McAdoo v. The Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Authority et al
Filing
38
OPINION AND ORDER adopting Magistrate Judge John K. Larkins IIIs Non-Final Report and Recommendation 24 and overruling Plaintiff Phillip McAdoos Objections to the R&R 29 . Defendant MARTAs Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 14 , which the Court recharacterizes as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, is granted and MARTA is dismissed from this action. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 3/10/17. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
PHILLIP MCADOO,
Plaintiff,
v.
1:16-cv-734-WSD
THE METROPOLITAN ATLANTA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY, THE
MARTA/ATU LOCAL 732
EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT
PLAN, and THE MARTA/ATU
LOCAL 732 EMPLOYEES
RETIREMENT PLAN
ALLOWANCE COMMITTEE,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge John K. Larkins III’s
Non-Final Report and Recommendation [24] (“R&R”). The R&R recommends the
Court grant Defendant Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Authority’s1 (“MARTA”)
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
1
The party’s correct, full name is the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority. ([14.1] at 1).
[14] (“Motion”). Also before the Court are Plaintiff Phillip McAdoo’s (“Plaintiff”)
Objections to the R&R [29].
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Facts2
On March 7, 2016, Plaintiff Phillip McAdoo filed his complaint [1] against
MARTA and two other Defendants, the MARTA/ATU Local 732 Employees
Retirement Plan and the MARTA/ATU Local 732 Employees Retirement Plan
Allowance Committee (collectively “the Plan Defendants”). On May 2, 2016,
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint [2]. MARTA argues that Plaintiff’s
allegations against it are beyond the scope of his Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) charge, and are therefore required to be dismissed. ([14.1]
at 2).
1.
First Amended Complaint
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he worked for MARTA
from January 1988 through October 2010. ([2] ¶¶ 12-13). He further alleges that,
while he worked for MARTA, he was a disabled individual under the Americans
2
The facts are taken from the R&R and the record. The parties have not
objected to any specific facts in the R&R, and the Court finds no plain error in
them. The Court thus adopts the facts set out in the R&R. See Garvey v. Vaughn,
993 F.2d 776, 779 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993).
2
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act. (Id. ¶ 16). Plaintiff
alleges that, on October 17, 2010, he became disabled, and he advised MARTA
that he could not work in the same position without a reasonable accommodation,
including retraining. (Id. ¶ 30). He further alleges that MARTA refused to provide
him with retraining despite having retrained non-disabled employees and having
no legitimate reason to deny Plaintiff’s request. (Id. ¶¶ 31-34). Plaintiff alleges
that MARTA violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide
him with a reasonable accommodation or training. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 41).
2.
Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge
On November 18, 2015, the EEOC received Plaintiff’s charge of
discrimination. ([14.2]). Plaintiff filed the charge against the “MARTA/ATU
Local 732 Employees Retirement Plan.” (Id. at 1). He alleged that the
discrimination took place on September 17, 2015. (Id.). In the narrative portion of
the charge, McAdoo wrote:
I was an employee for the above named company and a member of
the union for over twenty (20) years until I suffered an on the job
injury. On or about October 9, 2012, I was terminated while under the
care of my physician from the injury. On September 25, 2014, I was
awarded full pension entitlement. On September 17, 2015, I was
denied full entitlements.
The Retirement Pension Plan stated the reason for denial was that I
was only eligible for 18 months of retirement service credit spent on
workman’s compensation.
3
I believe that I have been discriminated against because of my
disability, in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, as amended
(Id.). The EEOC sent its notice of the discrimination charge to one of the Plan
Defendants. (Id. at 2).
B.
R&R and Objections
On December 7, 2016, the Magistrate Judge issued his R&R. The
Magistrate Judge first determined that MARTA’s motion should be construed as a
motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c),
because MARTA filed an answer in this case. The Magistrate Judge next
determined that Plaintiff’s claims against MARTA for failure to accommodate are
beyond the scope of his EEOC charge, which exclusively alleged that the Plan
Defendants denied certain retirement benefits. The Magistrate Judge also noted
that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge did not name MARTA as a respondent. The
Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff’s claims against MARTA are beyond the
scope of any reasonable investigation into the claims contained in his charge, and
that, even if it was within the scope, Plaintiff’s claim was not timely presented to
the EEOC. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends the Court grant
MARTA’s Motion.
