Petty v. DeKalb County et al

Filing 4

ORDER DISMISSING Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr. on 10/10/2014. (dfb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
DARREN PETTY,
Plaintiff,
v.

1:14-cv-2815-WSD

DEKALB COUNTY, GWINNETT
COUNTY, HENRY COUNTY,
ROCKDALE COUNTY, CITY OF
AVONDALE, KEITH LEWIS,
CORPORAL HURST, JEANNE
CANAVAN, JAMES T. CHAFFIN,
OFFICER BRADLEY, and
OFFICER LONG,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the required frivolity review of Plaintiff
Darren Petty’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint [3] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I.

BACKGROUND
On September 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Application for Leave to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis [1] (“Application”) in this action. On September 8, 2014,
Magistrate Judge Russell G. Vineyard granted [2] Plaintiff’s Application, and
forwarded Plaintiff’s Complaint to the Court for the required frivolity review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Plaintiff’s pro se civil rights Complaint appears to assert a myriad of largely
unintelligible claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff asserts claims for
false arrest, perjury, prosecutorial misconduct, and violations of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), all in relation to his arrest for, and
eventual conviction of, theft by receiving. Plaintiff asserts that he was not given
exculpatory evidence at trial relating to his arrest and perjury by the officers
involved, and that it was only revealed to him at sentencing. Plaintiff asserts that,
as a result, he was forced to take an Alford plea.1 Plaintiff argues that “if this
exculpatory evidence was made available plaintiff would [have] demanded a trial
and [the] outcome [would] have been in his favor.” (Complaint at 5).
Plaintiff is not seeking a release from confinement2 or otherwise challenging
his conviction or sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 or 2254. Plaintiff instead
seeks an unspecified amount in monetary damages.

1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (the court may accept a
defendant’s guilty plea despite his claims of innocence where “defendant
intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the
record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.”).
2
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state whether he is currently incarcerated.
2

II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard

A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if at any time the
court determines the action is frivolous or malicious or that it fails to state a claim
on which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). “Failure to state
a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H&S, Inc.,
366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). Under this standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Review for frivolousness, on the other hand, “‘accords judges not only the
authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but
also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” See

3

Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Neitzke v.Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). A claim is frivolous when it “has
little or no chance of success,” that is, when it appears “from the face of the
complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories
are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327).
Plaintiff filed his Complaint pro se. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff must comply with the threshold
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Beckwith v. Bellsouth
Telecomms. Inc., 146 F. App’x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005). “Even though a pro se
complaint should be construed liberally, a pro se complaint still must state a claim
upon which the Court can grant relief.” Grigsby v. Thomas, 506 F. Supp. 2d 26,
28 (D.D.C. 2007). “[A] district court does not have license to rewrite a deficient
pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).

4

B.

Analysis

To the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for an alleged
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, the Supreme Court has held that a
plaintiff must first show that his “conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 or 2254 before
he can recover damages in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for an alleged unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
“[C]ivil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of
outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily
require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.”
Id. at 486. “[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district
court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must
be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence
has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487.
Plaintiff claims that if the exculpatory evidence of his false arrest and the
perjury committed by the police officers had been “made available plaintiff would

5

[have] demanded a trial and [the] outcome [would] have been in his favor.”
(Complaint at 5). Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims of false arrest, perjury, prosecutorial
misconduct, and Brady violations thus, if successful, “would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” and Plaintiff has failed to establish that
his conviction has been reversed on direct appeal or on state collateral attack, or
invalidated by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.3 Plaintiff is
thus barred from raising his § 1983 claims, see id. at 486-87, and Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint [3] is DISMISSED

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

SO ORDERED this 10th day of October, 2014.

3

The Court has found no evidence that Plaintiff has filed a petition for federal
habeas review to challenge his conviction or sentence.
6