Carr v. Jackson et al
Filing
24
OPINION AND ORDER adopting Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand's Final Report and Recommendation 22 , granting Defendants Theodore Jackson, Mark Adgers, Reuben Wingfield, and Jerry Conner's Motion to Dismiss 17 and dismissing this action without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 6/1/17. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
KENTAVIUS CARR,
Plaintiff,
v.
1:16-cv-1442-WSD
THEODORE JACKSON, MARK
ADGERS, REUBEN WINGFIELD,
and JERRY CONNER,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand’s Final
Report and Recommendation [22] (“R&R”). The R&R recommends the Court
grant Defendants Theodore Jackson, Mark Adgers, Reuben Wingfield, and Jerry
Conner’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss [17]. The motion is
unopposed.
I.
BACKGROUND1
On May 2, 2016, Plaintiff Kentavius Carr (“Plaintiff”) filed his Complaint
[1], alleging that he is Muslim, that as part of his beliefs he is required to eat Halal
or Kosher food, and, while incarcerated at the Fulton County Jail, he did not
receive responses to his numerous requests to receive Halal or meals that met
Muslim dietary restrictions. On August 16, 2016, the Magistrate Judge, pursuant
to a frivolity review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, allowed Plaintiff’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment religious free exercise claims to proceed. ([6]).
On October 31, 2016, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss. Defendants
argue the Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Plaintiff did not file a response to the Motion to Dismiss,
and it is deemed unopposed. See LR 7.1(B), NDGa.
On May 11, 2017, the Magistrate Judge issued his R&R. The Magistrate
Judge found that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies.
He recommends the Court grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and dismiss this
1
The facts are taken from the R&R and the record. The parties have not
objected to any specific facts in the R&R, and the Court finds no plain error in
them. The Court thus adopts the facts set out in the R&R. See Garvey v. Vaughn,
993 F.2d 776, 779 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993).
2
action without prejudice for lack of exhaustion. Plaintiff did not file objections to
the R&R, and has not taken any other action in this case.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams
v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). A district judge
“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). Where, as here, no party has objected to the report and
recommendation, the Court conducts only a plain error review of the record.
United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
B.
Analysis
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title . . . by a
prisoner confined in any jail . . . until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[A] prisoner must complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,
3
including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is “to
afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally
before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Id. at 93 (alteration and citation
omitted). The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory, “regardless of the
relief offered through administrative procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,
741 (2001). Courts do not have discretion to waive it. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d
1368, 1372-73 (11th Cir. 2008). “The modifier ‘available’ in the PLRA means that
inmates must exhaust administrative remedies so long as there is the possibility of
at least some kind of relief.” Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir.
2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted). There is an established process to
evaluate if administrative remedies were exhausted:
[D]eciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is a two-step process.
First, the court looks to the factual allegations in the defendant’s
motion to dismiss and those in the plaintiff’s response, and if they
conflict, takes the plaintiff’s version of the facts as true. If, in that
light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it must be dismissed. This
process is analogous to judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(c).
If the complaint is not subject to dismissal at the first step, where the
plaintiff’s allegations are assumed to be true, the court then proceeds
to make specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual
4
issues related to exhaustion. The defendants bear the burden of
proving that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his available
administrative remedies. Once the court makes findings on the
disputed issues of fact, it then decides whether under those findings
the prisoner has exhausted his available administrative remedies.
Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082-83 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
“A district court may properly consider facts outside of the pleadings to resolve a
factual dispute regarding exhaustion where the factual dispute does not decide the
merits and the parties have a sufficient opportunity to develop the record.”
Singleton v. Dep’t of Corr., 323 F. App’x 783, 785 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(citing Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1376).
After describing the grievance procedure at the Fulton County Jail, the
Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
(R&R at 5-7). The Magistrate Judge noted that, since September 14, 2015,
Plaintiff has filed eight grievances in the Fulton County Jail Grievance Procedure,
none of which mention that Plaintiff wanted a Halal diet or food meeting Muslim
dietary restrictions.2 The Magistrate Judge concluded here that Defendants met
2
In one grievance, which Plaintiff filed after the Complaint in this action,
Plaintiff complained that he was unable to participate in Ramadan because he did
not receive a Ramadan tray. He did not mention that he wanted a Halal diet or
food meeting Muslim dietary restrictions. (Adger Aff. at ¶¶ 7, 9; McMullen Aff. at
27-48).
5
their burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. The Court finds no plain error in these findings and recommendation,
and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted. See Slay, 714 F.2d at 1095.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand’s Final
Report and Recommendation [22] is ADOPTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Theodore Jackson, Mark
Adgers, Reuben Wingfield, and Jerry Conner’s Motion to Dismiss [17] is
GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
SO ORDERED this 1st day of June, 2017.
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?