Thornton v. Benefield et al
Filing
16
ORDER AND OPINION overruling plaintiff's Objections 15 and adopting the Report and Recommendation 9 as the opinion of the Court. This action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial or Full Summary Judgment 7 is denied as moot. Signed by Judge Julie E. Carnes on 7/26/14. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
GEORGETTE BENITA THORNTON,
GDC #769078,
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGE DEBORAH C. BENEFIELD,
et al.,
PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS
42 U.S.C. § 1983
CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:13-cv-3206-JEC
Defendants.
ORDER AND OPINION
Plaintiff is confined at Lee Arrendale State Prison in Alto,
Georgia.
Plaintiff, pro se, seeks forty-five million dollars in
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from the trial and appellate judges
who presided over her state criminal case and from the United States.
(Pl.’s Compl. [1]; Pl.’s Resp. [6].)
Plaintiff contends that
defendants entered invalid and illegitimate judgments in her criminal
case, resulting in her present confinement. (See Pl.’s Compl. [1, 11, 1-2].)
After plaintiff confirmed that she seeks only damages in this
action, and not release from prison, Magistrate Judge Walker screened
the
complaint
under
28
U.S.C.
Recommendation (“R&R”) [9].)
§
1915A.
(Final
Report
and
Judge Walker found that plaintiff’s
claims are barred by the principle set out in Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994) and that the defendant judges are immune from the
relief plaintiff seeks.
AO 72A
(Rev.8/8
2)
(Id.)
Judge Walker thus recommended that
the case be dismissed and that plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment be denied as moot. (Id.) Plaintiff filed objections to the
R&R.
(Pl.’s Obj. [15].)
A district judge must conduct a careful and complete review of
a magistrate judge’s R&R.
(11th
Cir.
1982).
The
Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732
district
judge
must
“make
a
de
novo
determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is
made.”
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
Those portions of the R&R for
which there is no objection are reviewed only for clear error.
See
United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“District judges do not actually have to exercise de novo review of
magistrate
judges’
decisions,
however,
unless
an
objection
is
made.”).
Plaintiff does not dispute the conclusion in the R&R that her
claims are barred by the principle set out in Heck and by absolute
immunity.
(Pl.’s Obj. [15].)
She instead argues that this case
should be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the habeas action
she recently filed in this Court.
(Id.); see Thornton v. Seabolt,
No. 1:13-cv-3692-JEC-LTW (N.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2013), Pet. at Dkt. No. 1.
Plaintiff contends that this action is “subordinate” to the habeas
action and should be suspended.
(Pl.’s Obj. [15] at 2-4.)
Since plaintiff filed her objections, however, this Court has
ruled on the habeas action filed by plaintiff in Case No. 1;13-cv2
AO 72A
(Rev.8/8
2)
3692-JEC-LTW.
On July 25, 2014, the Court dismissed that action.
See Doc. Nos. 31 and 32.1
Accordingly, because plaintiff’s claims in this action implicate
the validity of her state judgment of conviction and
because that
judgment has not been invalidated, plaintiff’s present § 1983 action
cannot be entertained.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s Objections to the
R&R [15] are OVERRULED.
The Court ADOPTS the R&R [9] as the opinion
of the Court.
1915A.
This action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial or Full Summary Judgment [7]
is DENIED AS MOOT.
1
Even had this Court not dismissed plaintiff’s habeas corpus
action, it would have been unable to stay the present § 1983 action
pending resolution of that habeas case. Specifically, a § 1983
action that is barred by Heck (that is, an action in which success
on the claims would impugn the validity of a criminal conviction
or sentence) cannot be stayed. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641, 649 (1997); Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 (11th Cir.
1995). Claims barred by Heck are not cognizable under § 1983, and
the Supreme Court has held it is error for district courts to stay
such cases.
Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.
“[A] claim either is
cognizable under § 1983 and should immediately go forward, or is
not cognizable and should be dismissed.” Id.; cf. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007)(noting that courts have power to stay
a civil action filed before a criminal case has concluded, where
Heck does not apply because there has been no conviction). If a
plaintiff “eventually satisfies the precondition to a valid claim
under Heck” --invalidation of her conviction or sentence--she is
permitted to raise that claim in a new civil rights action.
Abella, 63 F.3d at 1065 & n.3 (“[A] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damages action
which would demonstrate the invalidity of a conviction or sentence
does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been
invalidated.”).
3
AO 72A
(Rev.8/8
2)
SO ORDERED this 26th day of July, 2014.
/s/ Julie E. Carnes
JULIE E. CARNES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4
AO 72A
(Rev.8/8
2)
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