Grochowski et al v. Clayton County, Georgia et al
Filing
195
OPINION AND ORDER granting Defendants CorrectHealth, LLC, James Rose and Walter Smith's 137 Motion for Summary Judgment; GRANTING Defendants Clayton County, Kemuel Kimbrough, Garland Watkins, Robert Sowell, and Samuel Smith's 138 Motion for Summary Judgment; DENYING Plaintiffs' 139 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on 9/28/18. (jkl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
DONALD GROCHOWSKI
as a representative administrator of
the estate of Kenneth Grochowski,
deceased, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:14-CV-2586-TWT
CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA
is sued through its Chair Jeffrey E.
Turner, and Commissioners in their
official capacity, and through the
Sheriff Kemuel Kimbrough, in his
official capacity, individually and
jointly, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights action. It is before the Court on the Defendants
CorrectHealth, LLC, James Rose and Walter Smith’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. 137]; the Defendants Clayton County, Kemuel Kimbrough,
Garland Watkins, Robert Sowell, and Samuel Smith’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. 138]; and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
[Doc. 139]. For the reasons set forth below, (1) the Defendants CorrectHealth,
LLC, James Rose and Walter Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 137]
is GRANTED; (2) the Defendants Clayton County, Kemuel Kimbrough, Garland
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Watkins, Robert Sowell, and Samuel Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[Doc. 138] is GRANTED; and (3) the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment [Doc. 139] is DENIED.
I. Background
This case arises from the death of the Plaintiffs’ decedent, Kenneth
Grochowski, at the hands of William Alexander Brooks while both men were
detained at the Clayton County Jail. Twenty year old William Alexander Brooks
was arrested on July 31, 2012.1 He was charged with misdemeanor offenses of
theft by receiving stolen property, giving a false name to an officer, driving on
a suspended license, and not wearing a seatbelt.2 Brooks was booked into the
Jail on August 1, 2012.3 Brooks underwent an initial medical assessment
conducted by the Defendant CorrectHealth’s employees.4 CorrectHealth is a
private entity that contracts with Clayton County to provide health care to
inmates and pre-trial detainees held at the Jail.5 During the assessment, Brooks
self-reported no past or current physical or mental health issues and denied any
1
County and Supervisory Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts
¶ 1 [Doc 138-2].
2
Id.
3
Id. ¶ 2.
4
Id. This included physical and mental assessments by the trained
nursing staff and review by a physician assistant.
5
Compl. ¶ 90 [Doc. 1].
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history of violent behavior.6 The CorrectHealth employees conducting the
assessment concluded that Brooks’ vital signs, general appearance, attitude, and
affect were all within normal limits.7 Therefore, Brooks was cleared for housing
within the general population.8
The classification officer on duty at the time, Officer Lashanda Baker,
completed Brooks’ Classification Form.9 Officer Baker reviewed Brooks’ criminal
history and determined that Brooks had no violent felony convictions, no escape
history, and no past or present institutional or behavioral problems.10 Therefore,
Officer Baker classified Brooks as a medium security inmate.11 There is no
evidence that any of the individual Defendants were aware (as alleged in the
Complaint) of any erratic behavior by Brooks prior to August 14, 2012.
Fifty-seven year old Kenneth Grochowski was arrested on August 8, 2012,
and charged with failure to appear on a DUI charge in Illinois.12 He was booked
6
CorrectHealth’s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 9 [Doc. 137-4].
7
Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
8
Id. ¶ 17.
9
County and Supervisory Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts
10
Id. The criminal history and current charges of an inmate are not
¶ 4.
provided to the medical staff by the jail security staff.
11
Id.
12
Id. ¶ 5.
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into the Jail the same day.13 Grochowski underwent a medical assessment and
was cleared for housing within the general population.14 Officer Baker completed
his Classification Form and classified him as a medium security inmate.15
Brooks and Grochowski were housed in the same cell beginning August
11, 2012.16 On August 14, 2012, at or around 9:05 pm, Brooks began beating
Grochowski until he was unconscious, and forcefully placed Grochowski’s head
in the toilet in an attempt to drown him.17 Another inmate alerted jail staff of
the assault, and Grochowski was found unresponsive in his cell.18 Grochowski
was transported to Southern Regional Medical Center where he was pronounced
dead the morning of August 15, 2012.19
The Jail was designed to house two inmates per cell.20 There are
ninety-six cells and a central control tower in each of the Jail's eight Housing
13
14
Id. ¶ 7.
15
Id. ¶ 8.
16
Id. ¶ 10.
17
Id. ¶ 12.
18
Id. ¶¶ 13-15.
19
Id. ¶ 18.
20
¶ 25.
Id. ¶ 6.
County and Supervisory Defendants' Statement of Material Facts
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Units.21 The cells have a solid door with a small window.22 Two corrections
officers are assigned to each Housing Unit per shift, one in the control tower and
one on the floor.23 The parties dispute whether the officer stationed in the
control tower can see into the cells.24 Each cell, including the one that housed
Brooks and Grochowski, is equipped with an emergency call button.25 It is the
policy of the Jail to conduct physical cell checks every hour and headcounts
three times a day.26 The corrections officers on duty followed these policies on
the night of the assault.27
21
Id. ¶¶ 23-24.
22
Id. ¶ 27.
