Hajiani v. Airtran Airways Inc.
Filing
24
ORDER granting Defendant's AirTran Airways' 17 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 5/17/2017. (btql)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
SALIM HAJIANI,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:16-CV-3494-TWT
AIRTRAN AIRWAYS INC.
Corporation Service Company,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a pro se civil rights action in which the Plaintiff Salim Hajiani alleges
that he was discriminated against because of his race when AirTran would not allow
him to board a flight. It is before the Court on the Defendant AirTran Airways’
Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 17]. For the following reasons, the Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. 17] is GRANTED.
I. Background
The Plaintiff alleges that he purchased a ticket from AirTran for flight number
1110 from Atlanta, Georgia to San Francisco, California, departing on September 17,
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2014.1 On the day of the flight, the Plaintiff proceeded through security without any
problems.2 When he approached the gate to board the plane, the Plaintiff was
allegedly told he would not be allowed on the plane because the employees did not
“feel comfortable with him.”3 The Plaintiff alleges that he demanded to speak to a
supervisor, who questioned the Plaintiff “about his background (race and religion),”
and told him he would not be allowed on the plane.4
On September 16, 2016, the Plaintiff filed a handwritten complaint (the
“Original Complaint”).5 The Original Complaint was only two pages in length and did
not contain any factual allegations or legal claims against AirTran. In an order
approving the Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Magistrate
Judge also ordered the Plaintiff to file a complete copy of his Complaint, noting that
“the Complaint appears to be missing pages and currently contains no factual
allegations.”6 In response, the Plaintiff then filed a new complaint (“Amended
1
Compl. at 6 [Doc. 8].
2
Id. at 6-7.
3
Id. at 7.
4
Id.
5
[Doc. 1].
6
Order Granting Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, at
1 [Doc. 2].
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Complaint”), one which was entirely typed, that was received by the Clerk’s office on
September 30, 2016.7 And then finally, the Plaintiff filed another complaint (the
“Third Complaint”) on October 11, 2016.8 AirTran executed a waiver of service on
November 22, 2016,9 and filed its answer denying liability on December 19, 2016.10
The Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and
compensatory and punitive damages for AirTran’s alleged violations of: (1) 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981; (2) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (3) the Georgia Civil Rights
Act, 1964.11 AirTran now moves to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that his
federal law claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and that his state law claim
does not exist.
II. Legal Standard
A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears that
the facts alleged fail to state a “plausible” claim for relief.12 A complaint may survive
7
[Doc. 3].
8
[Doc. 8].
9
[Doc. 10].
10
[Doc. 11].
11
Compl. at 8-11 [Doc. 8].
12
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however, even if it is “improbable” that
a plaintiff would be able to prove those facts; even if the possibility of recovery is
extremely “remote and unlikely.”13 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must
accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.14 Generally, notice pleading is all that is required for a valid
complaint.15 Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only give the defendant fair
notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests.16
III. Discussion
A. § 1981 and Title VI Claims17
AirTran first moves to dismiss the Plaintiff’s federal claims, arguing that they
are barred by the statute of limitations. Neither § 1981 nor Title VI has an established
13
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
14
See Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American
Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir. 1983); see also
Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir.
1994) (noting that at the pleading stage, the plaintiff “receives the benefit of
imagination”).
15
See Lombard’s, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986).
16
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
17
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
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statute of limitation. “When Congress has not established a time limitation for a
federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation
as federal law...”18 In deciding which state statute of limitations to apply, “federal
courts must first ‘characterize the essence of the claim in the pending case.’”19 The
Supreme Court has held that Ҥ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury
actions” for the purpose of determining the appropriate state statute of limitations.20
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the Plaintiff’s Title VI claims are also best
classified as personal injury actions.21 The applicable statute of limitations for
personal injury actions in Georgia is two years.22
The Plaintiff clearly filed the Original Complaint before the statute of
limitations deadline.23 However, because the Original Complaint contained no factual
allegations or legal claims whatsoever, the question is whether the Amended
Complaint and the Third Complaint relate back. The Magistrate Judge, believing the
18
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985).
19
Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157, 159 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268).
20
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280.
21
See Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996).
22
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.
23
The Plaintiff filed the Original Complaint on September 16, 2016. The
statute of limitations ran out on September 17, 2016.
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Original Complaint was missing pages, ordered the Plaintiff to re-file a complete
complaint. The Amended Complaint did contain factual allegations and legal claims,
but because it was typed, contained thirteen pages to the Original Complaint’s two,
and was not simply a reproduction of the Original Complaint, AirTran argues that it
is a completely new complaint and should not relate back.
Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that an amended
pleading will relate back when “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in
the original pleading...”24 This rule is generally permissive: “[a]s long as the amended
complaint refers to the same transaction or occurrence that formed the basis for the
original complaint and the defendant was put on notice of the claim by the first
complaint, there will be no bar to amendment.”25 While courts must balance the rights
of both plaintiffs and defendants, “[t]he critical issue in Rule 15(c) determinations is
whether the original complaint gave notice to the defendant of the claim now being
asserted.”26 “[I]f the litigant has been advised at the outset of the general facts from
24
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
25
Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1968) (emphasis
added and quotations omitted).
26
Davenport v. United States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1345 n.8 (11th Cir. 2000)
(quotations omitted).
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which the belatedly asserted claim arises, the amendment will relate back even though
the statute of limitations may have run in the interim.”27
The problem, of course, is that the Original Complaint contained no facts
whatsoever, either general or specific. In this way, the Original Complaint is
analogous to the notice of right to sue letters in the employment discrimination
context. In Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (1984), a
plaintiff received a notice of right to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission that informed the plaintiff that if she desired to commence a civil action
she must do so within 90 days.28 The plaintiff filed the notice with the district court,
but did not file a complaint that outlined the nature of her claim until well after the 90
day deadline had expired.29 The Supreme Court eventually held that because the right
to sue letter did not give the defendant notice of what her claim was, it was not an
original pleading that could be rehabilitated by Rule 15(c).30
27
Tri-Ex Enterprises, Inc. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 586 F. Supp.
930, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
28
Baldwin County, 466 U.S. at 148.
29
Id. at 148-49.
30
Id. at 150 n.3. Cf. Tri-State Enterprises, 586 F. Supp. at 932 (finding that
sufficient notice was given because of the issues framed in the original pleading).
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Now, at first blush, the Original Complaint seems to be simply missing pages,
as the first page ends with a heading for a preliminary statement before abruptly
jumping to a conclusion at the start of page two. While the Court may have been
inclined to allow the Plaintiff to re-file, correcting what seems to be a mistake, the
Amended Complaint is clearly not a simple re-filing of the Original Complaint. Not
only is it typed, but the text on the first page is also completely different. Rather than
re-filing the Original Complaint, the Plaintiff took the opportunity to file a completely
new one. Nor is this a situation where the Court has led the Plaintiff to believe that he
has done everything required of him, as was the case in Carlile v. S. Routt Sch. Dist.
RE 3-J, 652 F.2d 981 (10th Cir. 1981), despite the Magistrate Judge's order requiring
the Plaintiff to re-file the Original Complaint. In Carlile, the district court told the
plaintiff well before the 90 day deadline ran out that her filing of the right to sue letter
commenced the action.31 By contrast, the Plaintiff in this case took a calculated risk
and waited until the penultimate day before the deadline expired to file his Original
Complaint. And when given the opportunity to correct his mistake by re-filing his
Original Complaint, he instead chose to file an entirely new one. This puts the
Plaintiff in the company of the plaintiff in Baldwin County. “One who fails to act
31
Carlile, 652 F.2d at 983.
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diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.”32 In
order to determine whether the Amended Complaint relates back to the Original
Complaint, therefore, the Court can only look to the Original Complaint as filed.
Upon doing so, there is nothing that can be said to have put AirTran on notice
of the Plaintiff’s § 1981 and Title VI claims. The Original Complaint contains no legal
claims or factual allegations, and there were no “general facts” for AirTran to have
been made aware of. Because AirTran was not put on notice of the Plaintiff’s claims
by the Original Complaint, the Original Complaint is not considered an original
pleading. The filing of the Amended Complaint is therefore considered the
commencement of the action. Because the Amended Complaint was filed after the two
year period of the applicable statute of limitations for the federal claims, the Plaintiff’s
federal claims are barred and must be dismissed.
B. Georgia Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Plaintiff has also asserted a state law claim alleging that AirTran violated
the Georgia Civil Rights Act of 1964. Unfortunately for the Plaintiff, there is no
Georgia Civil Rights Act of 1964. In support of his claim, the Plaintiff seems to be
citing Section 2.90.030 of the Hall County Code, which appears to adopt certain
32
Baldwin County, 466 U.S. at 151.
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portions of the federal Civil Rights Act.33 Not only does this section of the Hall
County Code relate to employment discrimination, which is not at issue here, but the
Plaintiff also makes no allegations that any incident occurred in Hall County at all. As
a result, the Plaintiff’s claims for violation of the Georgia Civil Rights Act of 1964 are
dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant AirTran Airways’ Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. 17] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 17 day of May, 2017.
/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge
33
See HALL COUNTY, CODE § 2.90.030.
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