D.M. v. Chatman et al

Filing 53

ORDER: Defendant Page's Motion to Adopt 32 , Defendant Durham's Motion to Adopt 34 , and Defendants' Motion for More Definite Statement 12 are GRANTED. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 12 is GRANTED as to Count IV and DENIED a s to all other counts with right to refile. Furthermore, Defendants' Motion to Strike 12 and Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Portions of Defendants' Reply Brief or, in the Alternative, for Leave to File Surreply 38 are DENIED, as moot. Finally, Plaintiff is ORDERED to file an Amended Complaint as set forth above within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 8/11/2014. (cem)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
D.M.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TANYA CHATMAN, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:13-CV-03565-RWS

ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Defendants Chatman, Howell, Hunt,
McMillian, Weeks, Wells, and Woodard’s Motion for More Definite Statement
[12], Motion to Strike [12], and Motion to Dismiss [12]; Defendant Page’s
Motion to Adopt [32]; Defendant Durham’s Motion to Adopt [34]; and
Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Portions of Defendants’ Reply Brief or, in the
Alternative, for Leave to File Surreply [38]. After reviewing the record, and
with the benefit of oral argument, the Court enters the following Order.
Background
This civil rights action arises out of severe abuse Plaintiff D.M. sustained
from March 2011 until July 2011 while a resident at the Eastman Youth
Development Campus (“Eastman” or “Eastman YDC”) in Eastman, Georgia.

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Plaintiff, a sixteen year-old boy at the time of these events, was physically and
sexually abused by Reginald Patton and other residents of Eastman. Plaintiff
alleges Defendants—directors, supervisors, a corrections officer, and a
behavioral health counselor—deprived him of his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment constitutional rights by exhibiting deliberate indifference toward a
substantial risk of serious harm at the chaotic and violent juvenile detention
facility.
I.

Eastman Youth Development Campus
In 1998 the Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”) was the

subject of a U.S. Department of Justice investigation which found widespread
constitutional violations resulting from inadequate supervision, an inadequate
classification system to separate potential victims and attackers, low staffing,
and inappropriate responses to suicide risks, including the placing of at-risk
youths in solitary confinement. (Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶¶ 28-44.) In response to
these findings, the U.S. Department of Justice and the DJJ drafted a binding
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) to implement remedial measures at
DJJ facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 48-49.) The DJJ was then monitored by an independent

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monitor and the U.S. Department of Justice until it came into compliance with
the MOU in 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 69-70.)
Plaintiff alleges that once monitoring under the MOU ended,
management of DJJ facilities, including the Eastman YDC, slipped into
disarray. Due to the DJJ’s failure to set adequate guard-to-resident ratios, the
number of resident-on-resident physical and sexual assaults rose. (Id. ¶¶ 7281.) At Eastman, for example, the MOU required one guard for every sixteen
residents. (Id. ¶ 84.) Yet Plaintiff alleges that at the time of his abuse, Eastman
instead had a ratio closer to one guard for every thirty-two residents. (Id. ¶ 87.)
The Eastman facility also fails to classify and segregate its residents to ensure
their safety. (Id. ¶ 108.) As a result, physical and sexual assaults have occurred
almost daily since 2009. (Id. ¶ 88.) From January 2011 to April 2011, three
riots broke out. (Id. ¶¶ 95-101.) One riot involved sixty youths who set bed
linens and trash on fire, requiring the response of five local law enforcement
agencies. (Id. ¶¶ 95-98.) In each riot, guards were attacked, including one who
suffered a broken nose while another had her teeth pushed in after being struck
in the face. (Id. ¶¶ 97-103.)

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In addition, Plaintiff points to two audits revealing alleged
unconstitutional conditions at the Eastman YDC. An August 2010 audit found,
among other things, that Eastman residents were not being classified or housed
appropriately based on their age, offense, and dangerousness to other residents.
(Id. ¶ 119.) A November 2011 audit reached similar conclusions and further
found that officials were not properly monitoring sexual offenders at Eastman.
(Id. ¶¶ 125-26.)
II.

