Croland v. City of Atlanta et al
Filing
107
ORDER denying 87 and 89 Motions for Summary Judgment. The Parties shall file a proposed consolidated pretrial order within 30 days of the entry of this Order. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 01/03/2019. (rsg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
CAROLINE CROLAND,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEPHENSON CAMILLE,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:15-CV-3303-RWS
ORDER
This is a civil rights case. It arises from Plaintiff Caroline Croland’s
arrest by Defendant Stephenson Camille—a police officer with the City of
Atlanta (“City”)—on June 1, 2014, while Ms. Croland was volunteering for an
organization that provides food to the homeless in Woodruff Park. Ms.
Croland was cited for violating a City ordinance that makes it unlawful to
attempt to incite a riot. According to Ms. Croland, she was arrested without
probable cause and in retaliation for a previous incident when Ms. Croland
filmed Officer Camille as he detained and searched an unknown man. Ms.
Croland sues Officer Camille under federal law for violations of her First and
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Fourth Amendment rights and for related claims under Georgia law. The case
comes before the Court now on Officer Camille’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [87] and Ms. Croland’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment [89].
After reviewing the record, the Court enters the following Order.
Background
Ms. Croland volunteers her time to two organizations. (Pl.’s SOF, Dkt.
[89-1] ¶ 1.) First, she is a long-standing member of the group “Food Not
Bombs,” which serves homeless people by preparing and distributing meals to
them. (Id.) As a Food Not Bombs volunteer, Ms. Croland prepared and
distributed meals to homeless men and women in Woodruff Park on most
Sunday afternoons. Ms. Croland is also an active member of Cop Watch of
East Atlanta (“Cop Watch”), which is a watchdog group focused on increasing
police accountability and preventing police brutality by filming police officers
in public. (Id.)
On May 15, 2014, Ms. Croland and other Cop Watch volunteers
witnessed Officer Camille as he and another City police officer detained three
African-American men in Woodruff Park. (Pl.’s Resp. To Def.’s SOF, Dkt.
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[99] ¶ 25.)1 Ms. Croland filmed Officer Camille as he detained and searched
one of those men. (Id.)
A week later, on June 1, 2014, Officer Camille returned to Woodruff
Park where Food Not Bombs volunteers were distributing meals to the
homeless. (Pl.’s SOF, Dkt. [89-1] ¶ 3.) For over an hour, Officer Camille
patrolled the park. (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s SOF, Dkt. [100-1] ¶ 4.) Much of
Officer Camille’s activity during that time was captured on videos submitted
into evidence. (Pre-Arrest Video, Dkt. [87-4]; Arrest Video, Dkt. [87-5];
Video attached to Aff. of Vincent Castillenti (“Castillenti Video”), Dkt. [85-1];
see also Mclean Video, Dkt. [87-6].) Those videos show the following:
Officer Camille stationed himself by the Woodruff Park pavilion, near a
table that the Food Not Bombs volunteers had set up to assemble and distribute
meals. (Pre-Arrest Video, Dkt. [87-4] at 00:28.) He repeatedly took a list of
radio codes, City ordinances, and state laws from his pocket, studied it, and
then returned it to his pocket. (Id. at 2:10–3:15; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s SOF, Dkt.
[100-1] ¶ 4.) A volunteer then asked Officer Camille to leave the park because
1
The parties disagree on whether the officers detained one or three men on
May 15. However construed, this fact is not material to the Court’s analysis.
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there was no apparent reason for his presence and he was making those
gathered for the meal feel “nervous” and “unsafe.” (Pre-Arrest Video, Dkt.
[87-4] at 3:15–5:40.) Officer Camille responded that he chose not to leave
because he was in a public park. (Id. at 3:15–4:08, 4:54–4:58.) Rather than
patrolling elsewhere, Officer Camille positioned himself closer to the Food Not
Bombs table. (Id. at 4:27–4:45.) There, he propped himself against a post and
tried largely to ignore persistent and sometimes insulting comments from
volunteers, which went on for approximately 8 minutes. (Id. at 4:45,
5:00–13:05.) At one point, Officer Camille idly looked at his phone, and at
another he offered his badge number. (Id. at 7:40–8:50, 11:50–12:00.)
