Johnson v. Colvin
Filing
14
ORDER and OPINION Reversing and Remanding the decision of the Commissioner. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter final judgment in Plaintiff's favor. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan J. Baverman on 3/28/2016. (bdb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
JEFFREY ANTHONY
JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner
Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.
1:14-cv-03007-AJB
O R D E R A N D O P I N I O N1
Plaintiff Jeffrey Anthony Johnson (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to
section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review
of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“the Commissioner”) denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) under the Social Security Act.2 For the reasons below, the undersigned
1
The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. (See Dkt. Entries dated 11/19/2014 & 11/20/2014). Therefore, this Order
constitutes a final Order of the Court.
2
Title II of the Social Security Act provides for federal Disability Insurance
Benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Title XVI of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq., provides for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) Benefits
AO 72A
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REVERSES the final decision of the Commissioner AND REMANDS the case to the
Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on August 30, 2010, alleging disability
commencing on June 30, 2008. [Record (hereinafter “R”) 120-23]. Plaintiff’s
applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. [See R72-77, 80-82].
Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
[R84-85]. An evidentiary hearing was held on June 13, 2012. [R26-52]. The ALJ
issued a decision on August 15, 2012, denying Plaintiff’s application on the ground that
he had not been under a “disability” from June 30, 2008, the alleged onset date, through
the date of the decision. [R14, 22]. Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council,
for the disabled. Title XVI claims are not tied to the attainment of a particular period
of insurance disability. Baxter v. Schweiker, 538 F. Supp. 343, 350 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
Otherwise, the relevant law and regulations governing the determination of disability
under a claim for DIB are nearly identical to those governing the determination under
a claim for SSI. Wind v. Barnhart, 133 Fed. Appx. 684, 690 n.4 (11th Cir. June 2, 2005)
(citing McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986)). In general, the
legal standards to be applied are the same regardless of whether a claimant seeks DIB,
to establish a “period of disability,” or to recover SSI, although different statutes and
regulations apply to each type of claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (establishing that
the judicial provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) are fully applicable to claims for SSI).
Therefore, to the extent that the Court cites to SSI cases, statutes, or regulations, they
are equally applicable to Plaintiff’s DIB claims.
2
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and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on December 4, 2013,
making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. [R5-8].
Plaintiff then filed suit in this Court on September 18, 2014, seeking review of
the Commissioner’s decision. [See Doc. 1]. The answer and transcript were filed on
April 15, 2015. [See Docs. 8, 9]. On May 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed a brief in support
of his petition for review of the Commissioner’s decision, [Doc. 12], and on
June 17, 2015, the Commissioner filed a response in support of the decision, [Doc. 13].3
The matter is now before the Court upon the administrative record, the parties’
pleadings, and the parties’ briefs, and it is accordingly ripe for review pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS4
A.
Background
Plaintiff was born on October 13, 1961, and therefore was forty-six years old at
the time of his alleged disability onset and fifty years old on the date of the ALJ’s
decision. [R22, 120]. He had completed two years of college. [R40, 137]. Plaintiff
3
Plaintiff did not file a reply brief, and neither party requested oral
argument. (See Dkt., passim).
4
In general, the records referenced in this section are limited to those
deemed by the parties to be relevant to this appeal. [See Docs. 12, 13].
3
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alleged disability due to depression; stress; arthritis; carpal tunnel syndrome;
gastrointestinal problems; knee, hip, back and neck pain; leg numbness; and weakness
and lethargy caused by medication. [R29, 137, 186].
B.
Lay Testimony
At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff complained of constant pain in his left
hip, right knee, and lower back. [R30-31]. Plaintiff testified that he had difficulty
washing dishes after “maybe five to ten minutes” due to his hands cramping up; that he
could not lift a gallon of milk; that he could walk an hour before needing a break; and
that he could stand for thirty to forty-five minutes before needing to sit down. [R32-34,
37]. He further indicated that he spends most of his day lying down due to pain and
weakness. [R34]. Plaintiff reported that he had been prescribed pain medication in
2010 but because he did not have insurance, he was taking over-the-counter medication.
[R42].
Plaintiff stated that he had last worked in 2008, doing warehouse work. [R41].
He testified that it was a temporary job that reached its end and that he had not sought
work since then because he started experiencing health problems. [R41].
4
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C.
Administrative Records
In an adult function report dated September 27, 2010, Plaintiff reported that he
lived in a motel with his wife. [R150-57]. He stated that on a typical day, he would try
to make breakfast, then lunch, then dinner, and would read the newspaper, use his
computer, try to exercise, and try to take a shower. [R151]. He reported that he did the
cooking, laundry, ironing, cleaning, and shopping. [R151-52]. He stated that he
shopped twice a week, for two to three hours at a time. [R153]. He said that he
struggled with his personal care because of pain and side effects of his medication.
[R151]. He also indicated that he could go out alone and could walk, ride in a car, and
use public transportation but could not drive because he did not have a license. [R153].
He reported that he had been prescribed braces for his knee and wrist for use every day.
5
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[R156]. He stated that his medications included amitriptyline,5 propoxyphene,6
diclofenac,7 and naproxen.8 [R157].
