Estrada et al v. Becker et al

Filing 75

ORDER denying as moot 30 Motion to Dismiss ; denying as moot 38 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; granting 52 Motion to Dismiss ; denying 72 Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 5/15/2017. (ss)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ELLY MARISOL ESTRADA
an individual, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:16-CV-3310-TWT

MARK BECKER
President of Georgia State University,
in his individual and official capacity,
et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This is a civil rights action challenging an admissions policy of the University
System of Georgia. It is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Stay
Proceedings [Doc. 72], Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 30], and Motion to Dismiss the First
Amended Complaint [Doc. 52], as well as the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction [Doc. 38]. For the following reasons, the Defendants’ Motion to Stay
Proceedings [Doc. 72] is DENIED, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First
Amended Complaint [Doc. 52] is GRANTED, and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 38] and the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 30]
are DENIED as moot.
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I. Background
The Plaintiffs include noncitizen graduates of Georgia high schools who were
brought into the United States as children, and have since received deferred action
status under the federal Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy, also known
as DACA.1 DACA was established by Presidential executive order in 2012. In
substance, it provides for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to defer removal
action against individuals who meet certain requirements. Deferred action recipients
are then allowed to remain in the United States during a period of stay specified by the
Department of Homeland Security.2 The Defendants include the Presidents of five
selective Georgia institutions of higher education,3 as well as the members of the
Georgia Board of Regents.
The same year that DACA was adopted, the Georgia Board of Regents adopted
a number of state policies concerning eligibility for admission to selective Georgia
universities. In particular, Policy 4.1.6 provides that “[a] person who is not lawfully
present in the United States shall not be eligible for admission to any University
1

Amended Compl. ¶¶ 9-11. The Plaintiffs also include the Savannah
Undocumented Youth Alliance, a membership organization whose members have
been affected by the policies at issue in this case.
2

Id. at ¶¶ 45.

3

I.e., Georgia Institute of Technology, University of Georgia, Georgia
State University, Augusta University, and Georgia College and State University.
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System institution which, for the two most recent academic years, did not admit all
academically qualified applicants...”4 Policy 4.3.4 requires those selective institutions
to verify the lawful presence of all admitted applicants.5 The Plaintiffs challenge these
policies, claiming that they are “lawfully present” due to their status under DACA,
that they are otherwise eligible for admission to the institutions at issue, and they have
suffered harm by having to either attend less prestigious schools or leave the state to
attend comparable institutions.
On April 26, 2016, an action was filed in the Superior Court of Fulton County
that is similar to this case.6 In that case, the plaintiffs were DACA recipients who were
denied in-state tuition at University System of Georgia institutions. In particular, the
plaintiffs were denied in-state tuition because they were not considered “lawfully
present” for purposes of state provisions similar to those at issue in this case. On
December 30, 2016, the Superior Court found in favor of the plaintiffs and the
defendants appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals, where the case is currently

4

Id. at ¶ 48.

5

Id. at ¶ 49.

6

See Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez, et al. v. C. Dean Alford, et al., No.
2016-cv-274418 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2016).
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pending.7 The Defendants now move to stay proceedings in this action until the state
case is resolved, and in the alternative to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim.
II. Legal Standard
A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears that
the facts alleged fail to state a “plausible” claim for relief.8 A complaint may survive
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however, even if it is “improbable” that
a plaintiff would be able to prove those facts; even if the possibility of recovery is
extremely “remote and unlikely.”9 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must
accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.10 Generally, notice pleading is all that is required for a valid

7

The Georgia Court of Appeals originally sent the case directly to the
Georgia Supreme Court for review of federal preemption issues. The Georgia
Supreme Court, seeing no preemption issues, sent the case back to the Court of
Appeals.
8

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

9

Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).

