Inniss et al v. Aderhold et al

Filing 46

REPLY BRIEF re 29 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 42 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed by Deborah Aderhold, Monica P. Fenton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Opinion and Order)(Orland, Devon)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER INNIS
et al,

*
*
*
Plaintiffs,
*
*
v.
*
CIVIL ACTION NO.
*
1:14-CV-01180-WSD
DEBORAH ADERHOLD, et al, *
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Defendants.
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__________________________________________________________________
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
__________________________________________________________________
Chief Justice John Marshall famously described the role of the federal
judiciary as declaring “what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). But like their Complaint, Plaintiffs’ Opposition
is based on speculation about where the law may be going, or where it has gone in
other circuits, not what it is today in this Circuit. And the law today – in this
Circuit – precludes their claims.1 This Court should decline the invitation to
disregard binding precedent, apply the law as it is, and dismiss the Complaint.

1

Two cases presenting similar claims are now pending before the Eleventh
Circuit. See Brenner, et al. v. Sec’y of Florida Dep’t of Health, et al., No. 1414061 (11th Cir.); Grimsley, et al. v. Sec’y of Florida Dep’t of Health, et al., No.
14-14066 (11th Cir.). A ruling of the Eleventh Circuit in those cases could well be
dispositive of the claims asserted here.

I.

Baker v. Nelson Forecloses Plaintiffs’ Claims.
Plaintiffs argue that Baker v. Nelson is inapplicable because (1) they present

different claims than those decided in Baker, and (2) doctrinal developments since
Baker have rendered it no longer applicable. Both arguments fail.
A.

Plaintiffs Assert the Same Claims as those Decided in Baker.

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Baker by suggesting that they have asserted
two claims not decided there. Plaintiffs suggest first that Baker was about the
issuance of state marriage licenses, not the recognition of out-of-state marriages,
and second, this case, unlike Baker, includes claims by parents seeking to marry.
Plaintiffs’ attempt is unavailing.
Neither of these alleged distinctions present different issues from those
decided in Baker. Although Plaintiffs seek to frame their claims differently, the
core of each claim remains the same: does the Due Process Clause or Equal
Protection Clause confer a right to marry on same-sex couples? This is the only
issue they have posed in this case, and the only claims for relief they have pled.
See Am. Compl. 93-103 (asserting claim for relief under Due Process Clause for
denying same-sex couples the right to marry); 104-27 (asserting claim for relief
under Equal Protection Clause for denying same-sex couples the right to marry).

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And that is the issue squarely presented and decided in Baker. As Baker remains
binding, Plaintiffs’ claims fail.
Plaintiffs’ claim about recognition of out-of-state marriages rests on their
general Due Process and Equal Protection theories. They do not assert a claim
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause or any other legal theory that would
distinguish them from their fellow Plaintiffs who seek to be married here.
Plaintiffs’ claim about parents marrying is similarly grounded. Plaintiffs Elizabeth
and Krista Wurz do not assert any claim for adoption, and do not allege that they
have sought to adopt jointly and been denied. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-41. Rather,
they simply assert that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses grant them a
right to marry. That assertion was squarely presented and rejected in Baker.
B.

Baker Remains Binding Despite Plaintiffs’ Purported “Doctrinal
Developments,” and Forecloses Plaintiffs’ Claims.

Plaintiffs rely on language from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick, which was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court. Opp. at 15-16.
19-20. That reversal renders Bowers no longer binding. The Eleventh Circuit has
explained in the context of the prior panel precedent rule that, “[f]or any part of a
decision to be binding under the prior panel precedent rule, the decision must not
have been vacated or reversed by the Supreme Court--it must have survived the

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possibility of Supreme Court review.” Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d
1324, 1333 n.7 (11th Cir. 1999).2
In reversing the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court explicitly noted that
the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of summary affirmance law had been challenged
but declined to decide the issue. “Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the District Court was not obligated to follow our summary
affirmance in [a previous case]. We need not resolve this dispute, for we prefer to
give plenary consideration to the merits of this case rather than rely on our earlier
action in [the previous summary affirmance].” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
189 n.4 (1986). This disposition by the Supreme Court rendered the Eleventh
Circuit’s statements in Bowers no longer controlling.
Plaintiffs’ discussion of doctrinal developments3 does not rebut the State’s
argument that the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted Romer and Lawrence narrowly

