Guerra v. Rockdale County, Georgia et al
Filing
60
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 36 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting in part and denying in part 37 Motion to Dismiss. The Court DISMISSES Defendants City of Franklin, Tennessee, Tommy Justus, Rockdale Cou nty, Georgia, and Sheriff Eric J. Levett as party defendants; All claims against all Defendants in their official capacities; All claims in Counts Three, Four, and Five except Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Baker, Douglas, Porter, and Black i n their individual capacities; Count One; and Count Six. The following claims will proceed: Count Two (42 U.S.C. § 1983 Malicious Prosecution) against Defendant Douglas, in his individual capacity; Count Three (51-7-7 False Arrest) ag ainst Defendants Baker, Douglas, Black, and Porter, in their individual capacities; Count Four (51-7-40 Malicious Prosecution) against Defendants Baker, Douglas, Black, and Porter, in their individual capacities; and Count Five (51-7-20 Fals e Imprisonment) against Defendants Baker, Douglas, Black, and Porter, in their individual capacities. Signed by Judge Michael L. Brown on 10/28/2019. (dob) Modified on 10/28/2019 to edit signature date (dob). Modified on 10/29/2019 to edit text (dob).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
Gerardo Espinosa Guerra,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:16-cv-04656
Michael L. Brown
United States District Judge
v.
Rockdale County, Georgia, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________/
OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff claims he was wrongfully arrested and detained for sixteen
days based on a mistaken identification by members of the Rockdale
County Sheriff’s Office and the City of Franklin Police Department. He
filed suit, alleging violations of his constitutional rights and Georgia state
law. Defendant City of Franklin, Tennessee, and Defendant Officers
Tommy D. Justus, Becky Porter, and Chad D. Black (“Tennessee
Defendants”) moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint. (Dkt. 37.)
Defendant Rockdale County, Georgia, Defendant Rockdale County
Sheriff Eric J. Levett, and Defendant Officers Brandon W. Douglas and
Jonathan W. Baker (“Rockdale Defendants”) moved for partial judgment
on the pleadings. (Dkt. 36.) The Court grants in part and denies in part
both motions and allows the surviving claims to proceed.
I.
Background
In January 2015, police officers with the City of Franklin Police
Department (including Defendant Black as the lead investigator) began
investigating criminal activity at a local hotel. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 40.) They
identified and photographed five suspects, including an individual known
as Gerardo Emmanuel Espinosa Zamudio. (Id. ¶¶ 32–36.) Although
police made no arrests at the time, they later obtained an indictment
against Zamudio for aggravated assault and false imprisonment. (Id.
¶ 39.) Franklin police placed a warrant for his arrest in a nationwide
database. (Id. ¶ 40.)
Plaintiff Guerra was not involved in the criminal activity at the
Franklin hotel. On November 12, 2015, he was at his home in Conyers,
Georgia, minding his own business when two officers with the Rockdale
Sheriff’s Office knocked on his door. (Id. ¶ 43.) They were looking for
Plaintiff’s stepfather to ask him questions about a car he had previously
owned, again totally unrelated to anything that happened in Franklin.
(Id.) While trying to help the officers, Plaintiff provided his Georgia
2
driver’s license. (Id. ¶ 46.) The officers somehow thought Plaintiff might
be the subject of the Tennessee warrant and placed him in the back of
their squad car while investigating. (Id. ¶ 47.) They soon realized he
was not the suspect in the warrant and let him go, encouraging him to
“clear up the matter” so he would not be mistakenly arrested in the
future. (Id. ¶ 49.) Plaintiff — apparently accepting that advice — went
to the Rockdale County Sheriff’s Office a couple of days later and provided
his fingerprints, social security number, driver’s license, and other
identifying information. (Id. ¶¶ 49–50, 52.)
On November 16, 2015, someone in the Rockdale County Sheriff’s
Office sent a copy of Plaintiff’s driver’s license photograph to Defendant
Porter, with the Franklin Police Department. (Id. ¶ 54.) Defendant
Porter attempted to compare Plaintiff’s picture with pictures of suspects
at the Franklin hotel that police had taken months earlier. (Id. ¶ 55.)
She was unable to locate the photographs of the individuals involved in
the incident, however, although Plaintiff alleges such photographs were
in the file at the time. (Id.) As a result, Defendant Porter was unable to
confirm if Plaintiff was the individual sought in the Tennessee warrant.
(Id.)
A couple of days later, Defendant Porter showed Plaintiff’s
3
photograph to Defendant Black, who had been part of the original
investigation at the hotel. (Id. ¶ 60.) Defendant Black — looking only at
the photograph of Plaintiff and comparing it to his memory of the suspect
from months before — confirmed that Plaintiff was the individual sought
by the Tennessee warrant and asked the Rockdale officers to arrest him.
(Id. ¶ 63.)
Defendant Baker called Plaintiff and asked him to come back to the
sheriff’s office. (Id. ¶ 71.) Plaintiff did. (Id.) Rockdale Officers Baker
and Douglas arrested Plaintiff, telling him the Franklin officers had
identified him as the suspect involved in the assault at the hotel. (Id.
¶ 72.) Defendant Officer Douglas obtained an arrest warrant the next
day, charging Plaintiff with being a fugitive from justice. (Id. ¶¶ 78–79.)
Plaintiff remained in jail for sixteen days before police finally determined
that he was not the man sought in the Tennessee warrant and dismissed
the charges. (Id. ¶ 86.)
