Chancy v. Bruno et al
Filing
85
OPINION AND ORDER denying 53 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, granting 70 Motion for Summary Judgment, granting 75 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 5/8/15. (dr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
DONTAVIUS CHANCY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:14-CV-1083-TWT
JEFF BRUNO
in his individual capacity, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a race discrimination action. It is before the Court on the Plaintiff
Dontavius Chancy’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 53], the Defendant
Jeff Bruno’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 70], and the Defendant Jeff
Bruno’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 75]. For the reasons set forth
below, the Plaintiff Dontavius Chancy’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc.
53] is DENIED, the Defendant Jeff Bruno’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 70]
is GRANTED, and the Defendant Jeff Bruno’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
[Doc. 75] is GRANTED.
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I. Background
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This case arises out of an altercation that took place between the Plaintiff
Dontavius Chancy and three other individuals in the parking lot of a bar located in
Covington, Georgia. The Plaintiff claims that, on April 29, 2012, three men – Russell
Payne, Brian Ragan, and Michael Jones – followed him as he left a bar, and began
threatening him. The Plaintiff claims that their motivation was race-related. A conflict
broke out – both verbal and physical – although the parties disagree as to its details.
However, all parties agree that the Plaintiff displayed a firearm to the other three men
during the encounter. The Plaintiff later filed a report with the Covington Police
Department, which indicated that he had been “battered by three white males.”1 The
Defendant Jeff Bruno was assigned the case, and he began an investigation.2 As part
of his investigation, the Defendant interviewed the Plaintiff and the other participants
in the altercation.3 During their interviews, Ragan, Payne, and Jones told the
Defendant that the Plaintiff had pointed a firearm at them.4
Based on the findings of his investigation, the Defendant decided there was
probable cause to charge Ragan and Payne for battery, and probable cause to charge
1
Def.’s Statement of Facts in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ¶ 3.
2
Def.’s Statement of Facts in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ¶ 4.
3
Def.’s Statement of Facts in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ¶ 5.
4
Def.’s Statement of Facts in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ¶
8; see also Pl.’s Statement of Facts ¶ 5.
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the Plaintiff for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102, which states that “[a] person is guilty
of a misdemeanor when he intentionally and without legal justification points or aims
a gun or pistol at another, whether the gun or pistol is loaded or unloaded.” The
Defendant then applied for and secured arrest warrants for the Plaintiff, Payne, and
Ragan.5 On April 10, 2013, all of the charges against all three parties were dismissed.6
The Plaintiff brought suit against the Defendant Jeff Bruno, as well as Russell
Payne, Brian Ragan, and Michael Jones. The Plaintiff asserted claims for (1) false
arrest (section 1983), (2) access-to-courts (section 1983), and (3) unlawful
discrimination (section 1981). The Defendant Jeff Bruno now moves for summary
judgment.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and
affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue of material fact exists
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.7 The court should view
the evidence and any inferences that may be drawn in the light most favorable to the
5
Def.’s Statement of Facts in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ¶ 12;
Pl.’s Statement of Facts ¶¶ 11-12.
6
Def.’s Statement of Facts in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ¶ 13.
7
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
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nonmovant.8 The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds that
show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.9 The burden then shifts to the
nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to
show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist.10 A “mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence
supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be a sufficient
showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.”11
III. Discussion
A. Malicious Prosecution (section 1983)
As an initial matter, the Plaintiff frames his claim as one for false arrest.
However, the Eleventh Circuit has clarified that when a section 1983 action is based
on an arrest made pursuant to a warrant, the proper claim is for malicious prosecution,
not false arrest.12 Thus, the Court will assess the Plaintiff’s claim under the legal
8
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970).
9
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
10
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
11
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990).
