Alburkat et al v. Worldpay US, Inc.
Filing
63
OPINION AND ORDER granting 26 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Michael L. Brown on 10/16/18. (jpa)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
Alghadeer Bakery & Market, Inc.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 1:16-cv-03627
Michael L. Brown
United States District Judge
Worldpay US, Inc.,
Defendant.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
This commercial-contract dispute is before the Court on Defendant
Worldpay US, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 26).
For the reasons below, the Court grants that motion.
I. Background
Plaintiff is a bakery in Michigan. Dkt. 3 at ¶ 14. Defendant is a
payment-processing company. Id. at ¶ 9. The parties entered into a
contract known as a Customer Processing Agreement – or CPA – in which
Defendant agreed to provide payment-processing services for Plaintiff’s
credit-card transactions and Plaintiff agreed to pay Defendant various
fees. (Dkts. 23; 26-2). Pretty quickly into their relationship, Plaintiff
believed Defendant was charging excessive fees, so Plaintiff tried to
terminate the CPA. Dkt. 3 at ¶¶ 45-67. Defendant refused. Id. at 55-57.
Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging that: (1) four clauses of the CPA
are unenforceable under Georgia law; (2) Defendant breached the CPA
by charging excessive fees and not providing proper notice; and (3)
Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for unjust enrichment (alternatively to the
breach-of-contract claim).
Id. at ¶¶ 83-106.
The Court granted
Defendant’s motion to dismiss part of Count 2. (Dkt. 16). The Court
declined to rule on the motion to dismiss Counts 1 and 3 because the
parties could not agree on the operative CPA. Id. After the parties
engaged in limited discovery, they agreed on the controlling contract, and
Defendant moved for summary judgment on Counts 1 and 3 of Plaintiff’s
complaint. (Dkt. 26).1
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “No
The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion under Rule 56(d) to defer summary
judgment pending more discovery. (Dkt. 38).
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2
genuine issue of material fact exists if a party has failed to ‘make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element . . . on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” AFL-CIO v. City of
Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1186-87 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). An issue is genuine when the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of asserting the
basis for his motion. Id. at 323. The movant is not, however, required to
negate the non-movant’s claim. Instead, the moving party may meet his
burden by “showing – that is, pointing to the district court – that there is
an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at
324. After the moving party has carried its burden, the non-moving party
must present competent evidence that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Id.
The Court views all evidence and factual inferences in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d
1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). But the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
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supported motion for summary judgment. “The requirement is that there
be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248
(emphasis in original).
III. Analysis
A. Count 1 – Declaratory Judgment
Plaintiff contends in Count 1 of its complaint that the CPA was a
non-negotiable, take-it-or-leave-it contract with four clauses that are
unenforceable under Georgia law. Dkt. 27 at 2. Plaintiff thus seeks a
declaratory judgment invalidating each of those provisions. Defendant
argues that all provisions of the CPA are valid and enforceable under
Georgia law. The Court examines each provision individually.
i. Section 9.3
Section 9.3 of the CPA is a limitation-of-liability clause that
provides:
9.3
Limitation of Liability.
UNDER NO
CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL THE AGGREGATE FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF WORLDPAY AND THE BANK FOR
ANY FAILURE OF PERFORMANCE BY WORLDPAY OR
THE BANK UNDER THIS AGREEMENT EXCEED THE
FEES OR CHARGES PAID TO WORLDPAY BY CUSTOMER
FOR THE TRANSACTION OR ACTIVITY THAT IS OR WAS
THE SUBJECT OF THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF
PERFORMANCE AND IN ANY EVENT, SUCH FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
SHALL
NOT
EXCEED
THE
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AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FEES AND CHARGES PAID TO
WORLDPAY PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT IN THE
THREE MONTH PERIOD PRECEDING THE EVENT THAT
GAVE RISE TO THE CLAIM OF LIABILITY.
FOR
PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION 9.3, FEES OR CHARGES OF
THE PAYMENT NETWORKS OR OTHER THIRD PARTIES
PASSED THROUGH TO CUSTOMER PURSUANT TO THIS
AGREEMENT SHALL NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE
CALCULATION OF FEES AND CHARGES PAID TO
WORLDPAY.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE BANK,
WORLDPAY,
OR
THEIR
RESPECTIVE
AGENTS,
OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, EMPLOYEES OR AFFILIATES
BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL,
CONSEQUENTIAL,
PUNITIVE,
OR
EXPEMPLARY
DAMAGES OR CLAIMS BY CUSTOMER OR ANY THIRD
PARTY RELATIVE TO THE TRANSACTIONS OR
ACTIVITIES HEREUNDER, WHETHER OR NOT SUCH
DAMAGES WERE FORESEEABLE OR SUCH PERSON HAS
BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGES.