Plaintiff asserts claims against defendants in Georgia and
Tennessee. He sued Rockdale County, Georgia, Rockdale County Sheriff
Eric J. Levett, and Rockdale Sheriff Officers Johnathan W. Baker and
Brandon W. Douglas. He also sued the City of Franklin, Tennessee, and
4
Franklin Police Department Officers Tommy D. Justus, Chad D. Black,
and Becky Porter.1 He brings federal claims of false arrest (Count One)
and malicious prosecution/false imprisonment (Count Two) under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state-law claims of false arrest (Count Three),
malicious prosecution (Count Four), false imprisonment (Count Five),
and negligent hiring, retention, and training (Count Six). The Rockdale
Defendants filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and the
Tennessee Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (Dkts. 36; 37.)
II.
Legal Standard
A court may dismiss a pleading for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). At the motion to dismiss stage, “all
well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences
therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Plaintiff originally filed suit in the Superior Court of Rockdale County,
Georgia, but Defendants removed the case to federal court. (Dkt. 1.)
1
5
Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999).
When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a court is guided “by the same standard as
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Carbone v. Cable News
Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018).
While parties usually raise the defense of qualified immunity at
summary judgment, a party may nevertheless assert the defense at the
outset of the litigation on a motion to dismiss. See Corbitt v. Vickers, 929
F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019). A district court grants such a motion if
“the complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established
constitutional right.” Id. (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d
1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)).
Indeed, the early assertion and (if
appropriate) resolution of qualified immunity effectuates the principal
that qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the
other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985);
see also Andrews v. Scott, 729 F. App’x 804, 808 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Once
the defendants advance the affirmative defense of qualified immunity,
the complaint must be dismissed, unless the plaintiff’s allegations state
6
a claim of violation of clearly established law.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
III. Discussion
The Court notes from the outset that, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s
amendment to his complaint, none of the counts clearly delineates
against which of the Defendants the claims are asserted. The Court has
tried to discern Plaintiff’s intent through his mention of various
Defendants in each of the counts. The Court believes it has addressed all
outstanding issues.
A.
The Rockdale Defendants’ Motion
Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 36)
1.
for
Partial
The Court Grants the Rockdale Defendants’
Motion as to Count One.
The Rockdale Defendants (that is, Rockdale County Sheriff Levett
and Rockdale County Sheriff Officers Baker and Douglas) move for
judgment on the pleadings on Count One against them in their individual
capacities. (Dkt. 36-1 at 3.) They argue that, because they arrested
Plaintiff “under an arrest warrant from Tennessee with verification from
the agency that obtained the warrant,” Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for
false arrest.
(Id. at 4.)
In support of this argument, they cite the
7
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Carter v. Gore, holding that “[t]he issuance
of a warrant — even an invalid one . . . — constitutes legal process, and
thus, where an individual has been arrested pursuant to a warrant, his
claim is for malicious prosecution rather than false arrest.” 557 F. App’x
904, 906 (11th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff claims this rule does not apply
because he was not the individual named in the warrant.
Plaintiff is correct but for a different reason.
Contrary to the
Rockdale Defendants’ assertion, Plaintiff does not allege in the amended
complaint that the Rockdale Defendants arrested him pursuant to the
Tennessee warrant. He claims they arrested him for the “offense of
fugitive from justice, O.C.G.A. §17-13-33.” (Dkt. 33 ¶ 79.) He claims the
officers arrested him on November 18, 2015, and the next day, secured a
warrant for violating Georgia law. (Id. ¶¶ 71, 78.) This would mean that
Plaintiff alleges the original arrest was made without probable cause.
Indeed, as part of his false arrest claim, Plaintiff alleges that the
Rockdale Defendants “had no arguable probable cause, much less
probable cause” to swear out the warrant for his arrest for being a
fugitive from justice.
(Id. ¶ 103.)
Carter v. Gore thus does not bar
Plaintiff’s § 1983 false arrest claim.
8
Alternatively, the Rockdale Defendants argue that they are entitled
to qualified immunity because an officer who acts upon information from
another officer about the identity of a wanted suspect has probable cause
and does not commit false arrest as a matter of law. (Dkt. 36-1 at 4–5.)
Defendants cite no case that establishes this sweeping legal assertion.
The Court nevertheless concludes they are entitled to qualified
immunity.
“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government
officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340,
1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). So “[q]ualified
immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable
but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). Qualified immunity allows officials to “carry
out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or
harassing litigation.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.
2002). When properly applied, it “protects all but the plainly incompetent
9
or those who knowingly violate the law.”
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Qualified immunity may attach only when the officer is “acting
within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly
wrongful acts occurred.” Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1254
n.19 (11th Cir. 2010).
A public official acts within the scope of his
discretionary authority where the acts complained of were “undertaken
pursuant to the performance of his duties and within the scope of his
authority.” Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988). “Once
the defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary
authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified
immunity is not appropriate.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. There seems to be
no question that the Rockdale Defendants acted within the scope of their
discretionary authority when arresting Plaintiff.
See, e.g., Wate v.
Kubler, 839 F.3d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that officers acted
within discretionary authority when arresting suspect). Plaintiff, thus,
has the burden of showing that qualified immunity is unavailable to
them.
10
The qualified immunity analysis presents two questions: first,
whether the allegations, taken as true, establish the violation of a
constitutional right; and second, if so, whether the constitutional right
was clearly established when the violation occurred. Hadley v. Gutierrez,
526 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2008). These distinct questions “do not
have to be analyzed sequentially; if the law was not clearly established,
[the court] need not decide if the [d]efendants actually violated the
[plaintiff’s] rights, although [the court is] permitted to do so.” Fils v. City
of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011). The burden thus lies
with Plaintiff to show the Rockdale Defendants’ actions violated a
constitutional right and that the right was clearly established at the time
of his arrest. See Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1329.
a.
