Henderson v. Nissan and Kia of Union City et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING CASE AS FRIVOLOUS pursuant to 28 USC 1915(e)(2). Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 7/9/2015. (adg) Modified on 7/10/2015 (adg).
“Complaint” [3] to the Court for the required frivolity review. 1
Plaintiff, in her Complaint, appears to be explaining the circumstances
surrounding her providing “Nissan of Union City” a post-dated check to cover a
down payment of a vehicle Plaintiff was purchasing, and Plaintiff’s subsequent
arrest for deposit account fraud, her plea of nolo contendere, and subsequent issues
regarding the violation of the terms of her probation. Plaintiff asserts that her
“legal arguments [are that] all crimes are commercial, all law is contract; congress
does not grant administrative courts judicial authority.” (Complaint at 2). Plaintiff
asserts that her post-dated check is not considered criminal and that her
constitutional rights were violated. (Id.). Plaintiff does not provide any support
for these assertions. Plaintiff asserts further that she was denied due process, that
Nissan used malicious prosecution and committed a fraud against the courts, and
that Plaintiff was falsely imprisoned. (Id.). Plaintiff does not identify what
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The Magistrate Judge, in her March 30, 2015, Order, submitted this action to
the Court for a frivolity review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Section 1915A
requires the court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a government entity, officer, or employee, and to dismiss the
complaint if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) applies to civil
actions filed in forma pauperis, and requires the court to dismiss the complaint if it
is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff does not identify a government entity, officer,
or employee as a defendant and, thus 28 U.S.C. § 1915A does not apply. The
Court, because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, instead applies 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
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specific relief, whether monetary or equitable, she is seeking.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if at any time the
court determines the action is frivolous or malicious or that it fails to state a claim
on which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). “Failure to state
a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H&S, Inc.,
366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). Under this standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Review for frivolousness, on the other hand, “‘accords judges not only the
authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but
also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
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dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” See
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Neitzke v.Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). A claim is frivolous when it “has
little or no chance of success,” that is, when it appears “from the face of the
complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories
are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327).
Plaintiff filed his Complaint pro se. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff must comply with the threshold
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Beckwith v. Bellsouth
Telecomms. Inc., 146 F. App’x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005). “Even though a pro se
complaint should be construed liberally, a pro se complaint still must state a claim
upon which the Court can grant relief.” Grigsby v. Thomas, 506 F. Supp. 2d 26,
28 (D.D.C. 2007). “[A] district court does not have license to rewrite a deficient
pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).
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B.
Analysis
Liberally construing Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint, the Court finds that
Plaintiff appears to be asserting claims against Nissan & Kia of Union City and
Ms. Kristi Queen, a representative for Nissan (“Nissan”). The claims appear to be
related to Plaintiff’s prosecution and imprisonment arising from her arrest and plea
of nolo contendere on the charges of deposit account fraud. Plaintiff appears also
to assert that the crime of which she was convicted--deposit account fraud--is a
commercial and not a criminal matter and thus the state court should have applied
contract law because, in Plaintiff’s view, the alleged fraud was not a criminal
matter.
Plaintiff, thus, appears to assert a claim that her conviction was unlawful
because criminal law does not apply to her actions, or that Nissan committed a
fraud against the court and, thus, her conviction is invalid. Plaintiff’s claims, if
successful, are a challenge to the validity of her conviction, and the claims are
barred. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (“the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
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already been invalidated.”). Plaintiff’s Complaint, thus, fails to state a claim on
which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).2
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Tracy L. Henderson’s Complaint
[3] is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
SO ORDERED this 9th day of July, 2015.
_______________________________
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2
The Court notes also that, to the extent that Plaintiff meant for the Court to
consider her “Affidavit of Truth” as a complaint, Plaintiff failed to comply with
Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure states that a pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim
needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a
demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain a demand for relief
sought. Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a party “state
its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to
a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff’s Complaint
contains only seven substantive paragraphs, all of which contain several distinct
factual and legal allegations, in violation of Rule 10(b).
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