Ramsey v. Wallace Electric Company, LLC et al
Filing
35
OPINION AND ORDER that Defendants' 25 Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's claim for overtime pay under the FLSA is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 3/27/2015. (anc)
from November 18, 2010, through December 4, 2013.1 Plaintiff also claims she is
entitled, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), to liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and the
costs of this litigation.
On June 16, 2010, Plaintiff began working for WEC, a small business in
McDonough, Georgia, that provides electrical services, including service repair
work, preventive maintenance, electrical systems design and electrical renovations.
Defendant P. Wallace is Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of WEC.
Plaintiff did not have a formal title at WEC, but had various responsibilities in
running WEC’s day-to-day business. When Plaintiff was hired by WEC, she
understood she would be paid a salary. Plaintiff’s starting salary was $570.00 per
week, later raised to $620.00 per week. WEC ranged in size from fifty to
ninety-one employees. The majority of WEC’s employees are electrical
technicians who perform electrical work for WEC’s clients at the clients’ place of
business. WEC had six (6) office workers who performed administrative tasks,
and assisted in the day-to-day management of WEC’s business. Plaintiff was one
of the six office workers.
Plaintiff worked in WEC’s business office and had a variety of
1
Plaintiff’s last day at WEC was on December 4, 2013. Ramsey Dep. Tr. at
35: 23-25.
2
administrative responsibilities. Debbie Wallace was the office manager, and was
Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor. Plaintiff’s responsibilities at WEC were not
prescribed by any written handbooks or formal policies. She described her job
duties in a memorandum she prepared dated July 27, 2011. Ramsey Dep. Tr.
118-119., Ex. 6.
Defendant P. Wallace testified at his deposition that the employees, who
worked in the business office, including Plaintiff, “managed a very vital area of the
business that was critical to the financial well-being of the company.” Wallace
Dep. Tr. 23: 11-14. P. Wallace also stated that the employees in the business
office, including Plaintiff, “had to make decisions downstream, people under them
had to get approval from them. So they had to report to them, and their say so is
what stuck.” Id. at 23: 17-19. For example, although Wallace acknowledged that
he had the final decision-making authority at WEC, Wallace believed Plaintiff
independently handled:
[a]nything as far as information that they may need or directions to be
given from, you know, new hire-packages of forms to be filled out,
directions of how to fill them out, insurance that they have to deal
with with the men, their time as far as getting recorded properly and
turned in properly, pay rates, all of that stuff was in Rebecca’s hands.
Id. at 26: 1-11.
Plaintiff admits that one of her most “significant” and “valuable” duties was
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“talking to a customer.” Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts (“SOMF”) at ¶ 130;
Wallace Dep. Tr. 73: 18-74: 4. Plaintiff was responsible for service call intakes.
She interacted with WEC’s customers by answering the telephone, collecting
customer information, inquiring about customer needs, confirming the availability
of technicians, and creating purchase orders that were posted on a job board for
assignments. See Ramsey Dep. Tr. 53: 4-12-54: 1-10. After purchase orders were
posted, a lead technician assigned technicians to particular jobs. Pl.’s SOMF at
¶ 52.
Although Plaintiff did not place supply orders, she ensured that supplies
were properly delivered by manually matching items received against the packing
list delivered with the supplies. Id. at ¶ 94. After verifying delivery, Plaintiff
physically moved each item to the correct wooden pallet for the particular job for
which the supplies were ordered. Id. at ¶ 95. Plaintiff informed supervisors that
their supplies had arrived, with supervisors being responsible for directing the
materials to the correct job site. Id. at ¶¶ 96-97.
Plaintiff also received invoices for materials ordered for each job, confirmed
the materials required were ordered for jobs, and validated that the time spent on
each job was posted correctly to the job. Defs.’ SOMF at ¶ 44. Plaintiff also was
responsible for reviewing the time technicians billed on invoices and she matched
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the time billed on the invoices to the technicians’ time-sheets [sic]. Id. at ¶ 56.
Plaintiff was responsible for identifying any discrepancies in a time-sheet [sic] or
an invoice, and Defendants relied on her to make sure that the time billed on
invoices was accurate. See Ramsey Dep. Tr. 62: 6-25. “It was rare” for her
manager, Debbie Wallace, to review invoices before they were sent to a customer
and Wallace only reviewed invoices if a customer complained. Id. at 63: 5-10.