In an adult function report dated February 21, 2011, Plaintiff reported the same
living situation. [R178-85]. He stated that he did not know what he did all day and that
his medication affected his sleep. [R179]. He also stated that he had no problems with
personal care; that he prepared meals on a daily basis; and that he had no problems
5
Amitriptyline is a tricyclic antidepressant. It works by increasing the
amounts of certain natural substances in the brain that are needed to maintain mental
b a l a n c e .
M e d l i n e P l u s ,
A m i t r i p t y l i n e ,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a682388.html (last visited
3/28/16).
6
Propoxyphene is a pain mediation that was removed from the market in
December 2010 because of the potential to cause deadly heart disturbances.
M e d l i n e P l u s ,
P r o p o x y p h e n e
O v e r d o s e ,
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/002537.htm (last visited 3/28/16).
7
Diclofenac is an anti-inflammatory used to relieve mild to moderate pain.
M e d l i n e P l u s ,
D i c l o f e n a c ,
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a689002.html (last visited
3/28/16).
8
Naproxen is used to relieve pain, tenderness, swelling, and stiffness. See
M e d l i n e P l u s ,
N a p r o x e n ,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a681029.html (last visited
3/28/16).
6
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cleaning, ironing, or doing laundry. [R179-80]. He also stated that trazodone9 had
been added to his medications. [R185]. His other responses were generally the same
as in his September 2010 report. [R178-85].
D.
Medical Records
Plaintiff presented to Vine Hill Community Clinic on May 12, 2010, with
complaints of left-hip pain, right-knee pain, and numbness in both arms. [R194]. He
reported that the arm and hand numbness had been going on for two months, the
left-hip pain had started six months earlier, and the right-knee pain related to an injury
from the 1980s. [R194]. Upon examination, a moderate amount of swelling was noted
on the right knee, and there was obvious deformity of that knee, but no instability,
subluxation, or laxity; he walked with a steady gait; and he demonstrated full strength
in all extremities and normal deep tendon reflexes and coordination. [R195]. It was
noted that Plaintiff asked “numerous questions about where to go and what to do” to
obtain disability benefits. [R194-95]. The attending nurse assessed joint pain,
9
Trazodone is a serotonin modulator used to treat depression. See
M e d l i n e P l u s ,
T r a z o d o n e ,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a681038.html (last visited
3/28/16).
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prescribed Voltaren 75,10 and told Plaintiff that the clinic did not provide disability
examinations. [R195].
On June 30, 2010, Plaintiff presented to Nashville General Hospital Clinic with
complaints of right-knee pain, left-hip pain, and numbness and tingling in both hands.
[R211]. Orthopedist Ronald Baker, M.D., evaluated Plaintiff’s complaints. [R211].
Plaintiff stated that the right-knee pain had been present for several years and that he
remembered injuring it while playing basketball in college. [R211]. Plaintiff also
reported that the hip pain had been present for over a year and that the numbness and
tingling in his hands had also been going on for a number of years. [R211]. Upon
questioning, Plaintiff admitted to drinking a six-pack of beer each night. [R212].
Upon examination, it was noted Plaintiff had an antalgic gait with anteromedial
and lateral joint line tenderness and a large amount of effusion of the right knee.
[R212]. There was patellofermoral crepitus present and motor strength was 4+/5 on
full knee extension. [R212]. The left hip was noted to have decreased range of motion
and mild tenderness. [R212]. There was mild decrease in neck extension combined
with lateral flexion and a positive carpal tunnel compression test bilaterally. [R212].
10
Voltaren is a brand name for diclofenac. MedlinePlus, Diclofenac,
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a689002.html (last visited
3/28/16).
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There was also decrease in perception involving the median nerve distribution. [R212].
X-rays showed moderate degenerative joint disease in the left hip and moderate-tosevere degenerative joint disease involving the right knee, with obliteration of the
lateral joint line interval. [R212]. There was also osteophyte formation present, and
imaging was consistent with osteoarthritis. [R212, 219-20].
Dr. Baker assessed left-hip degenerative joint disease, right-knee moderately
severe degenerative joint disease, rule-out bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and
rule-out diabetes mellitus. [R213]. Dr. Baker aspirated the right knee, administered a
steroid injection, provided a brace for the right knee, and prescribed naproxen and
Darvocet11 for pain. [R213]. He also provided Plaintiff with splints to be worn at night
and recommended follow-up in six weeks for reevaluation of the hand symptoms and
to discuss possible surgical intervention for carpal tunnel syndrome or for consideration
of an EMG.12 [R213].
11
Darvocet is the brand name of a combination product containing
acetaminophen and propoxyphene. It is an opioid medication used to relieve mild to
moderate pain.
Medication Guide, Darvocet-N 50 & 100,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/UCM187067.pdf (last visited
3/28/16).
12
“EMG” is an abbreviation for electromyogram. 569 PDR Med. Dictionary
(1 ed. 1995). Electromyography measures the response of muscles and nerves to
electrical activity. It is used to help determine muscle conditions that might be causing
st
9
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On August 19, 2010, Plaintiff presented to Nandakumar Vittal, M.D., at the
Nashville General Hospital Clinic for evaluation of the numbness in his hands. [R214].