Dkt. 23 at 7.
In Georgia, “absent a public policy interest, contracting parties are
free to contract to waive numerous and substantial rights, including the
right to seek recourse in the event of a breach by the other party.”
Piedmont Arbors Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. BPI Constr. Co., 397 S.E.2d 611,
612 (Ga. App. 1990) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Georgia
law states that, to be enforceable, a limitation-of-liability clause “must be
explicit, prominent, clear and unambiguous.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. ADT,
LLC, No. 1:15-cv-517, 2015 WL 5737371, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2015)
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(internal quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff contends that
Section 9.3 falls short of this standard. Dkt. 27 at 22.
The CPA is seven pages long. Dkt. 23 at 3-9. Each page has two
columns of text. See id. Section 9.3 is located on the bottom of the first
column on the fifth page and continues to the top of the second column
on that page. Id. at 7. The length of the CPA and the location of Section
9.3 may suggest that the limitation of liability is not prominent. But it
has many other characteristics that make it explicit, prominent, and
clear.
First, this section of the CPA is set off in its own paragraph that
prominently announces a limitation of liability. It appears under the
conspicuous heading in all capital letters and bold font: “SECTION 9.
INDEMNIFICATION, DISCLAIMER, LIMITED LIABILITY.”
also has a subheading in bold font: “Limitation of Liability.”
It
The
section is not hidden or less prominent than other text. Georgia law
recognizes these features as making a limitation-of-liability clause
prominent and explicit.
See Imaging Sys. Intern, Inc., v. Magnetic
Resonance Plus, Inc., 490 S.E.2d 124, 128 (Ga. App. 1997) (finding
limitation-of-liability clause enforceable because it was “set off in its own
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paragraph with the heading ‘LIMITATION OF LIABILITY’ and with the
key language all capitalized.”). Indeed, Georgia courts have stricken
clauses that do not contain these prominent features. See JVC Am., Inc.
v. Guardsmark LLC, No. 1:05-cv-0681, 2006 WL 2443735, at *5 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 22, 2006) (holding limitation-of-liability clause unenforceable where
it was neither set off in its own paragraph nor did it use any boldface type
to “distinguish some terms and conditions from others”); Parkside Ctr.,
Ltd. v. Chicagoland Vending, Inc., 552 S.E.2d 557, 560 (Ga. App. 2001)
(refusing to enforce exculpatory clause not in a separate paragraph, had
no paragraph heading, and was written in same typeface as all
surrounding paragraphs).
Second, the text of Section 9.3 appears in all-capital letters. Only
one other section of the contract appears in capital letters, the provision
directly above Section 9.3, entitled “9.2 Disclaimer of Warranties.”2
The capital letters with which Defendant printed Section 9.3 bolster its
prominence. The capitalization of Section 9.2 does not diminish this
Although not relevant for this motion, the “Disclaimer of Warranties”
clause is also subject to a conspicuousness requirement. See Leland
Indus., Inc. v. Suntek Indus., Inc., 362 S.E.2d 441 (Ga. App. 1987). That
may explain the drafter’s use of capital letters for Section 9.2.
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finding of prominence because no subsections other than 9.2 and 9.3
appear in capital letters. Compare Allstate Ins. Co., 2015 WL 5737371 at
*5 (finding exculpatory clause printed in capital letters not prominent
where “much of the [c]ontract” also appeared in capital letters).
Third, the operative language of the limitation-of-liability does not
appear “far removed” from the heading announcing its presence. Cf. id.
(finding exculpatory clause not prominent where “the important limiting
language . . . [is] far removed from [the] heading”). Instead, Section 9.3
states from the start that it limits Defendant’s liability for “any failure of
performance . . . under this agreement.” Dkt. 23 at 7. Thus, the operative
language features prominently within the already prominent clause.
Finally, Section 9.3 uses clear and unambiguous language. It limits
Defendant’s liability to the fees and charges paid to it for any transaction
or occurrence that might give rise to any claim, not to exceed total fees
and charges in the three-month period preceding the event. Id. It also
exempts third-party fees and charges paid to Defendant. Id. Section 9.3
is straightforward and clear.
In sum, Section 9.3 is explicit, prominent, clear, and unambiguous.