Plaintiff described “post[ing] invoices” as her “main job,” and stated that WEC’s
“whole business was built around ordering materials to place on jobs.” Id. at 66:
15-16; 67: 23-25-68: 1.
Some of WEC’s projects required a permit from the state, city or local
governments. Plaintiff prepared the documentation required to obtain these
governmental permits, and consulted with the local government to “find out how
much everything would cost, break it all down.” Id. at 80: 13-20. She also called
the government when lines were required to be marked before work was performed
by WEC employees. Pl.’s SOMF at ¶ 72.
Plaintiff also performed a variety of Human Resources (“HR”) functions.
She was responsible for managing WEC’s insurance benefits program, tracking
employee vacation hours, and informing WEC’s employees whether they were
eligible for vacation time requested. Pl.’s SOMF at ¶¶ 84-86. Plaintiff was
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responsible for preparing separation notices for employees after determining they
were no longer employed by the company. Id. at ¶¶ 114-115. Plaintiff
communicated with employees about WEC’s insurance plan choices, enrolled
employees in the plans, tracked insurance claims, and answered questions
regarding WEC’s health benefits. Defs.’ SOMF at ¶¶ at 76-77. Plaintiff verified
WEC’s list of insured employees and ensured that employees, who left WEC’s
employment, were removed from the company’s insurance plan. Id. at ¶ 78.
Plaintiff made recommendations to senior management that certain employees be
terminated on three or four occasions while she was at WEC. Id. at ¶ 96.
B.
Procedural History
On June 27, 2014, Defendants moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claim for overtime pay under the FLSA. Defendants contend that Plaintiff is an
administrative employee exempt under the FLSA because her primary duties were
office work directly related to the management or general business operations of
WEC, and she exercised discretion and independent judgment regarding matters of
significance in the performance of her duties. On August 1, 2014, Plaintiff
responded to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and argued that she is
not exempt from the FLSA because she primarily performed clerical or secretarial
work that did not involve the exercise of discretion or independent judgment.
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II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Parties “asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support that assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Herzog v. Castle Rock
Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). Once the moving party has met this
burden, the non-movant must demonstrate that summary judgment is inappropriate
by designating specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Graham v. State
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). Non-moving parties
“need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however,
[they] may not merely rest on [their] pleadings.” Id.
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The Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion and must draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant, but
only “to the extent supportable by the record.” Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d
1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8
(2007)). “[C]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing
of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury . . . .” Graham, 193 F.3d at
1282. “If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must
deny the motion and proceed to trial.” Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1246. But, “[w]here
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party,” summary judgment for the moving party is proper. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
B.
Analysis
The FLSA generally mandates that employees who work more than forty
hours in a week must receive overtime pay for those hours worked in excess of
forty, at a rate of one and one-half times their regular wage. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
The overtime requirements do not apply to employees working in a bona fide
executive, administrative, or professional capacity, otherwise known as “exempt”
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff
regularly worked more than forty hours a week, or that Defendants did not pay
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overtime wages for the hours Plaintiff worked in excess of forty hours a week.
The parties dispute whether Defendants properly classified Plaintiff as exempt
under the FLSA.
Whether an employee is properly classified as an “employee employed in a
bona fide administrative capacity,” and thus an “exempt” employee depends on the
application of regulations issued by the Department of Labor. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.2. These regulations are given controlling weight unless they are found to be
arbitrary, capricious or contrary to the statute. See Gregory v. First Title of
America, Inc., 555 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2009). An employee is “employed
in a bona fide administrative capacity,” and thus exempt from FLSA’s overtime
requirements, if the employee is:
(1) Compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $455 per
week . . . exclusive of board, lodging or other facilities;
(2) Whose primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual
work directly related to the management or general business
operations of the employer or the employer’s customers; and
(3) Whose primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and
independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.
