Sigida v. Munroe Foods
Filing
127
ORDER granting 106 Munroe Foods 2 LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's retaliation, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment claims; GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as to the measurement of damages; and DENIED as to willful ness and the applicability of any exemptions. Denying without prejudice 105 Bake One Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the issue of joint employment and disposed of in accordance with the Court's disposition of Defendant Munroe Foods 2 LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment 106 insofar as it wasincorporated by reference into Bake One Inc.'s motion and denying 109 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties are ORDERED to file a proposed consolidated pretrial order within 30 days of the entry of this Order. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 12/15/2016. (bdb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ANNA N. SIGIDA and
DALE M. IRVING,
Plaintiff,
v.
MUNROE FOODS 2 LLC d/b/a
ATLANTA BREAD COMPANY,
MUNROE FOODS HOLDINGS,
LLC and BAKE ONE, INC.,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:14-CV-3968-RWS
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff Anna N. Sigida’s Motion
for Summary Judgment [109], Defendant Bake One’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [105], and Defendant Munroe Foods 2’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [106]. After reviewing the record, the Court enters the following
Order.
Background
Plaintiff Anna N. Sigida (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA” or “the Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et
seq., seeking to recover unpaid overtime pay and liquidated damages. The
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FLSA requires employers pay their employees overtime compensation at a rate
not less than time and a half for hours worked in excess of a forty-hour
workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). This requirement, however, does not apply
with respect to any employee “employed in a bona fide executive,
administrative or professional capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Defendant
Munroe Foods 2 (“Defendants” or “Munroe Foods”) moves for summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s overtime claim on the basis of executive and
administrative exemptions. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to these
claims stating she is not exempt from the overtime protections of the FLSA.
The nature of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants is, therefore, the key
issue in this case.
Plaintiff also claims quantum meruit and unjust enrichment under
Georgia law, and Defendant Munroe Foods moves for summary judgment
arguing Plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted by the FLSA. Additionally,
Defendant Munroe Foods moves for summary judgment on the issues of
retaliation, extension of the statute of limitations to three years, liquidated
damages, and an alternative measure of damages for only “half-time.”
Defendant Bake One moves for summary judgment claiming they are not
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joint employers with Defendant Munroe Foods and should be dismissed from
this case. Alternatively, it incorporates Defendant Munroe Foods’ motion for
summary judgment.
I.
General Background on Defendants and Plaintiff’s Employment
Defendant Munroe Foods was an entity that previously operated Atlanta
Bread Company (“ABC”) locations, but is no longer in operation. (Dkt. [106-2]
¶ 1). Specifically, Munroe Foods operated the Snellville, Georgia ABC location
beginning in January 2011. (Dkt. [106-2] ¶ 4). Defendant Bake One produces
bread and bakery products and then sells those products to other entities
throughout North America and abroad. (Dkt. [105-2] ¶ 1). Defendant Bake
One sold baked goods to Defendant Munroe Foods for their Snellville ABC
location. (Dkt. [105-2] ¶ 2).
Plaintiff was assistant manager for Defendant Munroe Foods at their
ABC Snellville location. (Dkt. [116] ¶¶ 1–2). The Snellville ABC location
permanently closed on December 6, 2015. (Dkt. [106-2] ¶ 31). From January
2008 through July 2012, Plaintiff was paid an hourly rate with overtime pay
“for any hours worked over forty hours per week.” (Dkt. [116] ¶ 5). In July
2012, Plaintiff accepted a salaried position as assistant manager for $26,000 per
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year. (Dkt. [106-2] ¶¶ 10–11; Dkt. [116] ¶ 18). At the time the Snellville ABC
location closed, Plaintiff was making $27,300 per year. (Dkt. [106-2] ¶ 32).
II.
The Nature of Plaintiff’s Employment
The Parties dispute the nature of Plaintiff’s employment. Defendants
contend that Plaintiff is subject to the executive or administrative exemptions
of the FLSA, or a combination of the two exemptions. Thus, Defendants argue
that Plaintiff was employed in an executive, administrative, or combination
capacity, with her primary duties being the management of Defendant Munroe
Foods’ Snellville store and supervision of its employees. (See Dkt. [105]; Dkt.
[106-1]). Plaintiff contends that she does not fall within an exemption of the
FLSA as “she was expected to be able to perform the duties of two or three
associates” and the majority of her work was non-managerial tasks. (Dkt. [113]
at 21. See generally Dkt. [109]).
A.
