Marquis Cove LLC et al v. Gasden
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER that this action is REMANDED to the Magistrate Court of Clayton County, Georgia. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 7/2/2014. (anc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
MARQUIS COVE, LLC and STAR
RESIDENTIAL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
1:14-cv-2100-WSD
MONIQUE GADSON,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Monique Gadson’s
(“Defendant” or “Gadson”) Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP
Application”) [1] and her Notice of Removal [1.1].
I.
BACKGROUND
On June 12, 2014, Plaintiffs Marquis Cove, LLC and Star Residential
(together, “Plaintiffs”) initiated a dispossessory proceeding (“Complaint”) against
Defendant in the Magistrate Court of Clayton County, Georgia.1 (Notice of
Removal at 4). The Complaint seeks possession of premises currently occupied by
Defendant, past due rent, fees, costs and expenses totaling $2,328.80, and rent
accruing up to the date of judgment or vacancy at a rate of $16.63 per day.
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No. 2014CM11123.
On July 2, 2014, Defendant, proceeding pro se, removed the Clayton County
action to this Court by filing her Notice of Removal and IFP Application.
Defendant claims in her Notice of Removal that “Respondent” violated the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”), and Rule 60
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “having a legal duty to abort eviction
pursuant to O.C.G.A. 51-1-6 [sic],” and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Notice of Removal at 2).
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
IFP Application
The Court “may authorize the commencement . . . of any suit, action, or
proceeding . . . without payment of fees or security therefor, by a person who
submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner[ 2]
possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The purpose is to provide indigent litigants with equal
access to the judicial system. Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 612
(11th Cir. 1997). A litigant seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) must
therefore show an inability to prepay fees and costs without foregoing the basic
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The word “prisoner” is a typographical error, and the affidavit requirement
applies to all individuals seeking to proceed in forma pauperis. Martinez v. Kristi
Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004).
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necessities of life. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 34243 (1948).
After consideration of Defendant’s IFP Application, the Court finds that
Defendant meets the financial requirements for IFP status and grants her request to
proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
B.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Eleventh Circuit has consistently held that “a court should inquire into
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the
proceedings. Indeed, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire
into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.” Univ. of
S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). “[O]nce a federal
court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless
to continue.” Id.
Congress has provided that “any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal in this case appears to
be based on federal-question jurisdiction, which extends to “all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-
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pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded
complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Thus, a
federal cause of action within a counterclaim or a federal defense is not a basis for
removal jurisdiction. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59-61 (2009).
Plaintiffs’ Complaint is a dispossessory warrant which is based solely on
state law. No federal question is presented on the face of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
That Defendant asserts defenses or counterclaims based on federal law cannot
confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. See Beneficial Nat’l
Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-32 (2002). Removal is not proper based
on federal-question jurisdiction.
The Court’s jurisdiction in this action also cannot be based on diversity of
citizenship, which extends to “all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,” and is between “citizens of different States.”
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), (2). It appears that the parties are both Georgia citizens,
and even if diversity did exist, Defendant fails to show that the amount-incontroversy exceeds $75,000.00. The Court must look only to Plaintiffs’ claim to
determine if the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied. See, e.g.,
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Novastar Mortg. Inc. v. Bennett, 173 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2001), aff’d,
35 F. App’x 585 (11th Cir. 2002). The Complaint here seeks possession of
property Defendant currently possesses and past due rent, costs and fees totaling
$2,328.80. The amount-in-controversy requirement is not satisfied and removal is
not proper based on diversity of citizenship. See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v.
Williams, Nos. 1:07-cv-2864-RWS, 1:07-cv-2865-RWS, 2008 WL 115096, at *2
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2008) (“[A] dispossessory proceeding under Georgia law is not
an ownership dispute, but rather only a dispute over the limited right to possession,
title to property is not at issue and, accordingly, the removing Defendant may not
rely on the value of the property as a whole to satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement.”). The Court thus lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and this action is
required to be remanded to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time
before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). 3, 4
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The Court notes that Defendant, on her Civil Cover Sheet but not in her
Notice of Removal, indicates that federal jurisdiction in this action is based on
Plaintiffs’, and Defendant’s, status as U.S. Government entities [1.2]. Defendant
has not alleged in her Notice of Removal that she, or Plaintiffs, are officers or
agencies of the federal government and it appears instead that Plaintiffs are private
companies and Defendant is a private citizen.
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Even if the Court had subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court is unable to grant
Defendant the relief she seeks—a stay of state court eviction proceedings—
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III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Monique Gadson’s IFP
Application [1] is GRANTED solely for the purpose of remand.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is REMANDED to the
Magistrate Court of Clayton County, Georgia.
SO ORDERED this 2nd day of July, 2014.
because a federal court is prohibited under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283, from enjoining a state court eviction proceeding.
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