Johnson v. State of Georgia et al
Filing
21
OPINION AND ORDER that Defendant State of Georgia's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 6 is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants City of Hiram, City of Newnan, and City of Kennesaw's Motion for a More Definite State ment 8 is GRANTED. Plaintiff must submit an amended complaint to the Court no later than May 9, 2014. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff William R. Johnson's Motion for Immediate Hearing for Injunctive Relief 14 is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER OR DERED that Defendant State of Georgia's Motion to Stay Discovery 7 is DENIED AS MOOT. The Court grants Plaintiff's 11 Motion for Extension of Time, nunc pro tunc, and accepts his response in opposition out of time. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 4/9/2014. (anc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
WILLIAM R. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
1:13-cv-3155-WSD
STATE OF GEORGIA et al.,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant State of Georgia’s Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [6], Defendants City of Kennesaw, City of
Hiram, and City of Newnan’s Motion for a More Definite Statement [8], and
Plaintiff William R. Johnson’s Motion for Immediate Hearing for Injunctive Relief
[14]. Also before the Court are Defendant State of Georgia’s Motion to Stay
Discovery [7], and Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time [11].
I.
BACKGROUND
On September 23, 2013, Plaintiff William R. Johnson (“Plaintiff”),
proceeding pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges
various violations of his civil rights by the State of Georgia (“Georgia”), and the
City of Kennesaw, Georgia, the City of Hiram, Georgia, and the City of Newnan,
Georgia (collectively, the “City Defendants”). Plaintiff also alleges common law
tort claims against these Defendants. Plaintiff’s Complaint is rambling and
unfocused. It is 135 pages long, and it is composed mainly of conclusory
statements regarding the City Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing in arresting him and
in revoking his probation. The Court has gleaned the following sparse facts from
the Complaint. Plaintiff alleges that, on June 15, 2010, he was involved in a hit
and run accident, for which he later took responsibility. On September 16, 2011,
he pleaded guilty to felony hit and run, and was sentenced to six years’ probation.
On September 5, 2012, he was arrested and charged with public drunkenness in
Newnan, Georgia, after the police responded to a complaint from the manager of a
local Applebees restaurant.
Plaintiff alleges that, on March 21, 2013, he was arrested in Hiram, Georgia.
Waitresses at a local Hooters restaurant contacted the police when they suspected
that Plaintiff intended to drive while intoxicated. Officers responded to the
Hooters, and asked to see Plaintiff’s driver’s license. Plaintiff alleges that he
refused to present his license to the officers, and that he was arrested for refusing
this request. Plaintiff contends that, in the course of this arrest, he suffered
physical injuries and was “knocked unconscious.”
On September 6, 2013, Plaintiff was arrested in Kennesaw, Georgia.
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Plaintiff contends that, late that night, police officers approached and questioned
him as he was walking along the side of the road. Plaintiff alleges that he refused
to show his driver’s license to the officers upon their request. Plaintiff was
arrested and charged with pedestrian under the influence, disorderly conduct, and
obstruction. Plaintiff alleges that, in the course of his arrest, he suffered physical
injuries, which included a black eye.
Plaintiff contends that the State of Georgia illegally charged him with a
lesser included charge, related to the June 15, 2010, hit and run incident. Plaintiff
argues that the criminal charge to which he pleaded guilty should be voided for
vagueness. Plaintiff further contends that his September 5, 2012, March 21, 2013,
and September 6, 2013, arrests were illegal, because Plaintiff was not obligated to
cooperate with the officers on those occasions.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to
deny Plaintiff’s First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants committed intentional infliction of
emotional distress against him. Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive
damages, unspecified attorney and court fees, a declaration that his constitutional
rights were violated by Defendants, and “injunctive relief” against Defendants, to
prevent his incarceration on state charges until this action is resolved.
3
On February 7, 2014, Defendant State of Georgia (“Georgia”) filed its
Motion to Dismiss, arguing that sovereign immunity deprives the Court of
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against Georgia.1 Also on February 7, 2014, the
City Defendants filed their Motion for a More Definite Statement, arguing that
Plaintiff’s Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading.
On March 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed his response in opposition to Georgia’s
Motion to Dismiss.2 Plaintiff did not oppose, or otherwise respond, to the City
Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement.
On March 13, 2014, Plaintiff submitted a Motion for Immediate Hearing for
Injunctive Relief, contending that he had been incarcerated by the Defendants, and
asking for his immediate release to prepare for this § 1983 action.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Georgia’s Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be either a “facial” or
1
Georgia does not specify in its Motion the rule under which it is moving for
dismissal. Georgia’s arguments contend that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. The Court, therefore, analyzes Georgia’s
Motion under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
On February 28, 2013, Plaintiff moved for an extension of time to respond to
Georgia’s Motion. On March 5, 2013, Plaintiff submitted his response in
opposition to Georgia’s Motion. The Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension
of Time, nunc pro tunc, and accepts his response in opposition out of time.
