Amoateng et al v. Nickerson et al
Filing
66
ORDER GRANTING 48 Motion for Summary Judgment. Counts III and IV are therefore DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 11/27/17. (bnw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
JOSEPHINE AMOATENG and
EHUI AMONIN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DEXTER NICKERSON, BUEL,
INC., and CHEROKEE
INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:16-CV-01098-RWS
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment on Punitive Damages and Direct Negligence Claims [48]. After
reviewing the record, the Court enters the following Order.
Background
This case arises out of a collision on June 6, 2014, between Defendant
Dexter Nickerson (“Defendant Nickerson”) and Plaintiff Josephine Amoateng
(“Plaintiff Amoateng”). (Defs.’ LR 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts (“Defs.’ SUMF”), Dkt. [48-9] ¶ 1.) At the time, Defendant Nickerson
was driving a tractor-trailer as the employee of Defendant Buel, Inc.
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
(“Defendant Buel”). (Id. ¶ 2.) Defendant Buel is a named insured under a
policy covering the vehicle at issue with Defendant Cherokee Insurance
Company. (Id. ¶ 8.)
On June 6, 2014, the tractor-trailer driven by Defendant Nickerson
overturned and collided with a vehicle driven by Plaintiff Amoateng. (Answer,
Dkt. [5] ¶ 14.) As a result, Defendant Nickerson was cited for unsecured load.
(Defs.’ SUMF, Dkt. [48-9] ¶ 11.)
On April 4, 2016, Plaintiff Amoateng filed this suit seeking to recover
for her resulting injuries. She has brought claims for negligence against
Defendant Nickerson (Count I), for respondeat superior against Defendant Buel
(Count II), for negligence against Defendant Buel (Count III), and punitive
damages (Count IV). Plaintiff Ehui Amonin, her husband, has also brought a
claim for loss of consortium (Count V). Together they bring a claim against
Defendant Cherokee Insurance Company (Count VI). On August 16, 2017,
Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on Punitive Damages
and Direct Negligence [48], which the court will now address.
2
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
Discussion
I.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “The moving
party bears ‘the initial responsibility of informing the . . . court of the basis for
its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.’” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.
2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Where the
moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who
must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a
genuine issue of material fact does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at
248. A fact is not material if a dispute over that fact will not affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law. Id. An issue is genuine when the evidence
3
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Id. at 249–50.
Additionally, “the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
No genuine issue of material fact exists “since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. Thus, if a party who has the
burden of proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
any essential element to a claim, summary judgment may be properly granted
against him.
Finally, in resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must
view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296
(11th Cir. 2002). But, the court is bound only to draw those inferences that are
reasonable. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier
4
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”
Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal citations
omitted); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (once the moving party has met
its burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party “must do more than simply
show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).
II.
Analysis
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive
damages against Defendants (Count IV) and direct negligence against
Defendant Buel (Count III). They first argue that Plaintiffs have failed to meet
their burden as to a claim for punitive damages. As a result, they argue, the
claims for direct negligence against Defendant Buel must also be dismissed
since Defendant Buel has admitted that respondeat superior applies in this case.
The Court will address each argument in turn.
A.
Punitive Damages (Count IV)
“Punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it
5
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions showed
willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want
of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to
consequences.” O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b). Negligence, or even gross
negligence, is not enough to support a claim for punitive damages. Durben v.
Am. Materials, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 618, 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). Plaintiffs allege
that the Defendants’ actions meet this standard.
As to Defendant Nickerson, in “cases involving automobile collisions,
punitive damages are authorized when the accident results from a pattern or
policy of dangerous driving, such as excessive speeding or driving while
intoxicated, but not when a driver simply violates a rule of the road.” Lindsey
v. Clinch Cty. Glass, Inc., 718 S.E.2d 806, 807 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). Here,
Defendant Nickerson was cited for unsecured load after the collision. (Defs.’
SUMF, Dkt. [48-9] ¶ 11.) There is nothing to suggest that he was under the
influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the collision. (Id. ¶¶ 13–14.) There
is also no evidence of a pattern or policy of dangerous driving. Since 2006,
Defendant Nickerson had not been involved in a motor vehicle collision while
operating a commercial vehicle. (Id. ¶ 17.) In 2010 he was involved in a
6
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
single vehicle accident due to a tire blow out, and no one was injured. (Id. ¶
18.) Plaintiffs have provided no additional evidence to support a conclusion
that Defendant Nickerson had a pattern or policy of dangerous driving. As
such, Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against Defendant Nickerson fails.
As to Defendant Buel, in a claim for negligent hiring, training,
supervision, and retention in the motor vehicle context, to recover punitive
damages Plaintiffs must show “some facts to support a conclusion that the
employer acted with such an entire want of care as to raise a presumption of
conscious indifference to the consequences.” W. Indus., Inc. v. Poole, 634
S.E.2d 118, 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotations and alterations
omitted). “A plaintiff can shoulder this burden of proof only by showing that
an employer had actual knowledge of numerous and serious violations on its
driver’s record, or, at the very least, when the employer has flouted a legal duty
to check a record showing such violations.” Id. (citing Smith v. Tommy
Roberts Trucking Co., 438 S.E.2d 54, 57–58 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)). “[A] jury
may award punitive damages even where the clear and convincing evidence
only creates an inference of the defendant’s conscious indifference to the
consequences of [its] acts.” Tookes v. Murray, 678 S.E.2d 209, 213 (Ga. Ct.
