Wofford v. Colvin
Filing
15
FINAL OPINION AND ORDER REVERSING the Commissioner's decision and REMANDING pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings in accordance with the above discussion. Based on the forgoing reasons and cited authority, the court concludes that the decision of the ALJ was not supported by substantial evidence and was the result of a failure to apply the proper legal standards. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janet F. King on 9/6/16. (kxw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
KAREN WOFFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:15-CV-01728-JFK
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
FINAL OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff in the above-styled case brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of the final decision
of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration which denied her
applications for disability benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the court
ORDERS that the Commissioner’s decision be REVERSED and that the case be
REMANDED for further proceedings.
I.
Procedural History
Plaintiff Karen Wofford filed applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income on November 11, 2010, alleging that she became
disabled on June 1, 2005. [Record (“R.”) at 37, 137-48]. Plaintiff later amended her
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alleged onset date to April 1, 2010. [R. at 37, 55]. After her applications were denied
initially and on reconsideration, an administrative hearing was held on July 12, 2012.
[R. at 37, 51-80, 85-96]. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision
denying Plaintiff’s applications on July 19, 2012, and the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review on February 5, 2014. [R. at 2-8, 37-46]. Plaintiff filed
her complaint in this court on May 19, 2015, seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision. [Doc. 2]. The parties have consented to proceed
before the undersigned Magistrate Judge.
II.
Facts
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder,
hypertension, and hepatitis C. [R. at 39]. These impairments are “severe” within the
meaning of the Social Security regulations. [Id.]. However, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. at 40-41]. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not capable
of performing her past relevant work as a general clerk. [R. at 44]. However, the ALJ
found that there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy
that Plaintiff can perform. [R. at 45]. As a result, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had
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not been under a disability at any time from April 1, 2010, the alleged disability onset
date, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. [R. at 45].
The decision of the ALJ [R. at 37-46] states the relevant facts of this case as
modified herein as follows:
The claimant wrote in her initial disability report that she was limited in her
ability to work by hypertension, depression, and bipolar disorder. (Exhibit 2E at 2).
She wrote that she stopped working on April 1, 2010, because of her condition. (Id.).
In function reports, she and Willa Henderson, her friend and sponsor, wrote that the
claimant was limited in her ability to lift, squat, walk, kneel, talk, hear, remember,
complete tasks, concentrate, understand, follow instructions, and get along with others.
(Exhibit 5E; Exhibit 9E).
At the administrative hearing, the claimant testified that she stopped working
because she was laid off due to poor vision, troubles concentrating, and reduction of
hours. She testified that she had anxiety at work and would vomit frequently. She
alleged that she has episodes where her body feels hot and that she starts sweating
twice a day. The claimant said that she is fatigued from her hepatitis C but is not
taking any medication for this. She stated that her hypertension is not controlled with
medication. Her feet swell when she stands and walks for extended periods, and she
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has severe stomach pain. She sleeps three to four hours on average each night. She
said that she has a hard time being in public and isolates herself from people she
knows. She enjoys being outdoors and gardening. She does not cook. Willa
Henderson also testified at the hearing about the claimant’s limited activities,
indicating that the claimant has been in and out of her house for several years. She
further testified that the claimant no longer drinks on a regular basis. She indicated
that the claimant has problems with isolation.
The medical evidence of record shows that the claimant received treatment for
her hypertension from St. Joseph’s Mercy Care Services and Grady Hospital in 2010
and 2011. (Exhibit 8F; Exhibit 9F). In November 2010, the claimant was seen at
Grady for her hypertension and she reported no chest, orthopnea, palpitations,
headaches, dizziness, or shortness of breath. (Exhibit 4F at 129). In January 2011, she
was treated for a syncopal episode and a headache, but she reported feeling “fine” after
being given additional antihypertensive medication. (Exhibit 9F at 10). In February
2011, the claimant was seen at Grady for newly diagnosed hepatitis C. (Id. at 5). She
reported no headaches, chest pain, or dizziness from her hypertension and said that she
was “[d]oing pretty good and no complaints today.” (Id.). In March 2011, the
claimant was seen at the Grady Liver Clinic for a new patient visit. (Exhibit 15F at 8).
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She denied jaundice, lower extremity edema, easy bruising, or increasing abdominal
girth. (Id.). In January 2012, she again denied these symptoms when seen at Grady,
but she did report decreased energy. (Exhibit 21F at 1). A physical examination was
normal. (Id. at 1-2). The provider noted that the claimant was interested in receiving
treatment for her hepatitis C but that she had “not show[n] up” to viral studies that had
been ordered “several times over [the] last year.” (Id. at 2).