Constitutional Violation
Plaintiff sued the Rockdale Officers alleging they violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause.
(Dkt. 33 ¶¶ 101–109.) “A warrantless arrest without probable cause
violates the Constitution and provides a basis for a section 1983 claim.”
Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004).
Probable cause to arrest exists when an arrest is objectively reasonable
11
based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. “This standard is met
when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which
he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent
person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Officers who make an arrest without probable
cause are nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if they had at least
“arguable probable cause for the arrest.” Id. at 1232. Arguable probable
cause exists if “reasonable officers in the same circumstances and
possessing the same knowledge as the defendant could have believed that
probable cause existed to arrest.” Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1298
(11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has held that no constitutional violation arises
from the mistaken arrest of one person (for whom no probable cause to
arrest existed) based upon the misidentification of that person as a
second person (for whom probable cause to arrest existed).
California, 401 U.S. 797, 802–03 (1971).
Hill v.
The Eleventh Circuit has
applied the same rule when police had a valid warrant for one person but
mistakenly arrest someone else due to a misidentification. Rodriguez v.
12
Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1345–46 (11th Cir. 2002). The same “reasonable
mistake” must apply in this case: a hybrid of Hill and Rodriguez,
involving a warrant for one person and a mistaken identification giving
rise to probable cause to arrest another person as a fugitive.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that a reasonable officer in
the Rockdale Defendants’ position “would have known that no arguable
probable cause existed to support the issuance of an arrest warrant for
Plaintiff.” (Dkt. 33 ¶ 106.) While alleging the operative legal conclusion,
Plaintiff also alleges facts that belie such a finding.
He claims the
Rockdale Defendants arrested him for being a fugitive from justice after
the Tennessee Defendants confirmed he was the subject of their warrant.
He claims the Rockdale Defendants sent the Tennessee Defendants a
copy of his driver’s license photo, that Defendant Porter initially failed to
identify Plaintiff from that photo, but that Defendant Black later did so.
(Id. ¶¶ 55–64.) Indeed, Plaintiff claims that the Tennessee Defendants
assured the Rockdale Defendants that the “guy that had the [hotel] case”
had reviewed Plaintiff’s photo and said “that’s him.” (Id. ¶ 64.) Finally,
Plaintiff alleges that the Tennessee Defendants asked the Rockdale
13
Defendants to arrest Plaintiff, assuring they would extradite Plaintiff to
Tennessee.
Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, the Rockdale
Defendants had at least arguable probable cause to believe Plaintiff was
a fugitive from Tennessee. They knew that the officer who investigated
the hotel case (Defendant Black) had looked at Plaintiff’s photo and
confirmed Plaintiff was their fugitive. Plaintiff does not allege that the
Rockdale Defendants had any reason to doubt the veracity or strength of
Defendant Black’s eye-witness identification. He sets forth actions that
he took to cooperate with the police and the Tennessee officers’ initial
failure to identify him as the subject of their arrest warrant — all of
which, he alleges, gave the Rockdale Defendants additional reason to
pause before arresting him on the word of the Franklin officer. (Id. ¶¶ 49,
50, 52, 55, 56.) He also explains the actions he believes a reasonable
officer would have taken before arresting him on the warrant given the
particular facts in this case. (Id. ¶ 82.) But, even accepting all of this as
true, the Rockdale Defendants’ had eye-witness identification from the
investigating officer. A reasonable officer in the same circumstances and
possessing the same knowledge as these officers could have believed that
14
probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff as a fugitive. Plaintiff has thus
failed to meet his burden to demonstrate a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights.
b.
Clearly Established Law
Even if Plaintiff could show the Rockdale Defendants violated his
constitutional rights by arresting him, he fails to meet his burden of
showing they violated clearly established law. The core question on this
prong of the qualified immunity analysis is “whether it was already
clearly established, as a matter of law, that at the time of Plaintiff’s
arrest, an objective officer could not have concluded reasonably that
probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff under the particular
circumstances Defendants confronted.”
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1303
(emphasis removed).
A constitutional right is only clearly established for qualified
immunity purposes if “every reasonable official would have understood
that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S.
658, 664 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration adopted).
Put differently, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate” to give the official fair warning
15
that his conduct violated the law. Id.; Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999,
1013 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“The critical inquiry is whether the law
provided [defendant officers] with fair warning that [their] conduct
violated the Fourth Amendment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Supreme Court has explained that the question is “whether it would
be clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.” See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
“If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be
clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is
appropriate.” Id.
A plaintiff typically shows that a defendant’s conduct violated
clearly established law by pointing to “materially similar precedent from
the Supreme Court, [the Eleventh Circuit], or the highest state court in
which the case arose.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296. While the facts of the
case need not be identical, “the unlawfulness of the conduct must be
apparent from pre-existing law.” Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1013.
In White v. Pauly, the Supreme Court reiterated “the longstanding
principle that ‘clearly established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high
level of generality.’ ” 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (quoting al-Kidd, 563
16
U.S. at 742). The Supreme Court held that to defeat a claim of qualified
immunity, a plaintiff must “identify a case where an officer acting under
similar circumstances as [the defendant] was held to have violated the
Fourth Amendment.”
Id.
“[G]eneral statements of the law are not
inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning to officers.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, “the clearly established law
must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” Id. The Supreme Court
has also explained that avoiding qualified immunity does “not require a
case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna,
136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015).
Fair warning can also arise from two other sources.
First,
“[a]uthoritative judicial decisions may ‘establish broad principles of law’
that are clearly applicable to the conduct at issue.” Gates, 884 F.3d at
1296 (quoting Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1209 (11th Cir.
