Mims et al v. Wright Medical Technology, Inc. et al

Filing 12

OPINION AND ORDER granting Defendants Wright Medical Technology, Inc. and Wright Medical Group Inc.s Motion to Dismiss 2 , granting the parties motions for leave to file matters under seal [4,6,9] and dismissing this action. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 3/29/17. (ddm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
IN RE: WRIGHT MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY INC., CONSERVE
HIP IMPLANT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION

MDL DOCKET NO. 2329
This Document Relates to:
ELIE M. MIMS and NORMA
C. MIMS
1:16-cv-3044-WSD

ELIE M. MIMS and NORMA C.
MIMS,
Plaintiffs,

1:16-cv-3044-WSD

v.
WRIGHT MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY INC. and
WRIGHT MEDICAL GROUP INC.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Wright Medical Technology,
Inc. (“WMT”) and Wright Medical Group Inc.’s (“WMG”) (together, “Wright
Medical”) Motion to Dismiss [2].

I.

BACKGROUND
On December 21, 2010, Plaintiffs Elie M. Mims and Norma C. Mims

(“Plaintiffs”) filed a products liability action against WMT in the State Court of
Gwinnett County, Georgia (“2010 Complaint”), based on alleged defects in
WMT’s Profemur Total Hip System. On January 21, 2011, WMT removed the
action to this Court, No. 1:11-cv-213-TWT. In their 2010 Complaint, Plaintiffs
sought damages related to and arising from Elie Mims’ total hip replacement and
explant surgery for his right hip. On February 17, 2014, Plaintiffs executed a
settlement agreement and release [3.1] (“Release”). The Release provides that
Plaintiffs:
[C]ompletely release and forever discharge Wright Medical and
its . . . parents . . . from any and all past, present or future claims,
actions, causes of action, costs, expenses and compensation of any
nature whatsoever, whether based on a tort, contract or other theory of
recovery, which [Plaintiffs] now have or which may hereafter accrue
or otherwise be acquired on [Plaintiffs’] behalf, without limitation,
any and all known or unknown claims for bodily and personal
injuries, which have resulted or may result from the alleged acts or
omissions of any party hereto.
(Release ¶ 2). The Release applies to all claims Plaintiffs “have or may ever have
against Wright Medical relating to or resulting from the implantation and use of
Wright Medical hip systems and components into Elie M. Mims, . . . including any
revisions thereto . . . .” (Id. ¶ 1).

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Under the settlement agreement, Plaintiffs received monetary compensation,
and they acknowledged receipt of the agreed-upon funds in the Release. (Id.) The
parties also agreed that the Release represented the “entire agreement among the
parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof,” (id. ¶ 12), and that the
Release would be governed by Georgia law, (id. ¶20). Plaintiffs acknowledged
that “their execution of this [R]elease is free and voluntary,” (id. ¶ 13A), and that
they signed the Release “voluntarily and of their own free will and assent[ed] to all
the terms and conditions contained in this Release,” (id. ¶ 21C). Plaintiffs further
acknowledged that they had “reviewed this Release and had the opportunity to
have it reviewed by their attorneys,” (id. ¶ 15), and that they fully understood the
“significance of all of the terms and conditions of this Release and have discussed
it with their independent legal counsel, or have had a reasonable opportunity to do
so,” (id. ¶ 21B).
On August 19, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a short-form complaint [1] (“2016
Complaint”) in this MDL based on Mr. Mims’s replacement of, and explant
surgery on, his left hip. The complaint alleges that Mr. Mims’ left hip implant was
a Wright Medical Conserve hip implant that was implanted on
November 22, 2005. (2016 Complaint ¶ 9). Plaintiffs allege Mr. Mims’s explant

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surgery took place on May 31, 2016. (2016 Complaint ¶ 11). Plaintiffs checked
all fourteen possible causes of action in the short-form complaint.
On October 18, 2016, Wright Medical filed its Motion to Dismiss, arguing
that the clear and unequivocal language of the Release bars all of Plaintiffs’ claims
in their complaint. Plaintiffs claim that the Release applied only to injuries and
damages arising from the failure to Mr. Mims’s right hip, and that, at the time the
parties entered into the Release and settlement agreement, no evidence existed that
Mr. Mims’s left hip had failed in any way, and Plaintiffs thus did not have a cause
of action. Plaintiffs claim Mr. Mims only learned of issues with his left hip in
2016, after which he underwent a total revision surgery of his left hip to remove
the WMT product.

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II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard1

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court must “assume that the factual allegations in the
complaint are true and give the plaintiff[] the benefit of reasonable factual
inferences.” Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 1187, 1196 (11th Cir.
2010). Although reasonable inferences are made in the plaintiff’s favor,
“‘unwarranted deductions of fact’ are not admitted as true.” Aldana v. Del Monte
Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 408 n.10 (11th Cir. 1996)). Similarly, the
Court is not required to accept conclusory allegations and legal conclusions as true.
See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010)
1

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs contend that, because the Motion to Dismiss
asks the Court to consider the Release—a document not included with or
referenced in the Complaint—the Court must convert the Motion to Dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment. The Court disagrees. A court may consider
documents attached to a motion to dismiss without converting the motion into one
for summary judgment if the documents are (1) central to the plaintiff's claim and
(2) undisputed. Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). The Release
is both central to Plaintiffs’ claims and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of
the Release. Under these circumstances, the Court may properly consider the
Release on a motion to dismiss. Even if the Court converted the Motion to
Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, the Court would reach the same
result, relying only on the plain language of the Release.

