Ambrose v. United States Department of Employment Security et al

Filing 6

ORDER that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 5/9/2016. (anc)

Plaintiff’s Complaint [3] to the Court for the required frivolity review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Plaintiff’s Complaint consists mostly of allegations regarding the hardships
she suffered as a result of her unemployment. (See Compl. at 3-8). Plaintiff
appears to seek unemployment benefits. She claims she was denied benefits
“[f]ollowing in time [sic] a third subsequent attempt to be allowed proper and
sufficient procedure before the Board of Review and its administrative law
agents.” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff does not identify the specific “Board of Review” with
which she sought relief.
She claims her action arises from Defendants’ “defective interpretation of
Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act, Trade Act of 1974 and its amendments.”
(Id.). Plaintiff does not explain why the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act
applies, or why the “Illinois Department of Employment Security” is named as a
Defendant.
The Complaint appears to allege that Plaintiff was an employee at the
Microtel Inn in Dunwoody, Georgia (“Microtel”). (Id. at 2). Plaintiff does not
state that she was terminated from her employment at the Microtel, stating only
that a “mutually beneficial employee/employer work relationship could not be
recognized.” (Id. at 3). Plaintiff claims “[t]he defendants are in possession of

2

plaintiff’s livelihood, and they hold on to it until today. Plaintiff has not received
final paycheck from previous employer. She has filed case number 15MS011307
with magistrate Court Fulton County, GA.” (Id. at 10).
On April 15, 2016, the Court entered an Order [4] requiring Plaintiff to file,
on or before April 29, 2016, an Amended Complaint. The Court noted that,
because Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, it was unclear what relief Plaintiff seeks and whether the Court
has jurisdiction over this action. (See April 15, 2016, Order at 5).
On April 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint. In it, she
clarifies that she is a resident of Illinois, and that a “representative from the
Georgia Department of Labor provided [her] the suggestion/choice to initiate a
claim for unemployment benefits in the state [she is] a resident . . .” (Am. Compl.
at 1). She states she wrote to the “Illinois Department of Unemployment Securities
Board of Review” and suggests that an administrative law judge was “assigned to
this case.” (Id. at 1, 2). Plaintiff also claims she filed a case “with magistrate
Court Fulton County, GA.” (Id. at 5).
Plaintiff does not claim she was fired from her job with Microtel, stating
only that she “asked to not be treated with such dissonance [sic] like (a) a
temporary staff from a staffing agency who is on call or (b) a slave who has no

3

choice in any work, roles, and no discussion is considered or allowed.” (Id. at 3).
She was asked by the Director of Operations “Do you want to just resign?” (Id. at
4). Regarding Microtel’s alleged failure to pay Plaintiff’s final paycheck, Plaintiff
now alleges that she received her final paycheck but “ha[s] not cashed the sum
amount . . .” and claims that the “mistake in [sic] my check is intentional.” (Id.).
Plaintiff appears to seek Illinois unemployment insurance benefits, and asserts that
Microtel “held my check and made it incorrect.” (Id. at 5).
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review

A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if at any time the
court determines the action is frivolous or malicious or that it fails to state a claim
on which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). “Failure to state
a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H&S, Inc.,
366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). Under this standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility

4

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Review for frivolousness, on the other hand, “‘accords judges not only the
authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but
also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” See
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). A claim is frivolous when it “has
little or no chance of success,” that is, when it appears “from the face of the
complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories
are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327).
Plaintiff filed her Complaint pro se. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff must comply with the threshold
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Beckwith v. Bellsouth

5

Telecomms. Inc., 146 F. App’x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005). “Even though a pro se
complaint should be construed liberally, a pro se complaint still must state a claim
upon which the Court can grant relief.” Grigsby v. Thomas, 506 F. Supp. 2d 26,
28 (D.D.C. 2007). “[A] district court does not have license to rewrite a deficient
pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).
B.

Analysis

Plaintiff’s Complaint and Amended Complaint fail to provide a basis for the
Court’s jurisdiction over this action. The Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act
provides:
Any decision of the Board of Review . . . shall be reviewable only
under and in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative
Review Law, provided that judicial review thereof shall be permitted
only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted
his administrative remedies as provided by this Act.
820 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/1100. Jurisdiction to review the denial of benefits
by the Illinois Board of Review thus rests with Illinois state courts, not with federal
district courts. See Hopkins v. Airborne Express, No. 05 C 1622, 2005 WL
1498474, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2005).1 To the extent Plaintiff sought judicial
1

To the extent Plaintiff seeks unemployment benefits in Georgia, Georgia law
similarly provides that judicial review of the Georgia Board of Review’s decision
is appropriate in state court. See Shields v. Bellsouth Advertising and Pub. Co.,
Inc., 228 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-8-223).

6

review in Illinois state court and seeks reversal of those state court proceedings, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims. See Pugh
v. Balish, 564 F. App’x 1010, 1013 (11th Cir. 2014) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine
“deprives us of jurisdiction” to “review and reject the judgments rendered in
previous state court proceedings” challenging denial of unemployment benefits).2
Plaintiff does not plead any facts to support that any federal law applies or
that any federal right has been violated.3 Diversity jurisdiction does not exist
because Plaintiff does not allege—and it does not appear—that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).4 Plaintiff’s remaining
claims based on Microtel’s alleged withholding of her final paycheck are, if
anything, state law claims. Where “no basis for original federal jurisdiction
2

Plaintiff seeks state unemployment insurance benefits, and the “United
States Department of Employment Security” is not a proper party to this action.
3
As to her alleged termination, Plaintiff does not allege she was engaged in
any protected labor activity, that she was a member of any protected class, or that
she was terminated or retaliated against on the basis of any of the foregoing.
“Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1, an at-will employee generally may be terminated
for any reason . . .” Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 528 S.E.2d 238, 239 (Ga.
2000).
4
The citizenship of the parties also does not appear to be diverse because
Plaintiff, who claims she is a “resident” of Illinois, is not diverse with Defendant
Illinois Department of Employment Security. If Plaintiff is a citizen of Georgia,
her citizenship is not diverse with Defendant Summit Management Corporation,
which is a corporation that maintains its headquarters in Georgia. (See
http://summitmgmtcorp.com/company.php, last accessed May 4, 2016).

7

presently exists, the district court has the discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.” Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe
Cty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1123 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); see also
Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002) (whether to
continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is a decision that “should be and is
vested in the sound discretion of the district court”). The Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims, and this action
is dismissed.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

SO ORDERED this 9th day of May, 2016.

_______________________________
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8