23
Id. ¶ 37.
24
The Defendants claim that the officer in the control tower has a
“clear view” of some of the cell's interior but cannot see the entire cell. Id. ¶ 28.
The Plaintiffs claim that the officer in the control tower cannot see into the cell
at all. Pls.’ Resp. to County and Supervisory Defendants' Statement of Material
Facts ¶ 28 [Doc. 171].
25
Pls.’ Resp. to County and Supervisory Defendants' Statement of
Material Facts ¶ 32.
26
County and Supervisory Defendants' Statement of Material Facts
¶ 39. The Plaintiffs dispute that this policy is always followed, see Pls.’ Resp.
to the County and Supervisory Defendants' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 39,
but do not dispute that the policy was followed on the night of the assault, see
id. ¶ 19.
27
¶ 19.
County and Supervisory Defendants' Statement of Material Facts
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The Plaintiffs, the decedent’s adult children, filed this action on August
11, 2014.28 The Plaintiffs named as defendants the County; CorrectHealth and
various employees; the Sheriff; and various supervisors and corrections officers
employed by the Sheriff’s Office.29 At this stage in the litigation, the Plaintiffs
have abandoned all claims against non-supervisory jail personnel, as well as
those against CorrectHealth’s employees. Therefore, the remaining Defendants
are the County, CorrectHealth, the Sheriff, and three jail supervisors who, it is
alleged, are responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Jail. The Sheriff
and the jail supervisors are collectively referred to as the “Supervisory
Defendants” in this Order. These Defendants and the Plaintiffs move for
summary judgment.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions,
and affidavits submitted by the parties show no genuine issue of material fact
exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.30 The
court should view the evidence and any inferences that may be drawn in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant.31 The party seeking summary judgment
must first identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of material
28
Compl. ¶ 4.
29
Id.
30
Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c).
31
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970).
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fact.32 The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the
pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of
material fact exists.33
III. Discussion
This Order will review each Defendant’s potential liability in turn,
beginning with CorrectHealth.
A. CorrectHealth
In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that the “acts, omissions, policies,
and customs” of CorrectHealth and its employees resulted in violations of the
decedent’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, including “the right to be
free of cruel and unusual punishment, the right to be protected, and the right
to medical care while incarcerated.”34 The Plaintiffs appended a state law
negligence claim to their § 1983 claim, alleging that CorrectHealth’s employees
breached their duty to the decedent by failing to perceive or mitigate the danger
that Brooks posed to other detainees.35 The Plaintiffs have abandoned all claims
against CorrectHealth employees, and this Court holds that the remaining
32
Celotex Corp. V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
33
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
34
Compl. ¶ 126.
35
First Am. Compl. ¶ 9 [Doc. 4].
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CorrectHealth employees should be dismissed from this action.36 This Court is
called upon to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate as to the
Plaintiffs’ claims against CorrectHealth as a private entity.
1. § 1983 Claim
CorrectHealth is amenable to suit under § 1983 because it has contracted
to perform a function “traditionally within the prerogative of” the County,
namely the provision of medical care to incarcerated persons.37 Therefore, this
Court will treat CorrectHealth as the “functional equivalent” of a municipality
for the purposes of determining its liability under § 1983. There is no respondeat
superior liability for a municipality under section 1983. A municipality can be
liable under § 1983 only when execution of its official “policy or custom” is the
“moving force” behind a constitutional violation.38 A municipality is liable only
for policies promulgated or ratified by officials with “final policymaking
authority.”39 A municipality cannot be liable for the acts of officials that it has
no authority to control.40
36
Consent Stipulation for Dismissal [Doc. 28]; Pls.’ Reply Br. to
CorrectHealth’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 1 n.1 [Doc. 176].
37
Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997).
38
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
694 (1978).
39
Hill v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1150, 1152 (11th Cir. 1996).
Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1331 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing
Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998)).
40
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CorrectHealth contends that none of its policies or customs were the
moving force behind the constitutional violations alleged by the Plaintiffs.
CorrectHealth asserts that the physical and mental health assessment
performed on Brooks by its employees met the relevant standard of care and
that the test results indicated no need for an immediate mental health
referral.41 CorrectHealth further asserts that neither CorrectHealth nor its
employees have any input in detainees’ security classifications or where they are
housed in the facility.42 The Plaintiffs do not dispute the truth of any of
CorrectHealth’s proffered facts. Rather, they contend that the quality of care
provided to Brooks is immaterial because Brooks’ initial assessment was
“inadequate for purposes of classification and assessment of assaultive
tendencies to determine suitability for double-celling.”43 It appears from
Plaintiffs’ briefing that the “policy or custom” complained of is the double-celling
of detainees without adequate safeguards to prevent inmate-on-inmate violence.
The Plaintiffs’ theory of liability fails as a matter of law because
CorrectHealth plays no role in setting classification policies for the Jail and
lacks the authority to do so. The parties agree that neither CorrectHealth nor
41
CorrectHealth’s Mot. For Summ. J., at 10 [Doc. 137-1].
42
CorrectHealth’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. For Summ. J., at 2 [Doc
181].
43
Pls.’ Resp. to CorrectHealth’s Statement of Material Facts in Supp.
of Mot. For Summ. J., at 11-15 [Doc. 176-1].
