Matute-Castellanos v. Geico Indeminity Company et al
Filing
36
OPINION AND ORDER granting 27 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on 6/29/17. (jkl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ROSINDA
MATUTE-CASTELLANOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:16-CV-3756-TWT
GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, et
al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action for false arrest. It is before the Court on the Defendant GEICO
Indemnity Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 27]. For the reasons
stated below, the Defendant GEICO’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 27] is
GRANTED.
I. Background
This case stems from a car accident that occurred on March 8, 2012, between
the Plaintiff Rosinda Matute-Castellanos and an insured of the Defendant GEICO.1
1
Def.’s Stat. of Mat. Facts ¶ 1. The Plaintiff, rather than filing her
response to the Defendant’s Stat. of Mat. Facts and her own statement of additional
facts separately, as required by Local Rule 56.1(B)(2), seems to have merged them
into one document. These new facts are not separately numbered or concisely written,
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In April of 2012, GEICO issued payment to the Plaintiff for the total loss of her car.2
In return, the Plaintiff signed title of the vehicle over to GEICO.3 The Plaintiff agreed
to make her vehicle available for pickup at her apartment, located at 3207 Henderson
Mill Road, Atlanta, GA 30341.4
On April 2, 2012, a driver from Insurance Auto Auctions, a company hired by
GEICO to take possession of the vehicle, attempted to retrieve the vehicle from 3207
Henderson Mill Road, but could not locate it.5 On April 27, 2012, Insurance Auto
and many are simply argumentative. In addition, the Plaintiff’s Brief in Response to
the Def.’s Motion for Summary Judgment contains numerous allegations which are
not contained in the Plaintiff’s Objection. In the interest of deciding this case on the
merits, the Court will consider the objections and facts laid out in the Plaintiff’s
response. However, as required by Local Rule 56.1(B)(1), the Court will “not consider
any fact...set out only in the brief and not in the...statement of undisputed facts.”
2
Id. at ¶ 2.
3
Id. at ¶ 3.
4
Id. at ¶ 4.
5
Id. at ¶ 5. The Plaintiff maintains that she “left the vehicle at 3207
Henderson Mill Drive, Apartment H2,” which she says is the address she told the
police. See Pl.’s Obj. to Def.’s Stat. of Mat. Facts ¶ 2 [Doc. 33-2] (emphasis added).
As will become clear, this is a common response by the Plaintiff. However, the
records the Plaintiff cites do not support her allegation. Indeed, there is no 3207
Henderson Mill Drive in the United States. See Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Objection to
Def.’s Stat. of Mat. Facts ¶ 5. Nor does the apparent discrepancy between the
apartment numbers matter. Tenants in the Plaintiff’s apartment complex park in a
common open air parking lot located at 3207 Henderson Mill Road. Thus, the location
of the car is not dependent on what apartment she lives in. Id.
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Auctions made a second attempt to locate and retrieve the vehicle, and again it was
not found.6 On May 3, 2012, an employee of Insurance Auto Auctions spoke with the
Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff agreed to make the vehicle available for pickup at 3207
Henderson Mill Road the next day between noon and 5:00 p.m.7 When the agent for
Insurance Auto Auctions arrived, once again the vehicle could not be located, and the
Plaintiff refused to speak with the driver.8
On May 15, 2012, GEICO assigned Mike Mitchell, a senior investigator with
GEICO’s Special Investigations Unit, to locate the vehicle.9 Mitchell was aware of the
previous unsuccessful attempts to retrieve the vehicle.10 During the course of his
investigation, Mitchell attempted to contact the Plaintiff, canvassed the apartments at
3207 Henderson Mill Road and the Plaintiff’s previous addresses, interviewed
employees at the management office of 3207 Henderson Mill Road, reviewed the tow
logs for 3207 Henderson Mill Road, and spoke with Mayra Rubio, the assistant for the
6
Def.’s Stat. of Mat. Facts ¶¶ 6-7. The Plaintiff makes the same objections
as above, but again the Court finds them unsupported and immaterial.
7
Id. at ¶ 8. The Plaintiff makes the same objections as above, but again the
Court finds them unsupported and immaterial.
8
Id. at ¶ 9. The Plaintiff makes the same objections as above, but again the
Court finds them unsupported and immaterial.
9
Id. at ¶ 10.
10
Id. at ¶ 11.