2007)).
Second, “it may be obvious from ‘explicit statutory or
constitutional statements’ that conduct is unconstitutional.” Id. (citing
Griffin Indus., 496 F.3d at 1208–09). Regardless of the method, “the
preexisting law must make it obvious that the defendant’s acts violated
17
the plaintiff’s rights in the specific set of circumstances at issue.”
Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010). In this way,
qualified immunity does what it should: it “gives government officials
breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments by
protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.” City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774
(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations adopted).
As explained above, Plaintiff alleges the Rockdale Defendants
arrested him based on an eye-witness identification from the officer who
investigated the hotel incident. Plaintiff has not shown, and the Court is
unable to find, any materially similar precedent that would “make it
obvious” that the Rockdale Defendants’ actions would violate Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Plaintiff cites Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d
1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1993). In that case, plaintiff alleged the defendant
officers falsely imprisoned her in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights. Id. The Eleventh Circuit analyzed her claims under
the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to allegations of
violations of substantive due process, not the arguable probable cause
standard that applies here. Id. at 1563. Moreover, the officers in Cannon
18
detained the plaintiff based upon information in a law enforcement
database, not an officer’s eye-witness identification as in this case. See
id. at 1564. Cannon would not have put the Rockdale Defendants on
notice that they would violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by
arresting him on the word of a fellow law enforcement officer.
Plaintiff also cites Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1073 (11th
Cir. 2003). But that case involved an arrest based on the plaintiff’s “mere
presence” in an apartment where drugs were located.
Id. at 1081.
Likewise, his reliance on Kingsland v. City of Miami, is misplaced as that
case involved intentional falsification of evidence by police officers to
support an arrest warrant in order to deflect blame from their fellow
officer. See 382 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 2004). This case involves
neither Plaintiff’s mere presence at the scene of a crime nor allegations
the Rockdale Defendants falsified evidence.
Even at the motion to
dismiss stage, Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that “every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates
that right.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664.
Admittedly, the Rockdale Defendants made a mistake, relying on
bad information from another police officer to arrest Plaintiff for
19
something he did not do. “The rationale behind qualified immunity is
that an officer who acts reasonably should not be held personally liable
merely because it appears, in hindsight, that he might have made a
mistake.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298. Accordingly, the Court grants the
Rockdale Defendants’ motion for partial final judgment on the § 1983
false arrest claim in Count One.2
2.
The Court Dismisses All Claims Against the
Rockdale
Defendants
in
their
“Official
Capacities.”
Plaintiff asserts claims against most of the individual defendants
in their individual and official capacities.3 The Rockdale Defendants
moved for judgment on the pleadings on all such official capacity claims
on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. They later concede they
The Rockdale Defendants did not move for dismissal of Count Two
against Defendant Douglas, so he and the federal claim against him must
remain in the case regardless of the ruling on Count One. (Id.)
3 In another example of poor drafting, Plaintiff fails to clarify which
claims he asserts against which Defendants in their official capacities.
Indeed, Plaintiff uses the term “official capacity” only in the caption to
his amended complaint. The Court thus assumes Plaintiff seeks to assert
such claims against all individual defendants (except Defendant Levett,
as Plaintiff includes in the caption no reference to official capacity claims
against him).
2
20
waived this defense by removing the case to federal court. (Dkt. 49 at 7
n.2.)
Plaintiff nonetheless asks the Court to dismiss the state-law claims
against Rockdale County and the individual Rockdale Defendants
(Levett, Baker, and Douglas) in their official capacities on the basis of
sovereign immunity.4 (Dkt. 46 at 10.) The Court does so.5
The Court also dismisses the § 1983 claims in Counts One and Two
against the individual Rockdale County Defendants in their official
capacities. A suit against a county sheriff or his deputies in their official
capacity is effectively a suit against the governmental entity the sheriff
or the deputies represent — in this case, the Rockdale County Sheriff’s
The Rockdale Defendants expressly did not move for judgment on the
pleadings or to dismiss Plaintiff’s related state-law claims against them
in their individual capacities. (Dkt. 36 at 2.)
5 Since Plaintiff consents to dismissal of the state-law claims against
Rockdale County, the Court need not address the Rockdale Defendants’
contention that the County cannot be held vicariously liable for
Defendants Baker and Douglas’s conduct. The Court nevertheless
recognizes that “Georgia courts speak with unanimity in concluding” that
counties cannot be held vicariously liable for the conduct of their sheriffs’
deputies. Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (collecting
cases); see, e.g., Lowe v. Jones Cty., 499 S.E.2d 348, 373 (Ga. Ct. App.
1998) (noting that “because deputy sheriffs are employees of the sheriff,
not the county, the county cannot be held vicariously liable as their
principal”).
4
21
Office. Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., 402 F.3d
1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S.
781, 785 n.2 (1997)); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66
(1985) (“Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a
government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Officialcapacity suits, in contrast, generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. . . .
It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest
is the entity.”); Lowe, 499 S.E.2d at 373 (concluding “deputy sheriffs are
employees of the sheriff, not the county, and the county cannot be held
vicariously liable as their principal”).
A plaintiff in a § 1983 action cannot rely on respondeat superior or
vicarious liability theories to hold a county liable for the individual
actions of its officers. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)
(citing Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)).
A county is only liable under § 1983 for actions for which it is actually
responsible, meaning when a county’s “official policy or custom” causes a
constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95. This requires a
plaintiff suing a county to show that the county “has authority and
22
responsibility over the government function in issue.” Grech v. Clayton
Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003).