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(construing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Mere “labels and
conclusions” are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This requires more than
the “mere possibility of misconduct.” Am. Dental, 605 F.3d at 1290 (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The well-pled allegations must “nudge[] their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 1289 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570).
B.

Analysis

The Release provides, and the parties agree, that Georgia law governs.
(Release ¶ 20). Under Georgia law, a release, like any contract, is interpreted
using the applicable rules of contract construction. See Rice v. Huff, 472 S.E.2d
140, 142 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). In Georgia:
[T]he construction of contracts involves three steps. At least initially,
construction is a matter of law for the court. First, the trial court must
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decide whether the language is clear and unambiguous. If it is, the
court simply enforces the contract according to its clear terms; the
contract alone is looked to for its meaning. Next, if the contract is
ambiguous in some respect, the court must apply the rules of contract
construction to resolve the ambiguity. Finally, if the ambiguity
remains after applying the rules of construction, the issue of what the
ambiguous language means and what the parties intended must be
resolved by a jury. The existence or nonexistence of an ambiguity is a
question of law for the court. If the court determines that an
ambiguity exists, however, a jury question does not automatically
arise, but rather the court must first attempt to resolve the ambiguity
by applying the rules of construction in O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2.
Woody’s Steaks, LLC v. Pastoria, 584 S.E.2d 41, 43 (Ga. Ct. App.2003) (internal
citations omitted). O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(4) instructs courts to look at the whole
contract to instruct the interpretation of any part of it, thereby giving meaningful
effect to as much of the contract as possible. U.S. ex rel. Whitten v. Triad Hosp.,
Inc., 210 F. App'x 878, 881 (11th Cir. 2006). “Georgia law allows a party to
release another from liability for future conduct and unknown claims, provided
such intent is clearly expressed in the release.” Dennis v. City of Atlanta, 751
S.E.2d 469, 472 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (citing U.S. Anchor Mfg. v. Rule Indus., 443
S.E.2d 833 (Ga. 1994); Lewis v. Schlenz, 291 S.E.2d 55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)).
Plaintiffs argue that the following language in the Release shows that the
parties did not intend to release Wright Medical from future claims relating to
Mr. Mims’s left hip:

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 Wright Medical is released from liability for “any and all known or
unknown claims for bodily and personal injuries, which have resulted or
may result from the alleged acts or omissions of any party hereto.” (Release
¶ 5).
 “[T]his settlement is a compromise of a disputed claim . . . .” (Release ¶ 5).
 “[Plaintiffs] further understand that the Lawsuit now pending in their names
against Wright Medical, being Case No. 1:11-cv-2013 pending in the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia shall be dismissed
with prejudice and without costs and that said dismissal may likewise be
pled as an absolute bar to any further claims or causes of action relating to
the Subject Events asserted by the [Plaintiffs], or on their behalf against
Wright Medical now or in the future.” (Release ¶ 11).
 “This Release is the entire agreement among the parties hereto with respect
to the subject matter hereof.” (Release ¶ 12).
Plaintiffs argue that these provisions show that the Release specifically
contemplates a release only of claims relating to the failed right hip implant. The
Court disagrees. Plaintiffs ignore other language that plainly and unequivocally
applies to the allegations in Plaintiff’s 2016 Complaint relating to Mr. Mims’s left
hip. The Release states that it applies to “all claims [Plaintiffs] have or may ever
have against Wright Medical relating to or resulting from the implantation and
use of Wright Medical hip systems and components into Elie M.
Mims . . . including any revisions thereto . . ., including but not limited to the
matters alleged against Wright Medical or that could have been alleged against
Wright Medical in Case No. 1:11-cv-0213 . . .” (Release ¶ 1) (emphasis added).

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This language could not be clearer—Plaintiffs released Wright Medical from any
future claims relating to any Wright Medical hip system implanted in Mr. Mims,
including but not limited to claims related to his right hip. This plain interpretation
is supported by paragraph 6 of the Release, which states: “[i]t is expressly
understood and agreed that this Release is for personal physical injuries or
sickness . . . and is intended to cover and does cover not only all now known losses
and damages, but any further losses or damages in any way related to or resulting
from the implementation and/or use of any Wright Medical Hip Systems and
components.” (Release ¶ 6).2
The Court finds the plain language of the Release applies to the allegations
in Plaintiff’s 2016 Complaint relating to Mr. Mims’s left hip. Where no ambiguity
exists in a contract, a court must enforce that contract according to its
unambiguous terms. See Woody’s Steaks, 584 S.E.2d at 43. Wright Medical’s
Motion to Dismiss is granted.3
2

Plaintiffs also “expressly waiv[ed] and assume[d] the risk of any of all
claims for damages against Wright medical, but of which the [Plaintiffs] d[id] not
know or expect to exist, whether through ignorance, oversight, error, negligence or
otherwise, and which, if known, would materially affect [Plaintiffs’] decision to
enter into this Release.” (Release ¶ 5).
3
Because several of the documents the parties submitted in support of their
briefs on the Motion to Dismiss contain confidential and sensitive information, the
parties filed their motions for leave to file matters under seal [4], [6], [9]. Having

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III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Wright Medical Technology,

Inc. and Wright Medical Group Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [2] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties’ motions for leave to file
matters under seal [4], [6], [9] are GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-3044-WSD is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED this 29th day of March, 2017.

reviewed the contents of the documents the parties seek to seal, the Court finds
they contain confidential and sensitive information, and the Court grants the
parties’ motions.

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