Brooks v. Atlas Roofing Corporation

Filing 42

OPINION AND ORDER denying Motion to Certify Class (306) in case 1:13-md-02495-TWT / (36) in case 1:14-cv-00001-TWT. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 6/8/2017. Associated Cases: 1:13-md-02495-TWT, 1:14-cv-00001-TWT(jkl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
IN RE ATLAS ROOFING
MDL DOCKET NO. 2495
CORPORATION CHALET SHINGLE 1:13-md-2495-TWT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION
NOBLE L. BROOKS, JR.
on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:14-CV-1-TWT

ATLAS ROOFING CORPORATION,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This is a multi-district class action arising out of the marketing and sale of
allegedly defective roofing shingles. It is before the Court on the Plaintiff Noble
Brooks, Jr.’s Motion for Class Certification [Doc. 36]. However, the Court finds that
it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s case. Consequently, the
case should be DISMISSED. The Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification [Doc. 36]
is DENIED as moot.

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I. Background
The Plaintiff and putative class members are purchasers of Atlas Chalet and
Stratford Shingles (“Shingles”). The Defendant Atlas Roofing Corporation (“Atlas”)
– a Mississippi corporation – designed, manufactured, and sold the Shingles.1 Atlas
represented and continues to represent that the Shingles are durable, reliable, free from
defects, and compliant with industry standards and building codes.2 The Plaintiff
alleges that the Shingles were defective at the time of sale due to a flaw in the
manufacturing process.3 The Plaintiff further alleges that despite Atlas’s knowledge
of the defect, Atlas did nothing to correct the defective design and continued to market
and warrant the Shingles as durable.4
The named Plaintiff Noble Brooks, Jr., who is a resident of Yazoo City,
Mississippi, had the Shingles installed on his home in 2006.5 In 2013, his roof began
to leak, resulting in damage to his home.6 That same year, he paid to repair the leaks.7
1

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 25.

2

Id. ¶ 2.

3

Id. ¶ 3.

4

Id.

5

Id. ¶¶ 19-20.

6

Brooks Dep., at 44.

7

Id. at 113.

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Eventually, the Plaintiff filed a warranty claim with the Defendant.8 On November
11, 2013, the Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated in the state of Mississippi.9 He seeks to bring his suit as a class action.
Because similar consumer class actions were filed in other states, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all related class actions pending in federal court
to this Court for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.10
The Defendant brought a motion to dismiss. It argued, inter alia, that the Court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).11
Specifically, it argued that the Plaintiff had not demonstrated minimal diversity. The
Court disagreed. It found that because the Plaintiff’s requested class is not limited to
Mississippi citizens, “the allegations in the Amended Complaint give rise to a
plausible inference that there is a non-Mississippi citizen that owns a structure in
Mississippi containing Chalet Shingles.”12 Thus, the Court concluded that it could not

8

Id. at 76-78, 137-140.

9

See [Doc. 1] under 1:14-cv-00001-TWT.

10

See Transfer Order [Doc. 1] under No. 1:13-md-02495-TWT.

11

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).

12

See [Doc. 30], at 5.

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dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at the motion to
dismiss stage. Now, the Defendant raises the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction in its
response to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification. It – once again – argues that
the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate there is minimal diversity.
II. Legal Standard
Federal district courts have limited jurisdiction.13 Attacks on subject-matter
jurisdiction come in two forms: “facial attacks” and “factual attacks.”14 Facial attacks
“require[] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a
basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as
true for the purpose of the motion.”15 On a facial attack, therefore, a plaintiff is
afforded safeguards similar to those provided in opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.16
“‘Facial attacks,’ on the other hand, challenge ‘the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings,

13

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

14

Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D.’s P.A., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261
(11th Cir. 1997); Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990).
15

Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,
613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)).
16

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981).

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such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.’”17 The presumption of truthfulness
does not attach to the plaintiff’s allegations.18 Further, “the existence of disputed
material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of
jurisdictional claims.”19
III. Discussion
Under the Class Action Fairness Act, “federal courts now have original
jurisdiction over class actions in which [1] the amount in controversy exceeds
$5,000,000 and [2] there is minimal diversity (at least one plaintiff and one defendant
are from different states).”20 The minimal diversity requirement may be met when
“only one member of the plaintiff class – named or unnamed – . . . [is] diverse from
any one defendant.”21 Because the Plaintiff filed his class action in federal court,

17

Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 511).

18

Id.

19

Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960 (11th Cir. 1999).

20

Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)).
21

Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1193 n.24 (11th Cir.

2007).
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relying on CAFA, he must show by a preponderance of the evidence that minimal
diversity is present.22
Here, it is undisputed that both the Plaintiff and the Defendant are citizens of
Mississippi.23 Thus, for minimal diversity to exist, at least one non-Mississippi citizen
needs to be a class member. Because the case is past the motion to dismiss stage, the
Plaintiff cannot rely on favorable inferences from his Complaint. The Plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such a class member exists.
Nevertheless, the Plaintiff has failed to identify a single non-Mississippi citizen that
would be a member of the class. Nor has the Court seen any evidence that suggests
such a class member exists. The Plaintiff counters in his reply brief that it was
inappropriate for the Defendant to raise the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction at the
motion for class certification stage. The Plaintiff states “[a] class certification motion
is not the correct procedural vehicle in which to debate this issue,” because “the Court

22

See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 104 (1998)
(noting that “the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing
its existence”); Evans, 449 F.3d at 1164 (“CAFA does not change the traditional rule
that the party seeking to remove the case to federal court bears the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction.”); Heretick v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 841 F.
Supp. 2d 1247, 1249 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“If Publix shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that the action concerns minimally diverse parties . . . CAFA presumes the
action fit for federal court.”).
23

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 25.

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should refrain from addressing issues not relevant to the issues that may be raised by
a motion to certify the class.”24 But subject-matter jurisdiction must be present
throughout the entire case.25 Thus, the Defendant did not err by arguing that the Court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in its response brief to the Plaintiff’s Motion for
Class Certification. In sum, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
minimal diversity and thus it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s
action.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiff Noble Brooks, Jr.’s case is
DISMISSED. The Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification [Doc. 36] is DENIED as
moot.
SO ORDERED, this 8 day of June, 2017.

/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge

24

Pl.’s Reply Br., at 3 (quoting Rivera v. Washington Mut. Bank, 637 F.
Supp. 2d 256, 263 (D.N.J. 2009)).
25

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the Court determines at any time that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
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