Peterson v. HVM L.L.C. et al
Filing
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ORDER denying as moot Plaintiff's 2 Motion for In Forma Pauperis Status. The Clerk is DIRECTED TO TRANSFER the entire case to the U.S. District for the District of New Jersey. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 2/21/2014. (cem)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ANDREA PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
HVM L.L.C., et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:13-CV-03417-RWS
ORDER
On January 24, 2014, Magistrate Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill entered an
Order [9] permitting Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis in this action. The
case was then referred to the undersigned for a frivolity determination. After
reviewing the record, the Court enters the following order.
Background
Plaintiff Andrea Peterson filed this action on October 16, 2013, against
Defendants HVM L.L.C., Extended Stay America (“ESA”), Centerbrige
Partners LP, Paulson & Company, and Blackstone Real Estate Partners VI,
seeking damages and injunctive relief related to Defendants’ alleged breach of a
Long-Term Lodging Agreement (“Agreement”). Plaintiff has also filed a
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Motion for In Forma Pauperis Status [2]1; Application for Temporary
Restraining Order, Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Expedited Hearing
on the Merits [3]; Motion for ECF Filing [4]; and Motion for Hearing Date [5].
Plaintiff alleges that in February 2009, she entered into the Agreement to
stay in a room at one of Defendants’ extended-stay hotels in Secaucus, New
Jersey. (Compl., Dkt. [10] ¶ 6.) The Agreement did not create a
landlord–tenant relationship. (Id. ¶ 3.) According to Plaintiff, she was required
to pay a lodging fee of $900 per month for her room, which she paid each
month. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 5.) In September 2012, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
falsely claimed that she owed them money in an effort to obtain a warrant of
removal from the Superior Court of Hudson County, New Jersey. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11.)
In their complaint, Defendants alleged that she owed them $30 per day for the
hotel room and had fallen behind on payments. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 15.) Because the
legal relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants was that of hotel manager
and guest, however, the Hudson County Landlord–Tenant Court later dismissed
the warrant of removal for lack of jurisdiction. (Id. ¶ 21.) On October 3, 2012,
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Because Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted,
Plaintiff’s Motion for In Forma Pauperis Status [2] is DENIED as moot.
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Defendants informed Plaintiff that she was no longer welcome at the hotel and
then locked her out later that day. (Id. ¶¶ 23-26.)
Plaintiff sought injunctive relief in New Jersey state court, stating that
she had fully performed the terms of the Agreement and had paid her monthly
rent. (Id. ¶ 34.) At an October 19, 2012 hearing, the judge denied injunctive
relief because there were material facts in controversy, and he stated that the
court could not process her complaint with the post office box mailing address
on her paperwork. (Id. ¶¶ 35-37.) The judge ordered Defendants to file an
answer, so Plaintiff moved for entry of default in December 2012 after they
apparently failed to do so. (Id. ¶ 39.) It is not entirely clear how the case
unfolded in the following months, but Plaintiff alleges that on May 2, 2013, the
Superior Court of Hudson County dismissed her case without prejudice. (Id. ¶
54.)
As a result of Defendants’ acts, Plaintiff states that her equal protection
rights were violated and that she has suffered significant financial hardship.
(Id. ¶¶ 46-57.) Plaintiff, now a resident of Georgia, filed this action on the basis
of federal question and diversity jurisdiction for her constitutional and state-law
contract claims. The Court next determines whether, based on the above
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allegations, she has stated any arguable claims.
Discussion
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), “the court shall dismiss the case
at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” A claim
is frivolous when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual
allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably
meritless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carrol v. Gross,
984 F.2d 393, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Where a claim is arguable, but ultimately
will be unsuccessful, it should be allowed to proceed. See Cofield v. Alabama
Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 936 F.2d 512, 515 (11th Cir. 1991). “Arguable means
capable of being convincingly argued.” Sun v. Forrester, 939 F.2d 924, 925
(11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” While this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual
allegations,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements
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of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, her “pleadings are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be
liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998). “This leniency, however, does not require or allow courts to rewrite
an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Thomas v.
Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 393 F. App’x 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2010).
