Freeport Guaranty v. Culley et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING 3 Final Report and Recommendation. This action is REMANDED to the Magistrate Court of Clayton County, Georgia. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 11/14/2014. (anc)
On June 16, 2014, the Magistrate Court of Clayton County entered a
Consent Judgment, signed by the parties, including Defendants. [1.1 at 3]. The
Consent Judgment states that Plaintiff is entitled to recover $1,847.83 and
possession of the premises currently occupied by Defendants.
On June 20, 2014, Defendants, proceeding pro se, removed the Clayton
County Action to this Court by filing a Notice of Removal and an application to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) [1]. In their Notice of Removal, Defendants do
not assert a basis for federal jurisdiction. Defendants state that they “want the
judgment for rent money to be dismissed, or at least to take into consideration
[their] expenses because [they] have endure [sic] a lot of pain and suffering since
[they] moved in due to the negligence of the owner,” including allegedly
uninhabitable living conditions. [1.1 at 2].
On July 2, 2014, Magistrate Judge Brill granted Defendants’ application to
proceed IFP. Judge Brill also considered sua sponte the question of subject matter
jurisdiction and recommends that the Court remand this case to the Magistrate
Court of Clayton County.
Judge Brill found that Plaintiff’s underlying pleading shows that this action
is a dispossessory action, which does not present a federal question. Judge Brill
concluded that the Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over this
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matter. Judge Brill also found that Plaintiff and Defendants are all citizens of
Georgia, as Defendants indicated on their Civil Cover Sheet, and that the amount
in controversy does not exceed the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. Judge Brill
concluded that the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over this matter and
that this case is required to be remanded to the state court.
There are no objections to the R&R.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v.
Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). A district judge
“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). With respect to those findings and recommendations to which a party
has not asserted objections, the Court must conduct a plain error review of the
record. United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
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B.
Analysis
Defendants do not object to the R&R’s conclusions that Plaintiff’s
Complaint does not present a federal question, and that the parties are not diverse.
The Court does not find any error in these conclusions. It is well-settled that
federal-question jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the
face of a plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. See Beneficial Nat’l Bank
v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-32 (2002). The record also does not
show that Plaintiff and Defendants are citizens of different states, or that the
amount in controversy exceeds the statutory threshold of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Williams, Nos. 1:07-cv-2864-RWS,
1:07-cv-2865-RWS, 2008 WL 115096, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2008) (“[A]
dispossessory proceeding under Georgia law is not an ownership dispute, but
rather only a dispute over the limited right to possession, title to the property is not
at issue, and, accordingly, the removing [d]efendant may not rely on the value of
the property as a whole to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.”).
Because the Court lacks federal question or diversity jurisdiction, this action
is required to be remanded to the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any
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time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).2
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill’s Final
Report and Recommendation [3] is ADOPTED. This action is REMANDED to
the Magistrate Court of Clayton County, Georgia.
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SO ORDERED this______ day of November, 2014.
_______________________________
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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The Court also agrees with Judge Brill’s conclusion that, even if subject
matter jurisdiction existed, which it does not, the Court is unable to grant
Defendants the relief they seek—dismissal of the Consent Judgment—because
federal courts “generally lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision.”
Doe v. Fla. Bar, 630 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing D.C. Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) & Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923)); see also Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir.
2009) (federal district courts cannot review, reverse or invalidate a final state court
judgment because “that task is reserved for state appellate courts or, as the last
resort, the United States Supreme Court.”).
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