2

Although the prior panel precedent rule is generally framed in terms focusing on
its application to subsequent panels of the Eleventh Circuit, judges in this district
have applied it to determine the extent to which a previous decision of the Eleventh
Circuit is binding on district courts. See, e.g., Bloodworth v. Colvin, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 60386, at *7 n.3 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 15, 2014); Insituform Techs., Inc. v.
AMerik Supplies, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2012); Jan R. Smith
Constr. Co. v. DeKalb County, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
3
Plaintiffs wrongly dismiss the State’s argument that subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have made clear that lower courts are to follow Supreme Court
precedent until the Court informs them otherwise, regardless of lesser doctrinal
developments. Opp. at 20 n.5 (arguing subsequent cases irrelevant because they
were opinions on the merits, not summary dismissals). Plaintiffs note that the 10th
Circuit also rejected this argument on that basis. Id. (citing Kitchen v. Herbert,
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and Windsor by its own terms had no bearing on the state definition of marriage.
Plaintiffs suggest that Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence is incompatible with the
Eleventh Circuit’s reading of Romer and Lawrence, but that is not an argument this
Court can entertain. “Under the prior precedent rule, [courts] are bound to follow a
prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by [the Eleventh Circuit] en
banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235,
1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations and quotations omitted). And Windsor by its
terms did not relate to the state definition of marriage. As Justice Kennedy made
explicit in the majority opinion, Windsor applied only where a state had
determined to permit same-sex marriage and the federal government refused to
defer to the traditional state prerogative to define marriage: “[t]his opinion and its
holding are confined to those lawful marriages.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). None of these cases constitute doctrinal development
sufficient to disregard Baker.
Plaintiffs also rely heavily on Loving v. Virginia. See, e.g., Opp. at 10, 11,
23, 25, 26, 27, 38. Loving, of course, predated Baker, and the appellants in Baker
relied heavily on it; indeed, they cited Loving on all but one page of their argument
755 F.3d 1193, 1232 (10th Cir. 2014). But their citation is actually to the dissent’s
discussion of the majority opinion; the dissent, on the very page cited, explains
why Rodriguez and Agostini apply to summary dispositions: The argument of the
majority (and Plaintiffs here) “is just another way of stating that a summary
disposition is not a merits disposition, which is patently incorrect.” Kitchen, 755
F.3d at 1232.
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section. See Exhibit A to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 11-16, 18-19. The
Supreme Court concluded that these Loving-based arguments did not even present
a substantial federal question, and, as the State has explained at length, that
conclusion is still binding on this Court.
In their supplemental filing, Plaintiffs also make much of the Supreme
Court’s recent denial of certiorari in cases in which three circuits held that the
Constitution does afford same-sex couples the right to marry. But the denial of
certiorari is not relevant here at all: “For at least eight decades the Supreme Court
has instructed us, time and again, over and over, that the denial of certiorari does
not in any way or to any extent reflect or imply any view on the merits.” Powell v.
Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1313 n.5 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Finally, and subsequent to Plaintiffs’ most recent filing, the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico upheld Puerto Rico’s marriage
definition against a Due Process and Equal Protection challenge on the grounds
that Defendants assert here: Baker still binds lower courts until and unless the
Supreme Court says otherwise, and nothing in Romer, Lawrence, or Windsor
allows a district court to disregard it. See Conde-Vidal, et al., v. Garcia-Padilla, et
al., No. 3:14-cv-01253 (D.P.R. Oct. 21, 2014) (attached as Exhibit A to
Defendants’ Reply Brief).

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II.