Before evaluating the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court first inquires
into whether it has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. A federal court
properly may exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants “only if
two requirements are met: (1) the state long-arm statute, and (2) the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178
F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, the Court uses a “two-step inquiry in
determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant is proper.” Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 557 F.3d 1293,
1295 (11th Cir. 2009). First, courts must consider whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction of the defendant would comport with Georgia’s long-arm
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statute. Id. If so, courts then consider whether the defendant has sufficient
minimum contacts with the state such that the exercise of jurisdiction would not
offend due process notions of “fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (citation
omitted). Finally, “ ‘[a] plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the
complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.’ ”
Scutieri v. Chambers, 386 F. App’x 951, 956 (11th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in
original) (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th
Cir. 2009)).
Under the relevant portion of the Georgia long-arm statute,
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
nonresident . . . as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts .
. . enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if he or
she were a resident of this state, if in person or though an agent, he
or she:
(1)
Transacts any business within this state . . . .
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 (emphasis added).
Out of all Defendants listed in Plaintiff’s Complaint, only HVM and ESA
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are alleged to have contacts in Georgia.2 Plaintiff states that “HVM/ESA
maintains and operates over twenty (20) hotels, in the State of Georgia and
maintains a Registered Agent in this District.” (Compl., Dkt. [10] at 9.)
Plaintiff thus appears to allege that HVM and ESA are subject to personal
jurisdiction here because they transact business in Georgia within the meaning
of the Georgia long-arm statute.
The Court may only exercise personal jurisdiction under the “transacting
business prong” of the long-arm statute if “(1) the nonresident defendant has
purposefully done some act or consummated some transaction in [Georgia], (2)
the cause of action arises from or is connected with such act or transaction, and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction . . . does not offend traditional fairness and
substantial justice.” Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 631 S.E.2d 734, 737 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added). Although Defendants certainly do transact
business in Georgia by operating hotels in this state, Plaintiff does not allege
2
Defendants Centerbridge Partners LP, Paulson & Company, and Blackstone
Real Estate Partners VI all appear to be citizens of New York and Delaware with no
alleged contacts with Georgia. (See Compl., Dkt. [10] at 7-9.) Moreover, it is unclear
what alleged wrongs these hedge funds and private-equity firms committed against
Plaintiff. In short, the Court has no personal jurisdiction over these Defendants in this
action.
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that her breach of contract claim arose from Defendants’ activities here, as
required under the statute. See Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers
Intern., Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “there must
be a sufficient nexus between those contacts [in the forum state] and the
litigation” for personal jurisdiction to be proper). In fact, all alleged
wrongdoing took place in New Jersey. As such, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Defendants is plainly not authorized under the Georgia longarm statute.
The Eleventh Circuit makes clear that when a district court lacks personal
jurisdiction, it may not evaluate the merits of a case. See Future Tech. Today,
Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2000) (personal
jurisdiction analysis does not require a determination on the merits); Republic
of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 940 (11th Cir.
1997) (“As a general rule, courts should address issues relating to jurisdiction
before addressing the merits of a plaintiff’s claim.”). Rather than automatically
dismissing a case for lack of personal jurisdiction, however, the courts have
discretion to transfer a case to a district that does have personal jurisdiction over
the nonresident defendants. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), when a case is filed in
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the wrong district, a district court may transfer the case to another district if the
case could have originally been brought there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The
district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong
division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such a case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”)
“This power exists even when the transferor court lacks personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.” Howell v. Komori Am. Corp., 816 F. Supp. 1547, 1552
(N.D. Ga. 1993).
It appears that all Defendants would be subject to personal jurisdiction
there because they are all either New Jersey companies or operate in New
Jersey. Moreover, all the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s cause of action took
place in New Jersey, and New Jersey law would apply to Plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim. Finally, it is in the interest of justice to transfer the case rather
than dismiss it because it will save Plaintiff time and expense in refiling the
case in New Jersey and reapplying to proceed in forma pauperis. Therefore,
instead of dismissing Plaintiff’s action, the Court will transfer Plaintiff’s entire
case to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a).
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for In Forma Pauperis
Status [2] is DENIED as moot. The Clerk is DIRECTED TO TRANSFER
the entire case to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.
SO ORDERED, this 21st
day of February, 2014.
_______________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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