Defendants’ Account of Plaintiff’s Responsibilities
The following is a summary of the evidence presented by Defendants in
support of their argument that Plaintiff is exempt under the FLSA. Defendants
contend Plaintiff was a salaried assistant manager which meant she “managed
all aspects of the store when she was on duty.” (Dkt. [106-2] ¶ 33).
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Specifically, Defendants contend Plaintiff was “responsible for generating and
submitting End of Day Reports, Deposit Reports, Over/Short Reports, Balance
Reports, monthly sales sheets, waste sheets, Food Cost/Food Cost Board forms,
Monthly Sales Labor Budget sheets and financial detail reports.” (Dkt. [106-2]
¶ 34). Additionally, Plaintiff “completed inventory reports on a weekly,
biweekly, or monthly basis throughout her employment;” communicated with
corporate, outside vendors, and customers; and completed produce orders.
(Dkt. [106-2] ¶¶ 35–50).
Defendants also contend Plaintiff “typically conducted the first or second
interview with potential new employees and made hiring recommendations
directly to [the General Manager], which recommendations were given
significant weight.” (Dkt. [106-2] ¶ 53). Additionally, when Plaintiff worked
at the same time as other management personnel, Plaintiff “was considered to
be in charge . . . .” (Dkt. [106-2] ¶ 74).
B.
Plaintiff’s Account of Her Employment Responsibilities
As stated above, Plaintiff vigorously disputes Defendants’ contentions
that she was employed in an executive or managerial capacity. On the contrary,
Plaintiff contends she did not supervise the hourly employees because she “was
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fulfilling the responsibilities of an hourly associate.” (Pl. Dep., Dkt. [107] at
160:12-13). Specifically, Plaintiff claims she “spent over 90% of her time in
production, cleaning, running the cash register, washing dishes, putting away
deliveries and other non-managerial duties.” (Dkt. [109] at 6). Additionally,
Plaintiff claims the general manager was present at the restaurant most of the
time and she was “never free from supervision.” (Dkt. [109] at 8).
As an initial matter, the Court notes that there is insufficient evidence
from which to decide as a matter of law the issue of Defendants being joint
employers at this time. Defendant Bake One Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [105] is therefore DENIED without prejudice. The Court now sets
out the legal standard governing a motion for summary judgment before
considering the Parties’ motions on the merits. The Court first considers the
Parties’ arguments as to the FLSA exemptions. The Court then considers
Defendants’ arguments as to the measure of damages, quantum meruit, and
unjust enrichment, followed by the Parties’ arguments as to willfulness and
retaliation.
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Discussion
I.
Summary Judgment Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “The moving party bears ‘the initial responsibility of informing the . . .
court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357
F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)). Where the moving party makes
such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must go beyond the
pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of
material fact does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257
(1986).
The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at
248. A fact is not material if a dispute over that fact will not affect the outcome
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of the suit under the governing law. Id. An issue is genuine when the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Id. at 249-50.
Finally, in resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must
view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296
(11th Cir. 2002). But, the court is bound only to draw those inferences which
are reasonable. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for
trial.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal citations
omitted); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (once the moving party has met
its burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party “must do more than simply
show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).
II.
Analysis
A.
Employee Exemptions under the FLSA
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Congress enacted the FLSA to remedy “labor conditions detrimental to
the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 201(a). Section 207
ensures that qualifying employees receive overtime benefits by stating:
No employer shall employ any of his employees who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce . . . for a workweek longer
than forty hours . . . unless such employee receives compensation
for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate
not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is
employed.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2)(c).
Exempt from this overtime benefits provision is “any employee
employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity.” 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The pertinent terms— “bona fide executive capacity” and
“bona fide administrative capacity”—are defined in the Department of Labor
Regulations. 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.100–541.203.
“The employer bears the burden of proving that an employee is exempt
from overtime payments.” Rock v. Ray Anthony Int’l, 380 Fed. App’x 875, 877
(11th Cir. 2010) (citing Atlanta Prof’l Firefighters Union, Local 134 v. Atlanta,
920 F.2d 800, 804 (11th Cir. 1991)). The employer “must prove applicability of
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an exemption by ‘clear and affirmative evidence.’” Birdwell v. City of
Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802, 805 (11th Cir. 1992). Further, the FLSA “should be
interpreted liberally in the employee’s favor” and the Act’s exemptions “are to
be narrowly construed” against the employer. Id.
1.
