Wesley Club et al v. Felton
Filing
7
OPINION AND ORDER that this action is REMANDED to the Magistrate Court of DeKalb County, Georgia. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill's Report and Recommendation 3 is deemed MOOT. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 11/18/2014. (anc)
Magistrate Court of DeKalb County, Georgia.2 The Complaint seeks possession of
premises currently occupied by Defendant, and past due rent and fees totaling
$904.30.
On August 11, 2014, Defendant, proceeding pro se, removed the DeKalb
County Action to this Court by filing a Notice of Removal and an application to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) [1]. Defendant appears to assert that there is
federal subject-matter jurisdiction based on the existence of a question of federal
law. She claims in her Notice of Removal that the dispossessory action violates
the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) and “15 USCA 1962 [sic].” (Notice of
Removal at 1).
On August 13, 2014, Magistrate Judge Brill granted Defendant’s application
to proceed IFP. Judge Brill also considered sua sponte the question of subject
matter jurisdiction and recommended that the Court remand this case to the
Magistrate Court of DeKalb County.
Judge Brill found that Plaintiffs’ underlying pleading shows that this action
is a dispossessory action, which does not present a federal question. Noting that a
federal law defense or counterclaim alone is not sufficient to confer federal
jurisdiction, Judge Brill concluded that the Court does not have federal question
2
No. 14D19114.
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jurisdiction over this matter. Judge Brill also found that Plaintiffs and Defendant
appear to be citizens of Georgia, and that the amount in controversy does not
exceed the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. Judge Brill concluded that the Court
does not have diversity jurisdiction over this matter and that this case is required to
be remanded to the state court.
On August 15, 2014, in lieu of objecting to the R&R, Defendant filed her
Amended Notice of Removal [5]. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”), Rule 60
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. She further claims that Plaintiffs have “a legal duty to
abort eviction pursuant to O.C.G.A. [§] 51-1-6.” (Am. Notice of Removal at 2).
In light of her pro se status, the Court construes Defendant’s filings liberally,
and as a whole, to determine whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over
this action.
II.
DISCUSSION
The Eleventh Circuit has consistently held that “a court should inquire into
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the
proceedings. Indeed, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire
into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”
3
Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). “[O]nce
a federal court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is
powerless to continue.” Id.
Congress has provided that “any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal in this case appears to
be based on federal-question jurisdiction, which extends to “all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘wellpleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded
complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Thus, a
federal cause of action within a counterclaim or a federal defense is not a basis for
removal jurisdiction. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59-61 (2009).
Plaintiffs’ Complaint is a dispossessory action which is based solely on state
law. No federal question is presented on the face of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. That
Defendant asserts defenses or counterclaims based on federal law cannot confer
federal subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. See Beneficial Nat’l Bank
v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
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Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-32 (2002). Removal is not proper based on federal
question jurisdiction.
The Court’s jurisdiction in this action also cannot be based on diversity of
citizenship, which extends to “all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,” and is between “citizens of different States.”
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), (2). Defendant has not alleged the citizenship of the
parties, and even if diversity does exist, Defendant fails to show that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.00. The Court must look only to Plaintiffs’ claim to
determine if the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied. See, e.g.,
Novastar Mortg. Inc. v. Bennett, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2001),
aff’d, 35 F. App’x 585 (11th Cir. 2002). The Complaint here seeks possession of
premises currently possessed by Defendant, and past due rent and fees totaling
$904.30. It is well-settled that “a claim seeking only ejectment in a dispossessory
action cannot be reduced to a monetary sum for purposes of determining the
amount in controversy.” Bennett, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 1361-1362; see also
Citimortgage, Inc. v. Dhinoja, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 2010). The
amount-in-controversy requirement is not satisfied and removal is not proper based
on diversity of citizenship.
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Because the Court lacks both federal question and diversity jurisdiction, this
action is required to be remanded to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at
any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).3
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is REMANDED to the
Magistrate Court of DeKalb County, Georgia.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill’s
Report and Recommendation [3] is deemed MOOT.
SO ORDERED this 18th day of November, 2014.
_______________________________
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3
Even if subject matter jurisdiction existed, the Court cannot provide
Defendant the relief she seeks—a stay of state court eviction proceedings—
because a federal court is prohibited under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283, from enjoining a state court eviction proceeding.
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