Plaintiff complained of numbness in both arms and hands, neck pain, and low-back
pain, but he denied weakness or difficulty with his legs. [R214]. Upon examination,
it was noted Plaintiff presented with mild discomfort on neck movement and that on
reflex there was absence of right biceps brachioradialis and triceps reflexes. [R214].
He was noted to a have a mild Hoffmann’s sign,13 and his gait was noted to be “fairly
normal.” [R214]. Dr. Vittal suspected mild cervical myeloradiculopathy, probably
from degenerative disk disease. [R214]. It was recommended that Plaintiff undergo
an EMG nerve-conduction study for both upper extremities, as well as a CT scan of his
neck. [R214-15].
A CT scan of the cervical spine performed in September 2010 showed no gross
fracture or malalignment but did show moderate-to-severe multilevel degenerative
muscle weakness, such as nerve disorders. KidsHealth, Electromyography,
http://kidshealth.org/parent/general/sick/emg.html (last visited 3/28/16).
13
A positive Hoffmann’s sign may indicate damage above the C5 or C6 level
of the cervical spine and is often associated with noticeable weakening of the grip in
the hands. HealthCentral, MS Signs v. Symptoms: What is the Hoffmann Reflex?,
http://www.healthcentral.com/multiple-sclerosis/c/19065/129802/reflex/ (last visited
3/28/16).
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changes resulting in multilevel central canal and neural foraminal narrowing bilaterally.
[R221]. It was noted that a component of the central canal stenosis was likely
congenital in nature, with significant degenerative changes likely contributing. [R221].
It was also noted that there was an incidental probable C3-4 disc bulging. [R221].
On November 2, 2010, Plaintiff presented for a consultative examination with
Harry Wright, M.D. [R197]. He complained of osteoarthritis in both hands and wrists,
his right knee, left hip, and neck. [R197]. He indicated pain and numbness and
weakness of his bilateral hands. [R198]. He further indicated stress, with difficulty
sleeping and depression. [R198]. Plaintiff denied drinking alcoholic beverages.
[R199].
Upon examination, it was noted that Plaintiff’s gait, station, and mobility were
normal but that he got out of the chair and on and off the examining table with
difficulty and using his hands. [R200]. His grip strength was thirty pounds in his right
hand and fifty pounds with his left hand, and he lifted ten pounds with each hand on a
one-time basis. [R200]. It was further noted that Plaintiff could grasp and manipulate
objects; had no abnormality of the neck, back, or extremities; demonstrated full strength
for all major muscle groups, except bilateral grip strength reduced to 4+/5; had reduced
range of motion in the wrists and left hip; had normal range of motion for the spine,
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shoulders, elbows, hands, fingers, knees, and ankles; had normal reflexes for all
extremities; and had negative Tinel’s Sign, Phalen’s Maneuver, and Romberg and
straight-leg raising tests. [R200-02].
Dr. Wright diagnosed bilateral hand and wrist pain, associated with neck pain
and carpal tunnel syndrome vs. cervical radiculopathy; possible rheumatoid arthritis;
left-hip pain, likely osteoarthritis, possibly rheumatoid arthritis; right-knee pain, likely
osteoarthritis and possibly rheumatoid arthritis; and depression/anxiety. [R203].
Dr. Wright opined that Plaintiff could sit with normal breaks and that, because of pain
and weakness in his hip, knee, wrists, and hands, Plaintiff retained the capacity to
occasionally lift and/or carry for up to one-third of an eight-hour workday a maximum
of less than ten pounds; to frequently lift and/or carry from one-third to two-thirds of
an eight-hour workday a maximum of less than ten pounds; and to stand and/or walk
for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday. [R203].
On November 4, 2010, Plaintiff reported for a psychological consultative
examination with Kathryn B. Sherrod, Ph.D. [R205-09]. It was noted that Plaintiff’s
gait was “fine” and that “he sat and stood with relative ease.” [R205]. Plaintiff told the
consultative psychologist that a friend drove him to the consultative exam, but he was
seen unlocking a car and driving himself after his evaluation. [R205]. He also reported
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that he did not drink alcohol. [R205]. On the mental status examination, he was noted
as worried and depressed. [R207]. His knowledge of general information was variable,
and his abstract reasoning was average. [R207]. It was suspected that Plaintiff was
overstating his mental-health problems. [R207]. He reported a lack of energy and was
estimated to be functioning in the average range of intelligence. [R208]. He received
an Axis I diagnosis of adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood and
rule-out alcohol abuse. [R208]. Plaintiff was assigned a GAF14 score of 61. [R208].
On December 21, 2010, James Moore, M.D., completed a Physical Residual
Functional Capacity (“RFC”) Assessment. [R223-36]. Counter to Dr. Wright’s
opinion, Dr. Moore found that Plaintiff could “occasionally” lift or carry less than
twenty pounds and could sit only six hours in an eight-hour workday. [R238].