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its employees have any input in classification or housing decisions.44 The Sheriff
and his subordinates are solely responsible for setting classification policy. In
his capacity as jail administrator, the Sheriff acts as an arm of the state and is
not subject to the control of the County or to entities operating on Countydelegated authority.45 Because CorrectHealth exercises no control over the policy
maker responsible for setting classification policy, CorrectHealth cannot be
liable under § 1983.46
The Plaintiffs seek to establish CorrectHealth’s responsibility to assess
detainees for security risks by pointing to language in the County’s 2008
Request for Proposal.47 That document suggests that the health care provider
will have “primary, but not exclusive responsibility for all the identification, care
and treatment of inmates who are ‘security risks’ or who present a danger to
44
CorrectHealth’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., at 2 [Doc
181]; accord Pls.’ Resp. Br. to CorrectHealth’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 5 n.8 [Doc.
176] (“CorrectHealth personnel did not provide ‘any input’ for the Sheriff
employee’s decisions as to ‘medium or maximum security and room assignment,’
which was ‘completely up to’ the Sheriff’s employees.”) (citing Pedersen Decl. ¶
31 [Doc. 137-2]).
Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cty., Ga, 400 F.3d 1313,
1325 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1315 (11th Cir.
45
2003)).
46
See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1343 (holding that local government entities
cannot be liable for the acts of the Sheriff over which it has no control).
47
See Doc. 173-2.
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themselves and others.”48 But whether or not the County actually sought to
assign CorrectHealth primary responsibility to conduct risk assessments is
beside the point. Final decisions on classification and housing decisions rest
with the Sheriff as a matter of law.49 Because the County itself has no authority
to control the Sheriff in his capacity as jail administrator, it follows that the
County could not delegate such authority to a private entity by contract. The
contractual language at issue cannot establish that officials subject to
CorrectHealth’s control had, or should have had, the authority to set
classification and housing policies in the Jail. Therefore, CorrectHealth’s
contract with the County cannot sustain a finding of liability under § 1983.
2. State Law Negligence Claim
CorrectHealth argues that it is not liable for negligence under Georgia
law because Brooks’ health screening met the standard of care and because the
Defendant had no input into classification or housing decisions at the Jail.50 The
Plaintiffs provide no response to CorrectHealth’s arguments in their reply
briefing. Indeed, the Plaintiffs did not address their state law negligence claims
at all in their response brief. Therefore, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have
48
Pls.’ Resp. to CorrectHealth’s Statement of Material Facts, at 11
(citing Request for Proposal, at 30 [Doc. 173-2]).
49
Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1325.
50
CorrectHealth’s Mot. For Summ. J., at 15-16.
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abandoned their state law negligence claim.51 In any event, the Plaintiffs’
negligence claim was premised on the idea that CorrectHealth’s failure to assign
a heightened security classification to Brooks caused harm to the decedent.
Undisputed facts in the record establish that CorrectHealth had no duty to and
did not participate in classification decisions. Thus, the Plaintiffs cannot
establish a prima facie case for negligence against CorrectHealth and the claim
fails as a matter of law.
B. Supervisory Defendants
The Plaintiffs sued the Supervisory Defendants in their individual and
official capacities for “acts, omissions, policies, and customs” that they allege
violated the decedent’s rights secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.52 In its Order of Dismissal, this Court dismissed all claims against
the Supervisory Defendants in their official capacities except for those
concerning inadequate provision of medical care.53 As for the claims against the
Supervisory Defendants in their individual capacities, this Court dismissed the
Plaintiffs’ failure to train claim but did not dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims
See Gore v. Jacobs Eng'g Grp., 706 F. App'x 981, 986 (11th Cir.
2017) (“[F]ailure to brief and argue [an] issue during the proceedings before the
district court is grounds for finding that the issue has been abandoned.”) (citing
Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d
1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000)).
51
52
Compl. ¶ 115. The rights identified by the Plaintiffs included the
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the right to be protected,
and the right to medical care while incarcerated.
53
Order of Dismissal, at 8 [Doc. 57].
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concerning the Supervisory Defendants’ personal participation in a
constitutional violation.54 The Plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint
to add claims for conditions of confinement that violated the decedent’s right not
to be punished prior to adjudication of guilt.55 The Plaintiffs also added a § 1983
claim on their own behalf for loss of familial association.56 At summary
judgment, the Supervisory Defendants request Eleventh Amendment immunity
for the claims against them in their official capacities and qualified immunity
for the claims against them in their individual capacities.57
The claim for loss of familial association is easily resolved. The County
and the Supervisory Defendants raised defenses to this claim in their briefing
to which the Plaintiffs failed to respond.58 The Plaintiffs have therefore
abandoned this claim and it is dismissed accordingly.59 As for the remaining
claims, this Court holds that the Supervisory Defendants are entitled to
immunity for the reasons provided below.
1. Official Capacity Claims
54
Id., at 10-11.
55
Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 67-88 [Doc. 73].
56
Second Am. Compl. ¶ 89.
57
County and Supervisory Defendants' Mot. for Summ. J., at 12-22.
58
Id. at 22-23.
59
See Gore, 706 F. App'x at 985.