It is strikingly similar to other limitation-of-liability provisions enforced
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by Georgia courts. The Court enforces it as written and grants summary
judgment against Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim that Section 9.3
is unenforceable.
ii. Section 7.5
Section 7.5 of the CPA requires Plaintiff to notify Defendant of any
overpayments, underpayments, or discrepancies within thirty days and
prevents Plaintiff from recovering any wrongful payments not reported
within that time:
Customer shall be solely responsible for reviewing its
statements from WorldPay (including statements provided
online) and for reporting to WorldPay in writing, within 30
days of Customer’s receipt . . . of any statement from
WorldPay, any underpayments, overpayments or other
discrepancies of any items reflected on such statements or
related to the period covered by such statement, including,
without limitation, discrepancies between the volume and/or
value of transactions that Customer actually processed during
the period indicated by the statement.
Customer
acknowledges and agrees that WorldPay and the Bank shall
not be liable or otherwise responsible to Customer, and shall
have no obligation to reimburse Customer, for any
underpayment to Customer or other discrepancy that is not
reported to WorldPay in writing within 30 days of Customer’s
receipt of the applicable statement.
Dkt. 23 at 6.
Plaintiff contends that this section is unenforceable under Georgia
law for several reasons. First, Plaintiff contends that this provision is
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not prominent enough. Plaintiff seeks to apply the prominence standard
– adopted for evaluating limitation-of-liability and exculpatory clauses –
to this notice provision.
But Plaintiff cites no case supporting this
argument, and the Court could find none.
To the contrary, courts applying Georgia law routinely enforce such
provisions without applying any prominence test. See, e.g., Triad Constr.
Co., Inc. v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-3581, 2016 WL 9051798, at
*4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2016) (discussing Georgia courts’ enforcement of
notice provisions and enforcing notice provision without applying
prominence test); In re Colony Square Co., 843 F.2d 479, 481 (11th Cir.
1988) (“when a default clause contains a notice provision, it must be
strictly followed . . . and summary judgment is warranted if notice is not
given”); Pillar Dev., Inc. v. Fuqua Constr. Co., Inc., 645 S.E.2d 64, 66 (Ga.
App. 2007) (holding that “[w]here a contract contains provisions
requiring written notice of a claim for breach, the failure to give notice as
required or to show waiver by the party entitled to notice is an
independent bar to the maintenance of a successful cause of action on the
contract”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Orkin Exterminating Co.
v. Stevens, 203 S.E.2d 587 (Ga. App. 1973)).
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This Court likewise declines to extend the prominence requirement
to a species of contractual provision to which Georgia courts have not
applied it. Allstate Ins. Co. v. ADT, LLC, 194 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1337
(N.D. Ga. 2016) (declining to extend prominence test to subrogationwaiver provisions and recognizing that Georgia contract law should be
interpreted “consistent with Georgia’s respect for ‘parties’ sacrosanct
freedom of contract’ ”).3
Plaintiff next argues that Section 7.5 is unconscionable. Georgia
law distinguishes between procedural and substantive unconscionability.
NEC Techs., Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1996). But, to
invalidate a contractual provision as unconscionable, Georgia law
requires “a certain quantum” of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability. Id. at 773 n.6. Georgia courts set a high bar for
Plaintiff’s argument that the term “items” should be interpreted to refer
only to card-payment transactions also fails. As noted in the Court’s
order denying Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) motion, Section 7.5 “unambiguously
applies to more than just card transactions when discussing a customer’s
discrepancy-reporting obligations.” Dkt. 38 at 7-8. A customer like
Plaintiff has the obligation to report all discrepancies – not just card
payments – within thirty days from receipt of the statement. If the
customer does not, “WorldPay and the Bank shall not be liable or
otherwise responsible” to the customer for any such discrepancies. Dkt.
23 at 6.
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unconscionability. Clark v. Aaron’s, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1310
(N.D. Ga. 2012).
The Georgia Supreme Court has explained, “[a]n
unconscionable contract is such an agreement as no sane man not acting
under a delusion would make, and that no honest man would take
advantage of.” R.L. Kimsey Cotton Co., Inc. v. Ferguson, 214 S.E.2d 360,
363 (Ga. 1975) (internal quotations omitted).
Put differently, an
unconscionable term “shock[s] the conscience.” BMW Fin. Servs., N.A.,
Inc. v. Smoke Rise Corp., 486 S.E.2d 629, 630 (Ga. App. 1997).4
In assessing substantive unconscionability, the Court “looks to the
contractual terms themselves.” NEC Techs., Inc., 478 S.E.2d at 771. The
Court should consider “the commercial reasonableness of the contract
terms, the purpose and effect of the terms, the allocation of the risks
between the parties, and similar public policy concerns.” Id. at 772.
