have been presented in the previously-filed motion. See Arthur,
500 F.3d at 1343; O’Neal v. Kennamer, 958 F.2d 1044, 1047 (11th Cir. 1992);
Bryan v. Murphy, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1259 (N.D. Ga. 2003); see also Jones v.
S. Pan Servs., 450 F. App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A motion to alter or
amend a judgment cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise arguments, or
present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”);
(“We join those circuits in holding that where a party attempts to introduce
previously unsubmitted evidence on a motion to reconsider, the court should not
grant the motion absent some showing that the evidence was not available during
the pendency of the motion.”).
3
Motions for reconsideration under Rule 60(b) are appropriate only where there is
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” newly discovered
evidence, fraud, a void judgment, or a judgment that has been satisfied or is no
longer applicable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
4
Pres. Endangered Areas, 916 F. Supp. at 1560 (“A motion for reconsideration is
not an opportunity for the moving party and their counsel to instruct the court on
how the court ‘could have done it better’ the first time.”). Whether to grant a
motion for reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the district court. See
Region 8, 993 F.2d at 806.
B.
Analysis
The Court dismissed Petitioner’s action because it was a successive § 2241
petition, and the saving clause exception under § 2255(e) does not apply to his
case. In his Motion to Reconsider, Petitioner appears to challenge, as he has
before, the “career offender” finding of the Court and its impact on sentencing. He
also seems to assert again that he is entitled to the saving clause exception under
§ 2255(e).4
The Eleventh Circuit does not allow federal prisoners to challenge the
application of the sentencing guidelines to their sentences under the savings clause
of Section 2255(e) where the challenged sentence does not result in a sentence
greater than the statutory maximum sentence. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d
4
An exception to Section 2255(e), known as the “savings clause,” permits Section
2241 petitions where it “appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). The Court
found that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that a motion brought under Section
2255 would be “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
5
1293, 1323 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“the savings clause does not authorize a
federal prisoner to bring in a § 2241 petition a claim, which would otherwise be
barred by § 2255(h), that the sentencing guidelines were misapplied in a way that
resulted in a longer sentence not exceeding the statutory maximum”).
Petition’s Motions assert the same claims that this Court previously
considered and dismissed. Petitioner does not allege any new evidence or
intervening developments or changes in the law. Petitioner has not demonstrated
any reason for the Court to reevaluate its judgment that Petitioner’s claims are
required to be dismissed as successive petitions pursuant to § 2241 and
reconsideration is required to be denied.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner Cleveland Hankerson’s Motion
for Reconsideration [8, 9] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 20th day of June, 2014.
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?