Bledsoe v. Erves et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims, asserted in Counts 2 and 3, are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's remaining state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 4/22/2015. (anc)
from both the state board and at the district levels,” including by “using
unsupported and false statements [and] misrepresentations designed to defame
the[ir] character.” (Id. at 3-7).1 Plaintiff asserts that Erves and Jackson “ha[d]
Plaintiff illegally removed from office” on insufficient grounds2 after Plaintiff
confronted them about “misconduct of illegal voting” that Plaintiff had observed
during Georgia PTA elections. Plaintiff claims that “[t]he District 12 Executive
Committee met and illegally voted to remove Plaintiff” in violation of [her] due
process rights and the GA PTA written Allegations and Disciplinary Procedures
Document.” (Compl. at 8).
On February 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed her Complaint and an Application for
Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”) [1]. Plaintiff asserts
federal claims against Erves, the Georgia PTA, and the members of the Georgia
PTA Board of Directors (collectively, “Defendants”), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for
violation of due process and slander (Counts 2 and 3). Plaintiff also asserts state
1
Although the crux of her Complaint appears to be that Erves and Jackson
defamed her, Plaintiff does not specify the “written and verbal communication and
comments that were false about Plaintiff.” (Compl. at 3).
2
Plaintiff asserts that Erves and Jackson alleged that “Plaintiff injured the
organization for [sic] purchasing a a [sic] name badge with her own funds and for
making a positive statement to an audience of District 12 leaders, that
‘Membership is Contagious in District 12,’ which caused no harm whatsoever to
the organization and does not meet the criteria for removal per the PTA Police for
removal; however this was the reason for Plaintiff’s documented removal in
violation of the PTA Bylaws and Policy Section 13.” (Compl. at 8).
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law claims for “breach of policy” (Counts 1 and 7), libel (Count 4), defamation
(Count 5), “deprivation” (Count 6), conspiracy (Count 8), “abuse of an
organization, position and authority” (Count 9), and “failure to exercise reasonable
intervention” (Count 10).
On March 3, 2015, Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand granted Plaintiff’s IFP
Application and Plaintiff’s Complaint was submitted to the Court for a frivolity
determination.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if at any time the
court determines the action is frivolous or malicious or that it fails to state a claim
on which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). “Failure to state
a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H&S, Inc.,
366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). Under this standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
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plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Review for frivolousness, on the other hand, “‘accords judges not only the
authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but
also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” See
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Neitzke
v.Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). A claim is frivolous when it “has little or
no chance of success,” that is, when it appears “from the face of the complaint that
the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories are
‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327).
Plaintiff filed her Complaint pro se. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff must comply with the threshold
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Beckwith v. Bellsouth
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Telecomms. Inc., 146 F. App’x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005). “Even though a pro se
complaint should be construed liberally, a pro se complaint still must state a claim
upon which the Court can grant relief.” Grigsby v. Thomas, 506 F. Supp. 2d 26,
28 (D.D.C. 2007). “[A] district court does not have license to rewrite a deficient
pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).
B.
Analysis
a.
Plaintiff’s Federal Law Claims
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may pursue relief for possible
violations of her constitutional rights only against the specific individuals who
committed acts that allegedly violated those rights. See Hafer v. Melo,
502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10
(1989). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that an act or omission committed by a person acting under color of state law
deprived her of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582
(11th Cir. 1995).
Construing her pro se Complaint liberally, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims must be dismissed as frivolous. It is axiomatic that
“the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely
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private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). Plaintiff does not allege that
Defendants acted under the color of state law, and other courts have held that a
parent-teacher association, like the Georgia PTA, is a private entity not subject to
liability under Section 1983. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. Clinton, 357 F. App’x 355,
357 (2d Cir. 2009) (parent could not state a claim under § 1983 against high school
PTA for violations of First and Fourteenth Amendments; because PTA was a
private entity, parent’s removal from decisionmaking team by PTA executive
board did not involve “state action”); Holy Spirit Ass’n for Unification of World
Christianity v. New York Congress of Parents & Teachers, Inc., 408 N.Y.S.2d 261
(N.Y. Supp. Ct. 1978) (although PTA used public school time, staff and facilities
for its activities, teachers distributed PTA’s literature to students during school
hours, PTA’s executive committee included school principal, and principal
determined whether PTA would be officially recognized and organized under
statewide PTA, PTA was a private actor and this relationship with school system
was not sufficient to support that PTA’s passage of allegedly unconstitutional
resolution was “state action” for purposes of § 1983).3
3
This is further supported by Plaintiff’s characterization of the Georgia PTA
as a “non-profit organization.” (Compl. at 2).