10

See Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American
Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir. 1983); see also
Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir.
1994) (noting that at the pleading stage, the plaintiff “receives the benefit of
imagination”).
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complaint.11 Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only give the defendant fair
notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests.12
III. Discussion
A. Motion to Stay
The doctrine of abstention permits a district court to decline or postpone the
exercise of its jurisdiction under a variety of circumstances. However, “[a]bstention
from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.”13 The Supreme
Court has laid out four main doctrines under which federal courts may abstain, known
by the cases in which they were first promulgated: Pullman, Younger, Burford, and
Colorado River.14 Each doctrine applies to a unique set of circumstances and has its
own requirements. The Defendants have cited several abstention doctrines without

11

See Lombard’s, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986).
12

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555).
13

Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 813

(1976).
14

See Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Colorado
River, 424 U.S. at 800. There are other abstention doctrines, but they were not cited
by the Defendants, nor are they applicable here.
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clearly identifying which doctrines they believe are applicable to this particular
situation. As a result, the Court will address all four.
1. Younger Abstention
Younger abstention applies where there is (1) an ongoing state judicial
proceeding that (2) implicates important state interests and (3) provides an adequate
opportunity for raising federal constitutional questions.15 However, the type of judicial
proceedings Younger is concerned with are enforcement proceedings “akin to criminal
prosecution,” that are “characteristically initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff, i.e.,
the party challenging the state action, for some wrongful act.”16 Because there is no
state enforcement proceeding in this case, Younger does not apply.
2. Burford Abstention
Burford abstention, meanwhile, applies:
(1) when there are difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the
result in the case then at bar; or (2) where the exercise of federal review
of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state
efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of
substantial public concern.17
15

See Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 432 (1982).
16

Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 592 (2013).

17

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350,
361 (1989) (internal quotations omitted).
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The purpose of Burford abstention is to “protect [ ] complex state administrative
processes from undue federal interference.”18 Even assuming that the policies of the
Board of Regents count as a large and complex scheme, the Plaintiffs in this case
“focus their attack upon a single statute whose possible invalidation could scarcely be
expected to disrupt” Georgia’s entire university system.19 In addition, the state law at
issue implicates important issues of federal law. As such, there is simply “no
overriding state interest, special state competence, or threat to [Georgia’s]
administration of its own affairs that would warrant denying appellants access to their
chosen federal forum and relegating their various federal claims to the courts of
[Georgia].”20

18

Id. at 362.

19

BT Inv. Managers, Inc. v. Lewis, 559 F.2d 950, 955 (5th Cir. 1977)
(finding Burford abstention inappropriate where the plaintiffs had only challenged one
statute of the Florida Banking Code).
20

Id.

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3. Pullman Abstention
Under the Pullman doctrine, federal courts are given the ability to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction in “deference to state court resolution of underlying issues of
state law.”21 Pullman applies only in cases raising constitutional challenges, and then
only when: “(1) the case [also] presents an unsettled question of state law, and (2) the
question of state law is dispositive of the case or would avoid, or substantially modify,
the constitutional question presented.”22 In this case, there are two possible
interpretations of the state policies at issue. Either (1) the policies’ use of the term
“lawfully present” is coterminous with federal law, or (2) it differs in some material
way. Regardless of which interpretation of the policy is correct, the case would not be
resolved. Under the first scenario, a court would still need to determine who federal
law defines as “lawfully present.” The second scenario, meanwhile, would then raise
significant questions of preemption and equal protection. Because the issue of state
law would not be dispositive in this case, Pullman abstention is unwarranted.

21

Rindley v. Gallagher, 929 F.2d 1552, 1554 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965)).
22

Id. at 1554-55 (citing Duke v. James, 713 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir.

1983)).
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4. Colorado River Abstention
Lastly, the Colorado River doctrine permits a district court to abstain “when
there is a concurrent state court action concerning the same matter.”23 The Eleventh
Circuit has interpreted Colorado River and its progeny to include a list of factors that
should be considered when considering abstention under this doctrine, namely:
(1) whether one of the courts has assumed jurisdiction over property, (2)
the inconvenience of the federal forum, (3) the potential for piecemeal
litigation, (4) the order in which the fora obtained jurisdiction, (5)
whether state or federal law will be applied, and (6) the adequacy of the
state court to protect the parties' rights.24
These factors must be weighed “flexibly and pragmatically, not as a ‘mechanical
checklist,’” and the ultimate decision must be “heavily weighted in favor of the
exercise of jurisdiction.”25

23

AFC Enterprises, Inc. v. Restaurant Group LLC, No.
1:10-CV-1772-TWT, 2010 WL 4537812, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2010) (citing
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813).
24

Ambrosia Coal & Const. Co. v. Pages Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1331
(11th Cir. 2004).
25