Dr. Moore also opined that due to his arthritis, Plaintiff should avoid climbing ladders,
ropes, and scaffolds. [R239]. On March 11, 2011, state agency review physician Susan
14
The Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) is a numeric scale
(0 through 100) that considers psychological, social, and occupational functioning on
a hypothetical continuum of mental health illness. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders 32-34 (4th ed., Text Revision, 2000). A GAF score between 61
and 70 indicates “[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) OR
some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy,
or theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some
meaningful interpersonal relationships.” Id. at 34.
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L. Warner, M.D., reviewed Plaintiff’s file and affirmed Dr. Moore’s assessment.
[R247].
E.
Vocational-Expert Testimony
The vocational expert (“VE”) testified that Plaintiff had no past relevant work.
[R45]. When asked about the capabilities of a person of Plaintiff’s age, education, and
work experience who could lift, push, pull, and carry up to twenty pounds
occasionally15; could sit/stand and/or walk six hours; could occasionally climb, but
never on ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch
and/or crawl; and would need to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards, the VE
testified that the person could work as a cashier, a fast-food worker, or a production
assembler. [R45-46]. When asked about the capabilities of the same person, if that
person also needed a sit/stand option, could frequently reach overhead, and could
frequently perform fine manipulation, the VE testified that the cashier positions would
decrease by about fifty percent, production assembler would decrease by about seventyfive percent, and the person could not work as a fast-food worker, but the person could
work as a information clerk. [R46-47].
15
The Agency defines “occasionally” as “occurring from very little up to
one-third of the time.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-10.
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III.
ALJ’S FINDINGS OF FACT
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1.
The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through September 30, 2012.
2.
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
June 30, 2008, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
3.
The claimant has the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis
of the right knee and left hip; degenerative changes of the cervical
spine; and, bilateral wrist symptoms (carpal tunnel syndrome versus
cervical related) (20 CFR 404.1520(c)). The claimant does not
have a “severe” mental impairment.
...
4.
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
...
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he
needs the option to alternate positions between sitting and standing.
He can frequently, but not constantly, reach overhead and
frequently, but not constantly, perform fine manipulation. The
claimant can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. The claimant
can occasional[ly] climb ramps and stairs and occasionally balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. He should avoid concentrated
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exposure to hazards (i.e., moving/dangerous
unprotected heights, etc.)
machinery,
...
5.
The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).
...
6.
The claimant was born on October 13, 1961, and was 46 years old,
which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged
disability onset date. The claimant subsequently changed age
category to closely approaching advanced age (20 CFR 404.1563).
7.
The claimant has a high school education and two years of college.
He is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564).
8.
Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant
does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1568).
9.
Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform
(20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)).
...
10.
The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from June 30, 2008, through the date of this
decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).
[R15-23].
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The ALJ explained that although Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause some of the symptoms Plaintiff alleged, his
statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms
were not fully credible. [R20]. First, she noted that although Plaintiff alleged disability
beginning in 2008, he sought only cursory treatment during the time he was insured and
that even after his insurance lapsed, it was not reasonable that he would not have been
making every effort to obtain treatment if he were as limited as he alleges. [R20].
Second, she explained that she found Plaintiff not to have been completely forthright,
based on the consultative psychological examiner’s notes stating that Plaintiff appeared
to have lied about driving to his appointment, medical notes indicating conflicting
reports of his alcohol use, Plaintiff’s allegations that he suffered side effects of
medication despite having received prescriptions only twice in 2010, and his testimony
at the administrative hearing, where he initially attempted to minimize his activities
before admitting to a fairly wide range of daily activities. [R20].
The ALJ also summarized the other evidence of record and noted in particular
that “Dr. Wright, the examining consultative physician, opined the claimant can
occasionally lift a maximum of 10 less than pounds [sic]; stand and/or walk for a total
of six hours in an eight-hour day; and, sit without restriction.” [R20]. The ALJ further
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observed that upon review of the objective medical evidence and Dr. Wright’s report,
state-agency reviewing physicians Drs. Moore and Warner opined that while Plaintiff
was precluded from any heavy, strenuous work, he was not precluded from a near-full
range of light work activity. [R20]. The ALJ went on to find “that the state agency
physician has produced a credible assessment of the claimant’s residual functional
capacity”; stated that she was “generally persuaded to accept it”; and adopted
Dr. Moore’s opinion, albeit with an additional sit/stand option and additional
manipulative limitations. [R17, 20-21, 237-45].
The ALJ then explained that because Plaintiff had no past relevant work, she
relied on the VE’s testimony to find that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy, such as representative occupations of: cashier, light
and unskilled (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) # 211.462-010); production
assembler, light and unskilled (DOT # 706.687-010); and information clerk, light and
unskilled (DOT # 237.367-018). [R21-22].
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IV.
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY
An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he is
unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.”
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A).
The impairment or
impairments must result from anatomical, psychological, or physiological abnormalities
which are demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques and must be of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do
previous work but cannot, considering age, education, and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).
The burden of proof in a Social Security disability case is divided between the
claimant and the Commissioner. The claimant bears the primary burden of establishing
the existence of a “disability” and therefore entitlement to disability benefits.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a). The Commissioner uses a five-step
sequential process to determine whether the claimant has met the burden of proving
disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274,
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1278 (11th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).
