Wilkerson v. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Filing 4

ORDER DISMISSING CASE without prejudice. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Consequently, this action is frivolous and is dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 5/14/2014. (cem)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
CAROL WILKERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:14-CV-00829-RWS

ORDER
On April 1, 2014, Magistrate Judge Walter E. Johnson granted Plaintiff
leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action. The Complaint is now before
the Court for a frivolity determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
After reviewing the record, the Court enters the following Order.
Discussion
The Court’s review of Plaintiff’s Complaint for frivolity is governed by
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to this Code section, “the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action . . . (i)
is frivolous or malicious [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

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granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A claim is frivolous when it appears
from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are “clearly baseless”
or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” While this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual
allegations,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, her “pleadings are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be
liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998). “This leniency, however, does not require or allow courts to rewrite
an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Thomas v.
Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 393 F. App’x 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff Carol Wilkerson alleges that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) and its employees conspired to commit fraud in
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connection with Plaintiff’s paperwork and the investigations of her charges.
Specifically, Plaintiff points to the EEOC’s Atlanta director, Bernice
Kimbrough-Williams, and several EEOC attorneys. It appears that the EEOC
determined that her employer had not violated any laws, declined to issue her a
right-to-sue letter, and failed to consider certain personal data in making their
decision. The EEOC’s allegedly fraudulent acts spanned a period of seventeen
years. While Plaintiff has attempted to call and visit the EEOC’s Atlanta and
Savannah offices to resolve her problems, she has been unsuccessful.
Assuming that all of Plaintiff’s allegations are true, the Court nonetheless
finds that the EEOC is immune from suit. Neither the United States nor federal
administrative agencies may be sued absent an unequivocal waiver of their
sovereign immunity. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Congress has
waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity in limited circumstances,
such as where the government is the employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).
But here Plaintiff does not allege that the EEOC was her employer. See Reeves
v. DSI Sec. Servs., 331 F. App’x 659, 661 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that a
plaintiff could not obtain relief against the EEOC under Title VII because the
EEOC was not his employer and there was no evidence in the record that the
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EEOC had waived sovereign immunity (citing Gibson v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co.,
579 F.2d 890, 891 (5th Cir. 1978))). Moreover, “[n]umerous courts have held
that there is no private right of action against the EEOC for claims that the
EEOC and its officers should be held responsible for failure to investigate
employment-related claims adequately.” Dowling v. U.S. EEOC, No. 12-cv01328-BNB, 2012 WL 1987266, at *1 (D. Colo. June 4, 2012); see also
Darbeau v. Library of Cong., 453 F. Supp. 2d 168, 170 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding
that the EEOC can only be sued as an employer, and “Title VII does not vest
federal courts with jurisdiction over suits against the EEOC for other causes,
such as agency inaction”). Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against the EEOC. Consequently, this action
is frivolous and is due to be DISMISSED without prejudice.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED, this 14th day of May, 2014.

________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge
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