Id. at 1332 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983)).
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Here, neither the first nor fifth factors apply.26 Similarly, the second factor does
not favor abstention. The convenience factor “should focus primarily on the physical
proximity of the federal forum to the evidence and witnesses.”27 The Court of Appeals
of Georgia is no more convenient than the federal courthouse. The two are located less
than one mile apart.
The third factor, the potential for “piecemeal litigation,” also counsels against
abstention. The concern here is not with “run of the mill piecemeal litigation,” but
rather with piecemeal litigation that is “abnormally excessive or deleterious.”28 But
in situations in which litigation is “inevitably piecemeal,” abstention is not favored.29
Litigation is inevitably piecemeal when resolution of one case would still leave the
other action unresolved no matter how the first action was disposed. In this case, the
state action involves completely different plaintiffs and addresses Georgia’s tuition

26

Neither court has assumed jurisdiction over property. And the Plaintiffs’
claims are not included in the state action, “eliminat[ing] any justification for the stay
that might be attributable to the prior filing of the state court action.” Am. Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Edward D. Stone, Jr. & Assoc., 743 F.2d 1519, 1525 (11th Cir. 1984)
(hereinafter “AMMIC”).
27

Ambrosia Coal, 368 F.3d at 1332.

28

Jackson-Platts v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 727 F.3d 1127, 1142 (11th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Ambrosia Coal, 368 F.3d at 1333).
29

Id. (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edward D. Stone, Jr. & Assoc.,
743 F.2d 1519, 1525 (11th Cir.1984)).
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related policies, not policies related to admission. The state action cannot provide
relief to the Plaintiffs in this case, though the relevant language is identical under both
policies. Because this Court cannot force the Plaintiffs to assert their claims in the
state proceeding, a stay order would not avoid, but merely delay, piecemeal
consideration of the claims.30
The fifth factor requires the Court to determine whether state or federal law
provides the rule of decision.31 First and foremost, though the policies to be
interpreted in this case are in one sense matters of state law, federal law is clearly at
the heart of this dispute. Furthermore, “this factor favors abstention only where the
applicable state law is particularly complex or best left for state courts to resolve.”32
The state law issues raised by the admissions policies at issue here are not so difficult
that they could not be easily handled by this or any other federal court. And lastly,
though the Court is confident that the Georgia Superior Court is more than adequate
to protect the parties’ rights, “[t]he fact that both forums are adequate to protect the

30

See AMMIC, 743 F.2d at 1525 (holding litigation to be “inevitably
piecemeal” in a case involving claims between two parties who were co-defendants
in a state action).
31

See Jackson-Platts v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 727 F.3d 1127, 1143
(11th Cir. 2013).
32

Id.

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parties' rights merely renders this factor neutral.”33 After carefully reviewing all of the
Colorado River factors, none of them compel abstention, and most expressly disfavor
it. Therefore, the Defendants’ motion to stay this case pending the outcome of the
related state action is denied.
B. Motion to Dismiss
Having denied the Defendants’ motion to stay, the Court now turns to the
Motion to Dismiss. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants’ policies violate both the
Equal Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause.34 The Supreme Court has said that
the Equal Protection Clause means “that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.”35 Of course, this does not mean that the Plaintiffs need to be similar in
all respects to others who are eligible for admission to Georgia’s selective educational
institutions, nor that the government cannot distinguish among its citizens at all.
Rather, the Equal Protection Clause “simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from
treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.”36

33

Id. (quoting Noonan S., Inc. v. Volusia Cty., 841 F.2d 380, 383 (11th Cir.

1988)).
34

See U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2

35

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

36

Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (emphasis added).

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The only relevant factor in this case is whether the Plaintiffs are “lawfully
present.”37 Both parties agree that federal law is controlling in the arena of
immigration law, but they disagree on what the law is and whether the Board of
Regents’ policies run afoul of it. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs are not
similarly situated to other noncitizens eligible for admission because DACA is a
creature of prosecutorial discretion, not statute. As a result, DACA recipients’
presence in the United States is not “lawful,” as defined by the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (“INA”), but rather a reflection of the President’s decision to
abstain from enforcing the Act under certain circumstances. The Plaintiffs,
meanwhile, contend that DACA has given them lawful presence and that they are
therefore similarly situated to other noncitizens, including refugees and asylees.38
Because DACA has made them lawfully present in the United States, the Plaintiffs
argue that the Defendants’ policy conflicts with federal law. The Plaintiffs’ Equal
Protection claim is therefore inextricably bound to whether Georgia’s policies are
preempted by DACA.

37

That is the only factor Georgia uses under the challenged policy to
determine whether a student is considered for admission.
38

See Compl. ¶ 60.