The claimant must prove at step one that he is not undertaking substantial gainful
activity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). At step two, the
claimant must prove that he is suffering from a severe impairment or combination of
impairments that significantly limits his ability to perform basic work-related activities.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At step three, if the impairment
meets one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404 (Listing of
Impairments), the claimant will be considered disabled without consideration of age,
education, and work experience.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii). At step four, if the claimant is unable to prove the existence of a
listed impairment, he must prove that his impairment prevents performance of past
relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At step five,
the regulations direct the Commissioner to consider the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and past work experience to determine whether the claimant
can
perform
other
work
besides
past
relevant
work.
See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). The Commissioner must produce
evidence that there is other work available in the national economy that the claimant
has the capacity to perform. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278 n.2. To be considered
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disabled, the claimant must prove an inability to perform the jobs that the
Commissioner lists. Id.
If at any step in the sequence a claimant can be found disabled or not disabled,
the
sequential
evaluation
ceases
and
further
inquiry
ends.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). Despite the shifting of burdens at step
five, the overall burden rests on the claimant to prove that he is unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy.
Doughty,
245 F.3d at 1278 n.2; Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983),
superseded by statute on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5), as recognized in
Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1991).
V.
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A limited scope of judicial review applies to a denial of Social Security benefits
by the Commissioner. Judicial review of the administrative decision addresses three
questions: (1) whether the proper legal standards were applied; (2) whether there was
substantial evidence to support the findings of fact; and (3) whether the findings of fact
resolved the crucial issues. Washington v. Astrue, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296
(N.D. Ga. 2008); Fields v. Harris, 498 F. Supp. 478, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1980). This Court
may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that
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of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). If
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s factual findings and the
Commissioner applies the proper legal standards, the Commissioner’s findings are
conclusive. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439-40 (11th Cir. 1997); Barnes v.
Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam);
Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Bloodsworth
v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).
“Substantial evidence” means “more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. It means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and it must be
enough to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury. Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Hillsman, 804 F.2d at 1180; Bloodsworth,
703 F.2d at 1239. “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [the Court]
must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as
unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131
(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Even where there is substantial evidence to the contrary
of the ALJ’s findings, the ALJ decision will not be overturned where “there is
22
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substantially supportive evidence” of the ALJ’s decision.
Barron v. Sullivan,
924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991). In contrast, review of the ALJ’s application of legal
principles is plenary. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1995); Walker,
826 F.2d at 999.
VI.
CLAIMS OF ERROR
Plaintiff asserts two allegations of error: (1) the ALJ failed to afford proper
weight to the medical opinion of examining-physician Dr. Wright and failed to provide
any reasons for her rejection of the opinion, and (2) the ALJ failed to properly apply
the Eleventh Circuit’s standard for evaluating complaints of pain. [Doc. 12]. The
Commissioner, in response, contends that the ALJ applied the proper legal standards
and that substantial evidence supports her conclusions. [Doc. 13].
Were the ALJ’s application of the pain standard the only allegation of error in
this matter, the decision would be due to be affirmed. As Plaintiff points out, the
Eleventh Circuit has established a pain standard that applies whenever a claimant
asserts disability through testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms. [See Doc. 12
at 17-19]. The standard requires that the claimant satisfy two parts of the test, by
showing “(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective
medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively
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determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed
pain.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002); accord Foote,
67 F.3d at 1560.
The pain standard “is designed to be a threshold determination made prior to
considering
the
plaintiff’s
credibility.”
Reliford
v.
Barnhart,
444 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1189 n.1 (N.D. Ala. 2006). Then, “[i]f the pain standard is
satisfied, the ALJ must consider the plaintiff’s subjective complaints.” James v.
Barnhart, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1372 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (citing Marbury v. Sullivan,
957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992)). In doing so, the ALJ considers the lay evidence,
medical opinions, and objective medical evidence; the claimant’s daily activities; the
location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain or other symptoms; precipitating
and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any
medication taken to alleviate the pain or other symptoms; other treatment received for
the pain or other symptoms; any measures used to relieve the pain or other symptoms;
and other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due
to pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). When a claimant’s subjective
testimony is supported by medical evidence that satisfies the pain standard, he may be
found disabled. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561; Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223
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(11th Cir. 1991). If the ALJ determines, however, that claimant’s testimony is not
credible, “the ALJ must show that the claimant’s complaints are inconsistent with his
testimony and the medical record,” Rease v. Barnhart, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1368
(N.D. Ga. 2006), and if the ALJ refused to credit subjective pain testimony where such
testimony is critical, he must articulate specific reasons for questioning the claimant’s
credibility, Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1004 (11th Cir. 1987). This credibility
determination does not require the ALJ to cite to particular phrases or formulations, but
it also cannot be a broad rejection so as to prevent the courts from determining whether
the ALJ considered the claimant’s medical condition as a whole. Dyer v. Barnhart,
395 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2005). After considering a claimant’s complaints of
pain or other subjective symptoms, the ALJ may reject them as not credible, and that
determination will be reviewed for substantial evidence.