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Failure to provide medical care is the sole remaining claim against the
Supervisory Defendants in their official capacities.60 The Supervisory
Defendants contend that the medical care that Brooks and the decedent received
at initial intake was not constitutionally defective and that, in any event, the
Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that the Supervisory Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the allegedly deficient medical care.61 The Supervisory
Defendants have established sufficient grounds to make the official capacity
claims against them subject to summary adjudication, and the Plaintiffs do not
substantively respond to the Supervisory Defendants’ arguments regarding the
sufficiency of the medical care provided to Brooks and the decedent. As such, the
claim against the Supervisory Defendants in their official capacities should be
dismissed.
Although it is not clear from the Plaintiffs’ briefing, the Plaintiffs could
be arguing that the Supervisory Defendants are liable because the results of
inmates’ medical screening are not taken into account during the classification
and housing process. As this Court already explained in its Order of Dismissal,
however, the Supervisory Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity for all claims pertaining to jail administration, which includes
classification and housing decisions.62 Because the Plaintiffs allege that the
60
Order of Dismissal, at 8.
61
County and Supervisory Defendants’ Mot. for Summ. J., at 12-13.
62
Order of Dismissal, at 8.
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harm arose from the Jail’s classification system rather than from the medical
care itself, the Plaintiffs cannot sustain their claims regarding inadequate
provision of medical care against the Supervisory Defendants in their official
capacities.
2. Individual Capacity Claims
The Supervisory Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified
immunity for the section 1983 claims brought against them in their individual
capacities. Qualified immunity exempts an officer from section 1983 liability
under certain circumstances.63 To be entitled to qualified immunity in the
Eleventh Circuit, an officer must show that he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority at the time of the alleged wrongful acts.64 Once the
officer has proved that he was within the scope of his discretionary authority,
the plaintiff must show that the officer violated “clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”65 In
order to establish that a reasonable officer would have known of a right, a
plaintiff must show development of law in a “concrete and factually defined
context” such that a reasonable officer would know that his conduct violated
federal law.66 Two questions are central to the qualified immunity defense. First,
63
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
64
Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002).
65
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
66
Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (11th Cir. 2000).
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the Court must determine whether there was a violation of a constitutional
right.67 Second, the Court must then determine whether the right was clearly
established.68 There is no dispute that the Supervisory Defendants were acting
within the scope of their discretion at all times relevant to this suit.69 Therefore,
the burden is on the Plaintiffs to establish that the Supervisory Defendants
violated clearly established law.
a. Constitutional Violation
A jail supervisor may be liable under § 1983 when that supervisor
personally participates in a constitutional deprivation or when there is a causal
connection between the supervisor's acts and the constitutional deprivation.70
When considering the claims of pretrial detainees, liability can attach when a
“prison official's deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk of serious
harm violates the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”71 A showing of deliberate
indifference requires “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2)
disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than gross negligence.”72
67
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736-42 (2002).
68
Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194.
69
Compl. ¶ 6; County and Supervisory Defendants’ Mot. for Summ.
J., at 19 n.3.
70
Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).
71
Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047 (11th Cir. 2014).
72
Id. at 1047.
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Although the Plaintiffs alleged in their original complaint that the Supervisory
Defendants personally participated in the decision to house Brooks with the
decedent,73 the Plaintiffs appear to have dropped that line of argument at
summary judgment. Therefore, the question before this Court is whether the
Supervisory Defendants’ policies or practices caused the decedent to be deprived
of his constitutional rights.74
The Plaintiffs identify various policies and practices that they allege
violated the decedent’s constitutional rights. First, they allege that the Jail was
designed such that all detainees are double-celled without continuous
observation by the jail staff.75 Second, they allege that the Jail was underfunded
and understaffed, preventing jail staff from single-celling assaultive detainees
and conducting continuous rounds.76 Third, they allege that the screening,
classification, and cell-assignment processes were “grossly inadequate” and
resulted in non-violent detainees being housed with violent detainees.77 Fourth,
they allege that the Defendants had a “practice” of failing to prevent in-cell
73
Compl. ¶¶ 31-33. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Supervisory
Defendants personally observed “erratic behavior” displayed by Brooks but
failed to make any changes to his security designation or housing assignment.
74
Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048.
75
Pls.’ Resp. Br. to County and Supervisory Defendants’ Mot. for
Summ. J., at 2.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 3.
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assaults because they did not investigate or seek to change the conditions that
gave rise to previous in-cell assaults.78
The Plaintiffs insist that these policies and practices constitute
“conditions of confinement” that should be analyzed under the objective test
articulated by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish.79 The Supreme Court held
in Bell that conditions claims brought by pretrial detainees arise under the
Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits punishment prior to the adjudication
of guilt.80 A condition of confinement violates the Fourteenth Amendment if it
is imposed with the intent, express or inferred, to punish the pretrial detainee.81
The Eleventh Circuit, however, has held that the decisional law applicable to
prison inmates applies equally to pretrial detainees.82 As a result, the Eleventh
Circuit has required plaintiffs challenging conditions of confinement to show
both that the deprivation suffered was objectively serious and that prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to the violation of the plaintiff’s
78
Id. at 4.
79
441 U.S. 520 (1979); Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 1-2 [Doc.
142] (arguing that the Bell standard applies to the Plaintiffs’ claims).
80
Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-36.
81
Id. at 538-40.
Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985); see
also Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996).