29 C.F.R. § 541.200.
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was compensated on a salary basis of more
than $455 per week. The issues are only whether the performance of office or nonmanual work was Plaintiff’s primary duty, and whether she exercised discretion
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and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. The
administrative exemption is an affirmative defense that Defendants bear the burden
of proving. See Rock v. Ray Anthony Int’l, LLC, 380 F. App’x 875, 877 (11th
Cir. 2010); Hogan v. Allstate Ins., 361 F.3d 621, 625 (11th Cir. 2004). The Court
interprets the FLSA liberally in favor of an employee, and its exemptions are
construed narrowly against the employer. Id.
1.
Primary Duty
“The phrase ‘directly related to the management or general business
operations of the employer or the employer’s customers,’ refers to the type of work
directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of the business, as
distinguished, for example, from working on a manufacturing production line or
selling a product in a retail or service establishment.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a). An
example of such work, includes, but is not limited to:
functional areas such as tax; finance; accounting; budgeting; auditing;
insurance; quality control; purchasing; procurement; advertising;
marketing; research; safety and health; personnel management; human
resources; employee benefits; labor relations; public relations,
government relations; computer network, internet and database
administration; legal and regulatory compliance; and similar activities.
29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b).
The regulations define “primary duty” as the “principal, main, major or most
important duty that the employee performs.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). The
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regulations provide:
Determination of an employee’s primary duty must be based on all the
facts in a particular case, with the major emphasis on the character of
the employee’s job as a whole. Factors to consider when determining
the primary duty of an employee include, but are not limited to, the
relative importance of the exempt duties as compared with other types
of duties; the amount of time spent performing exempt work; the
employee’s relative freedom from direct supervision; and the
relationship between the employee’s salary and the wages paid to
other employees for the kind of nonexempt work performed by the
employee.
29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a).
“Production work relates to the goods and services that the business
contributes to the marketplace, whereas administration relates to running the
business.” Rock, 380 F. App’x at 878 (citations omitted). The Court concludes
that there is no genuine issue of fact that Plaintiff’s primary duty was to perform
work that is “directly related to the management or general business operations of
[WEC] or [WEC’s] customers.” See 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a). In Hogan, the
Eleventh Circuit held that a sales employee’s duties are administrative if the
majority of the employee’s time is spent on advising customers, hiring and training
staff, delegating matters to other employees and determining the salary of
employees. 361 F.3d at 627. In Rock, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of an employer because the employee
performed administrative functions that were “at the heart of [the employer’s]
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business” and “necessary to [the employer’s] business operations.” 380 F. App’x
at 877-79. The employee’s primary job duties, in Rock, “included customer
communication, choosing the appropriate crane for specific jobs, assigning
operators to cranes, overseeing other employees, preparing and reviewing job
tickets, and maintaining the crane rental schedule.” Id. at 877.
There is no dispute here that “post[ing] invoices” was Plaintiff’s “main job,”
and WEC’s “whole business was built around ordering materials to place on jobs.”
Ramsey Dep. Tr. at 66: 15-16; 67: 23-25-68: 1. Plaintiff’s duties were exclusively
administrative in nature. Plaintiff was responsible for service call intakes,
preparing purchase orders and invoices, inventorying WEC’s supplies, reviewing
WEC’s bills, obtaining permits, and performing a host of HR-related duties.
Plaintiff’s responsibilities are listed as administrative work under the regulations
because she performed work in areas such as auditing, quality control, personnel
management, human resources, employee benefits and regulatory compliance. See
29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b). Plaintiff generally worked free of direct supervision. See
29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a).
Eleventh Circuit precedent also supports that Plaintiff’s primary duties at
WEC were administrative. See Hogan, 361 F.3d at 627; Rock, 380 F. App’x at
878-79; see also Viola v. Comprehensive Health Mgmt., Inc., 441 F. App’x 660,
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662-63 (11th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff’s position qualified under the functions of
advertising, marketing, public relations, and legal and regulatory compliance
because plaintiff admitted to promoting the company’s brand, scheduled and
hosted promotional events, advertised the events, and ensured that the promotional
events complied with Medicare regulations).
The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s primary duties at WEC directly related
to the management or general business operations of WEC.
2.