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“Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both
the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound
to respect.”39 At times, this principle can lead to conflict, but the “Supremacy Clause
provides a clear rule that federal law ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land...’”40 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to mean that Congress has the ability to
preempt state laws with which federal law comes into conflict.41 There are three types
of preemption: express, conflict, and field. Express preemption occurs when a statute
contains an express provision preempting state law.42 The parties agree that Congress
has not done so here. Conflict preemption occurs when it is either impossible to follow
both state and federal law, or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”43
Field preemption occurs when state law touches on a “field that Congress, acting
within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive

39

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012).

40

Id. (quoting U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2).

41

Id. at 2500-01.

42

Id.

43

Id. (quotations omitted).

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governance.”44 Importantly, however, the general assumption is that the “‘historic
police powers of the States’ are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.’”45
The Plaintiffs’ arguments for conflict preemption are unpersuasive. In order to
“stand[] as an obstacle” to congressional objectives, the Plaintiffs must point to a
“clear and manifest purpose of Congress,” which they fail to do.46 It is certainly the
case that federal regulations may, under certain circumstances, preempt state law.
Indeed, the Supreme Court “has recognized that an agency regulation with the force
of law can pre-empt conflicting state requirements.”47 But federal regulations only
have the force of law when they follow certain procedural requirements, like noticeand-comment rulemaking.48 “When Congress authorizes an agency to proceed through

44

Id. at 2501.

45

Id. at 2501 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230

(1947)).
46

The Plaintiffs do not argue that it is impossible to follow both federal and
state law here.
47

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009) (emphasis added).

48

See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203-04 (2015)
(stating that interpretive rules and policy statements do not carry the force of law). See
also River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citing United States v. Fifty–Three (53) Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th
Cir. 1982)).
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notice-and-comment rulemaking, that relatively formal administrative procedure is a
very good indicator that Congress intended the regulation to carry the force of law.”49
DACA, notably, did not go through notice-and-comment rulemaking, but was
announced through a simple policy memo. Therefore, DACA cannot be said to have
gone through the procedural rigors necessary to demonstrate a “clear and manifest
purpose of Congress” on its own terms.
Alternatively, the Plaintiffs contend that DHS has the authority to render an
alien lawfully present, and therefore entitled to all the benefits that come with that
designation, by way of the broad grants of power contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1103.50
Under the Plaintiffs’ view, because the INA gave DHS the power to enforce it,
Georgia’s policies frustrate a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” to grant DHS
broad discretion in granting deferred action status. But this argument is equally
lacking.

49

Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016).

50

See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (“[The Secretary] shall establish such
regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers; issue
such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out
his authority under the provisions of this chapter.”).
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The Fifth Circuit recently addressed this issue, and was upheld by an equally
divided Supreme Court.51 In that case, Texas sought a preliminary injunction against
DHS to prevent implementation of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and
Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”), a program similar to DACA. The plaintiffs
argued that the broad grants of authority contained in the INA, including 8 U.S.C. §
1103, authorized DHS to implement deferred action programs like DAPA and DACA.
But the Fifth Circuit disagreed, stating that “broad grants of authority...cannot
reasonably be construed as assigning decisions of vast economic and political
significance, such as [DACA], to an agency.”52 To view them otherwise would
undermine the very fabric of the INA itself, as it would give the President the ability
“to grant lawful presence and work authorization to any illegal alien in the United
States—an untenable position in light of the INA's intricate system of immigration
classifications and employment eligibility.”53 The Plaintiffs cite no other provision

51

Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an equally
divided court, U.S. v. Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2271, 2272, 195 L.Ed.2d 638 (2016) (per
curiam).
52

Id. at 183 (quotations omitted).

53

Id. The Court does not take any position whatsoever regarding the
constitutionality of DACA or the President’s executive authority to prioritize
deportations. This opinion is limited solely to the issue of whether such actions can
preempt state law.
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in the INA to show a clear and manifest purpose on the part of Congress to delegate
such broad authority to the Executive that would preempt state law.54
At most, DACA is a temporary reprieve from prosecution; it does not change
a recipient’s status and make them eligible for otherwise unavailable benefits.55 When
DHS uses the term “lawful presence” in DACA, it is using it for the limited purpose
of stating that recipients do not accrue “unlawful presence” for determining later
admissibility to the United States. Indeed, the DHS memo announcing the creation
of DACA expressly acknowledged that DACA “confers no substantive right,
immigration status or pathway to citizenship. Only the Congress, acting through its
legislative authority, can confer these rights.”56 And when given the opportunity to do