82
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constitutional rights.83 The Plaintiffs argue that the recent Supreme Court case
Kingsley v. Hendrickson abrogates Eleventh Circuit precedent such that the
Plaintiffs need only satisfy Bell’’s objective standard without a showing of
deliberate indifference.84
The Plaintiffs' argument regarding the reach of Kingsley is unpersuasive.
The Eleventh Circuit has thus far declined to apply Kingsley beyond the
excessive force context in which it arose, despite opportunities to do so.85 The
Plaintiffs give this Court no compelling reason to depart from decades of binding
case law establishing that plaintiffs must show deliberate indifference in prison
conditions cases. This Court need not reach the question of whether the
Supervisory Defendants were deliberately indifferent, however, because none
of the challenged policies created an objectively substantial risk of serious
83
See Evans v. St. Lucie Cty. Jail, 448 F. App'x 971, 973–75 (11th
Cir. 2011) (requiring that a pretrial detainee bringing a prison conditions case
show that (1) the deprivation was “sufficiently serious” and (2) prison officials
had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”) (citations omitted).
84
135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015); Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 8-9
(arguing that the Plaintiffs need not show that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent in prison conditions cases).
See Nam Dang ex rel Vina Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cty. Fla., 871
F.3d 1272, 1279 n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (declining to extend Kingsley’s holding to
a pretrial detainee’s claim of inadequate medical treatment); see also Collins v.
Bates, No. 2:14-CV-231-WHA, 2017 WL 4054160, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 2017)
85
(compiling cases in which the Eleventh Circuit has applied the deliberate
indifference standard to prison conditions cases brought by pretrial detainees
post-Kingsley), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:14-CV-231-WHA,
2017 WL 3951601 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2017).
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harm.86 Nor do the facts support the inference that any of the policies were
implemented with the intent to punish inmates at the Jail.
The Plaintiffs criticize the Jail's “objective” classification process on the
grounds that classification officers do not conduct face-to-face interviews with
inmates and do not consider violent misdemeanors.87 As a result, the Plaintiffs
argue, inmates with assaultive tendencies are double-celled with non-violent
inmates, making in-cell assaults substantially more likely.88 The Plaintiffs cite
case law standing for the proposition that classification systems cannot be
random and must at least consider inmates' capacity for violence.89 Although jail
administrators must consider an inmate's capacity for violence during the
classification process, it is not the role of the judiciary to second-guess
administrative decisions about which indicators should be considered and how
they should be weighed. This Court is mindful of the Supreme Court's
admonition that jail administrators “should be accorded wide-ranging deference
Keith, 749 F.3d at 1047 (“Whether a risk of harm is substantial is
an objective inquiry.”) (citing Marsh v. Butler Cty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028
(11th Cir. 2001)).
86
87
Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 16-18.
88
Id.
Cf. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1308 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The
inmates are not classified according to the severity of their offense, resulting in
the intermingling of inmates convicted of aggravated violent crimes with those
who are first offenders or convicted of nonviolent crimes.”); Jensen v. Clarke, 94
F.3d 1191, 1199 (8th Cir. 1996) (“random” assignment of inmates based only on
space availability created a substantial risk of harm).
89
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in adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.”90 The classification system in place at the Jail takes into account
various security-related factors, including the inmates' history of violent felonies
and disciplinary records from previous detentions at the facility.91 The Plaintiffs
put forward several recommendations for how the classification process could
be changed to better detect an inmate's propensity for violence. But the
dispositive question is not whether the classification system could be improved.92
Rather, the question is whether the existing system falls below what the
Constitution minimally requires.93 Even assuming that these incidents could be
fairly traced to the Jail's classification system, a few isolated events from several
90
Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.
91
County and Supervisory Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts
in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 33.
92
Bell, 441 U.S. at 562 (“The first question to be answered is not
whose plan is best, but in which branch of the Government is lodged the
authority to initially devise the plan… [T]he inquiry of federal courts into prison
management must be limited to the issue of whether a particular system
violates any prohibition of the Constitution[.]”).
93
Pls.’ Additional Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 1-3. The Plaintiffs
in fact identify six in-cell fights that occurred between May 12, 2007 and April
24, 2009. For two of these fights, however, the Plaintiffs provide no information
as to the participants' criminal histories. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. As for the altercation
between Antonio Raspberry and Bruce Goodman, see id. ¶ 6, that incident
occurred in administrative segregation, not general population, and is therefore
of little relevance to the case at bar. See Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325,
1329 (11th Cir. 2013).
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years prior are simply not enough to establish a causal connection between the
challenged classification system and the allegedly unsafe conditions at the Jail.94
The Plaintiffs further assert that at least 115 in-cell assaults occurred in the
Jail between 2010 and 2012.95 The County and the Supervisory Defendants
have objected to the methodology by which the Plaintiffs came by their figures
and the manner in which it has been presented to this Court.96 Even if the
Plaintiffs’ numbers are correct, however, the Plaintiffs do not identify which, if
any, of these assaults would not have occurred but for the inadequate
classification system. The evidence provided by the Plaintiffs could not persuade
a reasonable factfinder that the Supervisory Defendants' classification policies
created an objectively serious risk of harm.