Exercise of Discretion and Independent Judgment
29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a) provides:
To qualify for the administrative exemption, an employee’s primary
duty must include the exercise of discretion and independent
judgment with respect to matters of significance. In general, the
exercise of discretion and independent judgment involves the
comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct, and
acting or making a decision after the various possibilities have been
considered. The term “matters of significance” refers to the level of
importance or consequence of the work performed.
29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a).
“The phrase ‘discretion and independent judgment’ must be applied in light of all
the facts involved in the particular employment situation in which the question
arises.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b). In determining whether an employee exercises
discretion and independent judgment regarding matters of significance, the Court
considers the following non-exhaustive factors:
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Whether the employee has authority to formulate, affect, interpret, or
implement management policies or operating practices; whether the
employee carries out major assignments in conducting the operations
of the business; whether the employee performs work that affects
business operations to a substantial degree, even if the employee’s
assignments are related to operation of a particular segment of the
business; whether the employee has authority to commit the employer
in matters that have significant financial impact; whether the
employee has authority to waive or deviate from established policies
and procedures without prior approval; whether the employee has
authority to negotiate and bind the company on significant matters;
whether the employee provides consultation or expert advice to
management; whether the employee is involved in planning long or
short-term business objectives; whether the employee investigates and
resolves matters of significance on behalf of management; and
whether the employee represents the company in handling complaints,
arbitrating disputes or resolving grievances.
29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b).
“The exercise of discretion and independent judgment implies that the
employee has authority to make an independent choice, free from immediate
direction and supervision. However, employees can exercise discretion and
independent judgment even if their decisions or recommendations are reviewed at
a higher level . . . the fact that an employee’s decision may be subject to review
and that upon occasion the decisions are revised or reversed after review does not
mean that the employee is not exercising discretion and independent judgment.”
29 C.F.R. § 541.202)(c). An employee’s decisions made through the exercise of
discretion and independent judgment may consist of recommendations made to
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senior management. Id.
The exercise of discretion does not include “clerical or secretarial work,
recording or tabulating data, or performing other mechanical, repetitive, recurrent
or routine work.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(e). “An employee does not exercise
discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance merely
because the employer will experience financial losses if the employee fails to
perform the job properly. For example, a messenger who is entrusted with
carrying large sums of money does not exercise discretion and independent
judgment . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(f).
Plaintiff principally argues that she did not exercise discretion or
independent judgment because she performed mechanical tasks that were clerical
and secretarial in nature, and that Plaintiff did not have authority to make vital
decisions such as changing price quotes, approving invoices, ordering supplies,
setting company policy for vacation time, selecting insurance plans, and assigning
specific jobs to specific technicians. The fact that Plaintiff was not the final
decision-maker on aspects of WEC’s business does not mean that she is not an
exempt employee. See Rock, 380 F. App’x at 880 (noting that evidence supported
that plaintiff did not exercise discretion and independent judgment on some aspects
of his job, but holding that sufficient evidence existed to show that plaintiff
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exercised substantial control over the day-to-day operations of the company).
Plaintiff’s argument that she did not exercise discretion or independent
judgment because she was required to obtain approval from her supervisors on
certain matters of significance is without merit. In Hogan, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the fact that an employee’s actions are subject to review by a superior
does not mean that an employee does not exercise discretion or independent
judgment. 361 F.3d at 627; see also Henry v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 698 F.3d 897,
900-01 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that active supervision does not mean that an
employee does not exercise discretion, and an employer’s use of “various methods
to channel” an employee’s discretion does not “eliminate the exercise of that
discretion.”); Dymond v. U.S. Postal Serv., 670 F.2d 93, 96 (8th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff’s argument that she did not make her own independent decisions is
also contradicted by her testimony. At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she
exercised judgment in creating invoices, determined whether there was a
discrepancy in a time-sheet or an invoice, and that Defendants relied on her to
ensure that the time billed on invoices was accurate. See Ramsey Dep. Tr.
62: 6-25. Plaintiff stated that “it was rare” for her manager, Debbie Wallace, to
review the invoices before they were sent to a customer and that Wallace reviewed
an invoice only if a customer complained about the charges. Id. at 63: 5-10.