54

The only other statute the Plaintiffs cite outside of 8 U.S.C. § 1103 is a
narrow provision of the Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(c), 119 Stat.
231, which identifies deferred action recipients as being present in the United States
during a period of authorized stay, for the purpose of issuing state identification cards.
But as described below, “[t]his narrow provision also can’t be authority for the
proposition that the INA ‘delegated to the executive branch’ the wholesale authority
to preempt state law by declaring immigrants legal when they are not.” Arizona
Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 15-15307, 2017 WL 461503, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 2,
2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
55

See Texas, 809 F.3d at 167. See also Ga. Latino Alliance for Human
Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1258 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Deferred
action status, also known as non-priority status, amounts to, in practical application,
a reprieve for deportable aliens.”).
56

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A [Doc. 30-2].

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just that on multiple occasions, Congress has expressly declined to do so.57 The
Plaintiffs have failed to show a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” to grant the
Executive widespread authority to preempt state law in this area. If anything, Georgia
is using the exact same categories as federal law: the ones written by Congress. As
such, Georgia’s policies cannot conflict with DACA because DACA is not federal law
for preemption purposes.
Nor are the Plaintiffs’ field preemption arguments persuasive. The basic
concept of field preemption is “that States may not enter, in any respect, an area the
Federal Government has reserved for itself.”58 The “[p]ower to regulate immigration
is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”59 “The Government of the United
States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of
aliens.”60 But not “every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a

57

See Texas, 809 F.3d at 185 (“Congress has repeatedly declined to enact
the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act ("DREAM Act"),
features of which closely resemble DACA and DAPA.”).
58

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502.

59

DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) overruled on other grounds
by Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003)).
60

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.

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regulation of immigration.”61 Indeed, state law only becomes a “regulation of
immigration” if it “is essentially a determination of who should or should not be
admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may
remain.”62 Denying admission to selective Georgia institutions of higher education,
using the same categories Congress itself has adopted, is not tantamount to denying
admission to the country.
The cases the Plaintiffs cite to the contrary are easily distinguishable. The laws
at issue in United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (state law
making contracts with illegal immigrants unenforceable) and Lozano v. City of
Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013) (housing ordinances regulating residence based
on immigration status) were both preempted by federal law because they effectively
forced immigrants to move out of the state or locality. Admission to a selective
university, meanwhile, is not the same as the ability to contract or find housing. One
can hardly say that the inability to be admitted to the University of Georgia would
force someone to move out of the state, in the way that the inability to find housing
would. Indeed, Georgia does not even restrict admission to all institutes of higher
education; there are many collegiate programs in Georgia that the Plaintiffs might be
61

DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355.

62

Id.

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admitted to. And unlike the policies at issue in Hispanic Interest Coal. of Alabama v.
Bentley, No. 5:11-CV-2484-SLB, 2011 WL 5516953, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28,
2011), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Hispanic Interest Coal. of
Alabama v. Governor of Alabama, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012), the policies in this
case do not purport to come up with new classifications of immigrants.63
The Supreme Court has stated that it “will not presume that Congress, in
enacting the INA, intended to oust state authority to regulate...in a manner consistent
with pertinent federal laws.”64 In this case, Georgia’s policy is consistent with
pertinent federal law, in that it adopts the categories and classifications of aliens
contemplated by Congress in the INA. Nothing in the INA suggests that Congress has
delegated the authority to designate an entirely new class of persons as lawfully
present. Because Georgia follows federal law, the state policies are not preempted.
Returning to the Equal Protection analysis, the Plaintiffs cannot be said to be
similarly situated to other noncitizens who are eligible for admission under the policy
because they do not have lawful status and are not lawfully present as defined by

63

The Alabama policies denied admission to public postsecondary
educational institutions to anyone who was not lawfully present. However, the
original policies defined lawfully present as possessing “lawful permanent residence
or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa.”
64

DeCanas, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976).

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Congress. Without being similarly situated, the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim must
also fail.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First
Amended Complaint [Doc. 52] is GRANTED. The Defendants’ Motion to Stay
Proceedings [Doc. 72] is DENIED. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 30] and
the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 38] are DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED, this 15 day of May, 2017.

/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge

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