Hartford Life and Annuity Insurance Company et al v. G.L.L. et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER. The Jumper Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or, in the Alternative, to Stay this Interpleader Action 26 is DENIED AS MOOT. Defendant Terri Lee Brown's "Motion to Stay Response to J umper's Motion to Dismiss and for an Extension of Time to File Response to Motion to Dismiss and for Entry of an Order Restraining the Jumpers from Prosecution of Frivolous Litigation and for Expedited Hearing" 32 is DENIED AS MOOT. Pl aintiffs' Motion for Interpleader Deposit and Dismissal 40 is DENIED AS MOOT. Defendant Terri Lee Brown's Motion for Stay or, Alternatively, for Extension to Respond to Motion for Dismissal 53 is DENIED AS MOOT. This action is STAYED pe nding resolution of the Jumper Defendants' motion to remand, and Hartford's motion to dismiss or transfer, currently pending in Jumper et al. v. Crimson Financial Group, LLC, et al., No. 1:17-cv-25-SA-DAS (N.D. Miss. Feb. 15, 2017). The parties shall notify the Court when the motions have been resolved. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 6/9/2017. (bgt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
HARTFORD LIFE AND ANNUITY
INSURANCE COMPANY, THE
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
1:17-cv-131-WSD
TERRI LEE BROWN, as natural
guardian & next friend of G.L.L., a
minor, DOUGLAS JUMPER, SR.,
an individual and co-trustee of the
Martha Y. Jumper Revocable Trust,
ARTHUR DOUGLAS JUMPER,
JR., an individual and co-trustee of
the Martha Y. Jumper Revocable
Trust, DOUGLAS JUMPER, III, an
individual, LINDA MCCREARY, an
individual, MICHAEL
MCCREARY, an individual,
DISTINCTIVE HOMES, INC., a
Mississippi corporation, J&J
REALTY, LLC, a Mississippi
Limited Liability Company, DON
CARRIER, MICHAEL KENNEDY,
C.O. CONNELLY & ASSOC.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Douglas Jumper, Sr.,
Arthur Douglas Jumper, Jr., Douglas Jumper, III, Linda McCreary, Michael
McCreary, Distinctive Homes, Inc., and J&J Realty, LLC’s (together, the “Jumper
Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or, in the
Alternative, to Stay this Interpleader Action [26] (“Motion to Dismiss or Stay”),
Defendant Terri Lee Brown’s (“Brown”) “Motion to Stay Response to Jumper’s
Motion to Dismiss and for an Extension of Time to File Response to Motion to
Dismiss and for Entry of an Order Restraining the Jumpers from Prosecution of
Frivolous Litigation and for Expedited Hearing” [32] (Brown’s “April 2017
Motion”), Plaintiffs Hartford Life and Annuity Insurance Company (“Hartford”)
and The Prudential Insurance Company of America’s (Prudential”) (together,
“Plaintiffs”) Motion for Interpleader Deposit and Dismissal [40], and Brown’s
Motion for Stay or, Alternatively, for Extension to Respond to Motion for
Dismissal [53] (Brown’s “May 2017 Motion”).
I.
BACKGROUND
On August 5, 2011, Hartford issued a life insurance policy (the “Policy”) to
Gaylon Wayne LaBoa (the “Insured”). (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 17). Prudential was
appointed as the Policy administrator. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 19). On
August 10, 2011, the Insured designated his child, G.L.L., as the Policy’s
beneficiary. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 18).
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On September 25, 2016, the Insured died and a $3 million death benefit
(the “Death Benefit”) became payable under the Policy, subject to Prudential’s
receipt of the Insured’s death certificate. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20-21). On
September 26, 2016, the Insured’s insurance agent contacted Hartford to make a
claim, on behalf of G.L.L., to the Death Benefit. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 22). On
November 14, 2016, Hartford received a letter from the Atlanta Lawyer Group, on
behalf of unnamed investors, requesting that Hartford “not pay any claim on any
life insurance policy that is payable on the death of Gaylon Wayne LaBoa.”