In March 2011, the claimant told a Grady provider that she had relapsed with
substance abuse in June 2010 but had been abstinent since October 2010. (Exhibit 15F
at 8). She stated that her bipolar and depression symptoms had improved but that she
was still dealing with stressors. (Id.). In June 2011, the claimant underwent a
consultative psychological examination performed by Joan Kent, Ph.D. (Exhibit 13F).
She told Dr. Kent that she had been laid off in April 2010 “for work slow down.” (Id.
at 3). Dr. Kent’s mental status examination showed that the claimant’s memory was
intact and that she appeared to have good comprehension but poor to fair judgment.
(Id. at 4). Dr. Kent opined that the claimant appears capable of routine work and that
her social interaction is “fair but neediness can overtax others.” (Id.). She also opined
that the claimant appears capable in regards to concentration and directions. She
diagnosed the claimant with mild depressed bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress
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disorder (“PTSD”) with paranoia, and substance dependence in remission. (Id.). Dr.
Kent wrote that the claimant did not demonstrate motivation to work and appeared “to
have acclimated to a life relying on [Ms. Henderson] or shelters, unemployment
checks, or other public money.” (Id.).
In October 2011, the claimant reported that she was “[n]ow back off drugs” with
no suicidal ideation and that she did not want to act on the voices she heard. (Exhibit
15F at 13).
In January 2012, the claimant told a provider at Grady that her
depressive/bipolar symptoms were stable on medication. (Exhibit 21F at 1). She
reported that she had last used cocaine “2-3 months ago” and last used alcohol
“yesterday.” (Id.). In May 2012, the claimant presented to Grady Behavioral Health
with a chief complaint of needing to go back on her medication. (Exhibit 21F at 5).
She said that she had discontinued her medication in November 2011. (Id.). She
reported that she had “relapsed on alcohol 2 months ago.” (Id.). She reported mood
swings, anxiety attacks, and difficulty sleeping. (Id.).
The claimant’s treating psychiatrist, Nicole Garber, M.D., completed a
questionnaire and wrote that the claimant had extreme difficulties in maintaining social
functioning but “fair” abilities to relate predictably in social situations, interact with
supervisors, demonstrate reliability, and behave in an emotionally stable manner.
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(Exhibit 6F at 8, 9). Dr. Garber wrote that the claimant had extreme deficiencies of
concentration, persistence, or pace but a “fair” ability to maintain attention and
concentration. (Id. at 8, 12). Dr. Garber opined that the level of severity of the
claimant’s limitations dated back to 2005 but acknowledged that she first examined the
claimant in July 2010. (Id. at 9, 10).
In a function report, the claimant wrote that she went to church, the library, and
a women’s meeting on a regular basis. (Exhibit 9E at 7). She indicated that she used
to read a lot but had begun having trouble staying focused. (Id.). However, she
reported being able to watch television programs and play computer games. (Id.). She
reported that she sometimes felt that other people were against her. (Exhibit 9E at 8).
In her third-party function report, Willa Henderson, the claimant’s friend and sponsor,
indicated that the claimant had no problems getting along with family, friends,
neighbors, or others. (Exhibit 5E at 9). In June 2011, the claimant told the
consultative examiner that she would “sit up all night talking” with others at the
Women’s Day Shelter. (Exhibit 13F at 3). She also told the examiner that she was
independent in all activities of daily living, including bathing, dressing daily, cooking
without causing a fire, cleaning, making the bed, and laundry. (Id.). The examiner
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noted that the claimant “[a]ppear[ed] capable” with respect to concentration and
following directions. (Id. at 4).
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary during discussion of Plaintiff’s
arguments.
III.
Standard of Review
An individual is considered to be disabled if she is unable to “engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A).
The impairment or impairments must result from anatomical,
psychological, or physiological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of such severity
that the claimant is not only unable to do her previous work but cannot, considering
age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2) and (3).
“We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine if it is supported by
substantial evidence and based upon proper legal standards.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125
F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is
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such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”
Id. at 1440.
“Even if the evidence preponderates against the
[Commissioner’s] factual findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported
by substantial evidence.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
“‘We may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment
for that of the [Commissioner].’” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th
Cir. 2004) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
“The burden is primarily on the claimant to prove that [s]he is disabled, and
therefore entitled to receive Social Security disability benefits.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245
F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)). Under the
regulations as promulgated by the Commissioner, a five step sequential procedure is
followed in order to determine whether a claimant has met the burden of proving her
disability. See Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step
one, the claimant must prove that she is not engaged in substantial gainful activity. See
id. The claimant must establish at step two that she is suffering from a severe
impairment or combination of impairments. See id. At step three, the Commissioner
will determine if the claimant has shown that her impairment or combination of
impairments meets or medically equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R.