Administrative Exemption
Under the applicable regulations, the term “employee employed in a
bona fide administrative capacity” means any employee:
(1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of
not less than $455 per week . . ., exclusive of board,
lodging or other facilities;
(2) Whose primary duty is the performance of office
or non-manual work directly related to the
management or general business operations of the
employer or the employer’s customers; and
(3) Whose primary duty includes the exercise of
discretion and independent judgment with respect to
matters of significance.
29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a). The second and third elements are at issue here.
a.
Primary Duty is the Performance of Office or Nonmanual Work Directly Related to the Management or
General Business Operations
An employee’s “primary duty” is “the principal, main, major or most
important duty that the employee performs.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). Factors to
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consider when determining an employee’s primary duty include: (1) “the
relative importance of the exempt duties as compared with other types of
duties;” (2) “the amount of time spent performing exempt work;” (3) “the
employee’s relative freedom from direct supervision;” and (4) “the relationship
between the employee’s salary and the wages paid to other employees for the
kind of nonexempt work performed by the employee.” Id. The amount of time
an employee spends performing exempt work serves as a guide, but is not the
sole consideration, when evaluating an employee’s exempt status. 29 C.F.R. §
541.700(b).
To qualify for the administrative exemption, employees “must perform
work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of the business,
as distinguished, for example, from working on a manufacturing production
line or selling a product in a retail or service establishment.” 29 C.F.R. §
541.201(a). Examples of work “directly relating to management or general
business operations” include work in functional areas such as:
tax; finance; accounting; budgeting; auditing; insurance; quality
control; purchasing; procurement; advertising; marking; research;
safety and health; personnel management; human resources;
employee benefits; labor relations; public relations; government
relations; computer network; internet and database administration;
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legal and regulatory compliance; and similar activities.
29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b).
Plaintiff contends that her primary duty was performing manual labor.
Specifically, she claims she “spent over 90% of her time in production,
cleaning, running the cash register, washing dishes, putting away deliveries and
other non-managerial duties.” (Dkt. [109] at 6). Defendant claims that
Plaintiff’s primary duties involved non-manual work which included
completing financial and sales reports, inventory reports, assisting with the
weekly Sysco and produce orders, interviewing employees, disciplining
employees, etc. (Dkt. [106-1] at 18). While there is certainly evidence in the
record that Plaintiff performed some exempt duties, such as assisting with
financial reports and managing employee injuries, there is also evidence to
suggest that these tasks were simply data entry and at the express direction of
the general manager. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it
cannot be said that any administrative tasks were the most important part of her
work. Determining Plaintiff’s actual primary duties will therefore require
resolving factual disputes between the parties and assessing the credibility of
the witnesses, making resolution of this issue inappropriate for summary
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judgment.
b.
Exercise of discretion and independent judgment with
respect to matters of significance
Even if Plaintiff’s primary duty could be classified as administrative as a
matter of law, the evidence is not sufficient to say that she exercised discretion
and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.
“Generally, ‘matters of significance’ include responsibilities dealing with
matters of broad scope and significant detail that have a profound effect on the
employer’s business,” such as: “matters that have significant financial impact,
negotiating and binding the company on significant matters; and planning longor short-term business objectives.” Alvarez v. Key Transp. Serv. Corp., 541 F.
Supp. 2d 1308, 1313–14 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (internal citation omitted).
Here, the parties dispute the facts regarding Plaintiff’s exercise of
discretion. Defendants claims Plaintiff “exercised a great deal of authority as
Assistant Manager, particularly when she was the only manager on site.” (Dkt.
[106-1] at 21). Specifically, Defendants claim “she carried out major
assignments . . . including generating financial and sales reports.” (Dkt. [1061] at 20). Plaintiff claims that she did not have discretion and even when the
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general manager was not on site, any actions she took were at the express
direction of the general manager. (Dkt. [113] at 24–25). Specifically, Plaintiff
claims “all decisions which had a value of over $10.00 had to be made by the
[general manager].” (Dkt. [113] at 24). It is a jury question as to who is more
credible. As such, the Parties’ motions for summary judgment as to the
application of the administrative exemption of the FLSA is DENIED.
2.
Executive Exemption
The parties also disagree on whether Plaintiff fell under the executive
exemption. “Employee employed in a bona fide executive capacity” includes
any employee:
(1) Compensated on a salary basis at a rate of
not less than $455 per week . . ., exclusive of board,
lodging or other facilities;
(2) Whose primary duty is management of the
enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a
customarily recognized department or subdivision
thereof;
(3) Who customarily and regularly directs the
work of two or more employees; and
(4) Who has the authority to hire and fire other
employees or whose suggestions and
recommendations as to hiring, firing, advancement,
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promotion or any other change of status of other
employees are given particular weight.