([58.3]). The letter stated that the unnamed investors were victims of a Ponzi
scheme operated by the Insured, that their investment funds were used to pay for
the Insured’s life insurance policies, and that the investors are entitled, “ahead of
any other named beneficiaries,” to the death benefits payable under the insurance
policies. ([58.3]). The Atlanta Lawyer Group refused to reveal the identity of the
investors. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 24).
On January 12, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in Interpleader [1],
naming G.L.L. and Does 1-50 as defendants, and asking the Court to determine to
whom the Death Benefit should be paid. (Compl. ¶ 16). The next day, the Jumper
Defendants filed a Mississippi state court action (the “Mississippi Action”) against
(1) Hartford, (2) dissolved limited liability companies organized by the Insured
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(the “LaBoa LLCs”), (3) “unknown insurance companies” that issued life
insurance policies purchased with funds fraudulently obtained from the Jumper
Defendants by the Insured, and (4) unknown beneficiaries of life insurance policies
purchased with funds fraudulently obtained from the Jumper Defendants by the
Insured. ([58.4]). The Mississippi Action alleges that the Insured, through the
LaBoa LLCs, operated a ponzi scheme in which he fraudulently induced the
Jumper Defendants to invest funds. The Mississippi Action further alleges that the
Insured used these funds to purchase life insurance policies from Hartford and
other insurance companies. ([58.4] ¶¶ 61-65). The Jumper Defendants assert
claims, under Mississippi state law, against the LaBoa LLCs for securities fraud,
rescission and unjust enrichment. The Jumper Defendants also seek, under
Mississippi’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, to void the funds transfers from
the Insured to Hartford, and to impose a constructive trust or equitable lien, in
favor of the Jumper Defendants, over the funds and any items purchased with the
funds. ([58.4] ¶ 70).
On February 14, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint in
Interpleader [3], adding the Jumper Defendants as named defendants in this action.
On February 15, 2017, Hartford removed the Mississippi Action to the District
Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. See Jumper et al. v. Crimson
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Financial Group, LLC, et al., No. 1:17-cv-25-SA-DAS (N.D. Miss. Feb. 15, 2017).
On February 22, 2017, Hartford filed, in the Mississippi Action, a motion to
dismiss the action or transfer the action to this Court on the grounds that Plaintiffs’
Complaint was filed before the Mississippi Action and the cases “share the same
underlying facts, overlapping issues and substantially the same parties” (the
“Motion to Transfer”). Id. On March 17, 2017, the Jumper Defendants filed, in
the Mississippi Action, a motion to remand the action to state court. The
Mississippi district court has not ruled on the motion to remand or the motion to
dismiss or transfer.
On March 29, 2017, the Jumper Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss or
Stay, seeking to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction or to stay this
action pending conclusion of the Mississippi Action. On April 12, 2017, Brown
filed her April 2017 Motion, requesting, among other things, an extension of time
to respond to the Jumper Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or Stay, and an order
“precluding the Jumpers from continued prosecution of the frivolous litigation they
have filed in Mississippi.” ([32] at 2). On April 21, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their
Motion for Interpleader and Dismissal, seeking to deposit the Death Benefit funds
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with the Clerk of Court.1 On May 5, 2017, Brown filed her May 2017 Motion,
requesting the Court to defer ruling on, or grant Brown an extension of time to
respond to, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Interpleader and Dismissal.2 On May 15, 2017,
Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint in Interpleader [58], adding
Don Carrier, Michael Kennedy, and C.O. Connelly & Associates, LLC as named
defendants, and adding 28 U.S.C. § 1335 as an additional basis for subject matter
jurisdiction.
II.
DISCUSSION
The motions currently pending before the Court were filed before the
Second Amended Complaint was filed in this action. In view of this newly filed
Complaint, the Court denies as moot the Jumper Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or
Stay, Brown’s April 2017 and May 2017 Motions, and Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Interpleader Deposit and Dismissal. See Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit
Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1345 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (“An amended complaint
supersedes an original complaint.”); Gulf Coast Recycling, Inc. v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-2143, 2008 WL 434880, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14,
2008) (“An amended complaint completely supersedes the original complaint, and
1
Although Plaintiffs’ motion also includes requests for additional relief,
Plaintiffs withdrew these requests in their reply brief. (See [60] at 3-4; [61] at 3-4).