The Plaintiffs' evidence concerning the Jail's supervision policies is
similarly insufficient. As with the classification system, the Plaintiffs put
forward several means by which the inmate supervision could be improved. The
Plaintiffs suggest that cell doors could have larger windows; that audio or video
monitoring devices could be installed in each cell; or that more corrections
94
A history of widespread abuse can put the supervisory official on
notice of the need to take corrective action. Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. But “the
deprivations that constitute widespread abuse... must be obvious, flagrant, and
of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Id.
95
Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 14.
96
See Notice of Objection to Pls.’ Summary Chart [Doc. 165]; County
and Supervisory Defendants’ Reply Br. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., at 1011.
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officers could be assigned to each shift.97 These suggestions appear designed to
achieve the goal of continuous or near-continuous supervision of cell interiors.
But the Plaintiffs do not provide, and this Court is unaware of, any cases
holding that continuous supervision of double-celled inmates is required by the
Constitution. Identifying the minimal constitutional requirements for inmate
supervision is challenging because of the fact-specific nature of prison conditions
cases. Eleventh Circuit precedent, however, would appear to set the bar well
below the conditions challenged in this case. In Popham v. City of Talladega, the
widow of a man who committed suicide while detained in a city jail brought suit
against jail officials for failure to protect and properly monitor her decedent.98
The portion of the cell in which the suicide occurred was not in view of the jail's
video monitoring system, and no jail staff were on duty to conduct physical
checks.99 The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless rejected the claim, noting that the
plaintiff had “cite[d] no cases for the proposition that deliberate indifference is
demonstrated if prisoners are not seen by jailers at all times.”100 In Cagle v.
Sutherland, the Eleventh Circuit held that a one hour forty minute gap between
cell checks did not amount to deliberate indifference, notwithstanding a
97
Pls.’ Resp. to County and Supervisory Defendants’ Statement of
Material Facts ¶¶ 29-30, 38.
98
908 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1990).
99
Id. at 1565.
100
Id.
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previous consent decree mandating hourly cell checks at the prison.101 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that the consent decree “did not establish a
constitutional right to hourly jail checks” strongly suggesting that, in the
Eleventh Circuit's view, even hourly cell checks are not constitutionally
required.102 The out-of-circuit cases that the Plaintiffs marshal in support of the
contrary proposition do not go so far as to require continuous observation and,
in any event, present factual scenarios quite distinct from the case before this
Court.103 The Plaintiffs’ evidence is not sufficient to show that lack of continuous
observation deprived any inmate of his or her constitutional rights.
In addition to the Jail's classification and supervision policies, the
Plaintiffs challenge what they characterize as a “policy of allowing in-cell
101
334 F.3d 980, 989 (11th Cir. 2003).
102
Id.
In Lareau v. Manson, the Second Circuit adopted the magistrate
judge's finding that double celling inmates without providing adequate means
of contacting guards violates the Eighth Amendment. 651 F.2d 96, 108 n.11 (2d
Cir. 1981). The record on appeal is silent as to the frequency of physical cell
checks (or even whether such checks occurred at all) or the presence or absence
of emergency call buttons in the cell. And, even taking into account the
magistrate judge's findings, the Second Circuit concluded that holding pretrial
detainees in such conditions was constitutionally permissible for a period of 15
days or less. Id. at 105. In Hart v. Sheahan, the Seventh Circuit considered a
case in which jail staff did not observe inmates for a period of forty eight to fifty
consecutive hours while the staff conducted weapons and contraband checks in
different sections of the jail. 396 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2005). The remarkable and
easily distinguishable facts in that case make it wholly unhelpful in addressing
the issues presently before this Court.
103
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assaults to go un-prevented.”104 While the Plaintiffs list this policy as a condition
of confinement subject to review under the Bell v. Wolfish standard, it is difficult
to conceptualize how the failure to investigate the causes of previous in-cell
assaults could be a “condition” imposed on current detainees. In their briefing,
the
Plaintiffs
assert
that
this
policy
“reeks
of
deliberate
indifference”—apparently arguing that the supervisors were deliberately
indifferent to an excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence.105 The evidence to
support this allegation is thin at best. Jail officials are not the guarantors of
inmate safety.106 In order to establish that inmate-on-inmate violence is
excessive, the Plaintiffs must show that “violence and terror reign” at the Jail.107
Inmates must be exposed to a near-constant threat of violence.108 The Plaintiffs
assert that there had been 115 in-cell assaults over a period of about three years
leading up to the attack.109 The Plaintiffs further assert that the rate of in-cell
assaults is “high” in proportion to the total number of assaults over the same
104
Pls.’ Resp. Br. to County and Supervisory Defendants’ Mot. for
Summ. J., at 3.
105
Id. at 16.
106
Popham, 908 F.2d at 1564.
107
Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1320.
108
Id.
109
Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 14.