Office Camille then moved away from the volunteers, but he remained in
the vicinity of the Food Not Bombs table. (Id. at 13:05–26:22.) In all, Officer
Camille surveilled the area for well over an hour. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. [87-1] ¶ 6;
Pl.’s SOF, Dkt. [89-1] ¶ 4.) During this time, several park ambassadors were in
Woodruff Park and raised no concerns about the volunteers’ actions or any
other activities in the park. (Pl.’s SOF, Dkt. [89-1] ¶ 5.)
Around 4:30 p.m., Ms. Croland, standing near Officer Camille, began
expressing that she was “so angry” that they were unable to share a meal with
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people on Sunday “without state harassment.” (Arrest Video, Dkt. [87-5] at
00:08–00:33; Def.’s SOF, Dkt. [87-1] ¶ 16.) Officer Camille turned his back to
Ms. Croland, and as he began walking away, Ms. Croland repeatedly asked
him, “Why?” in an increasingly louder tone. (Arrest Video, Dkt. [87-5] at
00:30–00:37.) Ms. Croland then shouted, “Answer me!” (Id. at 00:38.)
At that point, Officer Camille immediately turned around, approached
Ms. Croland, and arrested her.2 (Id. at 00:38–1:11.) He told Ms. Croland that
she was being arrested for “disorderly conduct in the park.” (Id. at 00:49.)
Officer Camille charged Ms. Croland with violating City Ordinance § 106-81,
which makes it unlawful to cause, provoke, or engage in a fight or riotous
conduct. (Dkt. [87-10]; Dkt. [87-12] at 2.) Ms. Croland was later transported
to the Atlanta City Detention Center and held over night before being released
2
According to Officer Camille, he saw Ms. Croland “ball up her fists while
yelling . . . .” (Camille Aff., Dkt. [87-3] ¶ 10.) Ms. Croland, however, says that she
“absolutely did not ball up [her] fist.” (Croland Aff., Dkt. 87-8 ¶ 19; see also Pl.’s
Resp. to Def.’s SOF, Dkt. [99] ¶ 20.) The video evidence does not show Ms. Croland
before the arrest. The Court notes, however, that Officer Camille appears to have his
back to Ms. Croland while she is yelling, so it is unlikely that even if her fists were
balled Officer Camille would have seen them. Nevertheless, based on the record
before the Court, the Court cannot say that this fact is undisputed. As a result, in the
Court’s analysis, it will be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.
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on bond. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. [87-1] ¶ 24.)
Discussion
In her Amended Complaint [22], Ms. Croland sets forth three counts
against Officer Camille: violation of her First and Fourth Amendment rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I and II); and battery, false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under Georgia state law (Count III).3
Officer Camille moves for summary judgment on all three counts. Plaintiff
moves for summary judgment only as to her claims under § 1983. The Court
sets out the applicable legal standard before considering the parties’ motions on
the merits.
I.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “The moving
party bears ‘the initial responsibility of informing the . . . court of the basis for
its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,
3
Counts I and II were initially alleged against the City as well. However, on May 29,
2018, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the City as a defendant from the case, (Dkt. [83),
and the Court entered an order to that effect shortly thereafter, (Dkt. [84]).
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answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.’” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.
2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Where the
moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who
must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a
genuine issue of material fact does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at
248. A fact is not material if a dispute over that fact will not affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law. Id. An issue is genuine when the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Id. at 249-50.
Finally, in resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must
view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296
(11th Cir. 2002). But, the court is bound only to draw those inferences that are
reasonable. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier
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of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”
Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal citations
omitted); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (once the moving party has met
its burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party “must do more than simply
show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).
II.
Section 1983 Claims
Ms. Croland asserts claims against Officer Camille under § 1983 for
violating her Fourth and First Amendment rights. Section 1983 says:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to prevail on a claim under § 1983, then, a plaintiff
must show two things: “(1) that the act or omission deprived plaintiff of a right,
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privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and (2) that the act or omission was done by a person acting under color of
law.” Marshall Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171,
1174 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Bannum, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 901
F.2d 989, 996-97 (11th Cir. 1990)). Officer Camille does not dispute that he
was acting under color of state law, so the Court’s focus is solely on whether
Officer Camille’s conduct violated Ms. Croland’s constitutional rights.
