Bankers Life and Casualty Company v. Thornton et al
Filing
26
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff Bankers Life and Casualty Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 24 . Plaintiffs Motion is GRANTED as to Chanel V. Moores counterclaim that Plaintiff failed to pay her the proceeds of the Policy. Plaintiffs Motion is DENIED as to Ms. Moores counterclaims that Plaintiffs errors in processing the Policy caused Ms. Moore to suffer damages. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 9/28/16. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
1:15-cv-3330-WSD
DESIREE M. THORNTON,
CHANEL V. MOORE, and C&J
FINANCIAL, LLC,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Bankers Life and Casualty
Company’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Summary Judgment [24].
I.
BACKGROUND
This is in interpleader action involving a dispute among Defendants Desiree
M. Thornton, Chanel V. Moore, and C&J Financial, LLC (“C&J”) regarding the
proceeds of a Bankers Life insurance policy insuring the life of the late McRay
L. Thornton (the “Policy”). (Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts [24.2] (“PSMF”)
¶ 1). On October 15, 2015, Plaintiff deposited, into the registry of the Court,
$13,230.79, the full proceeds of the Policy. (PSMF ¶ 2). On November 20, 2015,
C&J filed a cross-claim against Ms. Thornton and Ms. Moore, asserting its claim
to the proceeds of the Policy. (PSMF ¶ 3; [9]).
On March 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed its amended interpleader complaint.
(PSMF ¶ 4; [16]). On April 25, 2016, Ms. Moore, proceeding pro se, filed her
“Complaint Against Interpleader,” which appears to assert a counterclaim. (PSMF
¶ 5; [18]). Ms. Moore alleges that, on April 9, 2015, she submitted to Plaintiff
McRay L. Thornton’s change of beneficiary form. ([18] at 2). Ms. Moore claims
Mr. Thornton sought to remove his wife, Desiree M. Thornton, as a beneficiary of
the Policy. (See id.). In a letter dated April 9, 2015, Plaintiff requested
Ms. Thornton’s signature, which Plaintiff stated was required under Louisiana’s
community property laws to change the Policy’s beneficiary. (Id. at 3).
Ms. Moore and Mr. Thornton were unable to secure Ms. Thornton’s signature.
(Id.).
On August 19, 2015, Plaintiff sent Ms. Thornton a letter stating Plaintiff was
in error, that the beneficiary change should have been accepted without
Ms. Thornton’s signature, and that Ms. Thornton was “incorrectly advised that [she
was] listed as primary beneficiary.” (Id. at 13). Ms. Moore seeks the entire
proceeds of the Policy, legal fees and costs, and payment of costs relating to
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Mr. Thornton’s funeral “incurred due to [Plaintiff’s] erroneously refusing to accept
initially, the change of beneficiary forms submitted by [Mr.] Thornton and
subsequently authorizing payment to Charbonnet-Labat-Glapion Funeral Home.”
(Id. at 3). Liberally construed, Ms. Moore appears to claim Plaintiff’s errors
caused the competing claims that led to this action, and has caused her to suffer
“undue stress.” (See id.).1
On August 3, 2016, the Court entered a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff
against Ms. Thornton. (PSMF ¶ 8; [22], [23]). On August 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed
its Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff argues that, because Ms. Moore’s
counterclaim is simply an attempt to assert an entitlement to the proceeds of the
Policy, the counterclaim is required to be dismissed as a matter of law. Ms. Moore
did not file a response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and it is
deemed unopposed. See LR 7.1(B), NDGa.
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“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The party seeking summary judgment bears the
burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact.
Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). Once the
moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that
summary judgment is inappropriate by designating specific facts showing a
genuine issue for trial. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282
(11th Cir. 1999). The nonmoving party “need not present evidence in a form
necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his
pleadings.” Id.
“At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those
facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Where the record tells two
different stories, one blatantly contradicted by the evidence, the Court is not
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required to adopt that version of the facts when ruling on summary judgment. Id.