29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a). The Parties’ submissions focus on the second, third,
and fourth elements.
a.
Primary Duty is Management
The Department of Labor Regulations define “management” as
including, but not limited to, activities such as:
interviewing, selecting, and training of employees; setting and
adjusting their rates of pay and hours of work; directing the work
of employees; maintaining production or sales records for use in
supervision or control; appraising employees’ productivity and
efficiency for the purpose of recommending promotions or other
changes in status; handling employee complaints and grievances;
disciplining employees; planning the work; determining the
techniques to be used; apportioning the work among the
employees; determining the type of materials, supplies, machinery,
equipment, or tools to be used or merchandise to be bought,
stocked, or sold; controlling the flow and distribution of materials
or merchandise and supplies; providing for the safety and security
of the employees or the property; planning and controlling the
budget; and monitoring or implementing legal compliance
measures.
29 C.F.R. § 541.102.
As stated above, the term “primary duty” is defined to mean “the
principal, main, major or most important duty that the employee performs.” 29
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C.F.R. § 541.700(a). The regulations provide that “[d]etermination of an
employee’s primary duty must be based on all the facts in a particular case,
with the major emphasis on the character of the employee’s job as a whole.” 29
C.F.R. § 541.700(a). The Eleventh Circuit has rejected a “categorical
approach” to deciding whether an employee falls within the executive
exemption. Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1269 (11th
Cir. 2008). Moreover, it has recognized “the necessarily fact-intensive nature
of the primary duty inquiry, that the answer is in the details, and that where an
issue turns on the particular facts and circumstances of a case, it is not unusual
for there to be evidence on both sides of the question, with the result hanging in
the balance.” Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit has found a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding the management duties prong of the test where the employee
performed some managerial tasks, but spent greater than fifty percent of his
time performing tasks identical to those of hourly employees. Barreto v. Davie
Marketplace, LLC, 331 F. App’x 672, 675 (11th Cir. 2009). In Baretto, the
employee did not have time to perform his managerial duties because he spent
so much time performing non-exempt work. Id. Conversely, the Eleventh
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Circuit has held that the assistant manager of a pizza restaurant met the
managerial duties requirement, despite making pizzas and interacting with
customers, where his managerial tasks, such as supervising delivery drivers,
apportioning work, and marketing the restaurant, were more important to
operation of the enterprise. Diaz v. Team Oney, Inc., 291 F. App’x 947, 949
(11th Cir. 2008).
Here, Plaintiff performed some managerial tasks, such as making Sysco
and produce orders and reporting employee injuries to corporate. But, taking
the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she also performed a
substantial amount of manual labor that was necessary to serve the restaurant’s
customers. Just as with the administrative exemption, determining Plaintiff’s
actual primary duties will require resolving factual disputes between the parties
and assessing the credibility of the witnesses, making resolution of this issue
inappropriate for summary judgment.
b.
Customarily and regularly direct the work of two or
more employees
“An employee who merely assists the manager of a particular department
and supervises two or more employees only in the actual manager’s absence
does not meet this requirement.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.104(c). Defendants argue
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that Plaintiff “regularly directed the work of all hourly employees during every
shift.” (Dkt. [106-1] at 14). Plaintiff claims “the employees did not require
supervision” and she could not physically supervise other employees through
the layout of the restaurant and the non-exempt duties she was responsible for
during every shift. (Dkt. [123] at 15–16).
Even if Plaintiff’s primary duties could be classified at this time as
management, the evidence is not sufficient to determine that she customarily
and regularly directed the work of two or more employees. Unlike in Barreto
where the other employees performed their duties without supervision because
they already understood their jobs, the parties here dispute Plaintiff’s
supervision of the other employees. Specifically, Plaintiff claims “employees
did not require supervision . . . [as] [t]hey were scheduled by the general
manager based on their abilities.” (Dkt. [109] at 11). Defendant claims that
Plaintiff “supervised the hourly employees whenever she was present in the
store” and “was charged with taking action when an employee misbehaved and
required discipline . . . .” (Dkt. [118] at 13). Thus, there is a triable issue as to
whether Plaintiff customarily and regularly directed the work of two or more
employees.
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c.
