Davis v. The Douglas County School System et al
Filing
21
OPINION AND ORDER granting 8 Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 1/20/15. (dr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
TONYA DAVIS
as Parent and Natural Guardian, on
behalf of John Doe, a Minor Child,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:14-CV-2192-TWT
THE DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL
SYSTEM a political Subdivision of the
State of Georgia, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action under the Am ericans with Disabilities Act. It is before the
Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Dism iss for Failure to Exhaust Adm inistrative
Remedies, or in the Alternative, Motion for Sum mary Judgment [Doc. 8], which is
GRANTED.
I. Background
The Plaintiff, Tonya Davis, brings cl aims on behalf of her m inor child, John
Doe, against the Douglas County School Di strict and its superintendent, Gordon
T:\ORDERS\14\Davis\14cv2192\mtdtwt.wpd
Pritz.1 John Doe is a student in Douglas County who uses a wheelchair to am
bulate.2
The Plaintiff claims that her son’s school, Fairplay Middle School, is not wheelchair
lleges that the wheelchair access barriers
accessible.3 In her Complaint, the Plaintiff a
force her son to focus on his sa
fety instead of his studies.4 Based on this, the Plaintiff
asserts claims under the Am ericans with Disab ilities Act (“ADA”) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Although the Plaintiff re quested that her son be transferred to
another, more accessible school,5 she never requested a dueprocess hearing under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The Defendants now move to
dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim s under Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or
12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary judgment.
II. Legal Standard
The Eleventh Circuit has considered motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies as motions to dismiss for lack of subject m
atter jurisdiction.6
1
Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6-7.
2
Id. ¶ 11.
3
Id.
4
Id. ¶ 12.
5
Id. ¶¶ 12-15.
6
Babicz v. School Bd. of Broward Cnty, 135 F.3d 1420, 1421 (11th Cir.
1998).
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A complaint should be dism issed under Rule 12(b)(1) only where the court lacks
jurisdiction over the subject m atter of the dispute.
7
Attacks on subject m atter
jurisdiction come in two forms: “facial attacks” and “factual attacks.”8 Facial attacks
“require[ ] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as
true for the purposes of the m otion.”9 On a faci al attack, therefore, a plaintiff is
afforded safeguards similar to those provided in opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.10
“‘Factual attacks,’ on the other hand, challenge ‘the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings,
such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.’”11 The presumption of truthfulness
does not attach to the plaintiff’s allegations.
7
12
Further, “the existence of disputed
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
8
Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D.’s , 104 F.3d 1256, 1261
(11th Cir. 1997); Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990).
9
Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit 613
,
F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)).
10
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981).
11
Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 511).
12
Id.
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material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of
jurisdictional claims.”13
III. Discussion
The Plaintiff brings claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging
that the Defendants failed to provide a school facility accessible t o John Doe. The
Defendants now move to dismiss on the ground that the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies, as required under the IDEA. The purpose of the IDEA
is to ensure “that all children with disab
ilities have available to thema free appropriate
public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to
meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, em ployment, and
independent living . . . .”14 Under the IDEA, a plaintiff is required to exhaust his
administrative remedies before filing a claim in federal or state court. 15 This is true
even if the plaintiff brings no claims under the IDEA and instead claims only under
the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.16
13
Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960-61 (11th Cir. 1999).
14
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
15
20 U.S.C. § 1415(1).
16
Id.; Babicz v. School Bd. of Broward Cnty, 135 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th
Cir. 1998).
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Here, the Plaintiff argues that she was not required to exhaust administrative
remedies because her claim is not related to John Doe’s education, but rather to his
access to school facilities, which, she ar gues, does not fall under the IDEA. The
Eleventh Circuit, however, has found that the IDEA applies to a broad spectrum of
claims – including “any m
atter relating to theidentification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of a free and appropriate public education to
such child.”17 For example, where the issue was whether a school was required to
allow access to oxygen and inhalers f or children with severe asthma, the plaintiffs
were required to exhaust their administrative remedies.18 Additionally, the Eleventh
Circuit has found that parents must exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA
before bringing their own personal retaliaion claims, even though those claim cannot
t
s
be brought under the IDEA.19
There is no dispute here that the Plai ntiff did not exhaust the adm inistrative
remedies available, instead the P laintiff simply argues that she was not required to
exhaust those rem edies. The m atter here relates to the provision of a free and
17
2007).
J.P. v. Cherokee Cnty. Bd. of Educ. 218 Fed. Appx. 911, 913 (11th Cir.
,
18
Babicz, 135 F.3d at 1421 n.6.
19
M.T.V. v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist. , 446 F.3d 1153, 1558 (11th Cir.
2006).
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appropriate education to John Doe, like the access to inhalers in Babicz. Because the
matter relates to Doe’s education, the Plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative
remedies under the IDEA. Th e Plaintiff’s claim s should therefore be dism issed
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Defenda Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
nts’
Exhaust Administrative Remedies, or in the Alternative, Motion for Sum mary
Judgment [Doc. 8] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 20 day of January, 2015.
/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge
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