Minyobe v. Wilson et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER that Defendants Chris Wilson and Pete Smith's Motion to Dismiss Complaint or Motion to Transfer Venue 4 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for improper venue is DENIED. De fendants Motion to Transfer Venue is GRANTED. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in their official capacities is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is hereby TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 11/7/2015. (anc)
Sweetwater, the speakers were ordered to be shipped to 1635 Pirkle Road, Apt.
1418, Norcross, VA 30093, which is in the Oakbrook Pointe Apartments complex
(“Oakbrook”). (Id. ¶ 16).
Seeking to determine the identity of the individual residing in Apartment
1418 (the “Apartment”), Wilson contacted Oakbrook by telephone, and asked an
employee to provide him with the identity of the Apartment’s resident. (Id.
¶¶ 20-22). Wilson also contacted the Gwinnett County Sheriff’s Office attempting
to identify the Apartment’s resident. (Id. ¶ 26).
On May 9, 2013, Judge George Peagler of the Sumter County Superior
Court signed a subpoena ordering Oakbrook to release the identity of the
Apartment’s resident. (Id. ¶ 27). Oakbrook identified Plaintiff as the resident of
the Apartment. (Id. ¶ 29). On May 15, 2013, Wilson contacted Plaintiff via
telephone, and told Plaintiff that he needed to come to Sumter County to discuss
the matter further. (Id. ¶ 35). On May 22, 2013, Wilson secured a warrant for
Plaintiff’s arrest from the Sumter County Magistrate Judge. (Id. ¶ 38; Wilson Aff.
[4.2] ¶ 10). Plaintiff claims that, after the arrest warrant was issued, Sheriff Smith
contacted him via telephone and accused him of stealing the Credit Card. (Id.
¶ 41). On January 9, 2014, Gwinnett County law enforcement officers arrested
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Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 45). Either that same day or the day after, he was transferred to
Sumter County. (Id.).1
On March 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants, alleging
causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, malicious prosecution, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment.
On May 8, 2015, Defendants filed their Motion, arguing that Plaintiff’s
official capacity claims against Wilson and Smith should be dismissed.
Defendants also seek dismissal of the Complaint [1] for improper venue, or, in the
alternative, transfer to the Middle District of Georgia, where Defendants argue
venue is proper. On May 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed a response [5] (“First
Response”), in which he “agrees to dismiss this action against Defendant Smith
and Defendant Wilson in their official capacities” and states he will file an
amended complaint reflecting such. As of this date, Plaintiff has not filed an
amended complaint. Also on May 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed another response [6]
(“Second Response”), in which he argues that a substantial part of Defendants’
1
Defendants allege that Plaintiff was transferred to Sumter County on January
10, 2014. (Mot. at 5). The Complaint, though ambiguous, suggests Plaintiff was
transferred on January 9, 2014, the same day he was arrested. (Compl. ¶ 45).
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alleged conduct occurred within the Northern District of Georgia, and therefore
venue is proper.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
Venue for Section 1983 actions is governed by the general venue provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides that venue is proper in:
(1)
a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located;
(2)
a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part
of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3)
if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be
brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in
which any defendant is subject to the court's personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
See New Alliance Party of Ala. v. Hand, 933 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam) (applying Section 1391(b) venue provision to Section 1983 action).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) allows a defendant to move to
dismiss an action for improper venue. “The plaintiff has the burden of showing
that venue in the forum is proper.” Pinson v. Rumsfeld, 192 F. App’x 811, 817
(11th Cir. 2006) (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Thomas Indus., Inc., 896 F.2d 1352,
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1355 (11th Cir. 1990)). When venue is improper, a court “shall dismiss, or if it be
in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district . . . in which it could have
been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Whether to dismiss or transfer is within the
discretion of the Court. See Pinson, 192 F. App’x at 817; Naartex Consulting
Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
B.
Analysis
Plaintiff argues that venue is proper under Section 1391(b)(2) because a
“substantial part of the events” giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim occurred in the
Northern District of Georgia. The Eleventh Circuit has held that, in considering
whether venue is proper under Section 1391(b)(2), “[o]nly the events that directly
give rise to a claim are relevant. And of the places where the events have taken
place, only those locations hosting a ‘substantial’ part of the events are to be
considered.” Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 2003).
In some cases, “venue will be proper in two or more districts.” Id.
In determining whether venue is proper, the Court is required to “focus on
relevant activities of the defendant, not of the plaintiff.” Id. at 1371-72. In
Jenkins, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a “minimum contacts”-style personal
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jurisdiction analysis in favor of an analysis focusing on whether the acts “have a
close nexus to the wrong.” Id. at 1372.