In this case, Plaintiff claims that Rockdale County is responsible
for the decision by Defendant Douglas (and perhaps others) to arrest him
based on what Plaintiff alleges was the absence of probable cause.
Accepting these allegations as true, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a
claim as a matter of law. The Eleventh Circuit has held that the State of
Georgia — not an individual county — has authority and control over
sheriffs’ law enforcement functions.
Id. at 1332.
In reaching this
decision, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed Georgia law and noted that the
Georgia Constitution created sheriffs’ offices as separate constitutionally
protected entities independent of individual counties. Id. at 1332–33.
This means that sheriffs in Georgia act as agents of the State — not
counties — in enforcing the laws and keeping the peace. Id. at 1333.
Indeed, while the State has supervisory authority over sheriffs, an
individual county has no control over its sheriff’s law enforcement
activities:
In contrast to the State, counties have no authority or control
over, and no role in, Georgia sheriffs’ law enforcement
function. Counties do not grant sheriffs their law enforcement
powers, and neither prescribe nor control their law
23
enforcement duties and policies. Counties also have no role in
the training or supervision of the sheriff’s deputies. Instead,
sheriffs exercise authority over their deputies independent
from the county.
Id. at 1336. As a result of its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit held that
Georgia sheriffs are not county policymakers when performing their law
enforcement function. Id. at 1343. Plaintiff thus cannot assert § 1983
claims against Rockdale County arising from the law enforcement actions
of the Rockdale Defendants.
Even if Rockdale County were the proper defendant, Plaintiff’s
allegations are still insufficient as a matter of law. A county is liable
under § 1983 only when its “official policy” causes the constitutional
violation. Id. at 1329 (citing Marsh v. Butler Cty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1027
(11th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). So, to impose liability on a municipality, a
plaintiff must show: (1) his or her constitutional rights were violated;
(2) the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate
indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) the policy or custom
caused the violation. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.
2004) (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 388).
Plaintiff has failed to allege any causal link between a county policy
and the alleged violation of his constitutional rights asserted in Counts
24
One and Two. In other words, he has not alleged that the Rockdale
Defendants falsely arrested him or maliciously prosecuted him because
of some county policy or custom. He claims in Counts One and Two that
the Rockdale Defendants “were acting under color of state law and within
their discretionary functions as employees or officer of” the County. (Dkt.
33 ¶¶ 102, 111.) Elsewhere in the amended complaint, he is critical of
the Rockdale Defendants for not conducting a more thorough
investigation before arresting him on the word of the Tennessee officer.
(Id. ¶ 73.) But he does not allege that they did so pursuant to any county
policy or custom. Similarly, he refers to Defendant Levett several times
as a “policy maker for the County.” (Id. ¶¶ 77, 82, 85.) But he never
alleges that Defendant Levett enacted a policy that led to his arrest.
Even accepting all Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Counts One and Two do
not state a claim against Rockdale County that is plausible on its face.
See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1329
(11th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of Monell claim where complaint
contained no plausible allegations of unconstitutional municipal policy);
Searcy v. Ben Hill Cty. Sch. Dist., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1340–41 (M.D.
Ga. 2014) (dismissing Monell claim for failure to identify a county
25
“custom or policy that caused the constitutional violation”); Lawrence v.
West Publ’g Corp., No. 1:15-CV-3341-MHC, 2016 WL 4257741, at *8
(N.D. Ga. June 17, 2016) (granting motion to dismiss where “Plaintiff
fails to allege any official custom, practice, or policy on the part of [the]
County that resulted in the deprivation of her constitutional rights”).
The Court thus dismisses Counts One and Two against the
Rockdale Defendants in their official capacities.6
3.
The Court Dismisses the State-Law Claims
Against Defendant Levett Based on Georgia
Official Immunity.
Defendant Levett has also moved for judgment on the pleadings as
to the state-law claims in Counts Three, Four, and Five on the basis of
official immunity. Georgia law immunizes Georgia government officials
“from suit and liability unless they ‘negligently perform a ministerial act
or act with actual malice or an intent to injure when performing a
discretionary act.’ ” Speight v. Griggs, 579 F. App’x 757, 759 (11th Cir.
Plaintiff does not appear to name Rockdale County as a defendant in
Counts One or Two. He identified only the “individual Defendants.”
(Dkt. 33 ¶¶ 102, 111.) But, even if he had, any such claims would fail for
the same reason. Counts One and Two may proceed only against the
specified individual Defendants in their individual capacities.
6
26
2014) (citing Roper v. Greenway, 751 S.E.2d 351, 352 (Ga. 2013) and GA.
CONST. art. I, § II, par. IX(d)).
Plaintiff does not contest Defendant Levett’s assertion that the
decision to arrest an individual is a discretionary act. Nor could he. See
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1297 (finding officers performed discretionary act
within the scope of their authority when arresting plaintiff); Marshall v.
Browning, 712 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (concluding decision to
arrest is act of discretionary authority). Defendant Levett thus can be
liable on Plaintiff’s state-law claims only if he acted with “actual malice”
or “actual intent to cause injury” as necessary to overcome official
immunity. See Adams v. Hazelwood, 520 S.E.2d 896, 898 (Ga. 1999). The
Supreme Court of Georgia has defined actual malice in the context of
official immunity to mean a “deliberate intention to do a wrongful act” or
“an actual intent to cause injury.” Id. Actual malice requires more than
evidence the defendant acted with “ill will” or “the reckless disregard for
the rights or safety of others.” West v. Davis, 767 F.3d 1063, 1073 (11th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Murphy v. Bajjani, 647 S.E.2d 54, 60 (Ga. 2007)). The
phrase “actual intent to cause injury” means “an actual intent to cause
harm to the plaintiff, not merely an intent to do the act purportedly
27
resulting in the claimed injury.” Id. (quoting Kidd v. Coates, 518 S.E.2d
124, 125 (Ga. 1999)).
