John Hancock Life Insurance Company (USA) v. Andrews

Filing 39

OPINION AND ORDER denying 31 and 36 Motions to Compel Discovery. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 12/17/2015. (anc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
JOHN HANCOCK LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY (USA),
Plaintiff,
v.

1:15-cv-3715-WSD

WILLIAM ANDREWS and
GLADYS ANDREWS,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant William Andrews and
Defendant Gladys Andrews (together, “Defendants”) Motion to Compel Discovery
[31] (the “Motion”) and Second Motion to Compel Discovery [36].
I.

BACKGROUND
On October 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed its Complaint [1] against Defendant

William Andrews. On November 6, 2015, Plaintiff John Hancock Life Insurance
Company’s (“Plaintiff”) filed its Amended Complaint [11] against Defendants.
Plaintiff asserts that it “inadvertently sent [Mr.] Andrews a check (“Check”) in the
amount of $188,490.00, which [Mr. Andrews] had not earned and which he had no
right to receive or retain” (the “Funds”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 11). Mr. Andrews

negotiated the Check to Mrs. Andrews, who deposited it in an account she
controlled. (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff discovered its mistake, and sought the return of the
Funds. (Id. ¶¶ 14-17). Mr. Andrews did not comply with these demands, and
Plaintiff initiated this action.
On November 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed its Amended Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order [14] (“Amended TRO Motion”), requesting that the Court issue
temporary injunctive relief against Mr. Andrews and Mrs. Andrews preventing
them from spending or otherwise disposing of the Funds. (Am. TRO Mot. at 5).
On November 9, 2015, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s TRO Motion
and Amended TRO Motion. At that hearing, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had
not presented evidence sufficient to warrant the imposition of a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”). The Court declined, under the circumstances, to issue a
TRO, but ordered the parties to engage in expedited discovery, allowing Plaintiff
to seek a preliminary injunction if the facts developed supported that it was entitled
to injunctive relief. (See November 10, 2015, Order by Docket Entry).
On November 13, 2015, the Court entered its Expedited Discovery
Scheduling Order [17] (the “Scheduling Order”). The Scheduling Order required
that Defendants serve their discovery requests on Plaintiff “[o]n or before

2

November 24, 2015.” (Scheduling Order ¶ 2). 1 Defendants did not serve their
discovery requests until December 2, 2015, eight (8) days after the deadline set by
the Court. (Mot. at 21-2).
On December 7, 2015, the Court held a telephonic hearing on Plaintiff’s
Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction [25]. The Court, based on the
evidence submitted with the Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction and the
Court’s discussion with counsel for the parties at the December 7, 2015, telephonic
hearing, entered a TRO against Defendants. (December 8, 2015, Order at 10). The
Court scheduled a hearing on Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Preliminary
Injunction for December 22, 2015. (Id.).
At the December 7, 2015, telephonic hearing, Plaintiff asked the Court if it
was required to respond to Defendants’ untimely discovery requests. The Court
stated that Plaintiff was not required to respond, but allowed Defendants to file a
motion to show good cause why Defendants should be excused from the Court’s
Scheduling Order.
On December 9, 2015, Defendants filed their Motion to Compel Discovery.
Defendants do not present any argument that good cause exists to excuse their
failure to comply with the Court’s Scheduling Order. Defendants instead assert
1

The deadlines set in the Scheduling Order were proposed by the parties.
(See [16]).
3

that the discovery schedule “does not include an expiration date.” (Mot. at 1).
Defendants assert also that they need the requested discovery to support their claim
that Mr. Andrews was advised by someone employed by Plaintiff that he was
entitled to the Funds, and will be prejudiced if they are unable to adequately
respond to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and. (Id. at 2).
II.

DISCUSSION
Under Rule 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a scheduling

order regarding discovery “may be modified only for good cause and with the
judge’s consent.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Good cause is shown if the party
seeking an extension demonstrates that the schedule could not be met despite the
party’s diligence. See Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d
1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court is not obligated to extend the
discovery deadline, and may “hold litigants to the clear terms of the scheduling
order.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1307
(11th Cir. 2011).
Defendants’ assertion that the discovery schedule “does not include an
expiration date,” is clearly incorrect. The Scheduling Order plainly states that
“[o]n or before November 24, 2015,” defendants may serve discovery

4

requests . . . .” (Scheduling Order ¶ 2). It is uncontested that Defendants did not
serve their discovery requests until December 2, 2015.
Defendants do not argue that good cause exists to excuse their failure to
comply with the Court’s Scheduling Order. The Court notes that the
November 24, 2015, deadline, was agreed to by Defendants. (See [16] at 1).
Defendants do not assert that this deadline could not be met with due diligence.
Because Defendants have failed to establish good cause to excuse their
failure to comply with the Court’s Scheduling Order, the Court will not order
Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ untimely discovery requests.2 See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 16(b)(4).

2

Defendants assert that they will be prejudiced if Plaintiff is not compelled to
respond to their discovery requests. (Mot. at 2). That Defendants may be
prejudiced due to their counsel’s lack of due diligence may be true. Prejudice,
however, does not establish the existence of good cause to excuse the failure to
comply with the Court’s Scheduling Order. The Court notes also that the
Scheduling Order only addressed expedited discovery concerning Plaintiff’s
request for injunctive relief. Defendants will be entitled to engage in discovery on
the merits of the case, and their defenses, during the normal course of this case.
5

III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Compel

Discovery [31] and Second Motion to Compel Discovery [36] 3 are DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 17th day of December, 2015.

3

The Second Motion to Compel Discovery also does not address whether
good cause exists to excuse Defendants’ failure to comply with the Scheduling
Order.
6