12
See Carter v. Gore, 557 Fed. Appx. 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The
issuance of a warrant . . . even an invalid one . . . constitutes legal process, and thus,
where an individual has been arrested pursuant to a warrant, his claim is for malicious
prosecution rather than false arrest.”); Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 585 n.7 (11th
Cir. 1996) (“An arrest following the issuance of an information is an arrest as part of
a prosecution . . . [and so] [w]here an arrest is made after the filing of an information
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standard for malicious prosecution. To establish a malicious prosecution claim under
section 1983, “the plaintiff must prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable seizures in addition to the elements of the common law tort
of malicious prosecution.”13 The “constituent elements of the common law tort of
malicious prosecution include[]: (1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by
the present defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated
in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.”14
However, there may be no section 1983 liability if an officer is entitled to qualified
immunity.15 To defeat a qualified immunity defense, the Plaintiff must show that the
alleged constitutional violation was “clearly established.”16 For a violation to be
“clearly established,” the “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”17 Thus,
in this context, the Defendant “will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is
and the arrest is the basis of a Fourth Amendment section 1983 claim . . . the tort of
malicious prosecution is the most analogous tort to the section 1983 claim.”).
13
Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003).
14
Id. at 881-82.
15
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
16
See id. at 232.
17
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
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obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant
should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue,
immunity should be recognized.”18 The “qualified immunity defense is a question of
law to be decided by the court.”19
Here, the Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. In particular, the Plaintiff
has failed to establish that no reasonably competent officer would have believed there
was probable cause to support an arrest warrant for the Plaintiff. As noted above,
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102 indicates that “[a] person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he
intentionally and without legal justification points or aims a gun or pistol at another,
whether the gun or pistol is loaded or unloaded.”20 There is no dispute that the
Plaintiff “point[ed] . . . a gun . . . at another,” and so the only issue is whether a
reasonably competent officer could have believed, based on the available evidence,
that the Plaintiff did it without legal justification. In making his decision, the
Defendant considered the testimony of all participants in the altercation. In his
interview, Ragan indicated that the Plaintiff and Payne were simply exchanging words
when the Plaintiff went into his vehicle, retrieved his firearm, and pointed it at
18
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
19
Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir. 1991).
20
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102 (emphasis added).
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Payne.21 Ragan testified that the physical contact only took place after the Plaintiff
displayed his gun.22 In Payne’s interview, Payne confirmed this version of the
events.23 Even more, Jones testified that he was actually in the process of pushing
Ragan and Payne away from the Plaintiff when the Plaintiff chose to retrieve his
firearm.24 Although the Plaintiff indicated that he felt threatened, it is certainly not
obvious that no reasonably competent officer – based on all of the evidence – would
have concluded that there was probable cause for arresting the Plaintiff under
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102.
The Plaintiff makes a number of arguments in response. First, the Plaintiff
argues that the affidavit that the Defendant submitted to the Magistrate Judge was
“conclusory,” and did not include evidence justifying a finding of probable cause.25
However, “qualified immunity is not lost when all the evidence available to the officer
establishes at least arguable probable cause, even if this evidence is not listed in an
21
Bruno Aff., Ex. B at 8.
22
Bruno Aff., Ex. B at 9.
23
Bruno Aff., Ex. C at 5-6, 9-10.
24
Bruno Aff., Ex. D at 10-11.
25
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 3.
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affidavit.”26 The Plaintiff then argues that the Defendant admitted – in the Defendant’s
deposition – that the Plaintiff likely pointed the gun at the other men in order to
defend himself.27 But this does not mean that the Defendant admitted that the
Plaintiff’s act of self-defense was legally justified under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102. More
importantly, for the qualified immunity inquiry, the Defendant’s admission does not
show that no reasonable officer would have believed that the Plaintiff pointed his gun
at another without legal justification.
Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant, by failing to include certain
information in the affidavit supporting the warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment
as per the Supreme Court’s decision in Franks v. Delaware.28 In particular, the
Plaintiff points out that the Defendant did not notify the Magistrate Judge that the
Plaintiff was surrounded by three men and was subject to racial slurs. In Franks v.