4
On December 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Objections to the R&R. Plaintiff
argues (1) he has alleged sufficient facts required to maintain his causes of action
against MARTA; (2) his EEOC Complaint was legally sufficient and the scope of
it should be liberally construed to encompass his claims against MARTA; and
(3) MARTA’s failure to train continued through September 2015, and thus his
EEOC Charge was timely.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standards
1.
Review of a Magistrate Judge’s R&R
After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams
v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). A district judge
“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). Where no party has objected to the report and recommendation, the
Court conducts only a plain error review of the record. United States v. Slay,
714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Because Plaintiff objects to
the R&R, the Court conducts its de novo review.
5
2.
Standard of Review on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
under Rule 12(c)
Under Subsections (c) and (h)(2)(B) of Rule 12, defendants who have
answered a complaint may still challenge a plaintiff’s pleadings on the basis that
they fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Motions for judgment
on the pleadings based on allegations of a failure to state a claim are evaluated
using the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Sampson
v. Washington Mut. Bank, 453 F. App’x 863, 865 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011); Strategic
Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 n.8
(11th Cir. 2002); Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Phila. v. City of Atlanta, 864 F.
Supp. 1274, 1278 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings is
subject to the same standard as is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”).3
Dismissal of a complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), is appropriate “when,
on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations
will support the cause of action.” Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty.
Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). In considering a motion to
dismiss, the Court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and considers the
3
No party objects to, and the Court finds no plain error in, the Magistrate
Judge’s determination that MARTA’s Motion should be construed as a motion for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).
6
allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ.,
495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,
187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). The Court is not required to accept a
plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d
1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)),
abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., — U.S. —, 132
S. Ct. 1702 (2012). The Court also will not “accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). The complaint, ultimately, is required to contain “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
To state a plausible claim for relief, the plaintiff must plead factual content
that “allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Plausibility” requires more
than a “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” and a complaint
that alleges facts that are “merely consistent with” liability “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see also Arthur v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 569
F. App’x 669, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that Conley’s “no set of facts” standard
7
has been overruled by Twombly, and a complaint must contain “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”).
“A complaint is insufficient if it ‘tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.’” Tropic Ocean Airways, Inc. v. Floyd, 598 F. App’x 608, 609
(11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must do more than merely state
legal conclusions; they are required to allege some specific factual bases for those
conclusions or face dismissal of their claims.” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms.,
372 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004); see also White v. Bank of America, NA,
597 F. App’x 1015, 1017 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted
deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent
dismissal.”) (quoting Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188
(11th Cir. 2002))
B.
Analysis
To file a judicial complaint under Title VII, a plaintiff first must exhaust his
administrative remedies by filing a “charge” of discrimination with the EEOC
within 180 days of his termination. See, e.g., H&R Block E. Enters. v. Morris, 606
F.3d 1285, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d
1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Before suing under Title VII, a plaintiff must first
8
exhaust her administrative remedies. To do so, a plaintiff must file a timely charge
of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the last discriminatory act.”
(citation omitted)). “[T]he ‘scope’ of the judicial complaint is limited to the
‘scope’ of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out
of the charge of discrimination.” Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455,
466 (5th Cir. 1970).4
Plaintiff’s claims against MARTA fall outside the scope of the EEOC
investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of his EEOC charge.
The charge states:
I was an employee for the above named company and a member of
the union for over twenty (20) years until I suffered an on the job
injury. On or about October 9, 2012, I was terminated while under the
care of my physician from the injury. On September 25, 2014, I was
awarded full pension entitlement. On September 17, 2015, I was
denied full entitlements.
The Retirement Pension Plan stated the reason for denial was that I
was only eligible for 18 months of retirement service credit spent on
workman’s compensation.
