Watts v. Phillips

Filing 7

ORDER - Plaintiff shall file, on or before July 5, 2016, an amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of this action. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 6/15/2016. (rjs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
RALPH L. WATTS,
Plaintiff,
v.

1:16-cv-399-WSD

HONORABLE ROBERT F.
PHILLIPS, Judge, Charlton Probate
Court,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the required frivolity review of Plaintiff
Ralph L. Watts’ (“Plaintiff”) Complaint [3].
I.

BACKGROUND
On February 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Application for Leave to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”) [1], attaching his proposed
complaint [1.1]. On February 10, 2016, Magistrate Judge Walter E. Johnson
granted [2] the IFP Application and submitted Plaintiff’s Complaint to the Court
for the frivolity review required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that, in 1994, he purchased approximately one
acre of property from Lillie Mae Harvey (“Seller”). (Compl. at 1, 9). Plaintiff

asserts that Defendant Honorable Robert F. Phillips (“Defendant”), a state probate
court judge, later granted “Administrator Rights” over Plaintiff’s property to
Robert Jordan, Lillie Mae Harvey’s brother (“Seller’s Brother”). (Id. at 1, 3, 9-10).
After administrator rights were granted to Seller’s Brother, he demanded that
Plaintiff pay him $5,000 for the property. (Id. at 9-10). Plaintiff paid the amount
demanded but Seller’s Brother refused to issue a deed to Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant “prevent[ed] [him] from exercising [his] Civil Right to own
and enjoy [his] property.” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff also alleges other “Civil Rights”
violations by several non-defendants that “cost [him] thousands of dollars and
change[d] [his] living conditions.” (Id. at 1-2). Plaintiff does not identify the relief
he seeks.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard

A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if at any time the
court determines the action is frivolous or malicious or that it fails to state a claim
on which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). “Failure to state
a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H&S, Inc.,
366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
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1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). Under this standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Review for frivolousness, on the other hand, “accords judges not only the
authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but
also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). A claim is frivolous when it “has
little or no chance of success,” that is, when it appears “from the face of the
complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories
are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327). “[I]f the district court sees that an affirmative
defense would defeat the action, a [dismissal on the grounds of frivolity] is
allowed.” Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 (11th
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Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff filed his Complaint pro se. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff must comply with the threshold
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Beckwith v. Bellsouth
Telecomms. Inc., 146 F. App’x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005). “Even though a pro se
complaint should be construed liberally, a pro se complaint still must state a claim
upon which the Court can grant relief.” Grigsby v. Thomas, 506 F. Supp. 2d 26,
28 (D.D.C. 2007). “[A] district court does not have license to rewrite a deficient
pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).
B.

Analysis

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 8, complaints must contain a “short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a demand for the
relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (3). Rule 10(a) provides that “[e]very
pleading must have a caption with the court’s name, a title, a file number, and a
Rule 7(a) designation. The title of the complaint must name all the parties.”
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Id. 10(a). Rule 10(b) provides that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in
numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of
circumstances.” Id. 10(b). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not comply with any of
these provisions. It does not include a jurisdictional statement, a statement of the
relief sought, numbered paragraphs, a caption with the Court’s name, or a title
naming all of the parties.
Plaintiff also violates Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff’s Complaint includes (1) two pages of vague allegations, largely against
non-defendants, (2) two pages summarizing information about the Seller’s family
and her acquisition of the property at issue in this case, and (3) several attachments
the relevance of which Plaintiff does not explain. This does not constitute “a short
and plain statement of [Plaintiff’s] claim[s] showing that [he] is entitled to relief.”
Id. 8(a)(2).
Although Plaintiff’s pro se complaint should be construed liberally, he
“must comply with the procedural rules that govern pleadings.” Beckwith, 146 F.
App’x at 371.
These rules work together ‘to require the pleader to present his claims
discretely and succinctly, so that his adversary can discern what he is
claiming and frame a responsive pleading, the court can determine
which facts support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated
any claims upon which relief can be granted, and, at trial, the court
can determine that evidence which is relevant and that which is not.’
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Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting T.D.S. v.
Shelby Mut. Ins. Co.,760 F.2d 1520, 1543 n. 14 (11th Cir. 1985)).
In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend
his Complaint to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff is
required to file, on or before July 5, 2016, an amended complaint that complies
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to do so will result in dismissal
of this action. See LR 41.3(A)(2), NDGa.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that that Plaintiff shall file, on or before

July 5, 2016, an amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED this 15th day of June, 2016.

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