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Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278; 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. If the claimant is able to make this showing, she will be
considered disabled without consideration of age, education, and work experience. See
id. “If the claimant cannot prove the existence of a listed impairment, [s]he must prove
at step four that [her] impairment prevents [her] from performing [her] past relevant
work.” Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. “At the fifth step, the regulations direct the
Commissioner to consider the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education,
and past work experience to determine whether the claimant can perform other work
besides [her] past relevant work.” Id. If, at any step in the sequence, a claimant can
be found disabled or not disabled, the sequential evaluation ceases and further inquiry
ends. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a).
IV.
Findings of the ALJ
The ALJ made the following findings of fact:
1.
The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through December 31, 2014.
2.
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 1, 2010,
the amended alleged onset date. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571, et seq., and 416.971,
et seq.).
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3.
The claimant has the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder;
posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”); hypertension; and hepatitis C. (20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4.
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525,
404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926).
5.
The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work, as
defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c), except is limited to
occupations requiring no more than simple, routine, repetitive tasks, not
performed in a fast-paced production environment, involving only simple,
work-related decisions, and in general, relatively few workplace changes; and
is limited to occupations which require only occasional interaction with
supervisors, coworkers, and members of the general public.
6.
The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work. (20 C.F.R. §§
404.1565 and 416.965).
7.
The claimant was born on January 3, 1957, and was 53 years old, which is
defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date.
The claimant subsequently changed age category to closely approaching
advanced age. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563 and 416.963).
8.
The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English. (20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1564 and 416.964).
9.
Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability
because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding
that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable
job skills. (See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 82-41 and 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 2).
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10.
Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can perform. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569,
404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).
11.
The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, from April 1, 2010, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
[R. at 39-45].
V.
Discussion
Plaintiff Karen Wofford argues that the ALJ’s decision denying her disability
applications should be reversed. [Doc. 10]. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ erred
because she failed to properly evaluate the opinion of treating physician Dr. Nicole
Garber, who opined that Plaintiff’s symptoms met Listings 12.04 and 12.06. [Id. at 813]. Plaintiff also contends that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s
finding that Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms lacked credibility. [Id. at 1316]. In addition, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error when she did
not obtain testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”) at the fifth step of the sequential
evaluation. [Id. at 16-18]. Plaintiff’s final argument will be addressed first.
As discussed supra, the burden is on the claimant at step four to prove that her
impairments prevent her from performing her past relevant work. See Doughty, 245
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F.3d at 1278. If the claimant is able to satisfy this requirement, the burden then shifts
to the Commissioner at step five to produce evidence showing that the claimant is able
to perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See
Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 736 (11th Cir. 1981) (“[O]nce the claimant
establishes a prima facie case by showing that her impairment prevents her from
performing her prior occupation, the burden shifts to the Secretary, who must produce
evidence to show that the claimant is able to perform alternative substantial gainful
work that exists in the national economy.”). “To meet this burden, it is incumbent on
the [Commissioner] at a minimum, to come forward with specific findings showing
that the claimant has the physical and mental capacity to perform specified jobs.” Id.
(citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
“There are two avenues by which the ALJ may determine whether a claimant
has the ability to adjust to other work in the national economy: (i) by applying the 20
C.F.R. Part 404 Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the ‘Grids’); and (ii) by the use of a
VE, an expert on the kinds of jobs an individual can perform based on [her] capacity
and impairments.” Owens v. Comm’r of Social Security, 508 Fed. Appx. 881, 883
(11th Cir. 2013) (citing Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239-40). “The grids provide tables based
on work classifications of sedentary, light, medium, heavy or very heavy. These
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classifications are based on the exertional level, or ‘primary strength activities,’ the
work requires, such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and
pulling.” Watson v. Astrue, 376 Fed. Appx. 953, 956 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing SSR 8310). “In using the grids, the ALJ inputs the claimant’s physical exertion level, skill
level, age, education, and experience into a matrix, which establishes whether the
claimant is disabled.” Vuxta v. Comm’r of Social Security, 194 Fed. Appx. 874, 878
(11th Cir. 2006). “These tables constitute ‘administrative notice’ as to the number of
unskilled jobs that exist in the national economy at the various exertional levels. Thus,
when all the claimant’s vocational factors coincide with the criteria in the table, ‘the
existence of jobs is established.’” Watson, 376 Fed. Appx. at 956 (quoting 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 § 200.00(b)). “If nonexertional impairments1 exist,
the ALJ may use the Grids as a framework to evaluate vocational factors, but must also
introduce independent evidence, preferably through VE testimony, of the existence of
jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” Owens, 508 Fed. Appx.
at 883-84 (citing, e.g., Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992)). “It
1
A nonexertional impairment is “[a]ny impairment which does not directly affect
the ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, carry, push, or pull. This includes impairments
which affect the mind, vision, hearing, speech, and use of the body to climb, balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, reach, handle, and use of the fingers for fine activities.”