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A private entity may be liable as a “state actor” for a constitutional violation
only in the following circumstances: (1) “the State has coerced or at least
significantly encouraged the action alleged to violate the Constitution”; (2) “the
private parties performed a public function that was traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State”; or (3) “the State had so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with the [private parties] that it was a joint participant
in the enterprise[].” Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347
(11th Cir. 2001) (alterations in original) (quoting NBC, Inc. v. Comm’cns Workers
of Am., 860 F.2d 1022, 1026–27 (11th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not
allege facts supporting any of these circumstances. That the Georgia PTA
“receives a substantial amount of funds from teachers/educators that is paid from
through [sic] the State of Georgia appropriations from federal tax dollars” (Compl.
at 9), is not sufficient to support that the Georgia PTA, or any of its members, are
state actors. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987) (stating, “[t]he Government may subsidize
private entities without assuming constitutional responsibility for their actions;”
holding U.S. Olympic Committee not governmental actor despite federal charter,
regulation and funding); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (private nursing
home not state actor despite extensive regulation and receiving 90% of fees from
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state); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (private school that treats
students with addictions not state actor even though it operates under contract with
state and receives 90% state funding); Goia v. CitiFinancial Auto, 499 F. App’x
930, 936 (11th Cir. 2012) (that lender’s parent company received funding from
federal government does not show that lender was acting under color of state law
for purpose of showing state action under § 1983). Plaintiff fails to show that any
of Defendants are state actors, and Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are required to
be dismissed.4
b.
Plaintiff’s Remaining State Law Claims
1.
Original Jurisdiction
To the extent Plaintiff asserts that the Court has original subject matter
jurisdiction over her state law claims because “Plaintiff’s compensational relief for
damages exceeds $75,000 amount [sic] and both Plaintiff and Defendant [sic]
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The Court also notes that Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants conspired
with one or more state actors to violate her constitutional rights. See, e.g., NAACP
v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir. 1990) (allegations of a conspiracy can
serve to extend liability, under Section 1983, to private individuals, where a
plaintiff shows that the private individual conspired with one or more state actors);
Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff
failed to state a § 1983 claim where the facts alleged could have supported, at
most, a conspiracy between two private actors; plaintiff “fail[ed] to point to any
evidence that suggests an ‘understanding’ between [the private individual] and the
various state actors who took part in the investigation and prosecution of
[plaintiff]”). Plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim for this additional reason.
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resides [sic] in this District,” diversity jurisdiction requires that the amount in
controversy exceed $75,000 and the parties are citizens of different states.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Plaintiff does not allege, and it does not appear, that the
parties are citizens of different states and the Court thus lacks original subject
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See id.; see also Palmer
v. Hosp. Auth., 22 F.3d 1559, 1564 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Diversity jurisdiction, as a
general rules, requires complete diversity—every plaintiff must be diverse from
every defendant.”).
2.
Exercise of Supplemental Jurisdiction
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims, now dismissed, were the only claims in this
action over which the Court had original subject matter jurisdiction. The
remaining claims in this action involve only state law causes of action, over which
the Court may, but is not required to, exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (conferring district courts with supplemental jurisdiction over
“claims that are so related to claims in the action within [the court’s] original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy”). “The decision
on [whether to retain jurisdiction over the state-law claims] should be and is vested
in the sound discretion of the district court.” Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale,
279 F.3d 1271, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002); see generally United Mine Workers of Am.
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v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed
before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims
should be dismissed as well.”). The Eleventh Circuit has “encouraged district
courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when . . . the federal claims have been
dismissed prior to trial.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089
(11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye,
Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th Cir. 1984)). The Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims and these
claims are dismissed without prejudice.5
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims, asserted
in Counts 2 and 3, are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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Having declined to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state
law claims, the Court does not consider the merits of Plaintiff’s remaining claims.
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SO ORDERED this 22nd day of April, 2015.
_______________________________
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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