Plaintiff’s Abuse at Eastman
Plaintiff was transferred to Eastman on March 18, 2011, and was a

resident there for approximately three months. (Id. ¶¶ 127-28.) Shortly after
his arrival, Plaintiff was placed in resident area D-4. (Id. ¶ 140.) In early April,
he was assaulted by four or five other residents in his cell after a juvenile
corrections officer (“JCO”) left the resident area door open, allowing the attack
to take place. (Id. ¶¶ 141-43.) Several days later, while Plaintiff and his dormmates were being escorted by a single JCO to the dining hall, Plaintiff was
again attacked by several residents. (Id. ¶ 146-47.) His attackers beat him and
choked him until he became unconscious. (Id. ¶ 148.) Plaintiff then reported
these attacks to Defendant Tanya Chatman, a mental health counselor at
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Eastman, as well as to Defendants Director Fran Wells and Captain Alonzo
McMillian. (Id. ¶ 149.) Plaintiff was then placed in isolation for approximately
two weeks for his protection. (Id. ¶ 151.)
Residents placed in isolation were held in a cell for twenty-three hours
per day. (Id. ¶ 134.) Plaintiff was permitted one hour of recreation by himself
in an eight by eight foot cage but was not allowed to attend school or have
contact with others while in isolation. (Id. ¶¶ 135-36.)
Upon his release from isolation, Plaintiff was placed in dorm area F-3.
(Id. ¶ 152.) In that dorm, three residents beat him while the guard on duty
watched and failed to intervene. (Id. ¶ 154.) The guard told Plaintiff to lie
about the attack. (Id. ¶ 156.) Plaintiff spoke to Chatman, who sent him to the
medical unit because the cut over his eye would not stop bleeding. (Id. ¶ 157.)
After receiving five stitches, Plaintiff returned to dorm area F-3. (Id. ¶ 160.)
His attackers were not disciplined. (Id. ¶ 159.) Later, a resident attacked
Plaintiff and tried to take his shoes. (Id. ¶ 161.) Plaintiff resisted, and another
resident came up from behind and put him in a choke hold, choking him
unconscious. (Id. ¶¶ 162-63.) Meanwhile, two guards on duty failed to

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intervene. (Id. ¶ 164.) Plaintiff was then placed back in isolation for several
days. (Id. ¶ 165.)
When Plaintiff was released, he was placed in dorm area F-1, where
another resident, an older youth named Reginald Patton, also lived. (Id. ¶ 167.)
Plaintiff alleges that Patton was known to Defendants as a violent sexual
predator. (Id. ¶ 168.) In fact, Patton had been designated as a sexual predator
at Eastman. (Id. ¶ 169.) One resident had informed Defendant Christopher
Durham, a JCO, that Patton was sexually assaulting residents at Eastman. (Id. ¶
170.) Plaintiff states that all Defendants knew of Patton’s violent sexual
behavior but still placed Plaintiff and other residents in the same dorm area with
him. (Id. ¶ 171.)
One day, Patton attacked Plaintiff in his cell. Patton beat him, pulled his
pants down, and violently groped his penis. (Id. ¶¶ 172-73.) Plaintiff fought
off Patton and fled to another area of the dorm, but Patton pursued Plaintiff with
eight or nine other residents and cornered him. (Id. ¶ 174-75.) The attackers
beat Plaintiff, held him down, stripped off his pants, and repeatedly struck his
buttocks so that his buttocks muscles would relax. (Id. ¶ 176-77.) Patton then
attempted to penetrate Plaintiff with his penis. (Id. ¶ 178.) Although Plaintiff
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fought back violently, he was brutally beaten. (Id. ¶ 179.) At the time of this
attack, the dorm was staffed with only one JCO. (Id. ¶ 180.)
Following the attack, Plaintiff was placed in isolation for three weeks.
(Id. ¶ 181-82.) While he was in solitary confinement, Plaintiff attempted to
commit suicide by placing a plastic bag over his head and trying to swallow part
of a pencil. (Id. ¶ 183.) A JCO found Plaintiff unresponsive in his cell with
saliva running out of his mouth. (Id. ¶ 184.) Emergency medical personnel
transported him to a local hospital for treatment, and after receiving treatment,
Plaintiff returned to Eastman and was placed back in isolation. (Id. ¶¶ 185-86.)
Plaintiff’s attorney visited him and observed that he was engaging in selfmutilation and had cuts and bruises all over his body. (Id. ¶ 188.) The attorney
wrote a letter to Defendant Amy Howell, the DJJ Commissioner, demanding
that Plaintiff be moved, and finally secured his transfer to a facility in Augusta.
(Id. ¶ 190.) By that point, Plaintiff had been physically and sexually assaulted
nine times. (Id. ¶ 129.)
Plaintiff filed this action on October 29, 2013, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff names
eleven Defendants: Tanya Chatman, a mental-health counselor at Eastman;
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Christopher Durham, a JCO at Eastman; Amy Howell, Commissioner of the
DJJ; Garland Hunt, former Commissioner of the DJJ; Alonzo McMillian,
Institutional Program Director at Eastman; Tracy Page, Assistant Director of
Eastman; Georgia Smith, former Director of Eastman; Frank Spearman,
Principal at Eastman; Todd Weeks, former Director of Eastman; Fran Wells,
Director of Eastman; and Ronnie Woodard, Director of Secure Campuses at the
DJJ. All Defendants are sued in their individual capacities.
Discussion
I.

