Roberts v. Tractor Supply Company et al

Filing 33

ORDER denying Defendant New Buffalo Corporation's 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 4/23/2015. (cem)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
DANIEL J. ROBERTS,
Plaintiff,
v.
TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY
and NEW BUFFALO
CORPORATION,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:14-CV-02332-RWS

ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Defendant New Buffalo
Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss [9]. After reviewing the record, the Court
enters the following Order.
Background
On November 3, 2013, Plaintiff Daniel Roberts’ friend Lee Summey
(“Summey”) purchased a hunter’s tree stand (the “tree stand”) from Defendant
Tractor Supply Company (“TSC”). (Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶ 8.) The tree stand was
manufactured by Defendant New Buffalo Corporation (“Buffalo”). (Id. ¶ 9.)
At the time, TSC had no remaining boxed units of the particular tree stand

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model in stock, but offered to sell Summey the floor model which was on
display at the store. (Id. ¶ 10.) When Summey made the purchase, TSC did not
provide him with a box; a manual; or any instructions, warnings, or safety
procedures on how to properly assemble the tree stand. (Id. ¶ 11.) Rather, TSC
sold the tree stand as it was assembled on display, and delivered it to Summey
with a bag containing parts that the sales associate brought from the stock room.
(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this bag did not contain the necessary straps required
to safely construct the tree stand. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 28.)
Later that day, Summey met Plaintiff in the woods with the tree stand.
(Id. ¶ 13.) The two men then attempted to erect the tree stand and attach it to a
tree according to Summey’s recollection of how the tree stand looked while
displayed in-store. (Id. ¶¶ 13–14.) Nothing on the tree stand itself provided
any instructions or warnings. Plaintiff then attempted to ascend the tree stand,
which buckled and began to fall. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff jumped off the falling tree
stand, shattering his right leg below the knee when he hit the ground. (Id. ¶ 16.)
As a result, Plaintiff brings the following claims: negligence against TSC
(Count I); product liability sounding in negligence against Buffalo (Count II);
strict product liability for defective design against Buffalo (Count III); and strict
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product liability for a warning defect against Buffalo (Count IV). (Id. ¶¶
17–47.) Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages and attorney’s fees against both
TSC and Buffalo. (Id. ¶¶ 48–55.) Buffalo now moves to dismiss all of
Plaintiff’s claims against it (Counts II, III, and IV) for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I.

Motion to Dismiss Legal Standard
When considering a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss, a federal court is to accept as true “all facts set forth in the plaintiff’s
complaint.” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir.
2000) (citation omitted). Further, the court must draw all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187
F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (internal citations omitted). However, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id.

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Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when “ ‘it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.’ ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). A plaintiff must assert a plausible claim, which
requires factual allegations that “raise the right to relief above the speculative
level.” Id. at 556. This standard “does not[, however,] impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence [supporting the
claim].” Id.
II.

Buffalo’s Motion to Dismiss [9]
Plaintiff brings three product liability claims against Buffalo under two

theories of liability: negligence (Count II) and strict liability (Counts III and
IV). Buffalo moves to dismiss all claims on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to
adequately allege (1) that the product was defective, and (2) that the defect
proximately caused Plaintiff’s injury.
The elements of defect and proximate cause are essential to product
liability claims both under strict liability and under negligence. A claim for
strict product liability requires a plaintiff to allege that the product was
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defective at the time of sale, and that its condition proximately caused the
plaintiff’s injury. Chicago Hardware & Fixture Co. v. Letterman, 510 S.E.2d
875, 877-78 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (requiring a plaintiff to prove “that the
property when sold by the manufacturer was not merchantable and reasonably
suited to the use intended (i.e., defective), and that its condition when sold was
the proximate cause of the injury sustained.”). And in Georgia, it is well
established that the requirements of a product claim sounding in negligence are
virtually the same as the requirements for strict product liability. See Jones v.
Amazing Products, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1238 (N.D. Ga. 2002); see also
Steinberg v. SICA S.P.A., 2006 WL 618593, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 10, 2006)
(“Under Georgia product liability law, a cause of action under a negligence
theory and a cause of action under a strict liability theory requires essentially
the same evidentiary showing.”). In addition, each of Plaintiff’s product claims
against Buffalo, whether under negligence or strict liability, arise under the
same alleged product defects.
Thus, for the limited purpose of determining the adequacy of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, the Court will not distinguish between Plaintiff’s negligence claim
and strict liability claims. Rather, the Court will address whether Plaintiff’s
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Complaint adequately alleges (1) a product defect and (2) proximate causation
with respect to all of Plaintiff’s claims against Buffalo.
A.