I believe that I have been discriminated against because of my
disability, in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, as amended
4
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh
Circuit adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
9
([14.2]). The charge alleged that the entirety of the discrimination Plaintiff
suffered took place on September 17, 2015, the date he was denied “full
entitlements.” Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, on the other hand, alleges that
MARTA’s failure to accommodate him occurred in October 2010. ([2] ¶¶ 30-31).
The charge alleges that Plaintiff was discriminated against when the Plan
Defendants denied him full pension entitlements. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
alleges that MARTA failed to accommodate his disability by offering retraining or
other reasonable accommodations in 2010.
Plaintiff also failed to name MARTA in the EEOC charge, further
supporting that Plaintiff’s claims against MARTA fall outside the scope of the
EEOC charge. In Virgo v. Riviera Beach Associates, Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.
1994), the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether parties not named in EEOC charges
may be sued in subsequent civil actions. The Court stated:
Ordinarily a party not named in the EEOC charge cannot be sued in a
subsequent civil action. This naming requirement serves to notify the
charged party of the allegation and allows the party an opportunity to
participate in conciliation and voluntarily comply with the
requirements of Title VII. However, courts liberally construe this
requirement. Where the purposes of the act are fulfilled a party
unnamed in the EEOC charge may be subjected to the jurisdiction of
federal courts.
Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1358-59 (citations omitted). The Virgo Court continued, “In
order to determine whether the purposes of Title VII are met, courts do not apply a
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rigid test but instead look to several factors including: (1) the similarity of interest
between the named party and the unnamed party; (2) whether the plaintiff could
have ascertained the identity of the unnamed party at the time the EEOC charge
was filed; (3) whether the unnamed parties received adequate notice of the charges;
(4) whether the unnamed parties had an adequate opportunity to participate in the
reconciliation process; and (5) whether the unnamed party actually was prejudiced
by its exclusion from the EEOC proceedings.” Id. at 1359.
Plaintiff filed his charge against his retirement plan. The charge does not,
explicitly or implicitly, indicate any intent to charge MARTA with, or implicate it
in, any discrimination. As the Magistrate Judge noted, the mere fact that Plaintiff
states he worked for MARTA does not indicate any allegation that MARTA was
involved in wrongdoing, and, in context, it is clear that Plaintiff referred to “full
pension entitlement” in referencing his denial of “full entitlements.” In short,
Plaintiff “presents no non-conclusory argument as to why an investigation into the
denial of pension benefits by a retirement plan would reasonably lead to an
investigation into whether his employer should have offered him training five years
earlier.” (R&R at 13). The Court finds Plaintiff’s claims against MARTA were
not like, related to, and did not grow out of, the EEOC investigation, and Plaintiff
thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Gregory v. Georgia Dep’t
11
of Human Resources, 355 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Accordingly,
MARTA’s Motion is granted, and Plaintiff’s claims against it are dismissed.
The Magistrate Judge also determined that, even if Plaintiff’s claims against
MARTA fall within the scope of his EEOC charge, Plaintiff’s claims against
MARTA were not timely presented to the EEOC. A plaintiff must file a timely
charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the last discriminatory
act. H&R Block, 606 F.3d at 1295. Plaintiff alleges that MARTA failed to honor
his request for retraining or another accommodation in October 2010. His
November 2015 EEOC charge was filed years after MARTA’s alleged misconduct.
Plaintiff argues that MARTA’s failure to train continued through September 2015,
and that his claims are thus timely. Though a claim can be timely where there is
continuous discrimination, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not support that
any act of discrimination occurred within 180 days before September 2015. See
Beavers v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 975 F.2d 792, 796 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Where an
employee charges an employer with continuously maintaining an illegal
employment practice, he may file a valid charge of discrimination based upon that
illegal practice until 180 days after the last occurrence of an instance of that
practice.”). Accordingly, MARTA’s Motion is granted, and Plaintiff’s claims
against it are dismissed.
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III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Judge John K. Larkins III’s
Non-Final Report and Recommendation [24] is ADOPTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Phillip McAdoo’s Objections
to the R&R [29] are OVERRULED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant MARTA’s Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [14], which
the Court recharacterizes as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, is
GRANTED. MARTA is DISMISSED from this action.
SO ORDERED this 10th day of March, 2017.
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