SSR 83-10.
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is only when the claimant can clearly do unlimited types of [] work, . . . that it is
unnecessary to call a vocational expert to establish whether the claimant can perform
work which exists in the national economy.” Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1202
(11th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).
In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder, posttraumatic
stress disorder, hypertension, and hepatitis C are severe nonexertional impairments.
[R. at 39]. The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff’s mental impairments cause
moderate difficulties in social functioning and moderate difficulties in concentration,
persistence, or pace. [R. at 40]. In addition, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium work except that she is
“limited to occupations requiring no more than simple, routine, repetitive tasks, not
performed in a fast-paced production environment, involving only simple, workrelated decisions, and in general, relatively few workplace changes; and is limited to
occupations which require only occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,
and members of the general public.” [R. at 41]. Based on these findings, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence to carry her burden of proof at
the fourth step of the sequential evaluation because Plaintiff could not perform her past
relevant work as a general clerk. This work was semiskilled, and the RFC assessment,
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as determined by the ALJ, limits Plaintiff to unskilled work. [R. at 44]. As a result,
the burden shifted to the Commissioner at the fifth step to show that Plaintiff is able
to perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See
Cowart, 662 F.2d at 736.
The ALJ found at step five that “[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” [R. at
45]. The ALJ explained that she arrived at this conclusion by using the grids as a
framework to evaluate the vocational factors. [Id.]. Significant to the ALJ’s finding
at the fifth step was her conclusion that Plaintiff’s “additional limitations have little or
no effect on the occupational base of unskilled medium work.” [R. at 44-45]. The
ALJ wrote that a “finding of ‘not disabled’ is therefore appropriate under the
framework” of Medical-Vocational Rule 203.26 and Rule 203.19 because the
“Medical-Vocational Rules take administrative notice of the number of unskilled jobs
at the various exertional levels that exist throughout the national economy.” [R. at 45].
Although a VE was present at the administrative hearing, the ALJ did not rely on
testimony from the VE in finding that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” [Id.]. The court finds that the
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ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in reaching this conclusion and that
substantial evidence does not support her opinion.
As previously noted, the Eleventh Circuit has held that if a claimant has any
nonexertional impairments, the ALJ must introduce independent evidence, such as VE
testimony, of the existence of jobs existing in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant is able to perform. See Owens, 508 Fed. Appx. at 883-84
(citing, e.g., Marbury, 957 F.2d at 839). The ALJ in the present case found that
Plaintiff has numerous severe nonexertional impairments and that these impairments
cause difficulties and limitations in a variety of areas, such as social functioning and
pace of production. Despite the existence of nonexertional impairments, the ALJ did
not introduce VE testimony or other independent evidence of the existence of specific
jobs that Plaintiff can perform. [R. at 39-41, 45]. Instead, the ALJ relied solely on the
grids to find that Plaintiff is able to perform a number of unspecified jobs. [R. at 45].
This constituted error. “The ALJ should have elicited testimony from a vocational
expert to interpret and evaluate [Plaintiff’s] medically documented non-exertional
psychological and emotional limitations . . . .” Allen, 880 F.2d at 1202. Because the
ALJ failed to obtain testimony from a VE, substantial evidence does not support the
ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled and that her nonexertional limitations
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do not significantly erode the occupational base of unskilled medium work. See
Marbury, 957 F.2d at 839 (“An ALJ’s conclusion that a claimant’s limitations do not
significantly compromise his basic work skills or are not severe enough to preclude
him from performing a wide range of light work is not supported by substantial
evidence unless there is testimony from a vocational expert.”).
The court also notes that the Eleventh Circuit has addressed language identical
to that used by the ALJ and found it lacking. In Owens, the court wrote:
The ALJ’s next conclusion–that “the additional limitations have little or
no effect on the occupational base of unskilled medium work”–lacks
sufficient clarity to allow a reviewing court to determine that the proper
legal analysis was conducted. . . . Even if we assume that the ALJ’s
vague reference to “the additional limitations” was intended to refer to
[plaintiff’s] nonexertional limitations, there is no indication of which
nonexertional limitations the ALJ considered in making this conclusion.