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Plaintiff’s counsel.11 Mitchell informed Rubio that if the vehicle was not recovered,
he would report the Plaintiff to the police.12
On May 31, 2012, Rubio told Mitchell that the Plaintiff had moved the vehicle
to a parking lot at 3559 Chamblee Tucker Road, and the Plaintiff had since reported
the vehicle stolen.13 Upon visiting 3559 Chamblee Tucker Road, Mitchell could not
locate the vehicle there either.14 Mitchell spoke with a manager of the Kroger
Shopping Center located at that location, and the manager could not locate any record
of a vehicle being towed from that address.15
On June 4, 2012, Rubio informed Mitchell that she could no longer get in
contact with the Plaintiff.16 Three days later, on June 7, 2012, Mitchell filed an
11
Id. at ¶ 12.
12
Id. at ¶ 13.
13
Id. at ¶ 14. The Plaintiff, in her Objection, alleges that Rubio told
Insurance Auto Auctions on May 11, 2012, that the car had been moved to this new
address. See Pl.’s Obj. to Def.’s Stat. of Mat. Facts ¶ 4 [Doc. 33-2]. The Plaintiff
alleges that the car was moved because GEICO’s failure to recover the vehicle
resulted in her receiving a warning that her vehicle would be towed unless it was
moved. Id. However, both of these statements are hearsay and are not supported by
any non-hearsay evidence on the record.
14
Def.’s Stat. of Mat. Facts ¶ 15.
15
Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.
16
Id. at ¶ 18.
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incident report with the Chamblee Police Department, which included a written
statement.17 The case was assigned to Detective Chris Newberry, who conducted an
independent investigation that included reviewing Mitchell’s statement and the
Plaintiff’s police report, verifying the vehicle had not been recovered by GEICO or
DeKalb County, attempting to contact the Plaintiff multiple times, and conducting a
search to determine if any other government agency had located the vehicle.18 Based
on inconsistencies in the Plaintiff’s report, her delay in reporting the vehicle stolen,
her failure to return Newberry’s calls, and the frequent relocation of the vehicle,
Newberry suspected the Plaintiff had “sold the vehicle and reported her vehicle stolen
. . . ”19
On July 24, 2012, Newberry presented his findings to the DeKalb County
Magistrate Court.20 The Judge determined that there was probable cause for the charge
of Concealment of Property, and a warrant was sworn out against the Plaintiff on July
17
Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.
18
Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. Both of these paragraphs were unaddressed by the
Plaintiff and taken as admitted.
19
Id. at ¶ 29. This was also unaddressed by the Plaintiff.
20
Id. at ¶ 30.
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24, 2012.21 On March 8, 2014, the Plaintiff was arrested based on the warrant.22 The
Plaintiff appeared before a state magistrate in her bond hearing which was her only
court appearance.23 The charges were eventually dropped after the state Solicitor
determined that the statute of limitations had expired.24
The Plaintiff then filed her Complaint against GEICO in the State Court of
DeKalb County on October 7, 2016, alleging claims of false arrest and malicious
prosecution, as well as negligent hiring, training, and supervision. The case was
removed to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The Defendant now moves
for summary judgment on all counts.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and
affidavits submitted by the parties show no genuine issue of material fact exists and
21
Id. at ¶ 31.The Plaintiff objects, asserting that “had all facts been
presented and facts not omitted, [the Magistrate Court] would have not [sic] found
sufficient probable cause to issue a warrant.” Pl.’s Obj. to Def.’s Stat. of Mat. Facts
¶ 10 [Doc. 33-2]. Not only is this argumentative, but the Plaintiff did not dispute that
it was Newberry’s report, based on his independent investigation, that was the only
evidence presented to the Judge. The Defendant or its employees took no part in the
proceedings.
22
Id. at ¶ 32.
23
Matute Dep. at 67-68.
24
Def.’s Stat. of Mat. Facts ¶¶ 33-34.
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that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.25 The court should view the
evidence and any inferences that may be drawn in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant.26 The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds to
show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.27 The burden then shifts to the
nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to
show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist.28 “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence
supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be a sufficient
showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.”29
III. Discussion
A. False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution
The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant is liable for false arrest and malicious
prosecution because GEICO “provided false information and omitted important
information to the police in order to have Plaintiff arrested,”30 and “maliciously and
25
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
26
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970).