“[C]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of
inferences from the facts are the function of the jury . . . .” Graham, 193 F.3d at
1282. “If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must
deny the motion and proceed to trial.” Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1246. The party
opposing summary judgment “‘must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
genuine issue for trial.’” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). A party is entitled
to summary judgment if “the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of
the moving party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary
verdict.” Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir.
2002) (quotations omitted).
B.
Analysis
Plaintiff argues that, because Ms. Moore’s counterclaim is simply an attempt
to assert an entitlement to the proceeds of the Policy, the counterclaim is required
to be dismissed as a matter of law. Courts have held that where a claim arises out
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of an insurer’s refusal to pay proceeds, such claims are not “truly independent” of
an interpleader action and should be dismissed. See Kowalski v. Jackson Nat. Life
Ins. Co., No. 12-60597-CIV, 2013 WL 3308332, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 1, 2013);
Graziosi v. MetLife Investors USA Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-80 (CAR), 2013 WL
592394, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 14, 2013) (granting summary judgment to defendant
insurer where plaintiff’s breach of contract and bad faith claims arose out of
defendant’s failure to pay policy proceeds); Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co. v. Shah,
No. CV411-008, 2012 WL 3777135, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2012) (holding
claims for breach of contract and bad faith were not “truly independent” of
interpleader and stakeholder should therefore be dismissed); see also
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hovis, 553 F.3d 258, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2009)
(concluding claimant’s claim was not independent of interpleader and opining that
had the insurer “immediately paid [claimant] the proceeds of [the life insurance
policy, the claimant] would not have brought an action against [the insurer] based
on any of the causes of action”). However, interpleader protects “only from the
prospect of multiple litigation and does not automatically immunize a stakeholder
from liability.” Kowalski, 2013 WL 3308332, at *5 (brackets omitted) (quoting
Graziosi, 2013 WL 592394, at *4). Thus, a stakeholder may be liable “for
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diminishing the value of the interpleaded stake simply because of the presence of
an unrelated dispute as to who is its rightful owner” or “liable for its investigation
of ownership of the stake, at least where defects in its investigation can plausibly
be blamed for the existence of the underlying ownership controversy.” Id.
(quoting Hovis, 553 F.3d at 265-66).
Here, Ms. Moore’s counterclaims appear to assert (1) that Plaintiff failed to
pay her the proceeds of the Policy and (2) that Plaintiff’s errors caused this action,
resulted in Ms. Moore suffering “undue stress,” and caused Ms. Moore to incur
certain costs relating to Mr. Thornton’s funeral. (See [18] at 3). Ms. Moore’s first
counterclaim is not truly independent of the interpleader, because it simply
involves an allegation that Plaintiff failed to pay her the proceeds of the Policy.
See Shah, 2012 WL 3777135, at *5 (quoting Hovis, 553 F.3d at 262). The first
counterclaim is therefore dismissed. Ms. Moore’s second counterclaim, however,
asserts that Plaintiff’s errors in processing Mr. Thornton’s change of beneficiary
form caused Ms. Moore to suffer damages. It also appears Plaintiff’s errors can
plausibly be blamed for the existence of the underlying ownership controversy,
because Plaintiff’s errors led it to incorrectly advise Ms. Thornton that she was the
primary beneficiary of the Policy. (See [18] at 3, 13). Because Ms. Moore’s
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second counterclaim is not truly independent of the interpleader, Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment is denied with respect to this counterclaim.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Bankers Life and Casualty
Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment [24] is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED as to Chanel V. Moore’s
counterclaim that Plaintiff failed to pay her the proceeds of the Policy. Plaintiff’s
Motion is DENIED as to Ms. Moore’s counterclaims that Plaintiff’s errors in
processing the Policy caused Ms. Moore to suffer damages.
SO ORDERED this 28th day of September, 2016.
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