Plaintiffs’ Claims Fail As A Matter Of Law Even If Baker Does Not
Control.
Despite Plaintiffs’ rhetoric and appeal to the inevitability of history, this is at

bottom a simple case. If the Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause confer
on same-sex couples an unqualified right to marry, the challenged state statute and
constitutional provision are unconstitutional. And conversely, the challenged
provisions must be upheld if the Clauses do not confer such a right. They do not,
and this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ challenge.
Plaintiffs assert that courts did not wait on the democratic process before
protecting women and racial minorities. Opp. at 9. Plaintiffs forget the 13th, 14th,
15th, 19th, and 24th amendments. These amendments were products of the
democratic process directly designed to address those injustices, and the court
decisions to which Plaintiffs presumably allude enforced these amendments. But
Plaintiffs here ask this Court to do something quite different: presume the 14th
Amendment codifies Plaintiffs’ vision of the law (and assumptions about what the
U.S. Supreme Court is likely to do in the future) and therefore wield that
Amendment as a sword to cut off vigorous debate on one of the most hotly
contested subjects in our democratic system. As the Eleventh Circuit has
observed,
The focus on the trajectory of contemporary practice ultimately
proves too much. The fact that there is an emerging consensus
scarcely provides justification for the courts, who often serve as an
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antimajoritarian seawall, to be swept up with the tide of popular
culture. If anything, it is added reason for us to permit the democratic
process to take its course.
Williams v. AG of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1244 n.14 (11th Cir. 2004).
A.

Plaintiffs have Failed to State a Plausible Due Process Claim.
1.

Glucksburg precludes finding a fundamental right, and
thus the rational basis test applies.

Plaintiffs assert that the Glucksberg analysis doesn’t apply to claims seeking
to extend an established fundamental right beyond its previously recognized scope.
Opp. at 26-27. Plaintiffs are wrong; at least in the Eleventh Circuit, it does:
First, in analyzing a request for recognition of a new fundamental
right, or extension of an existing one, we must begin with a careful
description of the asserted right. Second, and most critically, we must
determine whether this asserted right, carefully described, is one of
those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed.”
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has applied this rule elsewhere in cases
seeking to extend an established fundamental right. “A parent’s due process right
in the care, custody, and control of her children is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court,” but the Eleventh
Circuit applied Glucksberg’s fundamental rights analysis to conclude that the right

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didn’t extend to a parent seeking to exercise them as to her adult child. See
Robertson v. Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005).
The right to marry is, of course, a fundamental right. But that right has
never previously been understood as extending to same-sex couples. Before a
court in this Circuit can extend that right as Plaintiffs request, it must apply the
Glucksburg analysis. Plaintiffs do not allege or argue that they can survive that
analysis, because they cannot.
2.

The challenged laws easily clear the rational basis hurdle.

Plaintiffs reject the State’s asserted list of interests on the basis that they are
matters outside the complaint that cannot be considered on a motion to dismiss,
and thus this Court must take as true Plaintiffs’ allegation that the State lacks any
legitimate interest in the challenged laws. Opp. at 21-23. But Plaintiffs are wrong;
the State need not present facts or evidence to support its interests on rational basis
review, and Plaintiffs’ allegation that the State lacks legitimate interests in the
challenged laws are conclusions of law this Court should disregard. On rational
basis review, courts can and do consider possible state interests at the motion to
dismiss stage. See, e.g., Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1345-46 & 1350 (11th Cir.
2005) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss and concluding rational basis was
satisfied based on state interests asserted in state’s brief). Moreover, “a state has
no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory
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classification. Rather, the burden is on the one attacking the legislative
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it, whether
or not the basis has a foundation in the record.” Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818 (citations
and quotations omitted).
a.

It is rational for the State to exercise caution before
redefining marriage in an unprecedented manner.

Plaintiffs and the State agree on a fundamental principle: the vital
importance of marriage and the role it plays in our society. Plaintiffs believe that
importance bolsters their claim of access to marriage. The State, on the other hand,
believes that the importance of marriage and the critical role it plays in our society
demands caution before expanding its scope beyond the definition that, until quite
recently, “was an accepted truth for almost everyone who ever lived, in any society
in which marriage existed.” Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006).
The Eleventh Circuit has held that similar caution satisfied the rational basis test in
the adoption context: “Nor is it irrational for the legislature to proceed with
deliberate caution before placing adoptive children in an alternative, but unproven,
family structure that has not yet been conclusively demonstrated to be equivalent
to the marital family structure that has established a proven track record spanning
centuries.” Lofton, 358 F.3d at 826. For the same reason, the challenged laws are
rationally related to this legitimate state interest. Plaintiffs do not respond to this
particular interest.
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b.

Windsor did not reject the State’s other asserted
interests.