Motion to Dismiss and Motion for a More Definite Statement
Standard1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” While this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual
allegations,” mere labels and conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In
order to withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient
1

As a preliminary matter, Defendant Page’s Motion to Adopt [32] and
Defendant Durham’s Motion to Adopt [34] are hereby GRANTED.
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factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint is plausible on its
face when the plaintiff pleads factual content necessary for the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. Id.
“At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as
true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273
n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). However, the same does not apply to legal conclusions set
forth in the complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. Furthermore, the court does not “accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Furthermore, “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a
pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(e). When a plaintiff alleges multiple claims against multiple defendants, a
more definite statement “will present each claim for relief in a separate count,
as required by Rule 10(b), and with such clarity and precision that the
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defendant[s] will be able to discern what the plaintiff is claiming and to frame a
responsive pleading.” Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll.,
77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted).
III.

Analysis
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights under

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by showing deliberate indifference
toward a substantial risk of harm created by Defendants’ (1) failure to provide
an adequate number of guards at Eastman (Count I); (2) improper segregation
of dangerous residents and potential victims (Count II); (3) failure to protect
Plaintiff from Reginald Patton (Count III); (4) isolating Plaintiff for extended
periods of time after he was subject to physical and sexual abuse and after a
suicide attempt (Count IV); and (5) failure to take action against various
patterns and practices of JCOs, such as allowing residents to engage in physical
altercations, instigating physical altercations, failing to report abuse, and
encouraging residents not to report abuse (Count V).
Defendants fall into three categories: (1) supervisors at the DJJ level
(Howell, Hunt, and Woodard); (2) supervisors at Eastman (McMillian, Page,
Smith, Spearman, Weeks, and Wells); and (3) non-supervisors at Eastman
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(Durham and Chatman). Plaintiff asserts Counts I and II against the
supervisory Defendants only; Count III against all Defendants; and Counts IV
and V against all Defendants except Durham, the JCO.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and fail to
provide “any clarity as to which [D]efendant is presumed to be in possession
of” knowledge about the conditions creating a substantial risk to Plaintiff,
“when or how that knowledge was acquired, or any other factual basis that
would support the conclusion that any particular Defendant could be presumed
to be charged with that knowledge.” (Defs.’ Br., Dkt. [12-1] at 10.)
Accordingly, Defendants move for a more definite statement. Moreover,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim and that Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court finds that Counts I, II, III, and V are not subject to dismissal at
this time. After reviewing Plaintiff’s allegations and entertaining oral
argument, however, the Court finds that Count IV concerning Defendants’
practice of placing Plaintiff in protective isolation following physical and
sexual assaults is subject to dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity.