None of the facts alleged in the amended complaint support a
plausible claim that Defendant Levett acted with actual malice or the
actual intent to injure Plaintiff as the Georgia Supreme Court has
defined those terms. Beyond the conclusory allegation that “[t]he acts
and omissions of the individual Defendants” were done with malice,
Plaintiff does not claim Defendant Levett had any personal involvement
in his deputies’ investigation or decision to arrest him. (See Dkt. 33
¶ 119.) Instead, he claims Defendant Levett is ultimately responsible for
his deputies’ conduct. Plaintiff claims, for example, Defendant Levett
“delegated responsibility for investigating the warrant to [Defendants]
Baker and Douglas” and that the deputies acted “pursuant to the
authority delegated to them by Sheriff Levett.” (Id. ¶¶ 51, 82.) Even if
true, these allegations do not establish a plausible claim that Defendant
Levett acted with actual malice toward Plaintiff or the intent to harm
him.
The other specific allegations against Defendant Levett are
similarly insufficient. He claims, for example, that “[p]ursuant to his
final policy making authority for the County, [Defendant] Levett
28
approved [Defendant] Baker [sic] and Douglas’ plan to swear out an
arrest warrant for Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 77.) Plaintiff does not, however,
allege that Defendant Levett knew his deputies’ assessment of probable
cause was deficient, was aware of their investigation, or otherwise acted
with either actual malice towards him or the intent to injure him when
Defendant Levett approved their “plan” to obtain an arrest warrant.
Last, Plaintiff alleges that “as a final policy maker for the County, Sheriff
Levett adopted the unconstitutional acts of Baker and Douglas, as well
as the basis for committing those acts.” (Id. ¶ 85.) An allegation that
Defendant Levett is somehow vicariously liable for his deputies’ conduct
because of his position certainly does not allege actual malice or intent to
harm.
Rather than pointing to specific allegations of malice or intent to
injure in his amended complaint, Plaintiff claims that malice may be
presumed from an arrest without probable cause. (Dkt. 46 at 7.) While
such an inference may support a malicious prosecution charge, the mere
allegation of an arrest without probable cause is insufficient to assert
malice so as to defeat Georgia official immunity. Marshall, 712 S.E.2d at
73 (holding that the issue “is not whether [defendant] acted maliciously
29
for purposes of the tort of malicious prosecution, but . . . whether she
acted with actual malice that would exempt her from official immunity”
(alterations adopted)). To defeat official immunity under Georgia law,
Plaintiff must allege facts supporting an inference that Defendant Levett
acted with actual malice or intent to injure. He failed to do this, and
Defendant Levett remains protected by official immunity under Georgia
law.
The Court dismisses the individual capacity claims against
Defendant Levett in Counts Three, Four, and Five. As the Court has now
dismissed all claims against Defendant Sheriff Levett, the Court
dismisses him from this case.
4.
The Court Dismisses All Claims Against Rockdale
County.
Plaintiff asserts claims against Rockdale County in Counts Three,
Four, Five, and Six. In his response brief, Plaintiff asks the Court to
grant Defendants’ motion in part and dismiss his state-law claims
against Rockdale County. (Dkt. 46 at 10 (“Plaintiff respectfully requests
that the Court grant the Rockdale Defendants’ Motion to the extent it
seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law claims against Rockdale
County.”).) The Court grants Plaintiff’s request and dismisses all statelaw claims against Rockdale County. Because Plaintiff does not name
30
Rockdale County in either of the federal claims — as far as the Court can
discern — the Court dismisses Rockdale County as a party defendant in
this matter.
B.
Tennessee Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under
12(b)(6) (Dkt. 37)
1.
The Court Dismisses All Claims
Tennessee Defendant Tommy D. Justus.
Against
Plaintiff asserts claims against Tennessee Defendant Justus in
Counts One, Three, Four, and Five. Defendant Justus moved to dismiss
these claims as insufficiently pled under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). He is correct.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555). The Supreme Court has also explained that the Federal Rules
demand more from a plaintiff “than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678. The complaint must
provide each defendant with “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty.
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)
31
(citation omitted). Plaintiff fails to do so here in regard to Defendant
Justus.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Justus worked for the Franklin Police
Department, supervised Defendant Officers Porter and Black, and was
aware of their actions. (Dkt. 33 ¶¶ 25–26.) Of course, that allegation is
not enough to state a claim against Defendant Justus. After all, “[i]t is
well-established that § 1983 claims may not be brought against
supervisory officials on the basis of vicarious liability or respondeat
superior.” Amnesty Int’l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1180 (11th Cir.
2009). A supervisor is liable under § 1983 only when the supervisor
“personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when
there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official
and the alleged constitutional violation.” Id. at 1180–81.
Plaintiff makes no such allegation anywhere in his amended
complaint.
Indeed, he fails to explain how Defendant Justus was
involved in the alleged misconduct.
Plaintiff lays out his factual
allegations in paragraphs 31 through 72 of his amended complaint,
beginning with the January 20, 2015, incident in Tennessee and ending
with his arrest in Rockdale County.
32
He never mentions Defendant
Justus in this recitation. He never alleges that Defendant Justus did
anything related to him, failed to do something related to him, or
participated in anyone else’s conduct related to him. He does not allege
any connection between something Defendant Justus allegedly did and
the other officers’ decision to arrest him. Aside from the conclusory
allegation that he was aware of his subordinates’ actions, Plaintiff does
not allege any additional facts to explain how Defendant Justus partook
in the misidentification.