Product Defect

In Georgia, a product is defective if it is “not merchantable or reasonably
suited for the use intended.” O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1). Meanwhile, “a product
is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling. If injury
results from abnormal handling, the manufacturer is not liable.” Jonas v. Isuzu
Motors Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1377 (M.D. Ga. 2002), aff’d, 58 F. App’x
837 (11th Cir. 2003). Such “abnormal handling” occurs “[w]hen the use to
which a product was being put at the time of injury is not that originally
intended by the manufacturer.” Talley v. City Tank Corp., 279 S.E.2d 264, 271
(Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that the tree stand is defective because neither
the necessary straps nor the assembly instructions were permanently affixed to
the tree stand. Plaintiff has thus alleged two specific defects of the product that
plausibly give rise to a claim. Indeed, the tree stand was lacking the
components that Plaintiff alleges should have been included. Buffalo argues
that assembling the tree stand without instructions and all the necessary
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components amounts to abnormal handling and relieves Buffalo from liability.
But Plaintiff’s injury occurred while attempting to mount the tree stand: this
appears to be the intended purpose of the product. In addition, when a
manufacturer “has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular
use, he may be required to give adequate warning of the danger, and a product
sold without such warning is in a defective condition.” Moore v. ECI Mgmt.,
542 S.E.2d 115, 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). The product is therefore defective if
Buffalo reasonably anticipated the danger of assembling the tree stand without
all parts and instructions. And here, Plaintiff’s factual allegations are enough
for the Court to reasonably infer that Buffalo anticipated this danger such that is
does not constitute an abnormal use.
Buffalo also argues that it is not liable for Plaintiff’s injuries because they
resulted from an open and obvious danger. Indeed, a manufacturer has no duty
“to warn of a product-connected danger which is obvious or generally known.”
Moore, 542 S.E.2d at 121. However, because Plaintiff was not provided
assembly instructions, the Court cannot conclude on the present record that it
was “obvious or generally known” to him that the tree stand was missing all the
necessary components.
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Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to claim that the product
was defective, and his Complaint cannot be dismissed on that basis.
B.

Proximate Cause

The Court now considers whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged
proximate cause, which is also an indispensable element to a products liability
claim under negligence and strict liability. See Talley, 279 S.E.2d at 269
(“Whether proceeding under a strict liability or a negligence theory, ‘proximate
cause’ is a necessary element of appellant's [product liability] case.”). To
satisfy proximate cause, a plaintiff must allege that the injury was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions. See Morris v. Baxter, 483
S.E.2d 650, 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); see also Steinberg, 2006 WL 618593, at
*4 (stating that proximate cause requires “that the injury sustained is a
reasonably foreseeable result of defendant’s negligence”).
Here, Plaintiff stated in his Complaint that the alleged defects foreseeably
led to his injury. Specifically, he alleges that it was foreseeable that the tree
stand would be sold outside its original packaging and without the instruction
manual, whether by a retailer or a second-hand seller, and that this “inherent
danger” caused his injury. (Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶¶ 26–30.) In addition, Plaintiff
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points out that the product typically required assembly when sold. These
allegations plausibly state the proximate cause element of Plaintiff’s claims.
However, Buffalo argues that dismissal is still proper because any defect
in the tree stand could not have proximately caused the injury because
intervening acts occurred. Buffalo argues that Plaintiff’s assembly of the tree
stand without the necessary instructions and components contributed to the
injury, and that TSC’s sale of the product without the instructions and
components is an intervening act that prevents a finding of proximate cause.
But determinations of proximate cause are generally better suited for a jury and
should only rarely be decided as a matter of law. See, e.g., Ontario Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Smith, 572 S.E.2d 533, 536 (Ga. 2002) (“[I]t is axiomatic that
questions regarding proximate cause are undeniably a jury question and may
only be determined by the courts in plain and undisputed cases.”); Steinberg,
2006 WL 618593, at *5 (stating that proximate cause should only be decided as
a matter of law when “the jury could only reasonably reach one conclusion”).
Accordingly, Buffalo’s Motion to Dismiss [9] cannot be granted based on
Buffalo’s argument that Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. A plaintiff’s
alleged contributory negligence bars recovery only if it is “the sole proximate
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cause of his injuries.” Bowen v. Cochran, 556 S.E.2d 530, 532 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001). And, regarding Plaintiff’s strict liability claims, “[c]ontributory
negligence is not a defense to a claim of strict liability for product-caused
harm.” Barger v. Garden Way, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 737, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)
(citing Deere & Co. v. Brooks, 299 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. 1983). In addition, where a
third party’s intervening act “could reasonably have been anticipated,
apprehended, or foreseen by the original wrong-doer, the causal connection is
not broken, and the original wrong-doer is responsible for all of the
consequences resulting from the intervening act.” Ontario Sewing Mach. Co. v.
Smith, 572 S.E.2d 533, 536 (Ga. 2002) (citing Williams v. Grier, 26 S.E.2d 698
(Ga. 1943).
Here, the facts are not so clear-cut that the Court should decide the
proximate cause issue. It is not “plain and undisputed” that Plaintiff’s own
actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries. Smith, 572 S.E.2d at 536.
Nor is it clear that Buffalo could not have foreseen the alleged intervening acts
of TSC. Rather, Plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support proximate cause.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561.
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Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient facts in his Complaint to
survive Buffalo’s Motion to Dismiss [9], which must be DENIED.
Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, Buffalo’s Motion to Dismiss [9] is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 23rd

day of April, 2015.

________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge

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