7
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
App. 2009). Summary judgment is, however, appropriate when there is
insufficient evidence from which a jury can presume conscious indifference to
the consequences. Bartja v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 463
S.E.2d 358, 361 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Buel is liable for punitive damages for
several reasons. First, they argue that Defendant Buel’s failure to follow
federal rules and regulations may be sufficient evidence of bad faith to survive
summary judgment as to punitive damages. They are correct that such a failure
can support an award of punitive damages, but only when the relevant rules
relate to a defendant’s duty to learn of a employee’s driving record prior to an
accident. See, e.g., Smith, 435 S.E.2d at 57 (holding that punitive damages
may be awarded when the employer fails to check its employee’s driving
record as required by federal rules and regulations); Royalston v.
Middlebrooks, 696 S.E.2d 66, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (upholding denials of
motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on
punitive damages when the employer had no motor vehicle reports in the
defendant employee’s records).
Plaintiffs point to two federal rules and regulations that Defendant Buel
8
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
failed to follow. As to the rule requiring post-accident drug and alcohol
testing, 49 C.F.R. § 382.303, this rule does not relate to the employer’s preaccident knowledge of its employee’s driving history. In addition, Defendant
Buel has provided evidence showing that it did in fact test Defendant
Nickerson for drug and alcohol use following the accident. (Suppl. Ex. A, Dkt.
63-1].) As to the requirement that an employer perform a background check
and look into its employee’s driving history, Plaintiff’s argument seems to be
predicated on Defendant Buel’s failure to produce its personnel file of
Defendant Nickerson during discovery. Since Plaintiffs have the burden of
proof, however, this is insufficient to show that Defendant Buel failed to
investigate to the extent required by law. In addition, a failure to investigate
cannot support a claim of punitive damages unless the record would have
shown other violations by the employee. See Smith, 435 S.E.2d at 57. The
undisputed evidence here shows that even if Defendant Buel failed to properly
investigate, any investigation would have failed to produce any disqualifying
information as to Defendant Nickerson. (Defs.’ DUMF, Dkt. [48-9] ¶¶ 17–19.)
Plaintiffs have therefore failed to meet their burden as to this theory for
punitive damages.
9
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
Next, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Buel had a system in place
encouraging and rewarding unlawful behavior upon which an award of
punitive damages may be based. They first point to Defendant Buel’s failure to
provide training to Defendant Nickerson. However, trucking companies are
not required by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations to train their
drivers. Ortiz v. Wiwi, No. 3:11-CV-00033, 2012 WL 4468771, at *4 (M.D.
Ga. Sept. 26, 2012). In addition, an employer need not subject a driver to a
road test if he has a valid Commercial Driver’s License. 49 C.F.R. § 391.33.
Defendant Nickerson held a valid Commercial Driver’s License. (Ex. D, Dkt.
[48-5], at 3.) Defendant Buel’s failure to provide training is therefore an
insufficient basis on which punitive damages may be awarded.
Plaintiffs next point to the fact that Defendant Buel previously assigned
Defendant Nickerson a tractor trailer that was falling apart and that Defendant
Nickerson was driving in a manner beyond the capabilities of his trailer to
support the conclusion that the collision resulted from a pattern of misconduct.
The Court finds, however, that this is insufficient evidence from which a jury
could find by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant Buel’s “actions
showed wilful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire
10
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to
consequences.” O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b). Evidence of only this one isolated
incident is not enough to show a pattern of behavior sufficient for an award of
punitive damages.
Since Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden as to punitive damages
at the summary judgment stage, Count IV is DISMISSED.
B.
Claim for Negligence Against Defendant Buel (Count III)
Under Georgia law, “when an employer admits the applicability of
respondeat superior, it is entitled to summary judgment on claims for negligent
entrustment, hiring, and retention. The rationale for this is that, since the
employer would be liable for the employee’s negligence under respondeat
superior, allowing claims for negligent entrustment, hiring, and retention would
not entitle the plaintiff to greater recovery, but would merely serve to prejudice
the employer.” Kelley v. Blue Line Carriers, LLC, 685 S.E.2d 479, 483 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Durben, 503 S.E.2d at 619). If, however, there is “a
valid claim for punitive damages against the employer based on its independent
negligence in hiring and retaining the employee or entrusting a vehicle to such
employee . . . it cannot be said that the negligence claims against the employer
11
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
are merely duplicative of the respondeat superior claim.” Id. In those
circumstances, summary judgment for the employer is not appropriate. Id.
Defendants have admitted that the doctrine of respondeat superior
applies to this case. (Defs.’ SUMF, Dkt. [48-9] ¶ 7.) As discussed above,
Plaintiffs do not have a valid claim for punitive damages against Defendant
Buel on the direct negligence claims. As such, Defendant Buel is entitled to
summary judgment as to the direct claim of negligence. Count III is therefore
DISMISSED.
Conclusion
In accordance with the forgoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment on Punitive Damages and Direct Negligence Claims [48] is
GRANTED. Counts III and IV are therefore DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of November, 2017.
________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge
12
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?