As explained above, Georgia courts routinely enforce notice
provisions like the one in the CPA. This suggests such provisions are not
– per se – unconscionable. See Triad Constr. Co., Inc., 2016 WL 9051798
Because the Court finds that the CPA’s provisions are not substantively
unconscionable, the Court need not address whether they are
procedurally unconscionable. Clark, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1311 (recognizing
that unconscionability claim fails as a matter of law when party fails to
show substantive unconscionability).
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at *4 (rejecting claim that notice provision was unconscionable because
the “legal argument is without support”). Nor does the Court find the
CPA so commercially unreasonable that it “shock[s] the conscience.”
BMW Fin. Servs., N.A., Inc., 486 S.E.2d at 630.
Apparently, Plaintiff and Defendant agreed Plaintiff would be in
the best position to review the monthly statements and identify
discrepancies.
Their decision is not shocking.
Plaintiff would only
receive one statement per month and would have familiarity with the
transactions that it conducted at the bakery. Defendant, on the other
hand, issued many (perhaps thousands) of statements per month and had
no first-hand knowledge of the bakery’s transactions.
The parties’
decision to allocate responsibility for identifying errors to Plaintiff was
reasonable.
So was the decision to require Plaintiff to notify Defendant of any
errors within thirty days. After all, it would be easier for the parties to
resolve disputes while the information is current rather than allowing
time to run, information to become stale, or errors to amass. See Triad
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 679 F. App’x 748, 753 n.6 (11th
Cir. 2017) (recognizing that a notice provision “ensur[es] that the party
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defending the claim has the opportunity to investigate the underlying
facts while they are fresh”).
The parties also decided that Defendant will not be liable for
unreported discrepancies – a simple way of ensuring that Plaintiff
fulfilled
its
obligation
to
review
the
statements
and
identify
discrepancies. As explained above, Georgia courts have not found such a
requirement unconscionable. And while Section 7.5 requires Plaintiff to
provide notice of discrepancies within thirty days, it does not require
Plaintiff to file a claim against Defendant within that time. Plaintiff has
plenty of time to resolve any discrepancy, whether through a lawsuit or
otherwise. The Court does not find the parties’ decision to contract in
this way commercially unreasonable, shocking, or appalling. The Court
thus grants summary judgment against Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment
claim alleging that Section 7.5 is unenforceable.
iii. Section 11.9
Next, Plaintiff challenges Section 11.9.
The provision, entitled
“Entire Agreement; Modification, Waiver; Section References,” allows
Defendant to modify the agreement (including fees) with notice, but also
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allows Plaintiff to terminate the CPA without paying a termination fee
in some situations:
WorldPay and the Bank shall have the right to modify the
terms and conditions of this Agreement, which right shall
include, without limitation, the ability to modify, amend, or
supplement the fees set forth on the Customer Processing
Agreement, by providing notice thereof to Customer (the
“Change Notice”).
Such modifications, amendments, or
supplements shall become effective upon the date stated in the
Change Notice, provided the date shall not be fewer than 15
days after the date of the Change Notice, unless the notice
relates to a change in the Rules made by the Payment
Network, a change in the fees charged by the Payment
Networks, or a change in applicable laws, rules or regulations
(collectively, a “Third Party Change”), in which case the
modification, amendment or supplement shall be effective
upon the earlier of the date stated in the Change Notice or
upon the date the Third Party Change is or was implemented
by the Payment Network or applicable governing authority. In
the event of any modification of this Agreement by WorldPay
or the Bank as contemplated in this Section 11.9, Customer
shall the right to terminate this Agreement, without the
payment of any early termination fee otherwise payable
pursuant to Section 10.3, by providing written notice thereof
to WorldPay and the Bank, provided such notice must be given
within 15 days following the date of the Change Notice, and
provided further, no such right to terminate shall apply in the
event the modification relates to a Third Party Change.
Dkt. 23 at 9.
Plaintiff claims that Section 11.9 is illusory, lacks mutuality,
violates public policy, and is unconscionable. Plaintiff cites no authority
to support its claim. See Dkt. 27 at 23-25. Instead, Plaintiff argues that
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the way Defendant increased fees somehow renders the provision
substantively unconscionable.
As the Court noted in its order on
Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) motion, Plaintiff’s argument identifies theories of
breach and alleges that Defendant failed to follow its obligations under
Section 11.9.
(Dkt. 38).
