Dixon v. State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Georgia

Filing 8

OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING the 4 Final Report and Recommendation. Plaintiff Anderson Dixon's Complaint 1 is DISMISSED. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 5/20/2015. (adg)

because certain charges were pending against him. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that
those charges had been dismissed, but “the Board refuses to acknowledge [his]
status” or notify him of the outcome of his parole hearing. (Id. at 3-4). Plaintiff
alleges also that he is not receiving “proper medical treatment in jail.” (Id. at 3).
On February 12, 2015, the Magistrate Judge granted [3] Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed in forma pauperis [2].
On February 24, 2015, the Magistrate Judge screened Plaintiff’s Complaint,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), and concluded that Plaintiff’s Complaint was
frivolous and recommended that it be dismissed. (R&R at 3-4). Plaintiff did not
file any objections to the R&R.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard

After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v.
Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1112
(1983). A district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of
the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). With respect to those findings and

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recommendations to which a party has not asserted objections, the district judge
must conduct a plain error review of the record. United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d
1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983).
B.

Analysis

Plaintiff did not object to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R. The Court thus
reviews the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations for plain error. See
Slay 714 F.2d at 1095.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may pursue relief for possible
violations of her constitutional rights only against the specific individuals who
committed acts that allegedly violated those rights. See Hafer v. Melo,
502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10
(1989). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that an act or omission committed by a person acting under color of state law
deprived her of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582
(11th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff did not identify any specific person or persons as a defendant or
defendants, and Plaintiff is not entitled to assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against
the Board. See Worley v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 932 F. Supp. 1466,

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1471 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (“Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles is not a
“person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .”). The Magistrate Judge
noted also that Plaintiff, even if he had named the individual Board members as
defendants, could not establish that he was deprived of a liberty interest that would
give rise to a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because “a Georgia inmate has
no liberty interest in parole.” (R&R at 4) (quoting Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946
(11th Cir. 2001)). The Magistrate noted further that Plaintiff’s allegation that he is
not receiving “proper medical treatment in jail” is unrelated to his claim against the
Board, and would need to be brought as a separate case against the appropriate
defendants. (R&R at 4). The Court finds no plain error in the Magistrate Judge’s
findings and recommendation. See Slay, 714 F.2d at 1095.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Alan J. Baverman’s

Final Report and Recommendation [4] is ADOPTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Anderson Dixon’s Complaint
[1] is DISMISSED.

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SO ORDERED this 20th day of May, 2015.

_______________________________
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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