734 F.2d 513, 517 (11th Cir. 1994).
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Wilson v. Heckler,
Similarly, SSR 96-7p16 requires that the ALJ first consider whether there is an
underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment that could reasonably
be expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms.
SSR 96-7p,
1996 WL 374186 at *1. The ALJ must then consider whether the condition could
reasonably be expected to produce the individual symptoms and must evaluate the
intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of these symptoms “to determine
the extent to which the symptoms affect the individual’s ability to do basic work
activities.” Id. The ruling further provides that “[i]t is not sufficient for the adjudicator
to make a single, conclusory statement that ‘the individual’s allegations have been
considered’ or that ‘the allegations are (or are not) credible.’ ” Id. at *2. Rather,
16
Social Security Rulings are published under the authority of the
Commissioner of Social Security and are binding on all components of the
administrative process. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 n.9 (1990); see also
Tauber v. Barnhart, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1377 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (Story, J.) (citing
20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1)). Although SSRs do not have the force of law, they are
entitled to deference so long as they are consistent with the Social Security Act and
regulations. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
Salamalekis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 221 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 2000) (“If a Social
Security Ruling presents a reasonable construction of an ambiguous provision of the
Act or the agency’s regulations, we usually defer to the SSR.”); Minnesota v. Apfel,
151 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Social Security Rulings, although entitled to
deference, are not binding or conclusive.”); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1204 n.3
(4th Cir. 1995); Gordon v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1995); Andrade v. Sec’y
of Health and Human Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1051 (10th Cir. 1993).
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SSR 96-7p requires that the decision contain “specific reasons” for the credibility
finding, supported by the evidence in the case record, and “must be sufficiently specific
to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the
adjudicator gave to the individual statements and the reasons for that weight.” Id. The
ALJ’s reasons for the credibility finding “must be grounded in the evidence and
articulated in the determination or decision.” Id. at *4.
Here, contrary to Plaintiff’s position, it is clear that the ALJ did not summarily
reject his subjective testimony. After reciting the pain standard, the ALJ went on to
summarize the evidence of record. [R17-19]. She then found that although Plaintiff’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the
symptoms Plaintiff alleged, his statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of the symptoms were not fully credible, and she enumerated why
Plaintiff’s “testimony [was] largely discredited”: although Plaintiff alleged disability
beginning in 2008, he sought only cursory treatment during the time he was insured;
even after his insurance lapsed, it was not reasonable that he would not have been
making every effort to obtain treatment if he were as limited as he alleges; Plaintiff had
misrepresented his ability to drive; he provided conflicting statements as to his alcohol
use; his allegations that he suffered side effects of medication were undermined by the
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lack of any prescriptions since 2010; and at the administrative hearing, Plaintiff initially
attempted to minimize his activities before admitting to a fairly wide range of daily
activities. [R20]. The ALJ also explained that the opinions of the state agency
reviewing physicians supported an RFC even less restrictive than the RFC appearing
in her decision. [R20-21]. The Court therefore finds that the ALJ articulated specific
evidence-based reasons for her credibility finding and thus applied the proper legal
standard in reaching her credibility determination.
The question remains, however, whether the ALJ’s reliance on the opinions of
the state agency review physicians over the more restrictive opinion issued by
examining physician Dr. Wright nevertheless precludes a finding that the RFC is
supported by substantial evidence. After careful review of the briefs, the ALJ’s
decision, and the case record, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s treatment of
Dr. Wright’s opinion does constitute reversible error.
In support of his argument that the ALJ erred in her consideration of
Dr. Wright’s opinion, Plaintiff points out that Dr. Wright opined that Plaintiff could
occasionally lift a maximum of less than ten pounds because of pain and weakness in
his hip, knee, wrists, and hands, [R203, 212, 221], yet the ALJ found that Plaintiff was
capable of a limited range of light work, [R17], which is defined in the regulations as
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involving “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of
objects weighing up to 10 pounds,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). [Doc. 12 at 8-16
(emphasis added)]. Plaintiff contends that because the ALJ did not state the weight she
assigned to Dr. Wright’s opinion or state why she did not fully credit the lifting
restrictions, the ALJ’s decision is marred by reversible error. [Id. at 8, 15-16].
In response, the Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s decision not to adopt the lifting restrictions assessed by Dr. Wright because the
restrictions conflicted with Dr. Wright’s examination findings and other medical and
opinion evidence, and she contends instead that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
finding that Plaintiff could perform the lifting and carrying requirements of light work.