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period.110 But, even if the Plaintiffs have the numbers right, an in-cell assault
rate of roughly thirty eight per year is not sufficient to show that the “violence
and terror reign” at the Jail or that inmates are subject to a “constant threat of
violence.” It is not incumbent on the Supervisory Defendants to investigate the
root causes of every in-cell assault, particularly when the incident records relied
on by the Plaintiffs show that the perpetrators of the assaults are quickly
identified and appropriate disciplinary action is taken. The Plaintiffs make
much of the case Goodman v. Kimbrough, in which the Sheriff was sued in his
official capacity after a detainee was brutally beaten by his cell-mate while in
administrative segregation.111 But the constitutional adequacy of the Jail's
classification and supervision policies were not at issue in the case. On the
contrary, it was deviations from official policy–namely deactivating emergency
call buttons and failing to conduct cell checks and head counts–that gave rise to
claims in Goodman.112 There is no sense in which Goodman could have put the
Supervisory Defendants on notice of a substantial risk posed by their
classification and supervision policies. Thus, the Supervisory Defendants cannot
as a matter of law be liable for their alleged policy of “allowing in-cell assaults
to go unprevented.”
110
Id.
111
Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1329.
112
Id. at 1335 (“Goodman does not allege that any official Sheriff’s
Department policy violated his constitutional rights.”).
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Because this Court concludes that none of the challenged policies give rise
to an objectively substantial risk of serious harm as a matter of law, it is
perhaps redundant to consider whether these policies constitute unconditional
conditions of confinement as urged by the Plaintiffs. Regardless, the Plaintiffs
cannot prevail even by application of their preferred standard. There is nothing
on the record to suggest that the Supervisory Defendants implemented the
aforementioned policies with the express intent to punish detainees. Thus, in
order to prevail the Plaintiffs must show that the challenged conditions are not
reasonably related to any legitimate penological purpose. The factfinder would
then be permitted, but not required, to draw the inference that the conditions
were imposed with the intent to punish detainees. In this case, the Jail's
classification, supervision, and housing policies are clearly related to the
Supervisory Defendants' legitimate penological interests in “preserv[ing]
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”113 This
Court declines the Plaintiffs' invitation to view each absence of some additional
safety measure as a condition of confinement that itself must further a
penological interest. Insofar as the absence of additional safeguards requires
explanation, the Supervisory Defendants supply penological interests, like
ensuring that classification systems are unbiased and protecting inmate privacy,
113
Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.
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that the Plaintiffs fail to meaningfully refute.114 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
has recognized “reasonably limit[ing] the cost of detention” as a legitimate
penological interest, notwithstanding the Plaintiffs’ protestations to the
contrary.115 In short, the Plaintiffs' evidence cannot give rise to the inference
that the challenged conditions are unconstitutional punishments. The
Supervisory Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that
the Plaintiffs cannot show that their policies violated the decedent's
constitutional rights.
b. Clearly Established Law
Even if the Plaintiffs could establish that the decedent’s constitutional
rights were violated, they cannot establish that the Supervisory Defendants
violated clearly established law. For the law to be so clearly established as to
overcome qualified immunity, it must have “earlier been developed in such a
concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable
government actors, in the defendant’s place, that ‘what he is doing’ violates
114
The Plaintiffs insist that protecting inmate privacy is not a
legitimate penological interest because inmates' privacy rights are substantially
curtailed while incarcerated. Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 10-11 [Doc. 142].
But the Plaintiffs’ discussion of the privacy rights of inmates is beside the point.
The Supervisory Defendants may well have an interest in preserving inmate
privacy even if the inmates do not have a right to demand privacy.
115
Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1573.
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federal law.”116 For the purposes of determining whether the law is clearly
established, this Court may consider only decisions from the Eleventh Circuit,
the Supreme Court, and the Georgia Supreme Court.117
The Plaintiffs provide only two cases for this Court’s consideration,
neither of which are sufficient to overcome the high bar that the Eleventh
Circuit has set for overcoming a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity. In
Hale v. Tallapoosa County, the plaintiff was placed in a 13-by-20-foot “bullpen”
with over a dozen other inmates, none of whom were segregated based on their
proclivity for violence.118 The plaintiff, who was booked for failure to appear, was
attacked by a detainee booked for murder and attempted murder.119 The sole
corrections officer tasked with monitoring the bullpen checked in only twice over
a five hour period.120 In short, the facts of Hale are not sufficiently similar to
those in this case to have given the Supervisory Defendants notice that their
policies violated clearly established law.
Jenkins by Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 823
(11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146 (11th
116
Cir. 1994)).
117
Id. at 826 n.4.
118
50 F.3d 1579, 1580-81 (11th Cir. 1995).
119
Id.
120
Id.
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The facts of Marsh v. Butler County, Ala. are even further removed from
those presented in this case.121 In Marsh, the plaintiffs were assaulted and
injured by prisoners at the Butler County Jail. The plaintiffs raised the
following claims regarding conditions at the jail:
1) there was no segregation of nonviolent inmates from violent
inmates, pretrial detainees from convicted criminals, juveniles
from adults, or inmates with mental disorders from those without
mental disorders, 2) at times the Jail housed more prisoners than
the cells could accommodate, 3) the Jail was routinely
understaffed, 4) no head counts of prisoners were made to make
sure they were all accounted for, 5) locks on cell doors were not
functional, allowing inmates to roam freely at all hours of the day,
6) homemade weapons were readily available by fashioning
weapons from material torn from the dilapidated structure of the
Jail, 7) no lock down of prisoners in their cells occurred at any
point during the day or night, 8) cells were not visually inspected,
9) no jailer was assigned to maintain prisoners' security on the
second floor where most of the inmates were housed, 10) the Jail
was not operated in accordance with written policies, 11) inmates
were not screened for mental health, medical conditions or conflicts
with other prisoners before entering the Jail, and 12) prisoners
were not disciplined or segregated when they attempted to escape,
threatened jailers, destroyed property or assaulted other
inmates.122
These conditions reflect a total abdication of the jail officials’ duty to classify,
supervise, and otherwise protect the inmates and detainees at the Butler
County Jail. But, precisely because the alleged conditions are so shocking,
Marsh is of little assistance to the Plaintiffs in establishing that the Supervisory
Defendants violated clearly established law. Marsh, like Hale, could not have
121
268 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001).
