Blue v. Lopez
Filing
40
ORDER granting 32 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 4/7/2017. (bdb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
JOHN DANIEL BLUE,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARIA DEGUADALUPE
LOPEZ,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:15-CV-01834-RWS
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [32]. After a review of the briefs and the record, the Court enters the
following Order.
Background
This dispute arises out of an altercation between Plaintiff John Daniel
Blue (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Maria Deguadalupe Lopez (“Defendant”).
Plaintiff is a citizen of Georgia and Defendant is a child protective services
caseworker employed by the Gwinnett County offices of the Georgia
Department of Human Services, Division of Family and Children’s Services
(“DFCS”). (Compl., Dkt. [1] ¶¶ 5-6.) On June 12, 2014, Defendant visited
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Plaintiff’s home to meet with Plaintiff’s girlfriend, Zstanya Patrick (“Patrick”),
about a complaint from the police department regarding domestic violence
occurring in the home. (Def.’s Statement of Mat. Facts (“Def.’s SMF”), Dkt.
[32-1] ¶¶ 33, 46.) As Defendant and Patrick were talking, Plaintiff arrived at
the apartment. (Id. ¶ 52.) Plaintiff believed that Defendant was a “drug addict”
friend of Patrick’s. (Id. ¶ 56.)
After speaking with Patrick, Defendant became concerned about the lack
of a specific plan to remove Plaintiff’s and Patrick’s two children from the
domestic violence occurring in the home. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 67.) Defendant went to
her car to call her supervisor, who instructed Defendant to call the Juvenile
Court and advise it of the situation. (Id. ¶¶ 66, 68-69.) An intake officer at the
court informed Defendant that the Juvenile Court judge had granted
Authorizations for protective custody, which allowed DFCS to take custody of
the children. (Id. ¶¶ 72-74.)
While Defendant was in her car, Plaintiff decided to take the children out
of the apartment. (Id. ¶¶ 78-80.) Plaintiff and his children got into a van,
which was parked in a parking space in front of Defendant’s vehicle. (Id. ¶¶
86, 91.) The vehicles were separated by a lane for travel, with the front of
Defendant’s vehicle facing the rear of Plaintiff’s vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 88-89.)
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Defendant claims that she did not want the children to leave with Plaintiff
because DFCS had custody of them. (Id. ¶ 94.) Plaintiff claims that as he was
getting ready to back out of the parking space, Defendant approached his van,
beat the driver’s side window, and told him he couldn’t leave with the children.
(Id. ¶¶ 93, 95.) Plaintiff told her “no” and put the van in reverse. (Id. ¶ 96.)
What happened next is disputed. According to Plaintiff, Defendant ran
to her car, pulled up behind Plaintiff’s van, and deliberately drove her car into
the back of Plaintiff’s van while he was backing out. (Pl.’s Statement of Mat.
Facts (“Pl.’s SMF”)., Dkt. [36-3] ¶ 1.) Plaintiff contends that he got out of his
van and asked Defendant to move her vehicle, but she did not respond. (Def.’s
SMF, Dkt. [32-1] ¶¶ 104-108.) Plaintiff states that he got back in his van and
began pulling it backwards and forwards until he was able to leave the parking
space. (Id. ¶¶ 112-113.) Notably, Plaintiff contends that he made no contact
with Defendant’s vehicle. (Id. ¶ 114.) Defendant, on the other hand, contends
that Plaintiff pushed her vehicle with his van until he had pushed her out of the
way and was able to maneuver the van out of the parking space. (Def.’s Br. in
Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Br.”), Dkt. [32-2] at 7.)
When the police were discussing the incident with Defendant at the
police department, they asked Defendant if she wanted to press charges against
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Plaintiff. (Def.’s SMF, Dkt. [32-1] ¶ 138.) Defendant was instructed by her
DFCS supervisor to say “yes.” (Id. ¶ 141.) On August 27, 2014, a Bill of
Indictment was issued against Plaintiff on the charge of aggravated assault for
striking Defendant’s vehicle with his own. (Id. ¶ 200-01.) A trial was held on
January 13-14, 2015, in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County on the sole
charge of aggravated assault. (Id. ¶ 202.) At the close of evidence, Plaintiff,
through his attorney, moved for a directed verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. (Id. ¶
203.) The trial judge denied the motion, finding that “a rational trier of fact
could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id.
¶ 204.) On January 14, 2015, Plaintiff was acquitted of aggravated assault.
(Id. ¶ 205.)