Delaware, the “Supreme Court . . . held that the Constitution prohibits an officer from
making perjurious or recklessly false statements in support of a warrant.”29
Additionally, “a warrant affidavit violates the Fourth Amendment when it contains
26
Carter, 557 Fed. Appx. at 909.
27
Pl.’s Reply Br., at 5-6.
28
438 U.S. 154 (1978).
29
Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994).
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omissions made intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the
affidavit.”30 However, “the rule does not apply to negligent . . . omissions.”31 An
“officer would not be entitled to qualified immunity when the facts omitted . . . were
. . . so clearly material that every reasonable law officer would have known that their
omission would lead to . . . [a] violation of federal law.”32 Omitted facts are “clearly
material” if “in the light of pre-existing law . . . the facts . . . clearly would have
negated probable cause if those facts had been included.”33 Here, the Defendant is still
entitled to qualified immunity. The Plaintiff has cited to no case indicating that merely
being surrounded by multiple people, and being subject to offensive language, legally
justifies brandishing a firearm. Thus, it cannot be said that the omitted information
was “clearly material” to the issue of whether there was probable cause to arrest the
Plaintiff under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102.34 Accordingly, the Defendant is entitled to
30
Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
31
Kelly, 21 F.3d at 1554.
32
Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327.
33
Haygood v. Johnson, 70 F.3d 92, 95 (11th Cir. 1995).
34
It is also worth noting that the warrant expressly noted that the Plaintiff
brandished his firearm during a fight. Bruno Dep., Ex. 14. Thus, the Defendant’s
omission did not create the impression that the Plaintiff pointed his gun at another
without any provocation.
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judgment as a matter of law on the Plaintiff’s section 1983 malicious prosecution
claim.
B. Access to Courts (section 1983)
The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant interfered with the Plaintiff’s ability to
access the judicial system to seek relief. In particular, the Plaintiff argues that the
Defendant initially withheld from the Plaintiff the names of the three other men
involved in the altercation.35 Access to the courts “is a right grounded in several
constitutional amendments, including the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”36
To “pass constitutional muster, access to the courts must be more than merely formal;
it must also be adequate, effective, and meaningful.”37 The “constitutional right is lost
where . . . police officials shield from the public . . . key facts which would form the
basis of . . . [a party’s] claims for redress.”38 Additionally, “[t]o assert an
access-to-the-courts claim, the plaintiff must possess a non-frivolous, arguable
35
Compl. ¶¶ 36, 65.
36
Dennis v. Schwarzauer, 496 Fed. Appx. 958, 959 (11th Cir. 2012).
37
Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
38
Id. at 1283 (quoting Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (7th Cir.
1984)).
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underlying cause of action, the presentation of which was prevented by the
defendant.”39
Here, the Defendant has not materially interfered with the Plaintiff’s ability to
bring suit against the other three men involved in the altercation. Ragan’s and Payne’s
names were on their arrest warrants, which were made public,40 and the Defendant
testified that he spoke to someone in the office of the Plaintiff’s counsel and gave her
the names as well.41 Thus, it is unclear how the Defendant impeded the Plaintiff’s
ability to bring suit. Indeed, the Plaintiff has asserted civil claims against Ragan,
Payne, and Jones in this lawsuit. Accordingly, the Defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on the Plaintiff’s section 1983 access-to-courts claim.42
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff Dontavius Chancy’s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 53], GRANTS the Defendant Jeff Bruno’s
39
Dennis, 496 Fed. Appx. at 959.
40
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. on the Pl.’s Access to Courts Claim, at 14.
41
Bruno Dep., at 37-39.
42
The Defendant also moves for summary judgment on the Plaintiff's
section 1981 claim. However, in his response, the Plaintiff clarifies that he is not
asserting the section 1981 claim against the Defendant.
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Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 70], and GRANTS the Defendant Jeff Bruno’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 75].
SO ORDERED, this 8 day of May, 2015.
/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge
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