He provides no better specificity in the individual counts. Instead
of explaining what he claims Defendant Justus did to violate his
constitutional rights or Georgia law, he merely lumps Defendant Justus
into a general allegation against all defendants. (See Dkt. 33 ¶ 75 (“All
officers involved in the identification of Plaintiff as the individual sought
in the Tennessee Warrant, including, but not limited to, Justus, Black,
and Porter, engaged in [c]onstitutionally deficient conduct.”).)
The
Federal Rules, however, “do not permit a party to aggregate allegations
against several defendants in a single, unspecific statement, but instead
require the pleader to identify (albeit generally) the conduct of each
defendant giving rise to his claims.” Parker v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 377
33
F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2005); see also Magluta v. Samples, 256
F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of complaint that
was “replete with allegations that ‘the defendants’ engaged in certain
conduct, making no distinction among the fourteen defendants charged”).
The Court finds that the amended complaint fails to provide
Defendant Justus fair warning of what Plaintiff claims he did. The Court
dismisses Counts One, Three, Four, and Five against Defendant Justus
and terminates him as a party defendant in this matter.
2.
The Court Grants the Tennessee Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss the Individual Claims in Count
One.
Tennessee Defendants Black and Porter claim they are entitled to
qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for false arrest in Count
One. The Court agrees.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Porter relied upon information he
received from Defendant Black in telling the Rockdale Defendants that
Plaintiff was the subject of their hotel investigation and prosecution.
(Dkt. 33 ¶¶ 61–64.) Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Porter had
any reason to question the veracity or reliability of that identification.
So, the analysis outlined above for the Rockdale Defendants applies to
34
Defendant Porter. She is entitled to qualified immunity on both prongs
of the analysis.
Defendant Black, however, did not rely upon information from
another officer. According to the amended complaint, he made the false
identification himself, based only on his memory of the man he saw at
the hotel. Thus he cannot argue that he had arguable probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff based on reliance from an eye-witness, as the other
Defendants can.
But, Plaintiff has still failed to identify materially
similar precedent that would have provided Defendant Black “fair
warning” that he could not rely upon that memory in seeking Plaintiff’s
arrest. A plaintiff must “identify a case where an officer acting under
similar circumstances as [the defendant] was held to have violated the
Fourth Amendment.” White, 137 S. Ct. at 552. Plaintiff has not done so.
Plaintiff also does not allege that Defendant Black deliberately
chose to ignore exculpatory evidence or fabricated evidence or falsified
any facts to secure his arrest.
inapposite.
The cases Plaintiff cites are thus
Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the
unlawfulness of the conduct was apparent from pre-existing law at the
35
time of his arrest, the Court grants Defendant Black’s motion to dismiss
Count One against him in his individual capacity.
3.
The Court Dismisses the Federal Claims in Counts
One and Two Against the Tennessee Defendants
in their Official Capacities.
It does not appear Plaintiff intended to assert Counts One or Two
against the City of Franklin or against the individual Tennessee
Defendants in their official capacities. But, if he did, the Court dismisses
those claims.
As explained above, in Monell, the Supreme Court held that a
municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the
municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. 436 U.S.
at 694–95. Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach
under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. It is only when the execution of
the government’s policy or custom inflicts the injury that the
municipality may be held liable under § 1983. Just as Plaintiff failed to
allege a Rockdale County policy or custom that he claims led to the
violation of his constitutional rights, so too has he failed to identify any
such policy or custom for the City of Franklin. The Court thus dismisses
all potential federal claims against Defendant City of Franklin.
36
For the same reason the Court dismissed the claims in Counts One
and Two against the individual Rockdale County Defendants in their
official capacities, the Court dismisses those claims against the
individual Tennessee Defendants.
4.
The Court Dismisses the State-Law Claims in
Counts Three, Four, and Five Against Defendant
City of Franklin.
Defendant City of Franklin contends that it is entitled to immunity
from Plaintiff’s state-law claims under the Tennessee Government Tort
Liability Act (“GTLA”).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29–20–205.
The GTLA
protects Tennessee governmental entities and bars claims against them
for the actions of their employees “if the injury arises out of . . . [t]he
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function” or “false imprisonment . . ., false arrest, malicious
prosecution, . . . or civil rights.” § 29–20–205(1), (2). Plaintiff counters
that any Tennessee immunities are inapplicable to this action because
“[w]hen foreign states engage in business in another state, they do so as
any other entity and not with sovereign immunity.” (Dkt. 47 at 9 (citing
Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924)).) After careful
37
consideration, the Court finds that principles of comity warrant the
applicability of the Tennessee GTLA to these Tennessee Defendants.
Generally, a court applies the substantive law of the forum state —
in this case, the substantive law of the State of Georgia.
A court,
however, may instead apply another state’s law on the basis of comity,
provided that the application of that law is not contrary to the policy of
Georgia. See Karimi v. Crowley, 324 S.E.2d 583, 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)
(noting that “the laws of other states have no force in Georgia except on
principles of comity and so long as their enforcement is not contrary to
the policy of this State” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Comity is
a principle under which the courts of one state give effect to the laws of
another state or extend immunity to a sister sovereign not as a rule of
law, but rather out of deference or respect. Courts extend immunity as a
matter of comity to foster cooperation, promote harmony, and build
goodwill.” Univ. of Iowa Press v. Urrea, 440 S.E.2d 203, 204 (Ga. Ct. App.
1993) (quoting Lee v. Miller Cty., 800 F.2d 1372, 1375 (5th Cir. 1986)).