Plaintiffs incorrectly argue Windsor rejected the State’s other family- and
parenting-related interests. Opp. at 28. What the Court actually did in Windsor
was conclude that marriage regulation is a decision for the states to make, and that
the federal government did not have a legitimate purpose to second-guess those
state decisions. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. That conclusion, of course, cuts the
other way here.
Plaintiffs are also wrong to suggest that the Windsor Court even addressed
these interests. It did not; instead, it considered (and rejected) only one asserted
interest: “[t]he stated purpose of the law was to promote an “interest in protecting
the traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws.” Id.
at 2693; see also id. (citing House Report asserting that DOMA “expresses both
moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality
better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality”) (quotations
omitted). The State has not asserted that interest here, and Windsor did not address
anything else.

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B.

Plaintiffs have Failed to State a Plausible Equal Protection Claim.
1.

The challenged laws are not impermissible classifications on
the basis of sexual orientation.

Plaintiffs argue that sexual orientation is a suspect classification. Opp. at
30-33. Binding Eleventh Circuit precedent holds otherwise. See Lofton, 358 F.3d
at 818. Plaintiffs urge this Court to disregard Lofton because (1) it is ten years old,
(2) other circuits have since concluded that heightened scrutiny is appropriate for
classifications based on sexual orientation, and (3) the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis
of the issue in Lofton was incomplete. Opp. at 32-33. None of these arguments
provide a permissible basis for this Court (or, indeed, a three-judge panel of the
Eleventh Circuit) to disregard the on-point holding of Lofton. Courts in the
Eleventh Circuit “are bound to follow a prior binding precedent [of the Eleventh
Circuit] unless and until it is overruled by [that] court en banc or by the Supreme
Court.” Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1236 (citations and quotations omitted).
Because of this, the rational basis test applies, and as explained above, the
challenged laws pass that test.
2.

The challenged laws are not impermissible classifications on
the basis of sex.

As explained in the State’s opening brief, the challenged laws do not
discriminate on the basis of sex; they apply equally to men and women. Even the
majority of courts striking down laws similar to those challenged here agree; of the
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cases Plaintiffs cite, only one post-dates Windsor. Opp. at 36 n.10. And although
that decision (by a Utah district court) was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, the Tenth
Circuit did not affirm on that basis. If Plaintiffs’ claims do not succeed under due
process or as a classification on the basis of sexual orientation, they cannot succeed
on this basis, either.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should be
GRANTED.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of October, 2014.
SAMUEL S. OLENS
Attorney General

551540

NELS PETERSON
Solicitor General

101074

KATHLEEN M. PACIOUS
Deputy Attorney General

558555

DEVON ORLAND
554301
Senior Asst. Attorney General

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D), I hereby certify that the foregoing has been
prepared in compliance with Local Rule 5.1(B) in 14-point New Times Roman
type face.
This 22nd day of October, 2014.

s/Devon Orland 554301

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing REPLY BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will automatically send
email notification of such filing to all CM/ECF participants of record, including the
following:
David P. Draigh, White & Case, LLP -FL
[e-mail]
Douglas E. Winter, Bryan Cave, LLP-DC
[e-mail]
Elizabeth Lynn Littrell, Lambda Legal
[e-mail]
Gregory R. Nevins, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.-GA
[e-mail]
Jennifer Burch Dempsey, Bryan Cave, LLP-ATL
[e-mail]
Jennifer Devine Odom, Bryan Cave, LLP-ATL
[e-mail]
Luke A. Lantta, Bryan Cave, LLP-ATL
[e-mail]
Susan L. Sommer, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.-NY
[e-mail]
Tara L. Borelli, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.-GA
[e-mail]
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William Vance Custer , IV, Bryan Cave, LLP-ATL
[e-mail]
Frank E. Jenkins , III, Jenkins & Bowen, P.C.
[e-mail]
Michael Van Stephens , II, Gwinnett County Law Department
[e-mail]
Robert Lige Walker, Jenkins & Bowen, P.C.
[e-mail]
Diana L. Freeman, Fulton County Attorney's Office
[e-mail]
Kaye Woodard Burwell, Office of the Fulton County Attorney
[e-mail]
R. David Ware, Office of Fulton County Attorney
[e-mail]
This 22nd day of October, 2014.
s/Devon Orland
Sr. Assistant Attorney General
Bar No. 554301

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