[Doc. 13 at 4-9]. First, the Commissioner points out that unlike the opinion of a
treating physician, the opinion of a one-time examiner is not entitled to special
deference or consideration, [id. at 5 (citing Crawford v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.,
363 F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004); Denomme v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,
518 Fed. Appx. 875, 878 (11th Cir. May 16, 2013))], and that an “ALJ may reject any
medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding,” [Doc. 13 at 5 (quoting
Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 280 (11th Cir. 1987))]. Second, the Commissioner
recites Dr. Wright’s objective findings, describing them as “generally normal” and
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arguing that “the finding that Plaintiff could lift 10 pounds with each hand actually
proves he could lift up to 20 pounds at once.” [Doc. 13 at 5-6]. Third, she contends
that the lifting restriction Dr. Wright assessed is contrary to the remaining medical
evidence in the record, asserting that the remaining medical evidence includes no lifting
restrictions; shows only limited treatment commencing approximately two years after
the alleged onset date; and shows that treatment records included many normal
findings. [Id. at 6-8 [citing R194-95, 205, 211-15, 219-21]]. Fourth, the Commissioner
points out that the reviewing physicians looked at the entire medical record and
concluded that Plaintiff could perform the lifting demands of light work. [Doc. 13 at 89 [citing R237-45, 247]]. Fifth, the Commissioner suggests that the ALJ’s failure to
articulate the weight she assigned to Dr. Wright’s opinion does not warrant reversal or
remand because the ALJ “fully considered” the opinion and ultimately made an RFC
finding that is supported by substantial evidence and is in many ways more restrictive
than Dr. Wright’s opinion. [Doc. 13 at 9 (citing Hardman v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-42
(CAR), 2013 WL 3820694, at *6 (M.D. Ga. July 23, 2013))].
The Commissioner evaluates every medical opinion the agency receives,
regardless of the source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); cf. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b) (“In
determining whether you are disabled, we will always consider the medical opinions
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in your case record together with the rest of the relevant evidence we receive.”);
SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939 at *4 (“[T]he [Social Security] Act requires us to
consider all of the available evidence in the individual’s case record in every case.”).
Thus, both examining and nonexamining sources provide opinion evidence for the ALJ
to consider in rendering a decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), (e). In determining the
weight of medical opinions, the ALJ must consider: (1) the examining relationship;
(2) the treatment relationship; (3) evidence supporting the conclusions; (4) the
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (5) the medical expert’s area of
specialty; and (6) other factors, including the amount of understanding of disability
programs and the familiarity of the medical source with information in the claimant’s
case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). In assessing the medical evidence, the
ALJ is “required to state with particularity the weight [given] to the different medical
opinions and the reasons therefor.” Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at 279.
The opinion of a treating physician must be given substantial or considerable
weight unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary.17
17
Phillips v. Barnhart,
Good cause exists when: (1) the treating physician’s opinion was not
bolstered by the evidence; (2) the evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) the
treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own
medical records. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241.
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357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440
(11th Cir. 1997)); accord Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178-79
(11th Cir. 2011). A one-time examining (i.e., consulting) physician’s opinion is not
entitled to great weight. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1160
(11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). However, the opinion of an examining physician is
generally entitled to more weight than the opinion of a nonexamining physician.
Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 1985). Also, in the Eleventh
Circuit, “the report of a non-examining doctor is accorded little weight if it contradicts
an examining doctor’s report; such a report, standing alone, cannot constitute
substantial evidence.” Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 (11th Cir. 1991); see also
Kemp v. Astrue, 308 Fed. Appx. 423, 427 (11th Cir. Jan. 26, 2009) (per curiam).
However, “the opinion of a non-examining physician who has reviewed medical
records may be substantial evidence if it is consistent with the well-supported opinions
of examining physicians or other medical evidence in the record.” Hogan v. Astrue,
Civ. Action No. 2:11cv237-CSC, 2012 WL 3155570, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 3, 2012)
(harmonizing Eleventh Circuit cases). In any event, “the ALJ is free to reject the
opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” Sryock
v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985) (quotation marks omitted).
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As an initial matter, it is clear that the ALJ erred in her consideration of
Dr. Wright’s opinion. Dr. Wright was the only examining physician to render an
opinion of Plaintiff’s limitations, yet the ALJ did not fully credit the lifting limitations
Dr. Wright assessed and did not state her reasons for doing so. [Compare R17, 20 with
R203]. The Commissioner’s citations to Crawford and Denomme do not persuade the
Court otherwise, as both cases are distinguishable from the matter at hand: in
Crawford, the ALJ explained that the opinion of the consultative psychologist was
discounted because she was not a medical doctor, her findings were based on the
claimant’s self-interested assertions, and her opinion was inconsistent with the findings
of the treating psychiatrist, Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158, and in Denomme, the court
concluded that the ALJ’s failure to specify the weight given to the opinions of the
examiners was harmless because the examiners’ findings were credited in the RFC,
Denomme, 518 Fed. Appx. at 878. Neither situation exists here. [Compare R17, 20
with R203]. The Commissioner’s citation to Sharfarz is also unavailing, as the court
in Sharfarz reversed and remanded the ALJ’s decision on the grounds that the ALJ
failed to articulate good cause for discounting the treating physician’s opinion and erred
in concluding that the consulting examiner’s opinion was not supported by his medical
findings.
Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at 279-80.
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Consequently, to the extent that the
Commissioner suggests that the ALJ’s failure to explain why the examining physician’s
opinion was not credited was not error, the Court finds no basis for the position in her
brief.