On May 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for unreasonable seizure of
a person under the Fourth Amendment, malicious prosecution under the Fourth
Amendment, and interference with right of familial association under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court previously dismissed all claims
except for one: malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
(See March 9, 2016 Order, Dkt. [18].) Defendant now moves for summary
judgment on that claim.
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Discussion
I.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “The moving
party bears ‘the initial responsibility of informing the . . . court of the basis for
its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.
2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal
quotations omitted)). Where the moving party makes such a showing, the
burden shifts to the non-movant, who must go beyond the pleadings and
present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does
exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at
248. A fact is not material if a dispute over that fact will not affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law. Id. An issue is genuine when the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
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Id. at 249-250. In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must
view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296
(11th Cir. 2002).
The court is bound only to draw those inferences that are reasonable.
“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Allen v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). “If the evidence
is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may
be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted); see
also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (holding that once the moving party has met
its burden under Rule 56(a), the non-moving party “must do more than simply
show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”).
II.
Analysis
The Eleventh Circuit has “unequivocally [] identified malicious
prosecution to be a constitutional tort that is cognizable under § 1983.” Uboh
v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (11th Cir. 1998). “To establish a federal
malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove a violation
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of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures in
addition to the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution.”
Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2015). In Georgia, the elements
of a common law tort for malicious prosecution are: “(1) a criminal prosecution
instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and without
probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4)
caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” Brown v. GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc., 770
S.E.2d 56, 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
“Whether probable cause existed for a plaintiff’s prosecution is the
gravamen of a malicious prosecution claim.” Pombert v. Glock, Inc., 171 F.
Supp. 3d 1321, 1329-30 (N.D. Ga. 2016). Defendant argues that the probable
cause element is dispositive in this case because of the trial judge’s denial of
Plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. (Def.’s Br., Dkt. [32-2] at
13-17.) Indeed, in Monroe v. Sigler, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that
the denial of such a motion “constitute[s] a binding determination of the
existence of probable cause[.]” 353 S.E.2d 23, 25 (1987); see also Haile v.
Pittman, 389 S.E.2d 564, 567 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (“[W]hen a trial judge rules
that the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction . . . the
existence of probable cause has been established . . . as to preclude [an] action
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for malicious prosecution.”) Plaintiff acknowledges the rule in Monroe, but
urges the Court not to follow it, arguing that the denial of a motion for directed
verdict in a criminal case is not the same as a binding determination of
probable cause in a civil case. (Pl.’s Br. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.
(“Pl.’s Brief”), Dkt. [36] at 15-17.) Plaintiff contends that: (1) the denial of a
directed verdict in a criminal case means there are facts from which a jury
could find guilt or innocence, and thus a jury could find either the existence or
non-existence of probable cause; (2) upon a motion for a directed verdict in a
criminal case, evidence is interpreted in the prosecution’s favor, whereas in the
summary judgment stage of a civil case evidence is viewed in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party; and (3) the elements of federal collateral
estoppel cannot be met because the issue of probable cause is not “distinctly
put into issue” and “actually and necessarily determined” in a ruling on a
motion for directed verdict. (Pl.’s Brief, Dkt. [36] at 15-17.)
The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments unpersuasive because the facts of
Plaintiff’s case are not distinct from those in Monroe. The same issues that
Plaintiff raises were present when the Supreme Court of Georgia decided that
the denial of a motion for directed verdict in a criminal case is sufficient to
establish probable cause in a civil case for malicious prosecution. See Monroe,
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353 S.E.2d at 25; see also Morgan v. City of Valdosta, No. 7:11-CV-177 (HL),
2013 WL 3339047 at *7 (M.D. Ga. July 2, 2013) (rejecting an argument similar
to the one Plaintiff makes that differing standards of review in criminal and
civil cases foreclose the rule announced in Monroe). Thus, the Court declines
to depart from Monroe.
Applying Monroe here, Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law. At the
close of evidence at Plaintiff’s criminal trial, Plaintiff, through his attorney,
moved for a directed verdict of acquittal. (Def.’s SMF, Dkt. [32-1] ¶ 203.)
That motion was denied, with the trial court judge finding that “a rational trier
of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Id. ¶ 204.) Thus, under Monroe, Plaintiff is foreclosed from arguing a
lack of probable cause in this case and his claim must fail. Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [32] is GRANTED.
Conclusion
As discussed above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [32] is
GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case.
SO ORDERED, this 7th day of April, 2017.
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________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge
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