But unconscionability does not turn on
performance; the question is whether the terms were unconscionable “at
the time of the making of the contract.” Dkt. 38 at 12 (quoting NEC
Techs., Inc., 478 S.E.2d at 771).
Section 11.9 does not “shock the conscience.” BMW Fin. Servs.,
N.A., Inc., 486 S.E.2d at 630. Although it allows Defendant to change the
terms (including fees) of the CPA, Section 11.9 requires Defendant to
provide notice to Plaintiff before the changes take place. It also allows
Plaintiff the opportunity to terminate the contract without a penalty if it
does not like the changes. This is a fair bargain. It is not something that
only a man “acting under a delusion would make” or that “no honest man
would take advantage of.” R.L. Kimsey, 214 S.E.2d at 363.
That the contract does not allow for early termination (without the
fee) if a Payment Network makes a change does not render the provision
any less enforceable. The parties allocated to Plaintiff the risk that a
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Payment Network might change fees and that those changes might
impact fees due under the CPA. The parties agreed to the allocation and
it does not shock the conscience.
Although alleging in the complaint that Section 11.9 is “illusory” or
“lacks mutuality,” Plaintiff does not advance those allegations in its
Response to Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See
Dkt. 27. And they would not succeed.
“[A] contract is invalid when one of the parties merely makes an
‘illusory promise’ to perform. An ‘illusory promise exists when ‘words of
promise . . . by their terms make performance entirely optional with the
‘promisor’ whatever may happen, or whatever course of conduct in other
respects he may pursue.” Douglas v. Johnson Real Estate Inv’rs, LLC,
No. 1:11-cv-567, 2011 WL 13177544, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 11, 2011)
(internal quotations omitted, alterations in original).
The Eleventh
Circuit has found that an agreement is not illusory under Georgia law
when a party may modify the contract only upon notice. See Caley v.
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1375 (11th Cir. 2005)
(finding change-in-terms provision enforceable where party must provide
notice before modifying). So too here. Defendant must comply with the
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CPA. And the change-in-terms provision requires Defendant to give the
customer notice upon any change in terms: it is not illusory or lacking
mutuality of obligation.
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants summary judgment
against Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim that Section 11.9 is
unenforceable.
iv. Section 11.4
Finally, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Section 11.4 is
unenforceable. This section, entitled “Attorneys’ Fees” provides:
In the event the Bank or WorldPay shall employ legal counsel
or bring an action at law or other proceeding against Customer
to enforce any of the terms, covenants, or conditions hereof,
Customer shall pay to the Bank and/or WorldPay its
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs so incurred.
Dkt. 23 at 8. Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claim is moot because
Defendant stipulated that it would not “seek to recover fees on
unmeritorious claims or defenses.” Dkt. 31 at 11. But the stipulation,
even if binding, does not resolve the dispute. Plaintiff challenges the
provision as unconscionable if Plaintiff would have to pay Defendant’s
legal fees at all for this action under Section 11.4.
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The Court finds that Section 11.4 does not apply here.
The
provision – by its terms – applies when Defendant hires legal counsel or
sues to enforce any terms of the CPA. Dkt. 23 at 8. Defendant has not
done that.
Instead, Plaintiff filed this suit and Defendant filed no
counterclaim to “enforce” any provision of the contract. Section 11.4
simply does not apply.
Even if the phrase “to enforce” were ambiguous, the Court would
reach the same interpretation. Georgia law requires courts to interpret
ambiguous contract terms against the drafter.
Kennedy v. Brand
Banking Co., 266 S.E.2d 154, 157 (Ga. 1980). Defendant drafted the
CPA. So construing any ambiguity in the phrase “to enforce” against
Defendant, would lead to the conclusion that a customer would only be
responsible for WorldPay’s attorneys’ fees when WorldPay starts an
action against that customer. Because Section 11.4 does not apply, the
Court need not address the unconscionability issue and dismisses
Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim with respect to Section 11.4.
B. Count 3 – Unjust Enrichment
In Count 3, Plaintiff brings a claim for unjust enrichment, in the
alternative to its breach-of-contract claim if the Court finds the CPA
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unenforceable.
The parties agree that “[u]nder Georgia law, unjust
enrichment is only available in the absence of an enforceable contract.”
Goldstein v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1347 (N.D.
Ga. 2009). Because the Court has determined that the Sections 7.5, 9.3,
11.4, and 11.9 of the CPA are enforceable, Georgia law bars Plaintiff’s
unjust enrichment claim.
IV. Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Dkt. 26).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 16, 2018
Atlanta, Georgia
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