122
Id. at 1029.
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put a reasonable jail official on notice that an “objective” classification system
or lack of continuous supervision could violate inmates’ constitutional rights.
Thus, the Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of showing that the Supervisory
Defendants violated clearly established law.
C. The County
The Plaintiffs seek to hold the County liable for “systemic conditions of
confinement” at the Jail that create an unreasonable risk of inmate-on-inmate
violence.123 The Plaintiffs challenge (1) elements of the Jail’s structure that
make it difficult to continuously observe inmates; (2) an alleged policy of
underfunding the Jail resulting in the Jail being understaffed; (3) an allegedly
inadequate classification system; and (4) an alleged failure to investigate the
causes of in-cell assaults.124 And, as already covered in the forgoing discussion
of the claims against the Supervisory Defendants, the Plaintiffs assert that they
need not show that the County or any of its policymakers were deliberately
indifferent to an objectively substantial risk of serious harm.
Notwithstanding the Plaintiffs’ insistence that the County and the
Supervisory Defendants are jointly and severally liable for each of the
challenged conditions, this Court holds that the County cannot be found liable
for constitutional violations arising from the challenged housing and
123
Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 1.
124
Pls.’ Resp. Br. to County and Supervisory Defendants’ Mot. for
Summ. J., at 2-3.
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classification decisions or from the alleged failure to investigate and ameliorate
the causes of in-cell assaults. Under Georgia law, the Sheriff, and not the
County, is responsible for the day to day operation of the jail.125 In matters of jail
administration, the Sheriff is an arm of the state and his actions cannot give rise
to County liability when he acts in his capacity as jail administrator.126 The
County has no authority to establish or modify the jail's housing and
classification policies. Nor can the County require the Sheriff to engage in
“systemic reviews” or investigate in-cell assaults.127 As such, this Court will
assess only those claims concerning matters over which the County had the final
say–namely, the Jail’s structure and funding.
The County is liable under § 1983 if its policies or customs were the
“moving force” behind a constitutional violation.128 The plaintiff must show “(1)
that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a
custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional
125
Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1325.
126
Id.
127
The Plaintiffs argue that the classification system is a “County
practice pursuant to its medical duty[.]” Pls.’ Resp. Br. to County and
Supervisory Defendants’ Mot. for Summ. J., at 21. For the same reasons that
CorrectHealth is not liable for harm arising from the classification system, the
County is not liable for the same.
128
Monell, 438 U.S. at 694.
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right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.”129 Georgia counties
have statutory duties involving “jail structure[,] inmates’ food, clothing, and
medical necessities.”130 The Plaintiffs argue that, because this is a conditions of
confinement claim, they need not show that the County was deliberately
indifferent to the risk that its policies or customs would give rise to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.131 This Court need not reach the
question of whether the County was deliberately indifferent, however, because
the Plaintiffs cannot clear the first hurdle of showing that the challenged
conditions of confinement were unconstitutional. As already discussed in the
context of the Supervisory Defendants’ liability for inadequate supervision, the
Constitution does not require that double-celled inmates be continuously
observed. It follows that elements of the Jail’s design that make continuous
observation difficult cannot give rise to liability for the County. As for the
Plaintiffs’ argument concerning underfunding, the Plaintiffs have not shown
that staffing levels at the Jail fall below constitutional minima. There is also no
evidence in the record suggesting that more officers would have been assigned
129
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).
130
Manders, 338 F.3d at 1322.
131
Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 8-9.
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to the night shift if the County had provided additional funding.132 The
Plaintiffs’ argument that the County’s jail design and funding decisions are not
related to a legitimate penological interest is foreclosed by the Eleventh Circuit’s
holding in Hamm that “reasonably limit[ing] the cost of detention” is a
legitimate penological interest.133 Therefore, the County is not liable under §
1983 for the challenged conditions or policies.
IV. Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, (1) the Defendants CorrectHealth, LLC, James
Rose and Walter Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 137] is
GRANTED; (2) the Defendants Clayton County, Kemuel Kimbrough, Garland
Watkins, Robert Sowell, and Samuel Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[Doc.138] is GRANTED; and (3) the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment [Doc. 139] is DENIED.
132
The Plaintiffs make much of the fact that a housing unit at the Jail
was closed at the time of the assault. Pls.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial
Summ. J. [Doc. 186]. The Plaintiffs argue that, had the housing unit been open,
jail officials would have been able to single-cell assaultive detainees. But
whether assaultive detainees could have been housed in the closed unit is
irrelevant. Brooks was classified as a medium security, non-assaultive inmate
and so would not have been single-celled even if the option were available. Thus,
there is no possible way in which the closure of the housing unit could have
caused the decedent harm.
133
Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1573.
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SO ORDERED, this 28 day of September, 2018.
/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge
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