27
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
28
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
29
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990).
30
Compl. ¶ 36.
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without probable cause prosecuted plaintiff for the crime of Concealment of Property
with Security Lien...”31 In Georgia, false arrest and malicious prosecution are separate
causes of action, but they both have similar elements. For example, in order to state
either claim, a plaintiff must show that the arrest or the prosecution was made
maliciously.32 The Plaintiff has completely failed to do so here. “Malice consists of:
(1) personal spite, or (2) general disregard of the right consideration of mankind,
directed by chance against the individual injured.”33 There is nothing in the record to
indicate that GEICO acted with malice in prosecuting the Plaintiff for the concealment
of property. Mitchell never knew the Plaintiff personally, and in fact never had the
opportunity to meet with or communicate with the Plaintiff at all, despite his best
efforts to do so. All the evidence on the record indicates that Mitchell contacted the
police solely because of the results of his investigation, not because of any personal
hostility.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that Detective Newberry’s decision to arrest
the Plaintiff was based on Newberry’s own independent investigation.34 “The law
31
Id. at ¶ 39.
32
See O.C.G.A § 51-7-1; id. at § 51-7-40.
33
Desmond v. Troncalli Mitsubishi, 243 Ga. App. 71, 75 (2000).
34
Def.’s Stat. of Mat. Facts ¶ 29. The Plaintiff never denied or responded
to this fact, and the Court considers it admitted, pursuant to Local Rule
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draws a fine line of demarcation between cases where a party directly or indirectly
urges a law enforcement official to begin criminal proceedings and cases where a
party merely relays facts to an official who then makes an independent decision to
arrest or prosecute...”35 Both false arrest and malicious prosecution “may successfully
be defended by an uncontroverted affidavit of the arresting officer that the decision
to arrest [the] plaintiff was made solely by him in the exercise of his professional
judgment and independently of any exhortations by the defendants.”36
In this case, Newberry specifically states that “based on the facts obtained
during [his] investigation and [his] personal judgment,” he decided to seek an arrest
warrant.37 The Plaintiff has admitted this fact. Thus, even assuming arguendo the
Plaintiff’s allegations that the Defendant had given misleading and false information
to the police were true, Newberry’s independent judgment severs the causal link
between the Defendant and the police required to maintain a claim for false arrest or
56.1(B)(2)(a)(2).
35
Ginn v. Citizens & S. Nat. Bank, 145 Ga. App. 175, 178 (1978) (citations
omitted).
36
Jacobs v. Shaw, 219 Ga. App. 425, 426 (1995) overruled in part by
Infinite Energy, Inc. v. Pardue, 310 Ga. App. 355 (2011). See also Adams v. Carlisle,
278 Ga. App. 777, 784 (2006) (reiterating rule in Jacobs, but emphasizing necessity
for officer’s testimony to be uncontroverted).
37
Aff. of Det. Chris Newberry, ¶ 15 (emphasis added).
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malicious prosecution.38 Without this causal link, or any evidence of malice on the
part of GEICO, the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on these two claims
must be granted.
B. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision
The Complaint asserts that the Defendant was “negligent in hiring, training and
supervising the staff in the pickup and investigation of the recovery of vehicles and
reporting them to the State.”39 The Plaintiff must “produce some evidence of incidents
similar to the behavior that was the cause of the injury at issue” to survive summary
judgment on this claim.40 The Plaintiff has produced no evidence whatsoever to
suggest that there have been any previous incidents similar to those alleged in this
case. Nor has the Plaintiff produced any evidence showing that GEICO knew or
should have known such incidents occurred even if they did. Given the lack of
evidence, the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this count as well.
38
See Adams, 278 Ga. App. at 797 (noting that independent investigation
by arresting officer severed causal link between the defendant’s statements and the
plaintiff’s arrest); McLeod v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 215 Ga. App. 177, 179 (1994)
overruled in part by Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326 (2008) (uncontroverted
evidence of independent investigation “relieved [defendants] of potential liability for
malicious prosecution” because there was an “absence of any causal link between
those acts attributable to defendants and the decision to arrest plaintiff.”).
39
Compl. ¶ 42.
40
Remediation Res., Inc. v. Balding, 281 Ga. App. 31, 34 (2006).
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant GEICO’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. 27] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 29 day of June, 2017.
/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge
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