“As a general rule, however, this court will not enforce the laws of
another state as a matter of comity if they are contrary to the public
policy of this state.” Id. at 205 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 1–3–9). Georgia
38
has a nearly identical tort liability limitation statute. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 50–21–24. The Georgia provision limits liability for claims of false
imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution, just like the
Tennessee statute. See § 50–21–24(7). The Court, therefore, finds that
application of the Tennessee statute on the basis of comity does not offend
Georgia policy, as Georgia itself has already enacted a virtually identical
statute. Cf. Urrea, 440 S.E.2d at 204 (“In discussing comity in the context
of sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court counseled: ‘It may be wise
policy, as a matter of harmonious interstate relations, for States to accord
each other immunity or to respect any established limits on liability.
They are free to do so.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Tennessee’s GTLA eliminates immunity from suit for government
entities “for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of
any employee within the scope of his employment.” TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29–20–205. The statute, however, provides a long list of exceptions
where the government entity remains immune from suit, including false
imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29–20–205(2).
The Court finds that, based on the application of
Tennessee’s GTLA, the City of Franklin is immune from suit for
39
Plaintiff’s state-law claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and
false imprisonment. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s state-law
claims against the City of Franklin in Counts Three, Four, and Five.
5.
The Court Denies the Motion as to Plaintiff’s
State-Law Claims Against the Individual
Tennessee Defendants.
The Tennessee Defendants argue they are immune from suit in
their individual capacities under the public duty doctrine. (Dkt. 37-1 at
19.) Plaintiff counters that Tennessee-based immunities do not apply in
this action and, even if they did, the public duty doctrine would not
protect the individual Tennessee Defendants.
The public duty doctrine is not applicable here.
Typically, the
doctrine “shields a public employee from suits for injuries that are caused
by the public employee’s breach of a duty owed to the public at large.”
Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tenn. 1995). Plaintiff’s state-law
claims here (false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment)
are not the sort of claims the doctrine shields. Instead, that doctrine
tends to protect government officials from claims of injuries specifically
due to negligence. See, e.g., Matthews v. Pickett Cty., 996 S.W.2d 162,
163 (Tenn. 1999) (discussing Tennessee public duty doctrine in context of
40
negligence action); City of Rome v. Jordan, 426 S.E.2d 861, 863 (Ga. 1993)
(discussing Georgia public duty doctrine in context of negligence for
nonfeasance of police department).
Plaintiff claims the Tennessee
Defendants violated three separate Georgia statutes, not a “duty owed to
the public at large.” The Court thus finds the public duty doctrine, either
based on Georgia law or Tennessee law, inapplicable.
6.
The Court Dismisses the Negligent Hiring,
Retention, and Training Claim in Count Six
Against Defendant City of Franklin.
In Count Six, Plaintiff alleges claims against Defendants Rockdale
County and the City of Franklin, asserting that both municipal entities
failed to properly train and supervise their employees or maintain proper
hiring standards because the municipalities “knew or should have known
[the individual defendants] were likely to engage in constitutionally
deficient criminal investigations.” (Dkt. 33 ¶¶ 141–147.)
Because of the posture of this case, the Court reviews the amended
complaint “as if all of the allegations contained therein are true.” See
Migut v. Flynn, 131 F. App’x 262, 265 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam);
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1355 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Because
we must accept the allegations of plaintiff’s amended complaint as true,
41
what we set out in this opinion as ‘the facts’ for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes
may not be the actual facts.”).
As with the application of the Tennessee GTLA above, the statute
similarly protects the City of Franklin under the discretionary function
exception. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29–20–205(1). Implementing policy,
supervising officers, and training all rise to the level of planning or policymaking and are thus discretionary acts that do not subject the City to
liability. See Savage v. City of Memphis, 620 F. App’x 425, 429 (6th Cir.
2015) (finding that under Tennessee law, city’s training program for its
police officers was discretionary function, and thus wrongful death suit
alleging that it negligently failed to train, supervise, and discipline its
police officers fell within GTLA’s discretionary function exception). The
Court thus dismisses Count Six against Defendant City of Franklin and
terminates the City of Franklin as a party defendant in this matter.
As discussed above, Plaintiff requested that the Court dismiss
state-law claims against Defendant Rockdale County. Accordingly, the
Court has dismissed the negligent supervision claim against Rockdale
County and thus the entirety of Count Six of Plaintiff’s amended
complaint.
42
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and
DENIES in part Defendants City of Franklin, Tennessee, Tommy D.
Justus, Chad D. Black, and Becky Porter’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 37).
Further, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
Rockdale County Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings (Dkt. 36).
The Court DISMISSES:
Defendants City of Franklin, Tennessee, Tommy Justus, Rockdale
County, Georgia, and Sheriff Eric J. Levett as party defendants;
All claims against all Defendants in their official capacities;
All claims in Counts Three, Four, and Five except Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants Baker, Douglas, Porter, and Black in their
individual capacities;
Count One; and
Count Six.
The following claims will proceed:
Count Two (42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Malicious Prosecution) against
Defendant Douglas, in his individual capacity;
43
Count Three (§ 51–7–7 – False Arrest) against Defendants Baker,
Douglas, Black, and Porter, in their individual capacities;
Count
Four
(§ 51–7–40
–
Malicious
Prosecution)
against
Defendants Baker, Douglas, Black, and Porter, in their individual
capacities; and
Count Five (§ 51–7–20 – False Imprisonment) against Defendants
Baker, Douglas, Black, and Porter, in their individual capacities.
SO ORDERED this 28th day of October, 2019.
44
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