Ubiquitous Entertainment Studios, LLC v. McPherson Implementing Local Redevelopment Authority et al

Filing 23

ORDER: Plaintiff's First Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response 10 and Plaintiff's First Motion for Leave to File a Reply 14 are GRANTED. Defendant Tyler Perry and Tyler Perry Studios, LLC's Motion to Dismiss 5 and Defen dant McPherson Implementing Local Redevelopment Authority's Motion to Dismiss 7 are GRANTED. Finally, Plaintiff's First Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief 22 is DENIED as moot. The Clerk shall close the case. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 10/7/2014. (cem)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
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UBIQUITOUS
ENTERTAINMENT STUDIOS,
LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
MCPHERSON IMPLEMENTING
LOCAL REDEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, et al.,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:14-CV-02261-RWS

ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Defendant Tyler Perry and Tyler
Perry Studios, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss [5], Defendant McPherson
Implementing Local Redevelopment Authority’s Motion to Dismiss [7],
Plaintiff’s First Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response [10],
Plaintiff’s First Motion for Leave to File a Reply [14], and Plaintiff’s First
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief [22]. After reviewing the record,
the Court enters the following Order.
Background
This case arises out of the state-created McPherson Implementing Local

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Redevelopment Authority’s (“MILRA”) attempt to find one or more buyers of
the Fort McPherson property, a base the United States Department of Defense
has slated for closure. Plaintiff Ubiquitous Entertainment Studios, LLC
(“UES”) alleges that MILRA abandoned its plans to hold an open bidding
process for the sale of all or part of Fort McPherson contrary to its
representations to UES in January 2014. At the time, MILRA told UES it could
not negotiate a deal because the federal government had yet to convey to
MILRA title to the land. MILRA stated that once they had title, they would
notify UES and other parties interested in purchasing part of Fort McPherson by
public notice. (Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶ 22.) In June 2014, however, Atlanta Mayor
Kaseem Reed announced “that the City of Atlanta and MILRA had entered into
‘robust’ talks to conclude the purchase of Ft. McPherson by movie-maker Tyler
Perry by the end of July 2014.” (Id. ¶ 26.)
On July 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed suit against MILRA, Tyler Perry, Tyler
Perry Studios, LLC, the Department of Defense, and other federal-government
defendants alleging that MILRA and the Tyler Perry defendants violated
Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process rights by failing to adhere to
the proper statutory and regulatory requirements for disposing of federal
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property. Plaintiff also alleges state-law claims of fraud and negligent
misrepresentation based on MILRA’s representation that it would later notify
interested buyers when it received title and could negotiate. Last, Plaintiff
asserts a conversion claim against the Tyler Perry defendants for unlawfully
possessing site and construction plans UES created and shared with MILRA.
MILRA and the Tyler Perry defendants move for dismissal of all claims. It
appears that the federal-government defendants have not been served.
Discussion
The Court held a hearing on Defendants’ motions to dismiss on
September 26, 2014. At that hearing, counsel for the federal-government
defendants made an appearance and pointed out a ripeness issue in this action.
Counsel represented that the Department of Defense has not conveyed title to
MILRA. Therefore, MILRA is currently incapable of closing a deal on the
property with the Tyler Perry defendants. It is unclear when the Department of
Defense will complete all the bureaucratic steps necessary to approve final
transfer of Fort McPherson to MILRA.
Although no Defendant raised the ripeness issue in their motions to
dismiss, the ripeness inquiry “goes to whether the district court ha[s] subject
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matter jurisdiction to hear the case.” Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881
F.2d 1570, 1573 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989). “Indeed, it is well settled that a federal
court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte
whenever it may be lacking.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d
405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999).
The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited “to cases and controversies of
sufficient concreteness to evidence a ripeness for review.” Digital Props., Inc.
v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1). “Strict application of the ripeness doctrine prevents federal
courts from rendering impermissible advisory opinions and wasting resources
through review of potential or abstract disputes.” Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of
Miami, 402 F.3d 1335, 1339 (11th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, the ripeness
doctrine “protects the other branches [of government] from judicial meddling.
One of the ‘basic rationale[s]’ for the ripeness doctrine is ‘to protect the
[administrative] agencies from judicial interference until an administrative
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the
challenging parties.’ ” Id. (quoting Digital Props., 121 F.3d at 590). To make
a ripeness determination, a court must decide “(1) the fitness of the issues for
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judicial decision, and (2) the hardship of the parties of withholding court
consideration.” Digital Props., 121 F.3d at 589 (citing Abbott Lab. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).
The gravamen of Plaintiff’s constitutional claim is that MILRA did not
adhere to proper procedures governing the sale of the Fort McPherson property.
Yet because the federal government has not yet approved conveyance of the
property to MILRA, a state entity, MILRA cannot close a deal with the Tyler
Perry defendants or any other party. Therefore, Fort McPherson is still in the
Army’s possession, and no state or private entity has a property interest in it.
Tyler Perry and MILRA have not entered into a contract to sell Fort
McPherson, so at this point the Court could only issue an impermissible
advisory opinion as to the legality of MILRA’s actions. Consequently, this
issue is not fit for judicial determination. Moreover, withholding consideration
will not impose hardship on the parties because whether and when MILRA and
Tyler Perry will close a deal is speculative at this point. In the event they do,
and Plaintiff still believes Defendants violated their rights, they will be able to
seek relief at that time. In sum, the issues in this case are not sufficiently
concrete for judicial review, and thus the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
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over this action. And because Plaintiff has not alleged diversity jurisdiction, the
Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s First Motion for Extension of Time
to File a Response [10] and Plaintiff’s First Motion for Leave to File a Reply
[14] are GRANTED. Defendant Tyler Perry and Tyler Perry Studios, LLC’s
Motion to Dismiss [5] and Defendant McPherson Implementing Local
Redevelopment Authority’s Motion to Dismiss [7] are GRANTED. Finally,
Plaintiff’s First Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief [22] is DENIED
as moot. The Clerk shall close the case.
SO ORDERED, this 7th

day of October, 2014.

________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge

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