Thus, if the ALJ’s decision is to be affirmed, it must be because the error is
harmless. See Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1002 (11th Cir. 1987) (applying
harmless error analysis in Social Security case); Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728
(11th Cir. 1983) (applying harmless error analysis where the ALJ made an incorrect
statement of fact). Generally, an error is harmless in a Social Security case if it “do[es]
not affect the ALJ’s determination that a claimant is not entitled to benefits.” Young
v. Astrue, No. 8:09-cv-1056, 2010 WL 4340815, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2010).
Here, despite the Commissioner’s arguments to the contrary, it is not clear that
the error was harmless. First, while many of the objective medical findings were in fact
in the “normal” range, a significant number of the findings were not: contrary to the
Commissioner’s recitation of the record, the nurse who tended to Plaintiff in May 2010
noted that although his right knee seemed stable, it was swollen and obviously
deformed, [R195]; in June 2010, Dr. Baker noted Plaintiff had an antalgic gait with
anteromedial and lateral joint line tenderness and a large amount of effusion of the right
knee, with patellofermoral crepitus, tenderness, and decreased range of motion in the
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left hip, mild decrease in neck extension combined with lateral flexion, a positive carpal
tunnel compression test bilaterally, and a decrease in perception involving the median
nerve distribution, [R212]; June 2010 x-rays showed moderate degenerative joint
disease in the left hip and moderate-to-severe degenerative joint disease involving the
right knee, with obliteration of the lateral joint line interval; there was osteophyte
formation present; and imaging was consistent with osteoarthritis, [R212, 219-20]; in
August 2010, Dr. Vittal noted that Plaintiff displayed mild discomfort with neck, there
was absence of right biceps brachioradialis and triceps reflexes, Plaintiff had a mild
Hoffmann’s sign, his gait was noted to be only “fairly normal,” and Dr. Vittal
suspected mild cervical myeloradiculopathy, probably from degenerative disk disease,
[R214]; cervical-spine imaging performed in September 2010 showed moderate-tosevere multilevel degenerative changes resulting in multilevel central canal and neural
foraminal narrowing bilaterally and incidental probable C3-4 disc bulging, [R221]; and
in November 2010, Dr. Wright noted that Plaintiff got out of the chair and onto and off
of the examining table with difficulty and using his hands, [R200], and had reduced
range of motion in the wrists and left hip, [R202]. Also, the fact that Plaintiff “lifted
ten pounds with each hand, on a one time basis,” [R200 (emphasis added)], does not
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translate into a finding that Plaintiff could therefore lift or carry twenty pounds for up
to one-third of an eight-hour workday, [see R45-47].
Moreover, while the Commissioner’s representation that the medical record does
not contain any lifting restrictions appears to be correct, it is not axiomatic that the lack
of an opinion of limitation means that no limitation exists. See Lamb v. Bowen,
847 F.2d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that “silence is equally susceptible” to an
inference of ability to work or inability to work and that “therefore, no inference should
be taken”). It also bears noting that the ALJ does not state that she discounted
Dr. Wright’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s lifting limitations on the basis of the lack of
a lifting limitation in the treatment notes, and it would be improper for the Court to
engage in such post hoc reasoning. See Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516
(11th Cir. 1984) (“We decline . . . to affirm simply because some rationale might have
supported the ALJ’s conclusion. Such an approach would not advance the ends of
reasoned decision making.”). It would be similarly improper for the Court to presume
post hoc that the ALJ’s failure to credit Dr. Wright’s opinion was based on Plaintiff’s
limited treatment other normal findings in the treatment records. See id.
Finally, the Court is not persuaded that the ALJ’s failure to articulate the weight
she assigned to Dr. Wright’s opinion is harmless because the RFC is in some ways
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more restrictive than Dr. Wright’s opinion. In Hardman, the case relied upon by the
Commissioner in support of the argument, the court did indeed affirm the ALJ’s
decision despite its observation that “the ALJ did not make a formulaic recitation of the
weight” he assigned the opinion, but it did so on the grounds that the examining
consultant’s opinion “did not directly contradict the ALJ’s findings” and that any error
regarding the opinion was therefore harmless. Hardman, 2013 WL 3820694 at *1, 6.
Here, in contrast, the RFC does directly contradict the ALJ’s findings, as full
accreditation of Dr. Wright’s lifting restrictions would have resulted in a exertional
level of “sedentary” rather than “light,”18 which necessarily limits the numbers of jobs
available in the local and national economies, and, considering Plaintiff’s age,
education, and lack of transferrable skills, could result in a disability determination.
See Medical-Vocational Grid Rule 201.12.19
18
While light work involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time,
sedentary work involves lifting no more than ten pounds at a time.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)-(b).
19
The Medical-Vocational Grids provide administrative notice “of the
numbers of unskilled jobs that exist throughout the national economy at the various
functional levels (sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy).”
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 2 § 200.00(b).
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For all of these reasons, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ reversibly erred
in her consideration of the opinion of consulting physical examiner Dr. Wright. The
undersigned therefore REVERSES and REMANDS the matter for further
consideration of Dr. Wright’s opinion and, if warranted, revision of the RFC.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court REVERSES the final decision of the
Commissioner and REMANDS the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter final judgment in Plaintiff’s favor.
IT IS SO ORDERED and DIRECTED, this the 28th day of March, 2016.
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