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A.

Count IV: Placement of Plaintiff in Isolation
1.

Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
performing discretionary functions from being sued in their individual
capacities. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Officials are shielded
“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “To receive qualified immunity, a
government official first must prove that he was acting within his discretionary
authority.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003). Once the
government official has satisfied this initial burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to show that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at
1358. As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Defendants were all acting
within their discretionary authority both in supervising the DJJ and Eastman,
and in guarding and counseling residents.
Next, whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity is determined
by a two-step inquiry. One inquiry is “whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if
true, establish a constitutional violation.” Barnett v. City of Florence, 409 F.
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App’x 266, 270 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736
(2002)). “If the facts, construed . . . in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
show that a constitutional right has been violated, another inquiry is whether the
right violated was ‘clearly established.’ ” Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001)). “Both elements of this test must be present for an official to
lose qualified immunity, and this two-pronged analysis may be done in
whatever order is deemed most appropriate for the case.” Id. (citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241 (2009)).
2.

Deliberate-Indifference Standard

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants placed him in isolation for weeks at a
time following his abuse even though they knew “that isolation has deleterious
effects on the mental health of residents and should be limited.” (Compl., Dkt.
[1] ¶ 235.) To show that such isolation amounted to a constitutional violation,2
Plaintiff must show there was “deliberate indifference to serious medical

2

It is unclear if Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, or was serving a sentence pursuant to a conviction, in which case the
Eighth Amendment applies. The distinction is irrelevant for the purposes of
Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claims, however, because the standard under both
amendments is the same. See Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th
Cir. 1985).
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needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The analysis includes an
objective and a subjective component. “First, a plaintiff must set forth evidence
of an objectively serious medical need. Second, a plaintiff must prove that the
prison official acted with an attitude of ‘deliberate indifference’ to that serious
medical need.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
Deliberate indifference, the subjective component, is more than mere
negligence. “An official acts with deliberate indifference when he knows that
an inmate is in serious need of medical care, but he fails or refuses to obtain
medical treatment for the inmate.” Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1246 (quoting
Lancaster v. Monroe Cnty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997)). However,
“[m]edical treatment violates the eight amendment only when it is ‘so grossly
incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be
intolerable to fundamental fairness.’ Mere incidents of negligence or
malpractice do not rise to the level of constitutional violations.” Harris v.
Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted) (quoting
Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986)). Thus, deliberate
indifference has three components: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of
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serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere
negligence.” McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999).
3.

Analysis

Defendants contend that Chatman’s placement of Plaintiff in isolation to
protect him from other youths did not violate clearly established law. The
Court need not decide whether Chatman violated Plaintiff’s rights by placing
him in isolation under the circumstances present here. Rather, even assuming
that Chatman’s actions did amount to a constitutional violation, the Court finds
that such a violation was not clearly established at the time Plaintiff resided at
the Eastman YDC.
A constitutional right is clearly established “only if its contours are
‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand what he is doing
violates that right.’ ” Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). While the fact
patterns of prior cases used to show that a right is clearly established need not
be “fundamentally similar” or even “materially similar,” the salient question is
whether the law at the time of the alleged violation gave officials “fair warning”

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that their acts were unconstitutional. Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1078
(11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 740).
A plaintiff can demonstrate that the contours of the right were clearly
established in several ways. First, a plaintiff may show that “a materially
similar case has already been decided.” Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d
1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). Second, a
plaintiff can point to “a broader, clearly established principle [that] should
control the novel facts [of the] situation.” Id. (citing Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).
Finally, the conduct involved in the case may “so obviously violate[ ] th[e]
constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” Id. (citing Lee v. Ferraro, 284
F.3d 1188, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002)). Under controlling law, a plaintiff must carry
his burden by looking to the law as interpreted at the time by the United States
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Georgia Supreme Court. See id.
First, Plaintiff has not cited a materially similar case holding that placing
a juvenile in protective isolation following an attack violates clearly established
law. Nor does the Court conclude that such conduct is such an obvious
violation of the Constitution that prior case law is unnecessary. Therefore, the

