Groves v. The Coca-Cola Company

Filing 23

ORDER GRANTING 5 Defendant's Motion for a More Definite Statement and DENYING 5 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file his Restated Complaint within 14 days of the date of entry of this Order. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 5/26/2015. (jtj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
BRIAN GROVES, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE COCA-COLA COMPANY,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:14-CV-01796-RWS

ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for a More
Definite Statement, or in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint [5-1]. After a review of the record, the Court enters the following
Order.
Background1
Plaintiff Brian Groves brings this action, on behalf of himself and a
nationwide class, against Defendant the Coca-Cola Company (“Coca-Cola”),

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As the case is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts as
true the facts alleged in the complaint. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964).

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claiming Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47
U.S.C. §§ 227 et seq. (Compl. for Damages & Injunctive Relief Pursuant to the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 et seq.
(“Compl.”), Dkt. [1].) At the core of Plaintiff’s Complaint is his allegation that
Defendant contacted him through unsolicited SMS messages on his cellular
telephone. (Id. ¶ 1.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant and its agents directed the mass
transmission of SMS messages to the cell phone numbers of customers or
potential customers nationwide. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that he received
these messages promoting the sale of Defendant’s “Coke” products on his
wireless phone in or around 2012. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff claims that he did not
solicit these messages or consent to them; he further alleges that he replied the
word “STOP” to one of the SMS messages he received in an effort to end their
transmission to his cellular phone. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff brings this action under 47 U.S.C. § 227, alleging that the SMS
messages transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone were placed via an
“automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”), as defined in § 227(a)(1) and
as prohibited by § 227(b)(1)(A). (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that these SMS
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messages violate § 227(b)(1) because these messages were “calls” under the
TCPA that were not made for emergency purposes, because Plaintiff incurred a
charge for these incoming messages, and because Defendant did not receive
Plaintiff’s consent to send these messages. (Id. ¶¶ 16-20.)
Plaintiff originally filed his Complaint in the Southern District of
California on his own behalf, as well as on the behalf of a class “consisting of
all persons within the United States who received any unsolicited SMS or text
message call from Defendant or its agents on their paging service, cellular
phone service, mobile radio service, radio common carrier service, or other
service for which they were charged for the SMS or text messages, through the
use of any automatic telephone dialing system as set forth in 47 U.S.C. §
227(B)(1)(A)(3), which SMS or text messages by Defendant or its agents were
not made for emergency purposes or with the recipients’ prior express consent,
within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint.” (Id. ¶ 22.) On June
9, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
transferred this action to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404. (Dkt. [19].)
Defendant now moves for a more definite statement, arguing that
Plaintiff has failed to provide enough detail to satisfy the notice pleading
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requirements of Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). (Dkt. [5].) In the alternative,
Defendant moves to dismiss. The Court now considers Defendant’s motion.
Discussion
I.

Legal Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), “[a] party may move

for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably
prepare a response.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While this pleading
standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Additionally, a plaintiff should
include a “brief factual description” of the circumstances that surround the acts
upon which the plaintiff bases a claim for relief. Parker v. Brush Wellman,
Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (citing Williams v. Lear
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Operations Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 1999)).
II.

Analysis
Defendant argues that “the bare-bones allegations of the Complaint are

so vague and ambiguous that it is impossible for Coca-Cola reasonably to
prepare a response.” (Def.’s Mot. for a More Definite Statement, Dkt. [5-1] at
2.) Plaintiff contends in response that his Complaint is specific enough to
notify the defendant of the substance of the claim being asserted. (Pl.’s Resp.,
Dkt. [12] at 11.) Plaintiff further suggests that Defendant seeks “additional
details that can and should be sought during discovery.” (Id. at 13-14.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff must amend his Complaint to include
additional allegations such that Defendant is better able to identify the
messages at issue. Defendant is entitled to allegations that are sufficiently
supported by facts so that Defendant is able to admit or deny liability in its
Answer. Plaintiff should allege, if in his possession, additional facts such as:
the time period during 2012 when he received the SMS messages; what the
SMS messages said; the phone number from which the messages were sent; the
phone number on which the messages were received; and why he believes that
Defendant or its agents sent the messages at issue. (See Def.’s Mot. for a More
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Definite Statement, Dkt. [5-1] at 2.)
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for a More Definite Statement is
GRANTED and Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to restate his Complaint so as
to set forth a short and plain statement of his claims showing that he is entitled
to relief from Defendant Coca-Cola. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for a More Definite
Statement [5-1] is GRANTED and Defendant’s Alternative Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint [5-1] is DENIED. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file his
Restated Complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of entry of this Order.
SO ORDERED, this 26th day of May, 2015.

________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge

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