2
On May 8, 2017, Brown amended her May 2017 Motion. ([55]).
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once a complaint is amended, the only issues before the Court are the ones raised
in the text of the amended complaint. The filing of the amended complaint renders
Defendants’ earlier filed Motion to Dismiss moot.” (citation omitted)).3, 4
The Court also considers the impact of the Mississippi Action on the
processing of this case. The cases involve overlapping facts, issues, and parties.
Currently pending in the Mississippi Action is Hartford’s motion to dismiss the
action or transfer the action to this Court. Also pending in the Mississippi Action
is the Jumper Defendants’ motion to remand the action to state court. The
Mississippi district court’s resolution of these motions likely will affect the
processing of this case. The Court, having weighed these considerations, finds that
a limited stay is appropriate in this action. The stay will apply to Plaintiffs’ request
3
Brown’s April Motion also is required to be denied because Brown failed to
attach supporting affidavits or a memorandum of law, in violation of Local
Rule 7.1(A)(1). See Transamerica Life Insurance Company v. Brown et al.,
No. 1:16-cv-4216-MHC (N.D. Ga. Apr. 24, 2017) (dismissing Brown’s motions
for judgment on the pleadings because she violated Local Rule 7.1(A)(1)); Regions
Bank v. Pearlman, No. 1:06-cv-2868, 2007 WL 521910, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15,
2007) (denying a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Local Rule
7.1(A)(1)).
4
Plaintiffs’ motion to deposit the Death Benefit funds with the Clerk also is
required to be denied as premature. Defendants Don Carrier, Michael Kennedy,
and C.O. Connelly & Associates, LLC have not appeared in this action or been
served with process, and thus have not received the “notice” required by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 67(a) or otherwise been given an opportunity to contest
Plaintiffs’ request. Fed. R. Civ. P. 67(a); (see [60] at 3).
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to deposit the policy proceeds into the registry of the Court. That request is one
commonly honored in our Court. Considering the overlapping actions in the
Georgia and Mississippi federal courts, it makes sense to deny the request to tender
the proceeds until the Court resolves how and where the litigation will proceed.
When the pending motions in Mississippi are resolved, the Court will hold a status
conference to set a schedule for further processing of the case pending here.5
Accordingly, this case will be stayed pending the Mississippi district court’s
resolution of the motion to remand and the motion to dismiss or transfer. See
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (“The District Court has broad
discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own
docket.”); Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr S.A., 377 F.3d
1164, 1172 n.7 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A] district court . . . retains the inherent
authority to issue a stay for the purposes of managing its own docket.”); see also
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Williams, No. 1:15-cv-62, 2015 WL 10961833, at *3
(N.D. Ga. May 22, 2015) (“District courts enjoy the authority to control the
disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for the litigants.”). The parties are required to notify the Court
5
The Court will contact Judge Sharion Aycock, who is presiding over the
case pending in the Northern District of Mississippi, to tell her that this Order was
entered and to discuss the schedule for further processing of these cases.
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when the motions have been resolved. When that is done, a status conference will
promptly be scheduled.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Jumper Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or, in the Alternative, to Stay this
Interpleader Action [26] is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Terri Lee Brown’s “Motion
to Stay Response to Jumper’s Motion to Dismiss and for an Extension of Time to
File Response to Motion to Dismiss and for Entry of an Order Restraining the
Jumpers from Prosecution of Frivolous Litigation and for Expedited Hearing” [32]
is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Interpleader
Deposit and Dismissal [40] is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Terri Lee Brown’s Motion
for Stay or, Alternatively, for Extension to Respond to Motion for Dismissal [53] is
DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is STAYED pending
resolution of the Jumper Defendants’ motion to remand, and Hartford’s motion to
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dismiss or transfer, currently pending in Jumper et al. v. Crimson Financial Group,
LLC, et al., No. 1:17-cv-25-SA-DAS (N.D. Miss. Feb. 15, 2017). The parties shall
notify the Court when the motions have been resolved.
SO ORDERED this 9th day of June, 2017.
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