Ms. Croland alleges that Officer Camille deprived her of her rights under
the First and Fourth Amendments. Officer Camille, however, argues that Ms.
Croland cannot prevail on her claims as a matter of law because they are barred
by qualified immunity.
A.
Qualified Immunity Standard
“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for individual public
officials performing discretionary functions ‘insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Sherrod v. Johnson, 667 F.3d 1359,
1363 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). To claim qualified immunity, a defendant must first show he was
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performing a discretionary function. Moreno v. Turner, 572 F. App’x 852, 855
(11th Cir. 2014). “Once discretionary authority is established, the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity should not apply.
Edwards v. Shanley, 666 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lewis v.
City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff
demonstrates that qualified immunity does not apply by showing: “(1) the
defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation.” Moreno, 572 F. App’x at 855.
Ms. Croland does not dispute that Officer Camille’s actions were
discretionary, so the burden shifts to Ms. Croland to show that Officer Camille
is not entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, there are two remaining inquiries:
whether the undisputed facts show a violation of Ms. Croland’s constitutional
rights and, if so, whether those rights were clearly established at the time in
question.
The Court previously grappled with these questions at the motion to
dismiss stage. And now, after the benefit of discovery–and particularly the
introduction of the video exhibits–the Court finds that the undisputed evidence
supports several allegations in the Amended Complaint critical to the Court’s
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denial of Officer Camille’s prior invocation of the qualified immunity defense.
(See Order, Dkt. [53] at 24–25.) But that evidence also casts doubt upon other
allegations. And so, the Court is unable to say, at this time, whether Officer
Camille is or is not entitled to qualified immunity.
B.
Constitutional Violation
Ms. Croland argues Officer Camille violated her rights under the Fourth
Amendment by arresting her without probable cause, and her rights under the
First Amendment by arresting her for lawfully protesting police activity.
A warrantless arrest in a public place violates the Fourth Amendment if
there was no probable cause to arrest the suspect for a crime. Jones v. Brown,
649 F. App’x 889, 890 (11th Cir. 2016). It is similarly a violation of the First
Amendment to arrest someone in retaliation for her protected speech. Hartman
v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261 (2006). But the converse of these principles is
also true: “the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest is an absolute
bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge to the arrest.” Brown v. City of
Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Redd v. City of
Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Because we hold that the
officers had arguable probable cause to arrest [the plaintiff] for disorderly
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conduct, we must hold that the [defendant] officers are also entitled to qualified
immunity from the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.”).
“Probable cause to arrest exists when law enforcement officials have
facts and circumstances within their knowledge sufficient to warrant a
reasonable belief that the suspect had committed or was committing a crime.”
Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007). Yet, “[t]o
receive qualified immunity, an officer need not have actual probable cause, but
only ‘arguable’ probable cause.” Brown, 608 F.3d at 734. Under that standard,
Officer Camille is shielded from liability if “reasonable officers in the same
circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as [Officer Camille] could
have believed that probable cause existed to arrest [Ms. Croland].” Id.
(quoting Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Importantly though, whether an officer faced with a particular set of facts
possesses probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest someone for a
crime depends on the elements of that particular offense. See Crosby v.
Monroe Cty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004). And here, Officer Camille
arrested Ms. Croland for violating Atlanta City Code § 106-81, a disorderly
conduct ordinance. Under the relevant part of that ordinance, a person engages
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in disorderly conduct if two elements are present: they must “[1] [c]ause,
provoke or engage in any fight, brawl or riotous conduct [2] so as to endanger
the life, limb, health or property of another.”4 (Dkt. [87-12] at 2.)
As to the first element, it is undisputed that there was no fight or brawl,
so Ms. Croland could not have caused, provoked, or engaged in either of them.
