Harpo v. LaGrua et al
Filing
16
OPINION AND ORDER denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration 9 and denying as moot Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel 6 , Motion to Amend Complaint 7 and 8 Motion for Time to Amend Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 4/12/17. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
WILHY HARPO,
Plaintiff,
v.
1:16-cv-3965-WSD
DANIEL J. CRAIG, Judge,
Richmond County Superior Court,
et al.,
Defendants.
WILHY HARPO,
Plaintiff,
v.
1:16-cv-4028-WSD
SHAWN ELLEN LAGRUA, Judge,
Fulton County Superior Court;
Official and Individual Capacities, et
al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Wilhy Harpo’s (“Plaintiff”)
Motions to Appoint Counsel, Motions to Amend Complaint, Motions for
Reconsideration, and Motion for Time to Amend Motion for Reconsideration filed
in civil action numbers 1:16-cv-3965-WSD (“October 24th Action”), and 1:16-cv4028 (“October 27th Action”).
I.
BACKGROUND
These are the latest in a series of actions filed in this Court by Mr. Harpo in
which he seeks relief from a dispossessory action brought against him by
Broadstone Maple, LLC (“Broadstone”) in the Magistrate Court of Fulton County,
Georgia. The Court has remanded each previous case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Order, Broadstone Maple, LLC v. Alexander Corporate
Accommodations, LLC, No. 1:16-cv-2774-WSD (N.D. Ga. August 2, 2016) (Doc.
4).1
In these actions, which contain substantially similar allegations to one
another and to Harpo’s previous filings, Harpo again seeks to challenge a
dispossessory action brought by Broadstone in the Magistrate Court of Fulton
County, Georgia. (See October 24th Action, [3] at Prayer for Relief). Harpo
seeks an emergency restraining order or injunction suspending the execution of a
writ of possession issued by the Fulton County Magistrate Court. (Id.; October
1
Because Plaintiff is a frequent filer of frivolous lawsuits, the Court has
previously ordered him “to disclose his full litigation history in any civil rights
complaint and/or [IFP] affidavit that he files.” See, e.g., Williams v. Harpo, No.
1:16-cv-12225-WSD (N.D. Ga. 2016) (ECF No. 2 at 2); Harpo v. City of Atlanta,
No. 1:16-cv-1067-WSD (N.D. Ga. 2016) (ECF No. 2 at 1-2); Harpo v. City of
Atlanta, No. 1:14-cv-2157-WSD (N.D. Ga. 2014) (ECF No. 2 at 1-2); Harpo
v. Fulton Cty. Sheriff, No. 1:14-cv-2208-WSD (N.D. Ga. 2014) (ECF No. 2 at
1-2).
2
27th Action, [3] at 6). Harpo also seeks an order stating that Judges Shawn
LaGrua and Judge Daniel J. Craig do not have authority to preside over pending
actions concerning Harpo. (October 27th Action, [3] at 7). Harpo also asserts over
a dozen claims against Judge LaGrua, Judge Craig, the Fulton County District
Attorney, the Richmond County District Attorney, the State Bar of Georgia, and
the Governor of Georgia (together, “Defendants”). These claims include violations
of state and federal RICO laws, false arrest, false imprisonment, libel, slander,
excessive force, conspiracy to deny access to courts, terroristic threats, and “other
claims.” (Id. at 6). Harpo seeks $1,000,000 in damages, and $2,000,000 in
damages specifically from Judge Craig. (Id.; October 24th Action, [3] at 8).
On February 3, 2017, the Court issued an Order dismissing these actions
pursuant to the required frivolity review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The
Court reiterated that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Harpo’s state-court
dispossessory action involving Broadstone. The Court found that Harpo’s new
claims asserted against Judges LaGrua and Craig are clearly baseless, because he
failed to show that either judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. The
Court also found that, to the extent Harpo raises claims against the district
attorneys of Richmond County and Fulton County, his claims are required to be
dismissed because prosecutors have absolute immunity from damages in Section
3
1983 actions for their prosecutorial actions. Accordingly, the Court dismissed this
action.
On February 3, 2017, Harpo filed, in these cases and in several others, his
Motion to Appoint Counsel, Motion to Amend Complaint, and Motion for
Reconsideration. Harpo also filed, in civil action number 1:16-cv-4028, his
Motion for Time to Amend Motion for Reconsideration. Harpo appears to seek
reconsideration of the Court’s order in another of Harpo’s actions, Harpo
v. Howard, et al., No. 1:16-cv-3876.
II.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(E), “[m]otions for reconsideration shall not be
filed as a matter of routine practice.” L.R. 7.2(E), NDGa. Rather, such motions
are only appropriate when “absolutely necessary” to present: (1) newly discovered
evidence; (2) an intervening development or change in controlling law; or (3) a
need to correct a clear error of law or fact. Bryan v. Murphy, 246 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1258-59 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Motions for reconsideration are left to the sound discretion of the district court and
are to be decided as justice requires. Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks,
Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1222-23 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (citing Region 8 Forest Serv.
Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 806 (11th Cir. 1993)).
4
Harpo does not present any newly discovered evidence, intervening
development or change in controlling law, or need to correct a clear error of law or
fact. Harpo claims that these actions raise new claims that were not asserted in
Harpo’s prior actions against Broadstone. Harpo does not, however, contest the
Court’s previous finding that his new claims, asserted against Judges LaGrua and
Craig and the district attorneys of Richmond and Fulton Counties, are clearly
baseless. He does not provide any additional information regarding the Court’s
jurisdiction over his claims stemming from his state-court dispossessory action.
Harpo’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied. Because the Court denies the
Motion for Reconsideration, Harpo’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, Motion to
Amend Complaint, and Motion for Time to Amend Motion for Reconsideration are
denied as moot.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Wilhy Harpo’s Motions for
Reconsideration [9] filed in civil action numbers 1:16-cv-3965-WSD and
1:16-cv-4028 are DENIED.
5
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motions to Appoint Counsel
and Motions to Amend Complaint filed in civil action numbers
1:16-cv-3965 and 1:16-cv-4028 are DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Time to Amend
Motion for Reconsideration [8] filed in civil action number 1:16-cv-4028 is
DENIED AS MOOT.
SO ORDERED this 12th day of April, 2017.
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?