Authority or suggestions regarding hiring, firing and
advancement given particular weight
Just as with the other two requirements, the record reflects conflicting
evidence as to whether particular weight was given to Plaintiff’s suggestions
regarding the hiring, firing and advancement of other people. To determine
whether an employee’s recommendations were given “particular weight,”
courts consider the following factors: (1) “whether it is part of the employee’s
job duties to make such suggestions and recommendations;” (2) “the frequency
with which suggestions and recommendations are made or requested;” and (3)
“the frequency with which the employee’s suggestions and recommendations
are relied upon.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.105.
Plaintiff claims she only interviewed potential employees after filing
suit, her recommendations regarding particular potential employees were not
followed, and she only completed hiring paperwork for an individual hired
over the phone by the general manager. (Dkt. [109] at 12–13). Defendants
claim that “during the entire time [Plaintiff] occupied the Assistant Manager
position, she conducted interviews, completed new hire paperwork, and made
recommendations to the General Manager. (Dkt. [118] at 15–16). Again, these
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factual disputes must be resolved, and summary judgment is inappropriate at
this time.
As such, the Parties’ motions for summary judgment as to the application
of the executive exemption of the FLSA is DENIED.
3.
Combination Exemption
The regulations promulgated pursuant to the FLSA recognize that an
employee may also be exempt from the FLSA’s overtime compensation
requirements if the employee’s primary duty includes a combination of work
that qualifies under two or more exemptions listed. 29 C.F.R. § 541.708.
Because the Court finds that summary judgment is inappropriate regarding both
the administrative and executive exemptions, the Parties’ motions for summary
judgment as to the application of the combination exemption is also DENIED.
B.
Measure of Damages
While the FLSA requires non-exempt employees to receive time and one
half over their “regular rate of pay” as overtime compensation, the statute does
not define a regular rate of pay. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); Lamonica v. Safe
Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1310 (11th Cir. 2013). The parties
dispute how the Court should calculate Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay.
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In Lamonica, the Eleventh Circuit described a general rule for
calculating the regular rate of pay for employees who are employed on a
weekly salary basis.1 In those circumstances, “the regular hourly rate of pay,
on which time and half must be paid, is computed by dividing the salary by the
number of hours which the salary is intended to compensate.” Id. at 1311
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 778.113(a) (emphasis added)). “Consequently ‘where the
employee is paid solely on a weekly salary basis, the number of hours the
employee’s pay is intended to compensate—not necessarily the number of
hours he actually worked—is the divisor.’” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Farm
Stores Grocery, Inc., 518 F.3d 1259, 1268 n.5 (11th Cir. 2008)).2
If a plaintiff’s salary was intended to compensate for all hours worked,
1
“Where the salary covers a period longer than a workweek, such as a month,
it must be reduced to its workweek equivalent.” 29 C.F.R. § 778.113(b). The Parties
do not dispute the Plaintiff was compensated on a fixed salary every two weeks.
2
Under that scenario, if a plaintiff’s salary was intended to compensate
for 50 hours a week but the plaintiff actually worked 55 hours a week, the
Court or a jury would still calculate the regular rate of pay by dividing the
employee’s salary by 50 hours. The overtime compensation for the 10 hours
over 40 per week would be calculated at one half the regular rate because the
employee was already partially compensated for those hours. However, the
remaining five hours, that were not intended to be compensated, would be
calculated at time and one half as the employee did not receive any
compensation.
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the “fluctuating workweek” method applies. Id. at 1310-11 (citing Overnight
Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 580 (1942)). The fluctuating
workweek method dictates that, “in the case of an employee who is paid
constant weekly salary for fluctuating hours,” courts should calculate the
regular rate of pay “by dividing that weekly salary by the number of hours
actually worked.”3 Id.
In this case, Defendants argue that if they are found liable for overtime,
they are entitled to pay overtime calculated at half-time under the fluctuating
workweek method, because they allege Plaintiff’s salary covered her straighttime pay for the hours worked. (Dkt. [106-1] at 27–28). Specifically,
Defendants argue the Plaintiff’s salaried position “encompassed at least fortyfive hours per week,” which indicates the salary would cover all hours worked
under the fluctuating workweek method. (Dkt. [106-1] at 27) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff argues she agreed to a forty hour per week position. (Dkt. [113] at 28).
Although the Plaintiff disputes the hours, she repeatedly admits during her
3
So, under the earlier hypothetical, the employee working 55 hours a
week under the fluctuating method would receive one half the regular rate for
the 15 hours of overtime, as opposed to 10 hours at one half the regular rate
and five hours at time and a half.