Nor is there any evidence to suggest that Ms. Croland’s actions caused or
provoked others to take part in riotous conduct. Thus, the Court must ask
whether it was reasonable for Officer Camille to believe that Ms. Croland,
herself, engaged in or was about to engage in riotous conduct or that her
conduct would provoke others to do so. The ordinance does not define “riotous
conduct,” and neither is there much authority specifically addressing Atlanta
City Code § 106-81(3). However, under O.C.G.A § 16-11-31, a person may be
found guilty of inciting a riot by: “(1) engaging in conduct which urges,
counsels, or advises others to riot; (2) with intent to riot; and (3) at a time and
place and under circumstances which produce a clear and present danger of a
riot.” Powell v. State, 462 S.E.2d 447, 448 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). A riot occurs
4
There is, in fact, a third element–that is, the person must engage in the
proscribed conduct while “within the corporate limits of the city.” But of course,
here, it is undisputed that Ms. Croland was in the City when she was arrested.
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when “two or more persons” commit “an unlawful act of violence or any other
act in a violent and tumultuous manner . . . .” Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-1130(a)).5
Here, the evidence before the Court shows that Ms. Croland said that
she was “so angry” that the volunteers were unable to distribute meals “without
state harassment;” that she repeatedly asked Officer Camille, “Why?”; and that
she shouted at Officer Camille from a considerable distance, “Answer me!”
Other than that, it does not appear that Officer Camille had any interaction with
Ms. Croland at all. Taking these facts in isolation, no reasonable officer in
Officer Camille’s position could have believed that probable cause existed to
arrest Ms. Croland. However, whether an arrest is objectively reasonable turns,
not only on the facts immediately preceding arrest, but on the totality of the
circumstances. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998).
5
The Court further notes that City Ordinance § 106-81 references O.C.G.A.
§ 16-11-30. And at any rate, even if Officer Camille lacked arguable probable cause
to arrest Ms. Croland under the ordinance, Officer Camille is still entitled to qualified
immunity if he “had probable cause to arrest [Ms. Croland] for any offense.”
Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1089 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Bailey v. Bd. of
Cty. Comm’rs of Alachua Cty., 956 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.4 (11th Cir.1992) (“The
validity of an arrest does not turn on the offense announced by the officer at the time
of the arrest.”)).
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Before arresting Ms. Croland, Officer Camille patrolled Woodruff Park
for well over an hour. During that time, he was confronted by Cop Watch
volunteers, with whom Ms. Croland was associated. Those volunteers were
persistent and sometimes insulting to Officer Camille. And although their
comments were not particularly threatening, they certainly conveyed that
Officer Camille was not welcome in the park and they wanted him to leave.
When Officer Camille arrested Ms. Croland, she was not alone. Instead,
she was accompanied by the Cop Watch volunteers who previously expressed
hostility toward Officer Camille’s presence in the park. One of those
volunteers encouraged Ms. Croland to “start a chant” so that people could
understand that Officer Camille “is a piece of shit.” Ms. Croland then shouted
at Officer Camille as described above. And, according to Officer Camille,
while doing so, Ms. Croland exhibited aggressive behavior by balling her
hands into fists.
Under these facts, a reasonable officer in Officer Camille’s position
could have believed that Ms. Croland’s behavior was likely to encourage others
in the park to engage in tumultuous conduct or even violence (in other words,
to riot). Powell, 462 S.E.2d at 448. A reasonable officer in such
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circumstances–i.e., outnumbered with no evidence to suggest that other officers
were nearby–could also believe that if such conduct were to occur, it would be
a threat to his or others’ “life, limb, health or property,” especially given that in
his affidavit, Officer Camille says that he feared for his safety and that of
others. (Aff. of Officer Camille, Dkt. [87-3] ¶ 11.) Accordingly, if these facts
were undisputed, they would at least arguably satisfy both elements of the
City’s disorderly conduct ordinance.
However, the facts are not undisputed. Specifically, there are three
issues of material fact that preclude the Court from finding that Officer Camille
is entitled to qualified immunity. First, the parties dispute whether Ms.