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Plaintiff described “posting invoices” as her “main job” and admitted that WEC’s
“whole business was built around ordering material to place on jobs.” Id. at 66:
15-16; 67: 23-25-68:1. In other words, Plaintiff concedes that her role in creating
invoices was crucial to the business operations of WEC and that she “perform[ed]
work that affect[ed] business operations to a substantial degree, even if [] [her]
assignments [we]re related to operation of a particular segment of the business.”
See 29 C.F.R. § 541.202)(b); see also Cue-Lipin v. Callanwolde Foundation, Inc.,
1 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1361-62 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (concluding that plaintiff exercised
discretion and independent judgment by performing work that affected “business
operations to a substantial degree” because, in overseeing the rental department,
plaintiff generated substantial revenue for the employer).
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s deposition and the memorandum she
prepared describing her duties at WEC are consistent with P. Wallace’s testimony.
P. Wallace acknowledged that he had oversight over most matters at WEC, but he
provided examples to support that Plaintiff exercised discretion and independent
judgment on discrete tasks that were critical to the day-to-day running of WEC’s
business. See Wallace Dep. Tr. 26-1-11. Plaintiff does not directly dispute this
testimony, but characterizes her responsibilities as involving no use of discretion or
independent judgment simply because she had an immediate supervisor with
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oversight responsibilities.
Plaintiff does not dispute that one of her most “significant” and “valuable”
duties was talking to the customer. Pl.’s SOMF at ¶ 130. Her responsibility to
handle service call intakes and coordinate jobs were tasks that were critical to the
day-to-day operations of WEC, and Plaintiff “had the authority to bind the
company on significant matters” because she facilitated and arranged the sale of
WEC’s services. See Johnson v. Haley, No. 1-12-cv-1450-TWT, 2013 WL
2445164, at *2 (N.D Ga. June 5, 2013) (finding that plaintiffs exercised discretion
and independent judgment because scheduling appointments was crucial to the
operation of defendants’ medical practice).
Plaintiff also exercised discretion and independent judgment in fulfilling her
HR-related functions. Plaintiff solely was responsible for managing all aspects of
WEC’s employer-based insurance plan. Plaintiff determined whether employees
were eligible for vacation, prepared separation notices after determining whether
an employee was still employed by WEC and she made recommendations
regarding whether certain employees were required to be terminated. In
performing her HR-related responsibilities, Plaintiff “implement[ed] [WEC’s]
management policies or operating practices,” See 29 C.F.R. § 541.202)(b); 29
C.F.R. § 541.203(e) (explaining that “human resources managers who formulate,
18
interpret or implement employment policies . . . generally meet the duties
requirements for the administrative exemption); see also Lockaby v. Top Source
Oil Analysis Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1469, 1471-72 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding that
employee’s duties involved the exercise of discretion and independent judgment
because employee was responsible for personnel matters, benefits matters, payroll
administration and human resources administration).
Plaintiff served as the functional interface with Defendants’ customers by
responding to questions, assuring the accuracy of invoices and ensuring the receipt
and delivery of supplies. These customer care functions are important to the
management of Defendants’ business and their customer relationships which are
critical to a small business. Plaintiff had the important role of interacting with
state, city and local government offices to obtain permits required for WEC and its
employees to perform its electrical work. She also prepared the information to
support permit applications.
Plaintiff’s primary duties were related to, and were important and significant
to, the day-to-day operations of WEC’s business, and they required the exercise of
discretion and independent judgment. That she performed important
administrative functions and exercised discretion and independent judgment is
confirmed by the detailed description of her duties as a WEC employee that she
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prepared on July 27, 2011. This list convincingly supports she is an exempt
administrative employee.2 Plaintiff qualifies for the administrative exemption, and
she is thus exempt from the FLSA’s requirement of overtime compensation for
employment in excess of 40 hours.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, having considered the facts in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, and determined that no reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff was not
an exempt administrative employee,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for overtime pay under the FLSA is GRANTED
[25].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED.
2
This description and Plaintiff’s deposition put in context the recast duties
description in the affidavit Plaintiff submitted in opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Court considered the affidavit as true but supplemented
it by the details provided in Plaintiff’s deposition and self-authored job description.
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SO ORDERED this 27th day of March, 2015.
_______________________________
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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