Plaintiff attempts to show venue is proper by linking Defendants’ actions to
the Northern District of Georgia. Plaintiff claims that he was “arrested in Gwinnett
County, Georgia on an arrest warrant secured by Defendant Wilson,” and that
Smith traveled to Gwinnett County to take Plaintiff to Sumter County. (Second
Resp. at 7). Contradicting himself, Plaintiff then claims that it was “agents on the
behalf of Defendant Smith [who] seized the Plaintiff person in the Northern
District of Georgia and subsequently transported the Plaintiff to Sumter County.”
(Id. at 8). He also claims that “the gravamen of the Plaintiff’s complaint is that he
was ‘illegally seized/arrested,’” an action that took place in this district. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested in Gwinnett County on an arrest
warrant secured by Wilson through alleged false statements before a Sumter
County Magistrate. This allegation is closer to the “minimum contacts”-style
analysis rejected by the Eleventh Circuit. A showing of a “close nexus” is what is
required here. Jenkins, 321 F.3d at 1371-72. Plaintiff does not allege that Wilson
secured the warrant while he was in the Northern District. Plaintiff here argues in
his memorandum in opposition to the Motion that Smith traveled to Gwinnett
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County to transfer Plaintiff to Sumter County, but his Complaint does not allege—
and Plaintiff offers no evidence to support—this claim. Plaintiff, in fact, later
contradicts this assertion, stating it was Smith’s agent who transferred him.
Plaintiff claims that Smith’s agent was Clyde Rutherford, a Sumter County
deputy sheriff. (Second Resp. at 8).2 Plaintiff appears to argue that, because
Rutherford was Smith’s agent, Smith is responsible for Rutherford’s actions for
purposes of the venue analysis. (Id.). Plaintiff does not cite to any case law to
support this proposition. Even if Plaintiff could establish that Rutherford’s alleged
actions are imputed to Smith for purposes of the venue analysis, Rutherford’s
alleged act of transferring Plaintiff to Sumter County is insufficient to establish
venue. Plaintiff’s claims do not arise out of his transfer.3, 4
2
Plaintiff raises this argument for the first time in his Second Response. The
Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that Defendants had any
direct involvement in Plaintiff’s arrest or transport to Sumter County.
3
At most, Rutherford’s alleged actions may suffice under the “minimum
contacts”-style analysis rejected by the Eleventh Circuit. See Jenkins, 321 F.3d at
1372.
4
Plaintiff also relies on two phone calls Wilson and Smith allegedly made.
(Second Resp. at 2-4). Plaintiff, however, does not allege that either call was made
within the Northern District or that the calls give rise to his claims. These
allegations are insufficient to establish that venue is proper is in this district.
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Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that Defendants’ actions in the
Northern District of Georgia, if any, give rise or have a close nexus to Plaintiff’s
claims. See id.; see also Kapordelis v. Danzig, 387 F. App’x 905, 906 (agreeing
with New York court that plaintiff’s arrest and four-day detention in New York
before transfer to Georgia did not “give rise” to his claims of malicious prosecution
and thus venue was improper in New York). To the contrary, Plaintiff’s
allegations show that Defendants’ relevant acts occurred almost exclusively in
Sumter County. Defendants’ allegedly insufficient investigation of Plaintiff took
place in Sumter, their allegedly false statements in securing a warrant for
Plaintiff’s arrest took place in Sumter, and Defendants were, at all relevant times,
located in Sumter. (See Wilson Aff. ¶¶ 7-13). The Court, therefore, finds that
venue is improper in the Northern District of Georgia.
To the extent Defendants move the Court to dismiss this action for improper
venue, however, that motion is denied. Plaintiff appears to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, and the interests of justice require that this matter be
transferred to the Middle District of Georgia. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); see also Direct
Response Prods, Inc. v. Roderick, No. 1:13-cv-945-WSD, 2013 WL 5890407, at
*7 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2013).
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Defendants also move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity
claims against Wilson and Smith. (Mot. at 8-9). Plaintiff indicated that:
Plaintiff agrees to dismiss this action against Defendant Smith and
Defendant Wilson in their official capacities and will hereby amend
his complaint as a Matter of Course pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1)(A) of
the Federal Rule[s] of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the Plaintiff
is still within twenty-one (21) days after the Defendants’
acknowledgement of service of the Plaintiff’s summons and complaint
on May 8, 2015.
(First Resp. at 2). To date, Plaintiff has not filed an Amended Complaint. Because
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Wilson
and Smith is unopposed, Defendant’s motion is granted.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Chris Wilson and Pete
Smith’s (together, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Complaint or Motion to
Transfer Venue [4] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for improper venue is DENIED.
Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue is GRANTED. Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities is
GRANTED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is hereby TRANSFERRED
to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.
SO ORDERED this 7th day of November, 2015.
_______________________________
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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