Croland actually balled her fists and if so, whether Officer Camille saw her do
it. Second, there is a question of fact as to whether Officer Camille heard all of
the comments made prior to Ms. Croland’s arrest. And third, the parties
disagree on the general demeanor of those in the park that day: while Ms.
Croland paints a picture of people “casually playing drums, talking, and
waiting on a Sunday meal,” (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s MSJ, Dkt. [98] at 7), the
tenor of the videos is much more contentious, and according to Officer
Camille, Ms. Croland shouted at him in front of at least four Copwatch and
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Food Not Bombs members, causing him to fear for his safety and the safety of
others, (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s MSJ, Dkt. [100] at 13–14).
“When conducting a qualified immunity analysis, district courts must
take the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury.”
Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005). In doing so, the
Court finds that there are questions of material fact as to whether a reasonable
officer could have believed that Ms. Croland engaged in disorderly conduct.
Accordingly, Officer Camille is not entitled to qualified immunity at the
summary judgment phase. See Wilkerson v. Seymour, No.
1:11-CV-4426-MHS, 2012 WL 12892433, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2012)
(finding an issue of material fact as to whether arguable probable cause existed
for officer to arrest plaintiff under a county ordinance that made it unlawful “[l]
to act in a loud and boisterous, reckless, unruly or violent manner [2] for the
purpose of insulting, degrading, or inciting another or a group of individuals
[3] in a public place” because, on the one hand, the officer testified that the
plaintiff’s “loud and boisterous behavior was attracting the attention of others,”
which caused the officer “to be concerned for his safety,” but on the other
hand, the plaintiff testified that there was no one else in the area when she was
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arrested”), aff’d in part, rev’d on other grounds, 736 F.3d 974 (11th Cir. 2013).
Nor, for that same reason, is Ms. Croland entitled to summary judgment on her
§ 1983 claims. Accordingly, both parties’ motions are DENIED as to Counts I
and II.
II.
State Law Claims
Officer Camille argues he is entitled to official immunity from Ms.
Croland’s state law claims. Under Georgia law, state and local officials may be
liable for their discretionary acts only “if they act with actual malice or with
actual intent to cause injury.” See GA. CONST. art. I, § II, ¶ IX(d); Gilbert v.
Richardson, 452 S.E.2d 476, 483 (Ga. 1994). Making arrests falls within the
discretionary function of law enforcement officers for purposes of official
immunity. See Richardson v. Quitman Cty., 912 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1381 (M.D.
Ga. 2012) (citing Selvy v. Morrison, 665 S.E.2d 401, 404 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)).
Because Officer Camille was acting within his discretionary function when he
arrested Ms. Croland, Ms. Croland must show that Officer Camille acted with
actual malice or actual intent to cause injury in order to overcome official
immunity. “[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice means a
deliberate intention to do a wrongful act.” Adams v. Hazelwood, 520 S.E.2d
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896, 898 (Ga. 1999).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Croland, there is
evidence from which a jury could conclude that Officer Camille acted with
actual malice when he made the arrest. One week after Ms. Croland filmed
Officer Camille as he detained and searched an African American man, Officer
Camille returned to Woodruff Park. While there, he stayed in the vicinity of
the Food Not Bombs volunteers for a prolonged period of time before arresting
Ms. Croland. And above, the Court explained that a reasonable jury could find
under Ms. Croland’s version of the facts, that Officer Camille had no reason to
believe that Ms. Croland violated the law. A jury could, therefore, find that
Officer Camille stayed in the park and ultimately arrested Ms. Croland to
retaliate against her or the other volunteers for filming him, and that he lacked
the prerequisites for doing so. This would constitute a deliberate intention to
do wrong (or, malice), thus depriving Officer Camille of official immunity.
Accordingly, Officer Camille’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as
to Ms. Croland’s state law claim.
Conclusion
For the reasons described above, Officer Camille’s Motion for Summary
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Judgment [87] is DENIED, and Ms. Croland’s Partial Motion for Summary
Judgment [89] is also DENIED. The Parties shall file a proposed consolidated
pretrial order within 30 days of the entry of this Order.
SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of January, 2019.
________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge
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