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deposition that the position would “not . . . be more than 45 hours.” (Dkt. [1161] at 48–54). Although the record does not clearly support a fluctuating
workweek, meaning Plaintiff’s salary would compensate her for all hours
worked, the record does support the intended hours to be compensated by the
salary was forty-five hours. Therefore, if the Plaintiff is found to be nonexempt, the half-time calculation would be appropriate for the five additional
hours over the forty hour workweek. Additionally, if Plaintiff is found to be
non-exempt, any hours past the forty-five hours, shall be calculated at time and
a half.
As such, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part, Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment as to this issue.
C.
Quantum Meruit and/or Unjust Enrichment
Defendants move for summary judgment on the state law claims of
quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have
held that claims where plaintiffs merely “recast” their FLSA claims are
preempted by the FLSA. See, e.g., Alexander v. Vesta Ins. Grp., Inc., 147 F.
Supp. 2d 1223, 1240–41 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (holding that the FLSA preempted
plaintiffs’ fraud claim, based on defendants’ alleged misrepresentations that
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they were exempt from the FLSA, because plaintiffs were merely recasting
their FLSA claims as state law claims in order to obtain additional damages);
Tombrello v. USX Corp., 763 F. Supp. 541, 545 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (“As a matter
of law, plaintiff cannot circumvent the exclusive remedy prescribed by
Congress by asserting equivalent state law claims in addition to the FLSA
claim.”). The Court finds theses cases persuasive here.
The Court therefore GRANTS the Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment as to the Plaintiff’s state law claims for quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment.
D.
Willfulness
If a defendant willfully violates the overtime compensation provision of
the FLSA, a three-year statute of limitations, for which period back wages may
be sought, is triggered, as opposed to the two-year limitations period that
normally applies. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). A finding of willfulness may also entitle
Plaintiff to an award of liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). As there exists
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff fell within the
administrative or executive exemptions, the Court has not determined that
Defendants are liable for overtime pay. A finding of a willful violation must be
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predicated on a finding of a violation of the overtime provision. See Cooke v.
Gen. Dynamics Corp., 993 F.Supp. 56, 65 (D. Conn. 1997). Therefore, the
Court DENIES both Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment as to the willfulness of any violation that may have occurred.
E.
Retaliation
Defendants also moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation
claim. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that she was not promoted to the general
manager position due to her pending FLSA lawsuit. (Dkt. [55] ¶¶ 61–65). It is
“unlawful for any person . . . to discharge . . . [an] employee because such
employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). To
establish a prima facie case under Section 215(a)(3), Plaintiff must establish:
“(1) she engaged in activity protected under the act; (2) she subsequently
suffered adverse action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection existed
between the employee’s activity and the adverse action.” Wolf v. Coca-Cola
Co., 200F.3d 1337, 1342–43 (11th Cir. 2000). The parties do no dispute that
the first two elements are satisfied.
“In demonstrating causation, the plaintiff must prove that the adverse
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action would not have been taken ‘but-for’ the assertion of the FLSA rights.”
Id. at 1343. Plaintiff can satisfy this burden if she proves a “close temporal
proximity” between the time Defendants learned about her protected activity
and the “failure to promote.” Raspanti v. Four Amigos Travel, Inc., 266 Fed.
App’x 820, 823 (11th Cir. 2008). This “close temporal proximity” standard
requires that the actions be “very close.” Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breedan, 532
U.S. 268, 273 (2001). “A delay of three to four months does not suffice.”
Raspanti, 266 Fed. App’x at 823 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to prove a causal relation based on close temporal
proximity. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in December 2014 and the alleged “failure
to promote” did not occur until October 2015, ten months later, which is too far
removed to establish a causal connection for retaliation. Therefore, Defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to the retaliation claim is GRANTED.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Munroe Foods 2 LLC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [106] is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s retaliation, quantum
meruit, and unjust enrichment claims; GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part as to the measurement of damages; and DENIED as to willfulness and the
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applicability of any exemptions. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[109] is DENIED. Defendant Bake One Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[105] is DENIED without prejudice as to the issue of joint employment and
disposed of in accordance with the Court’s disposition of Defendant Munroe
Foods 2 LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment [106] insofar as it was
incorporated by reference into Bake One Inc.’s motion.
The parties are ORDERED to file a proposed consolidated pretrial order
within 30 days of the entry of this Order.
SO ORDERED, this 15th day of December, 2016.
________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge
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