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law was only clearly established if a broader, clearly established constitutional
principle controls the novel facts of this case.
At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel correctly pointed out that under the
case law, “ ‘mental health needs are no less serious than physical needs’ for the
purposes of the Eight Amendment.” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1312
(11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Indeed, “it is established that psychiatric needs can constitute serious medical
needs and that the quality of psychiatric care one receives can be so substantial
a deviation from accepted standards as to evidence deliberate indifference to
those serious psychiatric needs.” Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir.
1996). In that regard, courts have held that discontinuing prescribed
psychotropic medication “on the basis of one cursory interview and without
having reviewed any medical records” could violate the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 1270. In another case, the Eleventh Circuit explained that when “prison
personnel directly responsible for inmate care have knowledge that an inmate
has attempted, or even threatened, suicide, their failure to take steps to prevent
that inmate from committing suicide can amount to deliberate indifference.”
Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 835-36 (11th Cir. 1990). So, too, can the
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failure to provide prisoners with psychological counseling after being raped.
See LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1544 (11th Cir. 1993).
These cases, however, did not give Chatman fair warning that the
decision to place Plaintiff in isolation would violate the Constitution. In this
case, Chatman used isolation not as a punitive measure but to protect Plaintiff
from further brutality in an out-of-control juvenile detention center. Thus,
Chatman’s decision did not exhibit a total lack of care like in other deliberateindifference cases.
To be clear, the Court does not doubt that isolation exacerbates the
devastating psychological effects of sexual violence. But Chatman faced the
dilemma of returning Plaintiff to the same dorm area where the attacks
occurred, transferring Plaintiff to another dorm area where the conditions were
no better, or placing Plaintiff in isolation where, if nothing else, Plaintiff would
not be physically brutalized. Confronted with such choices, the Court cannot
say that no reasonable person would have chosen to place Plaintiff in isolation
for his own protection. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that Chatman denied
him any psychological care at all. And while Chatman and the other
Defendants could have taken better measures to care for Plaintiff’s physical and
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psychological needs, it was not obvious at the time that their actions were “so
grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to
be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505 (quoting
Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058); see also id. (noting that “incidents of negligence or
malpractice do not rise to the level of constitutional violations”). The Court
accordingly finds that Chatman did not have fair warning that putting Plaintiff
in isolation would violate a clearly established right. Consequently, Chatman
and the supervisory Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Count IV.
B.

Remaining Claims

As to Plaintiff’s remaining claims contained in Counts I, II, III, and V,
the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for More Definite Statement
[12]. For the reasons adduced at oral argument, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to
file, within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order, an Amended
Complaint tying specific facts to specific Defendants and showing how the facts
contained in the Complaint relate to Plaintiff’s causes of action, including the
causal connection between Defendants’ alleged acts or omissions and Plaintiff’s
alleged constitutional deprivations.

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Because Plaintiff will file an Amended Complaint, Defendants’ Motion
to Strike [12] and Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Portions of Defendants’ Reply
Brief or, in the Alternative, for Leave to File Surreply [38] are DENIED, as
moot. Finally, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [12] is GRANTED as to Count
IV and DENIED as to all other counts, with the right to refile as to the other
claims, at which point the Court will review the motion to dismiss under the
facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Page’s Motion to Adopt [32],
Defendant Durham’s Motion to Adopt [34], and Defendants’ Motion for More
Definite Statement [12] are GRANTED. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [12]
is GRANTED as to Count IV and DENIED as to all other counts with right to
refile. Furthermore, Defendants’ Motion to Strike [12] and Plaintiff’s Motion
to Exclude Portions of Defendants’ Reply Brief or, in the Alternative, for Leave
to File Surreply [38] are DENIED, as moot.
Finally, Plaintiff is ORDERED to file an Amended Complaint as set
forth above within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order.

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SO ORDERED, this 11th

day of August, 2014.

________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge

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