Williams v. Georgia Department of Corrections et al

Filing 12

OPINION AND ORDER that the Final Report and Recommendation 10 is ADOPTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint 9 is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint 7 is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 8/13/2014. (anc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
RICHARD EARL WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.

1:13-cv-03084-WSD

GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill’s Final
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) [10], recommending that the Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [9] should be granted, and that
this action should be dismissed with prejudice.
I.

BACKGROUND
From June 2002, to May 12, 2012, Plaintiff Richard Earl Williams

(“Plaintiff”), an African-American male, was employed as a probation officer with
the Georgia Department of Corrections (the “GDC” or “Defendant”). In
June 2010, GDC management ordered Plaintiff “to cut his hair which [he] wore in
a dreadlocks style” “since at least 2004.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 29). Plaintiff

refused because, he claims, to cut his dreadlocks “would violate [his] indelible
rights, religious beliefs, and spiritual faith.” (Id. ¶ 19). For the next two (2) years,
Plaintiff continued to wear his hair in dreadlocks “despite subtle and not so subtle
communications from [GDC management] that [they] were extremely upset and
displeased with [him] over [his] continued objections and refusal to cut his hair.”
(Id. ¶ 20). As a result, Plaintiff filed internal grievances stating that the orders to
cut his hair were discriminatory and that “he was being subjected to a hostile work
environment as a direct result of his refusal to cut his hair. (Id. ¶ 21).
Effective January 1, 2012, Defendant enacted a new grooming policy (the
“Policy”), which prohibited male employees from wearing their hair below the top
of their shirt collar. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23). The Policy also prohibited male employees
from wearing their hair in dreadlocks. (Id. ¶ 24). Female employees, however,
“continued to adorn dreadlocks and wear hair styles which extend beyond their
collars without reproach by staff management.” (Id. ¶ 26).
On January 3, 2012, Chief Vaughn Andrews directed Plaintiff to “leave
work, get his dreadlocks cut off, and return to work within two hours.” (Id. ¶ 36).
Plaintiff refused, and on January 20, 2012, he received a Letter of Reprimand for
refusing to cut his dreadlocks, in violation of the Policy. (Id. ¶ 37).
Over the next several months, Plaintiff continued to resist the Policy. On

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March 2, 2012, he received a “Written Directive” disciplinary action ordering him
to cut his dreadlocks. (Id. ¶ 38). Once again, he refused, and, on March 16, 2012,
he received notice of a 5% reduction in his salary. (Id. ¶ 39). On May 13, 2012,
Plaintiff was “terminated for refusing to comply with the dress code based on his
continued objections and refusal to cut off his dreadlocks.” (Id. ¶ 40).
On April 10, 2012, shortly before his termination, Plaintiff filed a charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
On the EEOC form, Plaintiff indicated that he was discriminated based on race,
sex, and retaliation. (See [6-2], Ex. B). He later amended his charge to include
allegations regarding his termination.
On June 19, 2013, Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the
EEOC. (Id. Ex. C).
On September 16, 2013, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his Complaint
alleging sex-based employment discrimination.
On January 27, 2014, Plaintiff, now represented by counsel, filed his
Amended Complaint [6].1 Plaintiff asserts that his employment was terminated

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Because Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint [6], Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss the original Complaint [7] is deemed moot. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Bank of
Am., NA, No. 1:11-CV-4472-TWT, 2012 WL 3779106, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29,
2012); see also Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n
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because of his race, religion, sex, and national origin, and that he was retaliated
against for filing internal complaints claiming that the orders to cut his hair were
discriminatory, all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”).
On March 7, 2014, GDC filed its Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint (“Motion”) [9] for failure to state a claim.
On May 12, 2014, the Magistrate Judge issued her final R&R recommending
that Defendant’s Motion be granted, and that this action be dismissed with
prejudice.
There are no objections to the R&R.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standards
1.

Review of a Magistrate Judge’s R&R

After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2010);
Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). A

amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and becomes the operative
pleading in the case.”).

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district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report
or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). With respect to those findings and recommendations to
which objections have not been asserted, the Court must conduct a plain error
review of the record. United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984). Neither party filed objections to the R&R.
2.

