Strickland et al v. State of Georgia et al
Filing
13
ORDER granting Defendant Gwinnett County Government's 2 Motion to Dismiss, Defendants State of Georgia and George F. Hutchinson III's 5 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, Wells Fargo's 6 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' 7 Motion to Strike is DENIED. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 3/12/2014. (cem)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ANDRE STRICKLAND and
PATRICIA STRICKLAND,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF GEORGIA;
GWINNETT COUNTY
GOVERNMENT; DEUTSCHE
BANK TRUST COMPANY
AMERICAS; WELLS FARGO
BANK N.A., INC.; AMERICA’S
SERVICING COMPANY; and
GEORGE F. HUTCHINSON III,
in his Individual capacity,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:13-CV-2188-RWS
ORDER
This case is before the Court on Defendant Gwinnett County
Government’s (“County”) Motion to Dismiss [2], Defendants State of Georgia
(“State”) and George F. Hutchinson III’s (“Judge Hutchinson”) Motion to
Dismiss [5], Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s (“Wells Fargo”) Motion to
Dismiss [6], and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss
[7]. After reviewing the record, the Court enters the following Order.
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Background1
On November 13, 2012, Andre Strickland and Patricia Strickland
(Plaintiffs) filed suit in Gwinnett County Superior Court against Mortgage
Lenders Network USA, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., and GMAC Mortgage, LLC
for breach of a home loan agreement and predatory lending practices which
allegedly caused Plaintiffs’ bankruptcy. On March 19, 2013, after a hearing on
the matter, Judge Hutchinson dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against Wells Fargo
with prejudice and stayed the case against GMAC pending bankruptcy
proceedings. (Orders, [6-2], [6-3].) Plaintiffs appealed Judge Hutchinson’s
dismissal Order to the Georgia Court of Appeals, but the appellate court
dismissed the appeal as premature due to the pendency of Plaintiffs’ suit against
the other defendants. ([6-3].) It appears that Plaintiffs’ state court case is still
pending against GMAC and Mortgage Lenders Network.
Plaintiffs assert the following claims against all Defendants: gross
negligence (Count I) and denial of due process and equal protection under the
law (Count II). Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief “to amend the
1
Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ Complaint and the
attachments thereto. At the motion to dismiss phase, the Court accepts all wellpleaded facts as true.
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bad gross behavior of Defendants collectively,” relief “from state judgment and
orders,” and damages of $102,420 (the sum stated on their note).
Discussion
I.
Legal Standard - Motion to Dismiss
Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While this pleading
standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” mere labels and
conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In order to withstand a motion to
dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). A complaint is plausible on its face when the plaintiff pleads
factual content necessary for the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. Id.
“At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as
true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273
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n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). However, the same does not apply to legal conclusions set
forth in the complaint. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260
(11th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, the court does not “accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.
Because Plaintiffs are acting pro se, their “pleadings are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be
liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998). “This leniency, however, does not require or allow courts to rewrite
an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Thomas v.
Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 393 F. App’x 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2010).
II.
Analysis
A.
County’s Motion to Dismiss [2]
The County argues and the Court agrees that the Complaint is devoid of
factual allegations to support Plaintiffs’ claims against this Defendant.
Plaintiffs’ claims against the County are based on alleged misconduct by Judge
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Hutchinson. Specifically, Plaintiffs aver that the County caused their injuries
because Judge Hutchinson denied them a meaningful opportunity to be heard at
their state court hearing on May 12, 2013, and the County is responsible for the
actions of its officers. (Pl.s’ Resp., [4] at 1, 3.) However, Judge Hutchinson, a
superior court judge, is not a county official, see Freeman v. Barnes, 640
S.E.2d 611, 615 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006), and the County does not have supervisory
liability for his conduct. The Complaint contains no further allegations
concerning the County or any County officials. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims
against the County are DISMISSED.
B.
State and Judge Hutchinson’s Motion to Dismiss [5]
The State and Judge Hutchinson (“State Defendants”) urge the Court to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint under the Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine.
401 U.S. 37 (1971). According to Younger and its progeny, in exceptional
cases, federal courts may withhold equitable relief to avoid interfering with
state judicial proceedings. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989). Although Younger addressed state criminal
proceedings, its principles are “fully applicable to noncriminal judicial
proceedings when important state interests are involved.” Middlesex Cnty.
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Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). There
are three factors to consider to determine whether abstention is appropriate: (1)
the presence of an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) implication of
important state interests in the state proceeding; and (3) availability of an
adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in the state proceeding.
Id.; 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003).
The State Defendants argue that all three criteria for abstention are met
here. The Court agrees. Plaintiffs’ state suit is still pending against multiple
defendants. Further, disputes over real property and disputes involving
predatory practices against lay consumers implicate important state interests.
See e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 565 (1994) (“stability of
title in real property may be said to be an ‘important’ state interest”); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 460-62 (1978) (“the State has a legitimate
and indeed ‘compelling’ interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation that
involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of
‘vexatious conduct’”). Finally, Plaintiffs may raise their constitutional concerns
before the Georgia Court of Appeals upon final determination of their superior
court action. Therefore, the Court agrees that abstention is appropriate and
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Plaintiffs’ claims against the State Defendants are DISMISSED.2
C.
Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss [6] and Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Strike [7]
The Complaint states: “Wells and Deutsche both lacked standing to
collect, demand payments, [and] publish notices of foreclosure respecting the
subject property . . . .” (Compl., [1] ¶ 17.) This is the only allegation pertaining
to Wells Fargo. Further, the Complaint contains no information about the
2
Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief includes: declaratory and injunctive relief “to
amend the bad gross behavior of Defendants collectively;” relief “from [] a contract
that was unconscionable;”relief “from state judgment and orders;” and a “certain sum
of $102,420.00[, the] amount stated on the note.” (Compl., [1] ¶¶ 25-27.) Plaintiffs
do not articulate from which Defendant(s) they hope to recover these various forms of
relief. To the extent Plaintiffs are seeking money damages from the State Defendants,
their claims are denied.
Judicial immunity from civil suits for money damages is well established.
“[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for
their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are
alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 355-56 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871)). Plaintiffs
have not suggested that Judge Hutchinson lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
matter before him, nor have they suggested that he was acting outside of his judicial
functions when the alleged misconduct took place. Further, the State is immune from
suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment, unless it has consented to be
sued or Congress has abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity. Port Auth. TransHudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990). Neither consent nor abrogation is
present here.
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underlying loan, the property in question, or any foreclosure proceedings.3 The
Court agrees with the Defendant that Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible
claim for gross negligence or constitutional violations based upon a single
conclusory allegation. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims against Wells Fargo are
DISMISSED.
Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike is improper and
irrelevant because Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and
no evidence is needed at this stage. (Wells Fargo Opp. to Pl.s’ Mot. to Strike,
[10] at 2.) However, recognizing that Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court
has considered the contents of Plaintiffs’ motion in response to Wells Fargo’s
Motion to Dismiss. Having found that Defendant’s motion has merit, the Court
DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the County’s Motion to Dismiss [2] is
3
As Wells Fargo notes, res judicata bars Plaintiffs from attempting to relitigate claims raised in their state court suit against this Defendant. To the extent
Plaintiffs are attempting to assert the same causes of action here, those claims must
fail.
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GRANTED, the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [5] is GRANTED,
Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss [6] is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Strike [7] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 12th day of March, 2014.
________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge
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