Nor is there any indication of the reason or reasons why the ALJ arrived
at this conclusion.
508 Fed. Appx. at 884 (citations omitted). Like the ALJ in Owens, the ALJ in the
present case found that “the additional limitations have little or no effect on the
occupational base of unskilled medium work.” [R. at 45]. However, the ALJ did not
indicate which of Plaintiff’s limitations were considered, nor did the ALJ offer an
explanation in support of her conclusion. A reviewing court, therefore, is unable to
determine if the ALJ conducted the proper analysis in arriving at this finding.
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Furthermore, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s conclusion that
the occupational base of unskilled medium work would not be eroded by “the
additional limitations,” which the court assumes refer to Plaintiff’s nonexertional
limitations. The ALJ’s own findings and RFC assessment show that Plaintiff’s
nonexertional impairments resulted in numerous functional limitations. The ALJ
found that Plaintiff was limited to occupations requiring relatively few workplace
changes, only occasional interaction with others, work not performed in a fast-paced
production environment, and work requiring no more than routine, repetitive tasks.
Given these limitations, it is clear that Plaintiff is not able to perform a full range or
unlimited types of work at the medium exertional level.2 [R. at 41]. Substantial
evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision, and her exclusive reliance on the grids
constituted error.
In summary, the ALJ should have obtained VE testimony to interpret and
evaluate Plaintiff’s impairments rather than simply asserting, without explanation, that
2
The court also notes that the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s RFC limited her to
medium work requiring no more than simple, routine, repetitive tasks. [R. at 41, 44].
The ALJ’s “limitation to simple tasks [was] already contained within the unskilled
limitation, and is not a limitation above and beyond that classification. A limitation
to repetitive tasks, however, [was] not contained within the definition of unskilled.”
Vuxta, 194 Fed. Appx. at 878 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(a)). This is another reason
that remand is warranted in this case.
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Plaintiff’s additional limitations have little or no effect on the occupational base of
unskilled medium work. See Allen, 880 F.2d at 1202. The ALJ did not carry her
burden at step five by presenting evidence showing that there were specific jobs
existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. The
undersigned, therefore, finds that remand is required.
Plaintiff Wofford, as previously noted, offers a number of other arguments in
support of her contention that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed. [Doc. 10].
These arguments, however, need not be addressed. Upon remand, the Commissioner
must resolve the errors at the fifth step of the sequential evaluation. If another
administrative hearing is conducted, the ALJ should elicit testimony from a VE to
interpret and evaluate Plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations and the effect they have on
the occupational base. Any hypothetical questions posed to a VE must accurately and
comprehensively describe Plaintiff’s impairments. See Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d
1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1985). Because the further proceedings that are necessary upon
remand could impact other aspects of the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s claims, the
court finds it unnecessary to review Plaintiff’s remaining arguments. See Demenech
v. Secretary of the Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 913 F.2d 882, 884 (11th Cir.
1990) (per curiam) (concluding that most of plaintiff’s arguments did not need to be
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addressed because remand was warranted on a significant issue); Jackson v. Bowen,
801 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (finding that it was unnecessary
to address most of the issues raised by the plaintiff because they were likely to be
reconsidered on remand); Shaffer v. Comm’r of Social Security, 2015 WL 5604768,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. September 23, 2015) (“Because remand is required on the first issue
in this case, it is unnecessary to review Plaintiff’s second argument.”); Walker v.
Astrue, 2013 WL 5354213, at *19 n.22 (N.D. Ga. September 24, 2013) (“Because it
is recommended that this case be remanded for further proceedings that could impact
the ALJ’s assessment of claimant and Shaw’s credibility, her RFC, and her ability to
perform other work in the national economy, the Court need not address the remaining
issues raised by the claimant.”); Hall v. Astrue, 2012 WL 2499177, at *4 n.8 (N.D.
Ala. June 22, 2012) (“Because remand is warranted on these grounds, the court need
not consider claimant’s other arguments.”).
VI.
Conclusion
Based on the forgoing reasons and cited authority, the court concludes that the
decision of the ALJ was not supported by substantial evidence and was the result of
a failure to apply the proper legal standards. It is, therefore, ORDERED that the
Commissioner’s decision be REVERSED and that this action be REMANDED
21
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings in accordance
with the above discussion. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of
Plaintiff.3
SO ORDERED, this 6th day of September, 2016.
3
Although Plaintiff had been represented by attorney Jaya Ann Shurtliff, the
court granted Ms. Shurtliff’s motion to withdraw as counsel on July 28, 2016. [Docs.
13, 14].
22
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
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