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“factual” attack. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924–25 n.5 (11th Cir.
2003). A facial attack challenges subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the
allegations in the complaint, and the Court takes the allegations as true in deciding
whether to grant the motion. Id. Factual attacks challenge subject matter
jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings. Id. When resolving a factual
attack, the Court may consider extrinsic evidence such as testimony and affidavits.
Id. Georgia does not state whether it is making a “facial” or “factual” attack.
Georgia has not cited to extrinsic evidence in its brief, and the Court considers
Georgia’s Motion to be a “facial” attack challenging the Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.
Georgia argues that this action must be dismissed because all of Plaintiff’s
claims against Georgia are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign
immunity. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a State brought by both
citizens of another state and the State’s own citizens, unless a State waives its
sovereign immunity. McClendon v. Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252,
1256-57 (11th Cir. 2001). “[I]n the absence of consent[,] a [§ 1983] suit in which
the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is
proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d
1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
5
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). Thus, “the Eleventh Amendment bars a
federal court from exercising jurisdiction over a lawsuit against a non-consenting
State and its agencies.” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765,
778 (2000). Georgia’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity applies only to State
law tort claims filed in State court, and it does not extend to § 1983 actions filed in
federal court. See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23; Robinson v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 966
F.2d 637, 640 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that “a state waives its Eleventh
Amendment immunity only if there is an unequivocal indication that the state
intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the
Eleventh Amendment”). The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Georgia.
Plaintiff also alleges common law tort claims against Georgia. A State that
has not waived its sovereign immunity cannot be sued on State law claims in
federal court. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (noting that “the
constitutional principle of sovereign immunity does pose a bar to federal
jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States”). Georgia has not waived its
sovereign immunity for State claims filed in federal court. See O.C.G.A.
§ 50-21-23(b). The Court, therefore, also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
6
Plaintiff’s State law claims against Georgia.3
Georgia’s sovereign immunity deprives the Court of subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal and State law claims against Georgia.
Accordingly, Georgia’s Motion to Dismiss is required to be granted on this basis,
and its Motion to Stay Discovery is denied as moot.
B.
City Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to
state “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007), the Supreme Court recognized the liberal minimal standards imposed
by Federal Rule 8(a)(2) but also acknowledged that “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. In general, courts should not dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint with
prejudice “without first giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint
if a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.” Taylor v. McSwain,
335 F. App’x 32, 33 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d
3
The Court also lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State law claims against Georgia
because there is no federal question at issue, and because there is no diversity
jurisdiction. See Coastal Petroleum Co. v. U.S.S. Agri-Chemicals, A Div. of U.S.
Steel Corp., 695 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1983) (“For purposes of diversity
jurisdiction a state is not a citizen of any state.”) (citation omitted)
7
1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991) (overruled on other grounds by Wagner v. Daewoo
Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2002)).
The City Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint is an impermissible
shotgun complaint, and they ask that Plaintiff submit an amended complaint that
conforms to the pleading standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff did not respond to the City Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite
Statement, and the Court grants the Motion as unopposed. See L.R. 7.1(B) (“Any
party opposing a motion shall serve the party’s response, responsive memorandum,
affidavit, and any other responsive material not later than fourteen (14) days after
service of the motion . . . . Failure to file a response shall indicate that there is no
opposition to the motion.”)
Accordingly, Plaintiff is required to submit an amended complaint, which
states in a short and plain manner, the facts showing he is entitled to relief against
the City Defendants.
C.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Immediate Hearing on Injunctive Relief
A plaintiff’s demand to be released may only properly be brought under a
federal habeas petition. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)
(holding that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his
physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled
8
to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal
remedy is a writ of habeas corpus”).
Plaintiff’s Motion for Immediate Hearing on Injunctive Relief challenges the
fact of his confinement. Plaintiff, therefore, cannot obtain his release from prison
in this § 1983 action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is required to be denied.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant State of Georgia’s Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [6] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants City of Hiram, City of
Newnan, and City of Kennesaw’s Motion for a More Definite Statement [8] is
GRANTED. Plaintiff must submit an amended complaint to the Court no later
than May 9, 2014.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff William R. Johnson’s Motion
for Immediate Hearing for Injunctive Relief [14] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant State of Georgia’s Motion to
Stay Discovery [7] is DENIED AS MOOT.
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SO ORDERED this 9th day of April, 2014.
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