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court must “assume that the factual allegations in the
complaint are true and give the plaintiff[] the benefit of reasonable factual
inferences.” Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 1187, 1196 (11th Cir.
2010). Although reasonable inferences are made in the plaintiff’s favor,
“‘unwarranted deductions of fact’ are not admitted as true.” Aldana v. Del Monte
Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 408 n.10 (1996)). Similarly, the Court is
not required to accept conclusory allegations and legal conclusions as true. See
Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010)
(construing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007)).

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“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). Mere “labels and
conclusions” are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This requires more than
the “mere possibility of misconduct.” Am. Dental, 605 F.3d at 1290 (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The well-pled allegations must “nudge[] their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 1289 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570).
B.

Analysis
1.

Plaintiff’s Sexual Discrimination Claim

The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim is
foreclosed by Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975)
(en banc).2 In Willingham, the plaintiff applied for employment with the
defendant, a newspaper company, but the defendant refused to hire him. Id. at
2

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the
Former Fifth Circuit issued before the close of business on September 30, 1981.

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1086. The plaintiff in Willingham asserted that the sole basis for defendant’s
refusal to hire him was “objection to the length of his hair.” Id. The defendant had
enacted a grooming code, which “required employees (male and female) who came
into contact with the public to be neatly dressed and groomed in accordance with
the standards customarily accepted in the business community, [which] was
interpreted to exclude the employing of men (but not women) with long hair.” Id.
at 1087.3 The plaintiff in Willingham filed suit under Title VII, arguing that he had
been subjected to sex discrimination because a woman with hair of similar length
would have been hired. Id. at 1087-88. The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim,
holding that Title VII only covers discrimination based on “immutable” or other
constitutionally-protected characteristics. Id. at 1091. The Fifth Circuit also
reasoned that hair length is not an “immutable” characteristic of a person’s sex, nor
is it is not a fundamental right, and thus Title VII did not prohibit the defendant
from setting different grooming standards for male and female employees. Id. at

3

The defendant in Willingham enacted the grooming policy in response to
“community indignation” over a music festival where “[b]earded and longhaired
youths . . . flooded the countryside.” Id. At this festival, the use of drugs and
complete nudity was common. Id. These “excesses” made a very negative
impression in the defendant’s business community, so the defendant wanted its
male employees to avoid long hairstyles so that potential advertisers would not
associate the newspaper with “counter-culture types” who had created such a
disturbance during the festival. Id.

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1091-92.
The Magistrate Judge found that Willingham is not, as Plaintiff asserts,
distinguishable from this action. First, the Magistrate Judge found that, under
Willingham, an employer is not required to offer a business justification for its
policy, as long as the differing standards for men and women are not based on an
“immutable characteristic or a fundamental right.” See id. The Magistrate Judge
found further that GDC did offer a business justification to support the Policy—
that it wants its employees to maintain a professional appearance because they
often have to interact with courts and members of the public.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that, under Willingham, an employer may
set different grooming standards for male and female employees, and thus Plaintiff
cannot establish that his termination for his dreadlock hairstyle amounted to
discrimination, even if the same rule was not applied to female employees. See id.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s well-reasoned analysis and
conclusion. The Court finds no plain error in the Magistrate Judge’s findings and
recommendation that Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim should be dismissed.4
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To the extent Plaintiff asserts GDC should have adopted a policy similar to
that of the DeKalb County Policy Department, which allows both male and female
employees to wear dreadlocks, the Magistrate Judge found that GDC, as an
employer, has the authority to set different grooming standards for male and
female employees. The Court finds no plain error in this finding. See Willingham,
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2.

Plaintiff’s Race Discrimination Claim

The Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim
also is foreclosed by Willingham. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091 (“[A] hiring
policy that distinguishes on some . . . ground . . . such as grooming codes or length
of hair, is related more closely to the employer's choice of how to run his business
than to equality of employment opportunity . . . . Hair length is not immutable and
in the situation of employer vis a vis employee enjoys no constitutional
protection.”). The Magistrate Judge found that the Policy requires that all male
employees must keep their hair above the collar, and that the Policy does not target
hairstyles worn exclusively by African Americans.5 Instead, GDC adopted a
grooming standard applicable to employees of all races. A hairstyle, even one
more closely associated with a particular racial or ethnic group, is a mutable
characteristic not protected by Title VII. See id.; see also E.E.O.C. v. Catastrophe
Mangem. Sol., No. 13-00476-CB-M, 2014 WL 1347739 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 27, 2014)
507 F.2d at 1091; see also Gadson v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:13-CV-105-VEH,
2013 WL 3879903, *3 (N.D. Ala. July 26, 2013) (holding that female employee’s
“dreadlocks are mutable” and that “she cannot plausibly state a claim for gender
discrimination with respect to the [Department of Correction’s] prohibition against
her wearing dreadlocks, even though the challenged hairstyle policy allegedly only
applies to females”).
5
The Magistrate Judge found that the Complaint does not suggest that Policy
has been enforced against African Americans in a selective manner different than
other races. The Court finds no plain error in this finding.

9

(dismissing claim that grooming policy prohibiting dreadlocks was racially
discriminatory because “[a] hairstyle, even one more closely associated with a
particular ethnic group, is a mutable characteristic.”). The Court finds no plain
error in the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendation that Plaintiff’s race
discrimination claim should be dismissed.
3.

Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff asserts that he was fired in retaliation for internal complaints that he
filed asserting that the orders to cut his dreadlocks constituted discrimination .
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 44). Title VII prohibits discrimination against an employee
“because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
An employee engages in protected activity if he opposes an employment
practice based on a good faith, reasonable belief that the practice violates Title VII
or Section 1981. See, e.g., Bryant v. United States Steel Corp., 428 F. App’x 895,
898 (11th Cir. 2011); Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997).
An internal complaint about unfair treatment or general harassment, without an
allegation of discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin, is not protected

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activity. See id. at 436-37 (citing Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty Comm’rs,
47 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1995)).
The Eleventh Circuit broadly construes the causal relationship between
protected activity and an adverse retaliatory action. See Higdon v. Jackson,
393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff, however, still is required to
demonstrate that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity and that there is a
causal connection between the protected activity alleged and an adverse action.
See id. For an internal complaint of discrimination to constitute protected activity
under Title VII, the employee must have a “good faith, reasonable belief” that the
employer engaged in unlawful discrimination. Little, 103 F.3d at 960. The
conduct need not rise to the level of actual discrimination, “but it must be close
enough to support an objectively reasonable belief that it is.” See Clover v. Total
Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff must show “not
only that he subjectively . . . believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful
employment practices, but also that his belief was objectively reasonable in light of
the facts and record presented.” Butler v. Ala. Dept. of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209,
1213, (11th Cir. 2008). The reasonableness of the employee’s belief is “measured
against the existing substantive law.” Id.
The Magistrate Judge acknowledged that Plaintiff may have believed that

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the orders to cut his dreadlocks were discriminatory, but found that his belief was
not objectively reasonable because Willingham allows employers to adopt different
grooming standards for men and women. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091-92.
The Magistrate Judge also found that, because the Policy applies equally to
employees, male and female, of all races, it was not reasonable for Plaintiff to
believe that he had racially discriminated against. The Magistrate Judge concluded
that Plaintiff’s belief was unreasonable, and thus his internal grievances did not
amount to protected activity under Title VII. The Court finds no plain error in the
Magistrate Judge’s findings or recommendation that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim
should be dismissed.
4.

Plaintiff’s National Origin and Religious Discrimination Claims

Plaintiff’s EEOC charge listed claims for race discrimination, sex
discrimination, and retaliation. It did not include claims for religious
discrimination or discrimination based on his national origin. The Magistrate
Judge found that Plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative remedies by
filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and that he failed to do so. See,
e.g., H&R Block E. Enters. v. Morris, 606 F.3d 1285, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing
Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir.2001)) (“Before suing
under Title VII, a plaintiff must first exhaust her administrative remedies. To do

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so, a plaintiff must file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC within
180 days of the last discriminatory act.” (citation omitted)). The Court finds no
plain error in the Magistrate Judge’s findings or recommendation that Plaintiff’s
claims for discrimination based on religion and national origin should be
dismissed.6
III.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill’s Final

Report and Recommendation [10] is ADOPTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [9] is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint [7] is DENIED AS MOOT.

6

To the extent Plaintiff asserts that he was discriminated on the basis of
culture (Compl. ¶ 31), the Magistrate Judge found that culture is not a protected
category under Title VII. Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Court finds no plain error in the
Magistrate Judge’s finding that culture is not protected under Title VII.

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SO ORDERED this 13th day of August, 2014.

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